

when casualties occur, a clamor could begin to "bring our troops home." We witnessed that in Somalia; we could see that again in Kosovo. Our military deserves our support. I say to my fellow Senators, if you were sitting in a cockpit, ordered to carry out strikes against the Serbian military, you would like to know that the Congress, the elected representatives of the people, is with you, supporting your mission and concerned for the risks you are taking.

I first visited Kosovo in August of 1990 on a delegation headed by Senator Robert Dole. I commend this brave veteran for his mission to the Balkan region in the past few weeks in the cause of peace. His efforts contributed to the securing of signatures by the Kosovar Albanian delegation on a peace agreement.

During my visit to Kosovo in 1990, I saw first-hand the oppression of the Kosovar Albanians by the Serb authorities. I returned to the region most recently in September of 1998, traveling through Kosovo with Ambassador Christopher Hill and elements of a courageous international observer group called KDOM.

Since last March we have all closely followed developments—indeed the humanitarian tragedy—in this troubled region. And since last September, when NATO first threatened the use of force against Milosevic, NATO credibility has been on the line. We are now at a defining moment in this crisis.

Since September, I have been outspoken in my support for the use of U.S. ground troops as part of a NATO-led force to implement a peace agreement that is in place relative to Kosovo. In my view, such a military force is necessary—once a peace agreement is reached—if the parties to the agreement are to have the confidence necessary to be bound by the provisions of such a peace agreement. And I believe U.S. participation in such a force is necessary if we are to maintain our status as the leader of the NATO Alliance.

My greatest concern has been and continues to be that a deterioration of the situation in Kosovo could undermine the modest gains we have achieved in Bosnia—at a cost of over \$8 billion to date to the American taxpayer; and could lead to problems in neighboring Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, and perhaps Greece and Turkey.

In addition, I share with all Americans concern for the humanitarian tragedy we have witnessed—are now witnessing—in that troubled land.

But what happens if a peace agreement remains elusive, which is now the situation with which we are faced. It is one thing to deploy troops into a permissive environment for the purpose of overseeing the implementation of a peace agreement. It is quite another to use military power—air—to compel a sovereign nation to sign an agreement to end what is essentially an internal civil war.

There are many questions that must be addressed. The most important question is, what happens if bombing does not succeed? There are very few operations, historic examples, where air power alone has succeeded in meeting our military objectives. Some have made the argument here today that air strikes were the key to bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table in Dayton. I had the opportunity to visit with two people last week who were intimately involved in the Bosnia crisis—former British Defence Secretary Michael Portillo and former U.N. High Representative in Bosnia, Carl Bildt. Both of these men told me that air strikes were an important part, but not the decisive factor in ending the fighting in Bosnia. History records that the Croatian offensive against the Serbs, and the fact that the parties were all exhausted from fighting were of equal significance to the important air campaign by the United States and our allies. Today, that is not the case in Kosovo—the parties there are, regrettably, ready to fight.

My point is,—there is risk in relying on air strikes, alone, to stop the fighting in this crisis. We must know what our next steps will be and how far we are ready to go with other initiatives to stop the fighting in Kosovo. If this first military action is taken—which in my view this contingency is tantamount to an act of war—what comes next and how far we are willing to go? We must have in mind not simply our first step, but our second, third or fourth steps before we commit U.S. troops.

While one of my main concerns in this is the credibility of NATO now that we have threatened military action for many months, we must ask ourselves what happens to NATO credibility if the air strikes fail to accomplish their objectives? That would be a devastating blow to the Alliance if we take the drastic step of attacking a sovereign nation, and are not successful in the ultimate objective.

What of the credibility of the United States and our leadership on the continent of Europe, in military as well as economic or diplomatic partnerships? What of the credibility of the U.S. military as a partner in other actions? There are important issues that can be debated in the context of the pending amendment.

The Smith amendment provides that the Congress must be on record as supporting this operation before we commit the U.S. military to the crisis in Kosovo. I agree. We owe it to the men and women of the Armed Forces to act on this issue. For that reason, I will support the Smith amendment and vote for cloture on this amendment.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is closed.

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of S. 544, which the clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 544) making emergency supplemental appropriations and rescissions for recovery from natural disasters, and foreign assistance, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

Pending:

Hutchison amendment No. 81, to set forth restrictions on deployment of United States Armed Forces in Kosovo.

Lott amendment No. 124 (to amendment No. 81), to prohibit the use of funds for military operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) unless Congress enacts specific authorization in law for the conduct of those operations.

Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

AMENDMENT NO. 124

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, what is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The present business is amendment No. 124 offered by the majority leader.

Mr. STEVENS. The amendment to the Hutchison amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. STEVENS. The Kosovo question is the pending issue.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have listened with interest at the statements made by the distinguished Senator from Delaware. And he has some very good points. My memory of the conversations that were held at the time President Bush made the statement that the Senator from Delaware referred to was that the President was talking about racial cleansing, or genocide, on the part of the Serbs versus the Kosovo population—not just a military incident, but an act of genocide, but an act of racial cleansing in the magnitude of a national aspect.

There is no question that there is a dispute here. And the Senator from Delaware has heard my comments that I made to the President. I believe that article V of the NATO agreement does not authorize bombing in Serbia.

I was very interested over the weekend to listen to people talk on the radio and television about Yugoslavia. It seems that we are slipping back now, that it is a Yugoslav question, not just a Serb-Kosovo question, that is being raised now by the media. But in any event, I think this would be the first time in the history of NATO that NATO has taken offensive action against a nation that has a dispute within its borders. I think it is a horrendous proposition that the Serbs are presenting to Kosovo. "Either leave, or be exterminated."

But the question really is, What is the proper justification for this action

at the present time? If it is genocide, then I think we have really ample cause to be involved. If it is a matter of relocation of people within a nation, based upon whatever power the nation claims to relocate people within their boundaries, it is a different issue.

I must admit to being torn, as one who has attended the NATO meetings many, many times in the past, of what will be the future of NATO, if this action is taken.

I think the threat that President Bush made is the threat that all Americans would support; that is, that we would use military force to retaliate against a nation that instituted a process of racial cleansing, racial extermination within its borders, to the extent that it was contemplated at the time.

But I have to also raise the question: Where were we in Cambodia? Where were we in Ethiopia? Where are we going to be as this type of process continues in Africa? And we are reading more and more about that. Even this last weekend, juxtaposed to the story about Kosovo, is the story about the new racial cleansing commencing once again in Ethiopia.

It is not an easy issue. And I think it is one that we ought to pursue, because, from the point of view of this Senator, I do not like to set the precedent that an administration informs a foreign nation to sign an agreement, or, if you do not sign the agreement, we are going to bomb until you do. That to me is a precedent of which I don't want to be a part.

If we make a statement, as President Bush made, that if you engage in a process that is really against a whole concept of humanity, we are going to be first in line to punish you for doing it. Somehow or other, there is a place here where we can find a common position and support taking action as a nation. But, for myself, I just revolt at the concept that we are going to send people out to negotiate peace agreements, or whatever other kind of agreement it is, and authorize them to say, "Unless you agree with us, we are going to bomb you, and we are going to bomb you until you change your mind, and, if you do not change your mind, within our period of time, we are going to bomb you again." In this instance, the process would require taking down the air defenses of another nation in order that we might attack the forces that are on the ground.

I assume that most Members of the Senate have been there now and know what they are talking about. This is the most mountainous country of Europe. It is a place where, as I recall, some 20-odd divisions under the command of Adolf Hitler got just absolutely tied down by the actions of the people there on the ground. Of course, they didn't have the precision bombing we have now. They didn't have the automated systems that we have now and unmanned systems that can wreck havoc on any nation.

The question, really, to me is, "Are we to offer the use of military power to

carry out a threat of a negotiating team based upon their interpretation of the reasons behind a foreign nation's unwillingness to enter into an agreement that we sponsor?" Or, are we going to take action, as I said, on behalf of humanity to prevent the extermination of a race? To me, there is a great gulf between those two positions.

I intend to continue to raise the question with the President and his representatives about the constitutional power to make these threats, and then carry them out as threats as opposed to making a national statement—as President Bush did, as I understand it—that if there is a process of extermination going on, or racial cleansing going on, we will not stand idly by and watch that process, and we will use our military power.

I don't know whether the Senator from Delaware sees the difference in the two circumstances. But, as far as I am concerned, we are still on the first base. And that is we are asked to support the concept of using force—our force, mainly unmanned—to coerce the Serbs into signing an agreement. They have refused to sign that. As a sovereign nation, they have that right. If they take the action that is contemplated, and that many people feel they are going to take—that is, to enter into a process of racial extermination—then it is an entirely different question. I do hope that the Senate will remember that as we are considering the majority leader's amendment tomorrow.

It does seem to me that we are still on the question of should we use force to coerce the Serbs into signing the agreement that they do not want to sign. It is perhaps a distinction without a difference to some people. But it is a great difference to me.

Mr. BIDEN. May I respond, Mr. President?

Mr. STEVENS. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN. I think the way that the Senator phrased it, I can understand how he arrives at this issue as he does. I would argue that it is a distinction without much of a difference.

For example, the distinguished chairman talks about extermination justifying our action but relocation not. Historically, that is a distinction without a difference in terms of genocide. Historically, that is a distinction without a difference. In Bosnia, it was a distinction without a difference. This guy has a track record. The track record is clear. The track record is documented. The track record is obvious. So it is not a significant leap from President Bush's letter, which said: If they move against the Kosovars. We could argue, and President Bush could enlighten us what he meant by that, but the truth of the matter is he has moved against the Kosovars, and he is moving as we speak against the Kosovars. And a half-million people up in the mountains is a pretty big deal.

Second, with regard to this notion of forcing a peace agreement on someone

by saying, "If you don't sign, we will in fact bomb," that would make sense, I would argue, if in fact we were arguing about a border dispute, if we are arguing about whether or not they were to pay reparations, if we were arguing about whether or not they are going to sell oil or whatever. It is not about that. It is about genocide and ethnic cleansing. The whole purpose of the agreement, the only reason why the rest of Europe—of NATO—agrees with us that there is a need for force on the ground in Kosovo, is to prevent—prevent—prevent ethnic cleansing; prevent the systematic isolation of Albanians, Moslem Kosovars, Moslem Serbs.

So I understand the technical point the chairman is making. I do not understand the practical difference. This agreement that was signed onto relates to a framework that will assure the international community that this thug is not going to engage in the genocide he already has, the ethnic cleansing he has been promoting since 1989, and the thing for which we have a tribunal in the Hague. His military leadership, his puppets, are on the indictment list of the people engaged in this.

I acknowledge that it has not reached the proportions it did in Bosnia. I acknowledge that 43 men and women forced to kneel down and have guns pointed to the backs of their heads and have their brains blown out is not enough to say it is genocide countrywide. But it sure is enough, in my view anyway, to get the tickler file moving a little bit and saying: Wait a minute, what happened after that when they did that in Bosnia? What happened after that when the intercepted communications we have between Milosevic and Karadzic and others in Bosnia said, "Go get them, boys." Do we wait for Srebrenica to recur in Pristina? Do we wait for that?

What the international community said, I say to my friend from Alaska—international? Let me be more precise. The contact group in NATO—they said, "We do not. We learned a lesson here. We are not going to wait until he does that in Kosovo. We are going to work out an agreement." So they went outside Paris in some fancy old castle and they sat down and negotiated. And the idiot KLA, like the IRA, scuttled it initially because they threatened the Kosovar negotiators who were up there negotiating this agreement.

But keep in mind the purpose of the negotiation. The only reason to put international forces on the ground in Kosovo—the only reason, none other—is to guarantee personnel and institutions that will prevent Milosevic from being able to do what President Bush was worried he would do and threatened him that, if he did do it, he would use force. So there is a distinction, I acknowledge, between preemptively making this case based upon recent historical record and waiting until it happens.

But I will just say only one thing to my friend, who has forgotten more—and I mean this sincerely—he has forgotten more about our national defenses, has forgotten more about the conduct of war and the way to pursue it, than I am going to learn; and I acknowledge that. I mean that sincerely. But the one thing I am prepared to bet—prepared to bet my career on it—is if we do not act, I will bet my colleagues anything they wish to, within two years—within I think eight months, by the time the snows fall next winter—there will be genocide, documented, on a large scale, in Kosovo.

My only argument is I think NATO is correct and the President is correct. I believe President Bush was correct in saying that we are going to stop you from doing that.

The mechanism picked by the community, by NATO, was this peace agreement. That is the purpose of it. It was not to extract from Milosevic money, commitment, borders—anything else. It was to say: We are setting these folks in place to guarantee that you keep your promise that you are not going to eliminate these folks.

I understand the difference. I have enormous respect for my friend from Alaska, but that is the basis upon which the Senator from Delaware believes we should act, knowing full well what he says. I do not say it lightly, and never having been in combat myself, as my friend from Alaska has been, I want him to know I do not say lightly risk these young women and men. Because it is a risk. He was there in the room. We were both there with the President. I indicated that I thought the President, based on the intelligence community reports and also based upon the briefings I have received from the military, that it is probable—not possible, probable—that some American flier is going to lose his or her life. So I do not say it lightly, but I think it is balanced off against whether or not we set a chain reaction in place, again, where we watch genocide. Either we have to act at a higher price or don't act and see it spread.

I thank my colleague for his time. I know he has other business he wants to get to.

Mr. STEVENS. No, Mr. President, this is the pending business. If the Senator is finished?

Mr. BIDEN. I am. I yield the floor.

Mr. STEVENS. I will go on a little bit and let him know my fears, as I expressed to the President, if we go after those air defenses. I hope Serbia knows if we go after them we will get them. There is no question in my mind we have absolute capability to totally destroy the air defenses of Serbia. After having done so, though, I wonder how are we going to get him to sign the agreement. If he doesn't sign the agreement, then I assume we are going to carry out the threat, and we are going to bomb his tanks. And we can do that, too. And then, if he doesn't sign the

agreement, we can start bombing his people. And we can do that, too. All without involving our airmen yet. We can do all that without involving our airmen.

But the time is going to come when we are going to have to use manpower in the air or on the ground, and that is war. We ought to make up our mind. What the President is deciding is to commit an act of war. It is not covered by article V. I do not think there would be any hesitancy in President Bush, that he was threatening war. If you are threatening war in this country, that means you get a resolution, you get approval of the Congress. Only Congress can declare war.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, I agree with you.

Mr. STEVENS. I hope you do. But what is more, as I see it, once you do that, once you lay down the air defenses of a country, once you cripple their military—remember who is around them, a bunch of people who would like to find them crippled. Pretty soon you are going to have other people coming in there. We will be protecting the Serbs, before this is over.

People just do not understand. We are finally going to have to put people on the ground and when we get people on the ground—how long have they been in Germany since we conquered Germany? We still have men and women in uniform in Germany pursuant to a peace agreement that was entered into 50 or more years ago. That is what I told the President. Mr. President, these people are going to be there 50 years if you do this. If you are going to do it, you better have the support of the American people before you do it. And the way you get the support of the American people is to have their Representatives here in Congress stand up and say yes, I am ready to vote for a declaration of war.

I told the President, if he can show me that there is a concept of inhumanity, of absolutely racial cleansing, ethnic extermination, I will introduce his resolution of war. I told him that. But short of that, I do not see we should authorize a negotiator to go over to a foreign conference and say: Tell them if they don't agree with what you tell them to do, we will bomb them. If they do not agree after that, we will bomb them again. That is using our Armed Forces as a process of negotiation, not for the purpose that we maintain our military. We maintain our military to defend this Nation and to carry out our national interests abroad, not as an arm of negotiators and not to give the Presidency a feeling that all they have to do is enter into a series of negotiations, and if they fail, then use the military and bomb away. There is more to it than just bombing. There is more to it than just using Tomahawks or unmanned weapons. There is the concept of what is the followup. I say if we do that, if we take out their air defenses, we will be involved in trying to manage the

Serbian military for the rest of my lifetime. I think I am going to live a little while, Mr. President. It does seem to me that it is wrong the way we are approaching this.

We ought to look at what is in our national interest. If our national interest requires us to use military power, Congress should authorize them to use it. But the Presidency should not use our military power to carry out negotiations. That is wrong. I still maintain that the way it is being approached this time is wrong.

I yield the floor.

Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to compliment Senator STEVENS for the statement he just made. I think he is exactly right.

I want to follow those comments and read from the paper what the purpose of this proposed bombing strike is. This is the front page of the New York Times quoting Secretary Albright. She says:

Mr. Milosevic has a stark choice. That choice was for him to agree to the settlement signed in Paris last week by the ethnic Albanians who make up most of Kosovo's population or face NATO air strikes.

In other words, Mr. Milosevic has to agree to the peace settlement, and he never has agreed to it, but if he doesn't agree to it, he is going to be bombed.

Bombing is an act of war. So our Secretary of State and our President on Friday have said they support this agreement. The Serbs agree to this settlement that NATO has negotiated and that the Kosovars have now signed, or else they are going to be bombed.

I made the comment Sunday, I said that is a crummy way to start a war. I look at that as us starting the war. Are the Serbians right now at war against Kosovo? No, Kosovo is actually part of Serbia. It has been for hundreds of years. Is there a lot of fighting, a lot of tension? Yes. The Kosovo Liberation Army, for a little over a year, has been attacking Serbian forces for the purpose of independence for Kosovo. As a matter of fact, there was a celebration in one of the towns that was attacked in the last 2 days, a celebration recognizing the fact that about a year ago in February was the first martyr for the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army.

The goal of the Kosovo Liberation Army isn't autonomy. The goal of the Kosovo Liberation Army is independence. They have been fighting for independence. They have been attacking Serbian police in the process, and they have been killing some. Then Serbia usually responds with a lot more force. They have a lot more force. They have a bigger army. They have tanks, and they have killed a lot of people. I am not saying any of this is right. I am just saying this shouldn't be a purpose for the United States to go to war, to initiate bombing, because Serbia has not yet signed on to a peace accord that we think is the right thing to do.

I, for one, have serious reservations about it. What is the peace agreement that we have decided they have to accept? It is autonomy for Kosovo, and the second part of it is stationing 28,000 foreign troops in Kosovo.

Again, Kosovo is part of Serbia. We are telling them, you must agree to this or you are going to be bombed. I think that is using NATO's air force as a bargaining tool to try to bomb them into submission to a peace accord that they do not want to sign. Most sovereign nations wouldn't want to sign onto a deal that would put 28,000 foreign troops on its soil.

I think the administration is wrong in this area. Don't get me wrong. I think Milosevic is a tyrant. I think he is guilty of a lot of bad things. That still doesn't mean that I think we should go to war with Serbia. If we start a massive bombing campaign, we are going to war.

I think Senator STEVENS is right. The Constitution says Congress shall declare war. Our forefathers showed great wisdom. They did not want to get involved in a lot of wars. They knew that the elected representatives—the Congress, House Members and Senate Members—would be very reluctant to do so because we would be sending our constituents that we represent into war, so we wouldn't do it lightly. Granted, we also say in the Constitution the President is Commander in Chief, and he has the authority, and we give him that authority, to respond if U.S. lives, U.S. interests are at stake, but that is not the case. And something has to happen before Congress has a chance to convene and pass a declaration of war. We have all kind of assumed that.

Frankly, this President has tried to expand that power and I think even abused that power in saying he has the right to agree to an international force that is going to conduct a war.

NATO has never done that. Senator STEVENS is exactly right. NATO is a defensive alliance, and it has been successful. It was formed to make sure that if Soviet aggression against our European allies would happen, that we would all work together to repel that aggression. The very fact that we had significant forces in training and integrated training, demonstrates it has been a successful alliance. Never has NATO gone in to say we are going to go into another country that is not threatening neighboring countries, not threatening part of the alliance, and conduct military affairs to quell a civil war.

If we conduct bombing, if NATO conducts bombing into Serbia, we are going to be on the side of the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army. I said before, their goal is not autonomy; their goal is independence.

I will tell my colleagues, there are some of our allies who have very serious problems about that happening. The Greeks primarily have serious reservations about the wisdom of that. I

just wonder how well thought out this has been, or if we conduct the bombing, what happens?

I have heard President Clinton say we want to restore stability in the Balkans. It may be just the opposite result. We may start bombing and the Serbs may really escalate their attacks. I will read a comment from an article in today's New York Times:

The Yugoslav foreign minister told CNN, "We are not looking for confrontation," but his country considers any NATO force dispatched to Kosovo to be an aggression against sovereign territory, Yugoslavia.

Other reports were that if the NATO forces would strike into Serbia, they would use that as an excuse to be more aggressive against the KLA. They might try to strike against the United States, but they hopefully won't have very much success against our airplanes. U.S. planes are going to be too high and too fast, too sophisticated to attack. They will see the United States is now taking sides with the Kosovars and so instead of attacking the United States, where they can't really be successful, they will be attacking the Kosovars. Instead of stopping violence and bringing stability and peace to the region, we might be escalating the war. We might be starting the war.

I mentioned that to President Clinton. I do not want to see us start the war, but if we start bombing we may turn a guerrilla effort, that is going on right now between the KLA and Serbs, into a full-fledged war between the Serbs and Kosovo and see the loss of life greatly escalate, yet still not be successful. Just because we bomb does not mean that Serbia is going to say, OK, fine, you can bring the 28,000 troops in and station them in Kosovo. They may not agree with that. They may escalate their warfare. You may have a greater loss of life.

Then we are going to have another decision. Are we going to go after that 40,000 Serbian military force that is in Kosovo? Are we going to be attacking those tanks? Are we going to be attacking the platoons? Are we going to be going after those people? You can do only so much, as we all know, with airpower. How deeply engaged in this civil war are we going to become? Again, if our purpose was to bring about peace and stability, can that really happen, if we ignite that type of warfare throughout Kosovo and into Serbia?

I am afraid we may be starting something we can't get out of; I am afraid we might be there for years and years and years.

I have heard some of my colleagues say, wait a minute, President Bush was for this. I haven't heard President Bush say that he was for this. In December of 1992, President Bush issued a warning to Mr. Milosevic: Don't you dare go in and start genocide against the Kosovars or there will be a price to be paid.

Frankly, I supported that. It worked. It worked for one reason—because I think Mr. Milosevic respected Presi-

dent Bush, which is more than what I can say at the present time on U.S. leadership, or even NATO leadership. That is regrettable. But also I didn't hear President Bush, in December of 1992, saying he wanted to have a multinational peacekeeping force stationed in Kosovo, occupying Kosovo. He didn't say that.

He just let him know that if he started a very significant genocide in Kosovo, there would be a price to be paid. I do not mind if this President lets Mr. Milosevic know that. If he started slaughtering a large number of people, yes, there would be a military action against him. It does not mean we are going to be occupying Kosovo with 28,000 troops. I think that signal can be sent.

That is not what I am reading in the paper. Today I read in the paper that Mr. Milosevic must agree to the settlement signed in Paris last week by ethnic Albanians that make up most of Kosovo's population or face NATO airstrikes. In other words, we are going to be striking if they do not agree to a peace agreement, and that calls for autonomy for Kosovo and calls for stationing 28,000 troops in their country.

I believe that is unrealistic. I do not think that is the right negotiation. I do not think you can bomb another country into submitting to a peace plan. If they did, we would be putting 28,000 troops, in my opinion, into very hostile territory. They would be vulnerable to sniper fire, and that is not a very good situation either.

I have very, very strong reservations about deploying U.S. ground forces into Kosovo. I have told that to the President. I think that is a serious mistake. I hope we will not do it. That is part of the peace plan.

A lot of people are not aware of it. They seem to think we are trying to bring Milosevic to the peace table. I want him to come to the peace table. I want him to sign a peace agreement. I want him to have peace in Kosovo. But what this administration is saying is, unless he agrees to the plan that has already been agreed to by NATO and the Kosovars, including the deployment of 28,000 troops, we are going to begin bombing him.

Are we going to keep on bombing him until he agrees to the stationing of 28,000 troops in Kosovo? I do not think that is realistic. Then if we station 28,000 troops there, one, they are vulnerable to attack because it is a hostile area and, two, they will have to be there for a long, long time.

This area does have a history of fighting that goes back for many, many centuries. The Ottoman Empire, the Hapsburg Empire, 1389, the war in Kosovo—they have been fighting for centuries. There is real ethnic violence there. There are real problems, and I understand that.

I do not think you can station U.S. peacekeeping forces everywhere in the world where there is violence. There are reports that 80-some-odd people

were killed in the last few days in Borneo; 50-some were killed in Russia by 1 bomb. I heard my colleague from Delaware say in 1 village, 40-some people were assassinated, murdered, or they were killed. I do not know that we have seen the autopsy reports. We do not know whether they were carrying guns or not. They were shot point blank. We heard that. I do not know that to be the case.

There are lots of atrocities when you start fighting, and we know that. I know we had a civil war in this country 130 years ago, and we had hundreds of thousands of Americans who were killed. I am glad we did not have other countries intervening in our Civil War. I just think that would have been a mistake. I know both sides were trying to get the French and the British involved, but I am glad they did not get involved.

I seriously question the wisdom of us getting involved in this war, or if we are going to get involved in this one, why we are not getting involved on behalf of some of the Kurds in Turkey, where the loss of life has been some 37,000 in the last several years. Or what about in Sudan, where there have been over a million people massacred in the last 10 years? What about in Burundi, where 200,000 people have been murdered? I could go on and on.

We have to be very, very cautious when we start deploying U.S. forces around the world. In some cases, we have done it with very noble intentions, but it has not worked. It did not work in the early eighties in Lebanon. It did not work in Somalia. We had to bring our troops back and, unfortunately, we brought back a lot of our troops in body bags.

Again, I urge my colleagues to think seriously about what we are doing. For crying out loud, let's not be threatening bombing because the Serbs have not signed on to a peace accord that we somewhat arrogantly say, "This is what you have to do, and if you don't agree, you're going to be bombed." I do not think you can bomb a country into submission to sign a peace agreement, especially one that also says they have to agree to foreign troops stationed on their soil for an indefinite period of time. That is a mistake.

I compliment my friend from Alaska for his statement. Also, Mr. President, I reiterate that Congress needs to assert its constitutional prerogative, and that is that Congress has the right under article I, section 8, of the Constitution to declare war. Our forefathers did not want to make it easy for us to be involved in foreign entanglements, and they wanted Congress, i.e., the support of the American people, to be involved before we would ever do so. I think they were exactly right.

If President Clinton wants to initiate this effort, he should be asking Congress for a declaration of war. I think we, as leaders in Congress, should cooperate to bring that resolution to the floor and have a debate, a discussion, and have a vote.

Right now we have been talking about an amendment: No funds will be used for this combat or airstrikes or stationing troops until or unless Congress authorizes it. That may be the most expedient way of getting this up for a vote.

I personally would like to see a straight resolution, just like we had in the Persian Gulf war, which we voted on in January of 1991, which authorized the use of force in the Persian Gulf. We had a very significant debate. Most of my colleagues who were here at the time said that probably was the most important vote they ever cast.

I would like for us to have that. That resolution, I say to my colleagues, passed by a vote of 52 to 47, but it was significant, it was intense. We knew what we were talking about. We had significant debate on it. It was a healthy debate, and Congress supported the resolution. Airstrikes, I tell my friends and colleagues, started shortly after that resolution.

I do not think we are ready for that in this case in Kosovo today. The administration needs to make their case. They then should request a resolution of authorization—we should prepare one or they should prepare one—and we would vote on it. I hope we will do that before hostilities are initiated by NATO; i.e., the United States.

Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from Alaska for his indulgence, and I yield the floor.

Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following amendments be removed from the list at the desk: Senator DURBIN's Medicaid recoupment amendment, Senator KOHL's bankruptcy technical correction amendment, and Senator LOTT's rules amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside so that we may consider other amendments that are in order under the previous order.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

The Senator from Alaska has the floor.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I know Senator FEINGOLD wishes to make a statement, and I wish to accord him that privilege.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to add my thoughts to this critical debate about the potential deployment of United States troops to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping mission. I commend the Senator from Texas, Senator HUTCHISON, for her commitment to ensuring that the Members of this body have the opportunity to fully debate this important issue.

I also commend the Senator from New Hampshire, Senator SMITH, for his

work on this issue, and I share his contention that the President should seek congressional authorization prior to ordering a deployment to Kosovo.

Mr. President, like all of us, I am gravely concerned about the situation in Kosovo. More than 2,000 people, including women and children, have been killed since the fighting between ethnic Albanians and Serb security forces escalated just over a year ago. Hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to flee from their homes and hide in the woods during the cold winter months. Those that are able to return to their villages often find their possessions looted and their homes burned. Recent television news reports have shown Serb police shamelessly waiving to the cameras as they steal televisions and other valuables from the deserted homes of ethnic Albanians before setting the homes on fire.

Even today, as peace talks have adjourned without an agreement, the violence continues in Kosovo. I am pleased that four representatives from the Kosovar Albanian delegation last week signed the so-called Rambouillet agreement. However, I am alarmed that the government in Belgrade continues to offer ultimatums and to deploy troops and tanks in Kosovo. The continued defiance of President Slobodan Milosevic and other Serb leaders is very troubling. Once again, NATO has threatened airstrikes against Belgrade if the Milosevic government does not comply with the will of the international community. Once again, Belgrade has refused.

Last week, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe evacuated its observers from Kosovo in anticipation of possible NATO airstrikes. The violence in Kosovo has continued, with the aggression from both sides of this conflict.

As we debate this important issue, United States Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke is again in Belgrade attempting one last time to convince President Milosevic to cease his operations against the Kosovar Albanians and embark on a path to peace. Although I commend Mr. Holbrooke for his efforts, and hope, of course, that he is successful, I am skeptical.

Mr. President, I firmly believe that it is critical for Congress to take an active role in the debate and decision to send our men and women in uniform into any potentially hostile situation. As our constituents' voices in matters of policy, we in Congress must fully debate this important issue and vote up or down on whether or not to authorize such a deployment.

While I am pleased that the European members of NATO are taking the lead on the proposed deployment to Kosovo to implement the Rambouillet agreement, I have serious concerns about the United States participation in the form of U.S. troops in that mission.

No matter how one feels about the conflict in Kosovo or about the future of that province, under current American policy Kosovo is considered part of

Serbia, comprising, along with Montenegro, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic had made it abundantly clear that NATO troops are not welcome on what he refers to as "Serb territory," and he has begun to amass troops along the border with Macedonia, where approximately 12,000 NATO troops are already currently deployed.

In addition, for the moment, there is no peace to be kept by the peacekeeping force. While the Kosovar Albanian delegation in France has signed the Rambouillet agreement, the Serbs remain adamant that they will not sign the agreement unless the Kosovar Albanians and the Contact Group accept their latest demands. Many observers see this as a stalling tactic on the part of the Serbs, since they are demanding changes to text that already has been agreed upon.

It is into this very uncertain situation and environment that the President has proposed to deploy 4,000 United States troops.

Mr. President, with great regret, I have concluded that I must oppose the deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo at this time. I am compelled to do so for several reasons.

First, the potential for harm to our men and women in uniform is too great, and there is too much uncertainty surrounding the proposed deployment. The continuing violence in Kosovo, coupled with the mobilization of Serb troops in the area, fosters a volatile environment into which our troops should not be deployed. The fact that the Serbs are not presently willing to sign the Rambouillet agreement or allow NATO troops into Kosovo makes it hard to believe that there will be any peace at all for foreign troops to keep.

Second, since 1995, I have vigorously opposed the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia. One can draw disturbing parallels between the deployment to Bosnia and the proposed deployment to Kosovo. The administration, in my opinion, has again failed to make the case to the American people and to the Congress for the deployment of U.S. ground troops in the Balkans. As with the Bosnia mission, there is no clear set of goals beyond "maintaining" a currently nonexistent peace, there is no timetable for withdrawal, no cost estimate, and no exit strategy.

Mr. President, I have come to the floor of the Senate many times in the last 3 years to talk about the U.S. deployment to Bosnia. I have consistently opposed that deployment and have supported a number of attempts to end it. I cannot help but think that this proposed deployment to Kosovo is another in the long line of ill-fated and seemingly unending peacekeeping missions that this administration has chosen to undertake without the explicit authorization of the Congress.

Last week in the Washington Post, columnist David Broder wrote, "Sending in the military to impose a peace

on a people who have not yet settled ancient quarrels has to be the last resort, not the standard way of doing business." I agree with Mr. Broder. Peacekeeping should be the exception, not the rule. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Mr. Broder's column be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am seriously concerned that the administration has cited the Bosnia mission as some kind of positive precedent for a deployment to Kosovo—or anywhere else. In my view, the mission to Bosnia should not be a precedent for anything. The deployment to Bosnia has resulted in, of course, some real benefits for the people of that region, but it has resulted in less favorable consequences for the United States. However, the lack of clear goals and a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, and the glaring absence of an exit strategy, now more than 3 years later, and more than \$9 billion after the initial deployment, remain troubling.

Let me repeat that. We were promised that the troops would be out of Bosnia in 1 year, that the troops would be home by December of 1996; and after we were promised that, we would spend at the most \$2 billion. Our troops are still there, and it has cost over \$9 or \$10 billion. And now they do not even talk about getting out on any date certain. Any new deployment to the Balkans must not unduly add to the spiraling cost American taxpayers are being asked to bear for our already very, very expensive mission in Bosnia.

I do not want to see the mistakes of Bosnia repeated in Kosovo at the expense of our men and women in uniform. Our armed services have served very admirably in the Balkans. They and their families and fellow citizens have a right to know the details of the proposed deployment before it happens.

Third, I am concerned that the proposed deployment to Kosovo could set a new precedent for international peacekeeping. As we prepare to mark NATO's 50th anniversary, the topic of continued out-of-area NATO deployments for peacekeeping is a valid point of concern. How do we justify United States participation in NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo but not in international deployments in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, or the Congo, where many of the same tragic types of occurrences have been occurring for several years? Violent civil wars have shredded the fabric of civil society around the globe, but it doesn't seem to me, after observing this for over 6 years, that we have a clear principle for deciding where and when to intervene. No such principle emerges from the observation and the justifications for both the Bosnia and Kosovo proposed intervention.

Finally, I am concerned about the deployment of our men and women in uniform to Kosovo because our troops

are already stretched too thin around the globe. Currently, there are more than a quarter-million American troops deployed in foreign areas, from Haiti, to Bosnia, to the Persian Gulf, to the Korean peninsula. When I talk to my constituents, they are startled to hear that there is something like a quarter-million American troops, approximately 250,000 American troops, stationed around the world at this time.

I commend again our men and women in uniform for their service to our country. I cannot, however, support a policy that overcommits our American troops abroad, especially when the situation into which they would be sent in Kosovo is so very uncertain. Again, there will be more debate on this, and I think that is terribly important.

I conclude my remarks by thanking the Senators from Texas and New Hampshire for their work on this issue. I am also pleased that the House of Representatives took an opportunity to debate this extremely important issue and that the Senate has followed suit today.

Again, I regret that I am unable to support the deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo at this time.

EXHIBIT No. 1

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 17, 1999]

BEFORE WE SEND IN THE TROOPS . . .

(By David S. Broder)

Last Saturday, two days after the House of Representatives had narrowly defeated a resolution opposing the deployment of U.S. troops as part of a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, The Post's Douglas Farah reported some disquieting news about a previous peacekeeping mission to Haiti.

The chief of the U.S. Southern Command, Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, had told a closed session of a House subcommittee last month he wanted the troops removed from Haiti because the continuing instability of that poverty-stricken island nation put them at too grave a risk, according to a transcript of the hearing obtained by Farah.

You may be forgiven if you are surprised to learn the Army is still in Haiti. It has been more than four years now since the September day in 1994 when President Clinton sent a force of 20,000 troops onto the island. There was immense relief when last-minute negotiations cleared the way for their arrival; when they left their bases, they expected to have to fight their way ashore. But the brutal generals running the country backed down, and soon were replaced—thanks to U.S. force—by elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Neither Aristide nor his successor, Rene Preval, has been able to bring peace or democracy to Haiti. Factional fighting has immobilized the government and stymied efforts at economic recovery. And now that the factionalism has provoked assassinations and bombings reminiscent of the bad old days, the 500 U.S. troops still in Haiti spend much of their energy just trying to protect themselves against those they came to help.

It would be difficult for the Clinton administration to accept the general's call for a pullout, for it would concede the failure of a peacekeeping mission regularly touted as one of the signal achievements of recent years.

It would be especially embarrassing at the very moment when the administration is

trying to squelch opposition in Congress—fed by such foreign policy luminaries as Henry Kissinger—to sending 4,000 U.S. troops to Kosovo in a new peacekeeping mission.

Two days before peace talks resumed between the Serb forces occupying Kosovo and the rebel forces who claim to speak for the 90 percent Albanian population of the province, bombs planted by unknown persons killed at least seven people—a reminder of how far from peace Kosovo is.

During House debate, the question repeatedly raised was what assurance the administration could give that once the troops were sent into Kosovo, they would ever be able to get out. The response was that without NATO troops on the ground, the killing would go on, and without U.S. participation, our European NATO allies would not go it alone.

This was the latest manifestation of what might be called the Wilsonian conundrum. It was Woodrow Wilson, in the aftermath of World War I, who most boldly asserted the doctrine that the United States would not only use its might to protect its national interests against any external threats but would aid the struggle for democracy, freedom and self-determination of oppressed people wherever it was being fought.

Wilson's ambitions were almost instantly repudiated by the Senate in the debate over the League of Nations, but his ideas have influenced almost all his successors from FDR through Clinton. Under the slogans of human rights, liberation of captive nations or peacekeeping, they have tried—with only intermittent success—to lift American foreign policy beyond the crass calculations of power politics and into the exalted realm of morality and justice.

What we have learned, I think, is that all those good values cannot be imposed at the point of a gun—even if the gun is held by an American soldier who wants nothing in return but a safe trip back home.

Peace cannot be built unless and until the warring parties have exhausted themselves with bloodshed and are ready to take the responsibility on themselves to turn a new page. No better example can be found this Saint Patrick's Day than Northern Ireland, where decades of sectarian violence blessedly have given way to a shaky peace.

The United States, led personally by Clinton, played an honorable and vital role in bringing about that change. But it did so at the conference table, using diplomats, not troops.

The lesson is not that we should never be peacekeepers; rather, that there has to be a peace to keep. Sending in the military to impose a peace on people who have not settled ancient quarrels has to be the last resort, not the standard way of doing business.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, in view of the posture taken by the other side of the aisle, as I understand it, we will not take up any other amendments until we dispose of this amendment, which I understand. I will pursue the closing arrangement for the Senate so that we might put Senators on notice that there will be no other amendments considered today and that we will close.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a period for morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Monday, March 19, 1999, the federal debt stood at \$5,640,185,158,295.15 (Five trillion, six hundred forty billion, one hundred eighty-five million, one hundred fifty-eight thousand, two hundred ninety-five dollars and fifteen cents).

One year ago, March 19, 1998, the federal debt stood at \$5,537,630,000,000 (Five trillion, five hundred thirty-seven billion, six hundred thirty million).

Fifteen years ago, March 19, 1984, the federal debt stood at \$1,465,615,000,000 (One trillion, four hundred sixty-five billion, six hundred fifteen million).

Twenty-five years ago, March 19, 1974, the federal debt stood at \$471,306,000,000 (Four hundred seventy-one billion, three hundred six million) which reflects a debt increase of more than \$5 trillion—\$5,168,879,158,295.15 (Five trillion, one hundred sixty-eight billion, eight hundred seventy-nine million, one hundred fifty-eight thousand, two hundred ninety-five dollars and fifteen cents) during the past 25 years.

EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, which were referred as indicated:

EC-2241. A communication from the Managing Director for Administration, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Production of Nonpublic Records and Testimony of OPIC Employees in Legal Proceedings" (RIN3420-AA02) received on March 8, 1999; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

EC-2242. A communication from the General Counsel, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Motion to Reopen: Suspension of Deportation and Cancellation of Removal" (RIN1125-AA23) received on March 16, 1999; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2243. A communication from the Director of the Policy Directives and Instructions Branch, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Exceptions to the Educational Requirements for Naturalization for Certain Applicants" (RIN115-AE02) received on February 22, 1999; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2244. A communication from the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch" (RIN3209-AA04) received on March 12, 1999; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2245. A communication from the Director of the Division of Commissioned Personnel, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, the Department's report on the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps Retirement System for fiscal year 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2246. A communication from the Executive Director of the Committee for Purchase

From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled, transmitting, pursuant to law, a list of additions to and deletions from the Committee's Procurement List dated March 3, 1999; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2247. A communication from the Chair of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the Commission's report on the Secretary of Health and Human Services' report concerning the development and implementation of a Medicare prospective payment system for home health agencies; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2248. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Branch, U.S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Technical Amendment to the Customs Regulations" (T.D. 99-24) received on March 4, 1999; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2249. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Branch, U.S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Technical Corrections Regarding Customs Organization" (T.D. 99-27) received on March 4, 1999; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2250. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Unit, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Determination of Interest Rate" (Rev. Rul. 99-16) received on March 15, 1999; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2251. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Unit, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Congressional Review of Market Segment Specialization Program Audit Techniques Guides" received on March 12, 1999; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2252. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Unit, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Oshkosh Truck Corporation v. United States" (Fed. Cir. 1997) received on March 12, 1999; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2253. A communication from the Deputy Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Allocation of Assets in Single-Employer Plans; Interest Assumptions for Valuing Benefits" received on March 9, 1999; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC-2254. A communication from the Director of the Regulations Policy and Management Staff, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Indirect Food Additives: Polymers" (Docket 97F-0412) received on March 16, 1999; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC-2255. A communication from the Director of the Regulations Policy and Management Staff, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent; Technical Amendment" (RIN0910-AA60) received on March 16, 1999; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC-2256. A communication from the Director of the Regulations Policy and Management Staff, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Ear, Nose, and Throat Devices; Classification of the Nasal Dilator, the Intranasal Splint, and the Bone Particle Collector" (RIN98N-0249) received on March 16,