

of 4 p.m. Under the previous order, the time until 1:00 shall be in the control of the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. NICKLES, or his designee.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GREGG). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, acting as Senator NICKLES' designee, I ask unanimous consent to proceed to speak about Kosovo for up to 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator is recognized.

#### KOSOVO

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, the American people should realize and understand that in his press conference just 2 days ago, President Clinton talked about the justification for United States-led airstrikes against Serbian troops in Kosovo and that today we are apparently within hours—within hours—of going to war. He acknowledged that our U.S. pilots would be put at risk. And last week, the Pentagon's top military commanders also warned those of us on the Senate Armed Services Committee that there could be U.S. casualties if NATO launches airstrikes in an effort to pressure President Milosevic to accept the peace agreement that has been drafted by the U.S. and its allies and apparently signed by the Kosovar Albanians.

General Michael Ryan, the Air Force Chief of Staff, said this:

There is a distinct possibility we will lose aircraft in trying to penetrate those defenses.

Our Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak said:

It is going to be tremendously dangerous. Serbian air defenses are mobile, the terrain is very tough and the weather cannot be underestimated.

General Krulak also said there were some bottom-line questions that still need to be answered: What is the end game? What happens if the Serbs do not come to the table after the first airstrike? How long will the strikes go on? Will our allies stay with us?

General Dennis Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff, also discussed the probability—and I emphasize the word “probability”—of sending 4,000 U.S. troops as part of the NATO peacekeeping force. He said:

The current commitment on the ground remains a still-elusive peacekeeping argument. However, our troops earmarked for that are prepared.

General Reimer agreed with the chairman of the committee, Senator JOHN WARNER, who warned of the massing of Serbian troops on the border of

Kosovo preparing for extensive ground operations.

Mr. President, my colleagues and the American public should understand, notwithstanding yet another round of last-minute diplomatic efforts by the administration's special envoy and the architect of U.S. policy in the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, who is meeting with Mr. Milosevic as of today, the United States is preparing to go to war against the sovereign country of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and this air attack is very likely to be followed by U.S. ground troops.

As former Senator Bob Dole said on “Meet the Press” yesterday, it is time for the U.S. to fish or cut bait in the Balkans.

Compounding the situation is the fact that the Russian Prime Minister, Mr. Primakov, a staunch opponent of airstrikes and an ally of Milosevic, will be in Washington tomorrow, and I think his visit really presents a unique problem. An attack during Primakov's visit would certainly not help repair frayed U.S. and Russian relations. However, he is not due to leave until Friday. In a real paradox, by meeting with Mr. Primakov this week and delaying the attack, the administration may well give Mr. Milosevic additional time to launch an offensive, an offensive, by the way, which is also happening now.

General Wesley Clark, the NATO commander, has warned time and again that if no accord is reached, the Serb forces will resume fighting on a very large scale, and that is happening.

As the debate showed in the House of Representatives several weeks ago, and as the debate also continues in this body as of today and tomorrow, many in the Congress are concerned and frustrated and torn. Some support airstrikes and some do not. Some support ground troops; more do not. But we all agree, I think, that the Congress and the American people certainly deserve a better explanation of the administration's policy in the Balkans.

It is not that we have not asked the administration for clarification. Last July, I offered an amendment to the defense appropriations bill that required the President to come before the American people and the Congress before he committed the U.S. to a military involvement in Kosovo. The amendment was not prejudicial. It simply required the President to make the case as to why intervention in Kosovo was in our vital national security interest.

The language contained in section 8115 of Public Law 105-262—and it is the law of the land—unambiguously states that none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under the act may be obligated or expended for any additional deployment of the Armed Forces of the United States unless and until the President, in consultation with the leadership of the Congress, transmits to Congress a report that includes the following:

No. 1: certification that the presence of those forces to be deployed is necessary to the national security interests of the United States;

No. 2: the reasons why the deployment is in the national security interest;

No. 3: the number of military personnel to be deployed;

No. 4: the mission and objectives of forces to be deployed;

No. 5: the expected time schedule for accomplishing the objectives of the deployment;

No. 6: the exit strategy;

No. 7: the costs;

And lastly,

No. 8: the anticipated effects on the morale, the retention and the effectiveness of United States forces.

Mr. President, although our United States pilots are about to take part in an air attack that will put them in harm's way, to be followed by some 4,000 ground troops, that report—that report—required by law—has not been submitted to the Congress.

Last week, in the briefing that was conducted by Secretary of State Albright, National Security Council Chairman Berger, and Secretary of Defense Cohen, I again asked if the report would be forthcoming. I asked if the latest briefing—requested, by the way, by our Majority Leader LOTT—served in lieu of the report. The response of Mr. Berger was unclear to me, but in past conversations in previous briefings he said the administration should and could answer all the questions involved, and that the report would be made “at the appropriate time.”

With the attack imminent, it would seem now is the appropriate time. As a matter of fact, with all due respect to the administration, submitting such a report would not be difficult and it would be helpful. If the administration thinks—and they apparently think—that this is the case, that threats of military action may alter the behavior of the Serbs, of Milosevic, what clearer signal of intent to forcibly stop the violence against the Albanians than the President of the United States laying out the issues to Congress and the American people?

Perhaps we can do the administration a favor today. In answering these questions, required by public law, let us simply take public statements from the President and his Cabinet officers, as well as statements made in briefings to the Congress that have been reported in the public press.

As a Member of both the Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees, I want to emphasize there should not and cannot be any disclosure of military details of any proposed action, the timing of the action or the types or selection of various weapon platforms.

Let's take the reporting requirements—1, 2, and then 4. They ask the President to describe why deploying to Kosovo is in the national security interest of the United States as well as

what specific objectives our forces will have once on the ground in the province.

They are of particular importance because it will be these goals for which our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines will be risking their lives. Let me put it another way. Should a father, a mother, a husband or a wife—or any family member—have to ask, “For what did my son or daughter, husband or wife, mom or dad die for?” the answers to these questions will have to suffice.

Questions Nos. 1 and 2:

Certify the presence of forces to be deployed is necessary to the national security interests of the United States and the reasons why the deployment is in the national security interest.

Here is the answer that I am suggesting to the Clinton administration. President Clinton, taken from President Clinton’s press conference last Friday: It could be in the report. I am quoting the President:

A part of my responsibility is to try to leave to my successors, and to our country in the 21st century, an environment in Europe that is stable, humane and secure. It will be a big part of America’s future.

The President went on to say:

As we prepare to act, we need to remember the lessons learned in the Balkans. We should remember the horror of the war in Bosnia, the sounds of sniper fire aimed at children, the faces of young men behind barbed wire, the despairing voices of those who thought nothing could be done. It took precious time to achieve allied unity there, but when we did, our firmness ended all that. Bosnia is now at peace.

I continue to quote the President:

Make no mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill. But, action and resolve can stop armies and save lives.

And then the President goes on to specifically talk about why he thinks this is in our national interest. And it should be made part of the report, if he would simply submit it to the congressional leadership. He said:

We must also understand our stake in peace in the Balkans and in Kosovo. This is a humanitarian crisis, but it is much more. This is a conflict with no boundaries. It threatens our national interests. If it continues, it will push refugees across borders, and draw in neighboring countries. It will undermine the credibility of NATO, on which stability in Europe and our own credibility depend. It will likely reignite the historical animosities, including those that can embrace Albania, Macedonia, Greece, even Turkey. These divisions still have the potential to make the next century a truly violent one for that part of the world that straddles Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

Unquestionably, there are risks in military action, if that becomes necessary. U.S. and other NATO pilots will be put in harm’s way. The Serbs have a strong air defense system. But, we must weigh those risks against the risks of inaction. If we don’t act, the war will spread. If it spreads, we will not be able to contain it without far greater risk and cost. I believe the real challenge of our foreign policy today is to deal with problems before they do permanent harm to our vital

interests. That is what we must do in Kosovo.

Finally, the President said this:

One of the things that I wanted to do when I became president is to take advantage of this moment in history to build an alliance with Europe for the 21st century, with a European undivided, strong, secure, prosperous and at peace. That is why I have supported the unification of Europe financially, politically, economically. That is why I’ve supported the expansion of NATO and a redefinition of its missions.

Here is another answer that the administration could include in the report to the Congress as justification for an attack on Serbia and whether or not this is in our vital national interest.

Secretary of State Albright: This is taken from press accounts of congressional briefings. Six reasons:

No. 1: the Balkans represent a bridge between Europe and the Middle East and therefore are of strategic interest.

No. 2: unless we stop this conflict, it will spin into Albania, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey. The First World War started there. Another could again.

No. 3: we have a humanitarian obligation to stop massacres and refugee flight.

No. 4: what we do in Kosovo has a direct bearing on what has been achieved in Bosnia.

No. 5: what we do in Kosovo represents our leadership role in NATO, the credibility of NATO; both relevant to the future of NATO into the next century.

And lastly, No. 6: it is in our national interest to oppose Serb aggression.

One more answer: Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 1999:

First, we have a clear interest in protecting stability in a key part of Europe and our investment in Bosnia. If we don’t stop the conflict in Kosovo, it could draw in Albania and Macedonia, potentially threaten our NATO allies in Greece and Turkey and thereby divide the alliance.

Second, We have an important interest in averting another humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. Continued conflict also would create new opportunities for international terrorists, drug smugglers and criminals.

Third, America has a clear interest in ending years of Serb repression by strengthening democracy, upholding the rule of law including the valuable contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and protecting human rights.

Finally, persisting conflict in Kosovo would undermine NATO’s credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in the Balkans and U.S. credibility as one of the leaders of NATO.

Now, there, I have submitted the administration’s report as to why this is in our national interest, a report that has not been forthcoming, by simply quoting the President, the Secretary of State, and the Undersecretary of State. Whether or not you think that adds up to a rationale as to why we should be going to war is another question, but at least it is there.

Question No. 3 that is required by public law: Please provide the number of military personnel to be deployed.

Answer: In numerous press reports, President Clinton and various defense officials have stated the United States will commit up to 4,000 troops for deployment to enforce a peace agreement. However, the number of U.S. personnel who provide intelligence, logistical support, extraction capability, and offshore platforms is not available.

Question No. 4: What are the mission and objectives of the forces to be deployed?

Answer: In regard to the airstrike, the press reports as of today state:

NATO plans call first for a short, sharp demonstration airstrike consisting mainly of cruise missiles. [Casualty avoidance—those are my words not the press commentary.] If Mr. Milosevic does not submit, NATO, after additional consultation, [with our allies] plans to launch a sustained and rigorous bombing campaign that could last as long as a week.

The report went on to say:

A combination of U.S. cruise missiles and up to 400 American and European fighter jets would attempt to take out Serbia’s command and control structures and its air defense system and also to strip Serbia’s military in Kosovo of its ability to attack Kosovo fighters.

Just for the record again, the same press reports stress senior U.S. military officers have warned the Congress the air mission over Serbia would be tremendously dangerous with a high risk of NATO casualties.

Question No. 5, as required in the report: The expected schedule for accomplishing the objectives of the deployment.

Answer: It is not available—or at least it is not available on all the press reports, the briefings, and the information I have been able to obtain in regard to this weekend and in many previous months.

Question No. 6: The exit strategy for the United States forces engaged in the deployment.

I want all of my colleagues to pay attention to this response; this is the exit strategy.

Answer: American negotiator Christopher Hill, in discussing the negotiated peace agreement, has stated in the press that under the agreement, Serbia would remain sovereign over Kosovo for the next 3 years. Under the NATO peacekeeping force, including the 4,000 Americans, the Kosovo Liberation Army would disband and the Serbs would withdraw all but security forces.

That is certainly not the case as of today. However, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, again, in a very cogent and a very comprehensive briefing in response said before the committee February 25:

With respect to our exit strategy, we have learned from our experience in Bosnia that we should not set artificial deadlines. Rather, we should seek to create the conditions for self-sustaining peace so that the timing and circumstances for the reduction and ending of the presence of an international military force is well defined. There are a series of core conditions—apparently what will

have to take place in regard to Kosovo before the 4,000 troops—or how many would be deployed there as peacekeepers—could exit:

One, military stability including the swift and orderly departure of all Serb forces except those required for border security; two, replacement of Serb security forces with a functioning, local, representative police force; elections that meet international standards; and establishment of legitimate political institutions that would provide for substantial and sustained Kosovar autonomy.

That is a pretty tall order. That is a pretty tall order. We have seen the situation in Bosnia where we were to be there for 1 year; we have been there for 4 so far. It is now \$10 to \$12 billion. As we learned in the Balkans, time limits don't mean too much.

Question No. 7, as required by the amendment in the defense appropriations bill in regard to a report that has not been forthcoming: The costs associated with the deployment and the funding sources for paying these costs.

Answer: Assistant Secretary of Defense Kenneth Bacon on February 29: We have calculated or estimated the cost of what it would be to send the U.S. portion of a peacekeeping force into Kosovo. That would be about \$1.5 to \$2 billion a year but no decision will be made on sending peacekeepers in until there is a peace agreement.

Again, the Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, who has been very candid before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "An additional important element"—now, just stop here for a minute. It will be \$2 billion a year at least for 3 years and perhaps more.

Then, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering in a very candid statement said:

An additional important element in ensuring an effective and sustainable agreement will be international assistance for Kosovo. The U.S. plans to make a substantial contribution to bolster European Union efforts. We have requested \$50 million as part of the 2000 fiscal year budget request. We anticipate identifying additional funds needed to support the civilian implementation aspects of the agreement including funds to:

Repair damaged infrastructure—

The thought has just occurred to me, if we have airstrikes in Kosovo and Serbia and we destroy the infrastructure, we are now making the promise to send funds to repair the damaged infrastructure—

Stimulate economic growth in Kosovo through microlending;

Support free elections;

Assist in the establishment both of communal police units and an independent Judiciary system.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that will add up to a great deal more money than the \$2 billion a year. I can find no statement by the administration as to how they will request these funds. I assume they would come under an emergency supplemental, very similar to the one we are discussing on the floor today.

Finally, question No. 8: The anticipated effects of the deployment on the

morale, retention, and effectiveness of the United States forces.

While I think this is certainly needed, there is no answer that is available.

So that is it. Albeit, with very limited time and access to information over this weekend, and probably with some degree a lack of expertise, I have tried to piece together the response that the administration could make within a consultation requirement—a requirement again stated in public law—that would certainly help in the debate we are having today in regard to U.S. policy in the Balkans.

I have to say, with all due respect to the rationale behind this policy, I believe there are a great many more questions that remain that should have been answered before now, before, once again, U.S. credibility is on the line. As a matter of fact, last Friday the situation was summed up aptly by Mr. Fred Hiatt, a columnist with the Washington Post. The column was entitled "The Credibility Factor." I ask unanimous consent to have the full article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 21, 1999]

#### THE CREDIBILITY FACTOR

(By Fred Hiatt)

"It's well known," an administration spokesman said last week, that the President is "a tactician and not a strategist, and maybe looks to the next day and not the day after."

The official was talking about Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. But the description seemed oddly apt for President Clinton, too. When the two face off, as they are now doing over Kosovo, that puts the United States at a disadvantage. A tactician with a free totalitarian hand will always have the initiative over one operating in a democracy.

This isn't to say that Clinton is the moral equivalent of Milosevic, one of the reprehensible war criminals of this decade. But Clinton is always inclined toward the easy, short-term win, the half-way solution; and he has been willing to sacrifice truth and to slight principle to achieve his daily victories.

Now, when he should be building support in Congress and among the public for a difficult but necessary confrontation, he is paying a price for that record. With good reason, many voters do not believe he has thought out the consequences of his Kosovo policy; in the post-impeachment era, many members of Congress do not believe him, period.

The tactical victories Clinton has achieved with deception are considerable. During the impeachment trial, it became almost a cliché to attack the President for not having come clean as soon as Ken Starr began nosing around. If he had just fessed up in the first place, went the refrain, the country would have been spared this long trauma.

As a matter of principle, of course that was true. But tactically Clinton was right and his critics were wrong. If Clinton had said back in January 1997 that, yes, he had been using the Oval Office for sexual encounters with an intern and, yes, he had lied about this under oath during a civil deposition and, no, he didn't consider oral sex to be sex—he might not have survived the week. But he lied about "that woman" and survived the week, and the next week, and the one after that.

You could say his tactical dissembling has paid off in foreign policy, too. When he was dispatching troops to Bosnia in 1995, he promised they'd be there for only one year. The promise helped him win acquiescence from a reluctant Congress, and there wasn't much Congress could do when one year rolled into another and the troops did not come home.

Sending troops was the right thing to do, and keeping them there beyond a year was right, too. Any maybe, given doubts in Congress and the country, Clinton's way was the only one that would have worked. Maybe honest leadership wouldn't have carried the day. We'll never know.

What we do know is that his method of operation—his search for the risk-free alternative, his reluctance to spend political capital, to fully confront or explain the long-term consequences of policy—has a cumulative, corrosive effect. Clinton wouldn't push for U.S. troops to arrest war criminals or assist in the return of refugees, so Bosnia is farther from real peace than it should be—and the troops will have to stay longer as a result.

Among foes such as Milosevic, Clinton's credibility diminishes with each unbacked threat, each inflated claim of success for pinprick bombings, each recall of military force even once dispatched. Diminished credibility means, in the long run, a greater likelihood that force will have to be used.

Now all these chickens—the diminished credibility abroad, the skepticism at home, above all the unwillingness to fashion a strategy—are coming to roost in Kosovo. Clinton has threatened to bomb Milosevic yet again. Maybe this time he means it. But then what? Clinton also has promised that U.S. troops will not be sent into a "non-permissive" environment. They will enter Kosovo, in other words, only when Milosevic welcomes them in.

"These are incompatible objectives," Sen. Gordon Smith said in an interview. A freshman Republican from Oregon who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Europe, Smith is no isolationist; he has said he would support a dispatch of U.S. troops to Kosovo under the right circumstances. But he worries that Clinton has no credible plan.

Perhaps a round of U.S. bombing will compel Milosevic to call off his war against Kosovo civilians, sign a peace treaty and admit NATO troops. But what if it doesn't? What if Milosevic responds, instead, with a bloody crackdown in Pristina and villages through the province? Clinton, to assuage his fretful military commanders, has already promised not to follow air power with troops. But air power can't solve every problem.

If NATO bombs, Smith said, it should no longer pretend to be neutral. "The problem is Milosevic," he said. "If you go along that path, go to win."

Is Clinton prepared to see it through? On Friday he made a case for bombing, but did not explain what might come next, nor why those next steps would be worth the risk to U.S. life and treasure? Time enough tomorrow, or maybe the day after.

Mr. ROBERTS. In part he stated:

Among foes such as Milosevic, Clinton's credibility diminishes with each unbacked threat, each inflated claim of success for pinprick bombings, each recall of military force even once dispatched. Diminished credibility means, in the long run, a greater likelihood that force will have to be used.

Now all these chickens—the diminished credibility abroad, the skepticism at home, above all the unwillingness to fashion a strategy—are coming [home] to roost in Kosovo. Clinton has threatened to bomb Milosevic yet again. Maybe this time he

means it. [I think he does.] But then what? Clinton also has promised that U.S. troops will not be sent into a "non-permissive" environment. They will enter Kosovo, in other words, only when Milosevic welcomes them in.

"These are incompatible objectives." [He is quoting my colleague and my friend from Oregon, Senator GORDON SMITH, who said in an interview—and, by the way, Senator SMITH is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe] [he] is no isolationists; he has said he would support a dispatch of U.S. troops to Kosovo under the right circumstances. But he worries that [there is] no credible plan.

Perhaps a round of U.S. bombing will compel Milosevic to call off his war against Kosovo civilians, sign a peace treaty and admit NATO troops. But what if it doesn't? What if Milosevic responds, instead, with a bloody crackdown in Pristina and villages throughout the province?

That is happening as I speak.

Clinton, to assuage his fretful military commanders—who have good reason to fret—has already promised not to follow air power with troops. But air power can't solve every problem.

If NATO bombs, [Senator] SMITH said, it should no longer pretend to be neutral. "The problem is Milosevic," he said. "If you go along that path, go to win."

I certainly associate myself with the comments of Senator SMITH.

Is Clinton [is this Congress and are the American public] prepared to see it through? On Friday, he made a case for bombing [and the intervention] but did not explain what might come next, nor why those next steps would be worth the risk to U.S. life and treasure. Time enough tomorrow, or maybe the day after.

That was the conclusion of the editorial.

I have questions, but I am not going to take too much time to go over all the questions I have as a result of the statements that have been made. But in regard to Kosovo, what is the end state? What do we want to see in Kosovo once we are done doing whatever it is we plan to do?

If we don't want to support the independence and secession of the Kosovars, why are we serving as their air force?

How do we know we have ever attained our aims?

What are the measures of merit?

How long might it take?

We have talked about an exit strategy. I think we should focus on strategy; that is, on what we are trying to achieve, through what means, and how do we know we are done?

I don't accept the argument in regard to NATO credibility, or that NATO credibility is on the line, as an answer to why we should go there. NATO's credibility is sky high. Just ask all the nations who want to get in.

How is bombing conducive to peaceful conflict resolution? Have we ever been able to bomb a country into submission so that they would agree with our point of view? What if initial strikes don't attain the desired effect? How far are we willing to go to compel the Serbs to bend to our will? What are the risks? Why send peacekeepers when

there is no peace to be kept and neither side wants to compromise? It seems that is the case.

Why are we seeking to compel a sovereign nation—by the way, Yugoslavia was a founding member of the U.N.—to cede its territorial sovereignty to a guerrilla movement? What message does this send to other secessionists worldwide?

How do you explain supporting Yeltsin in fighting to keep Chechnya within the Russian Federation, at a cost of about 50,000 casualties—indeed, comparing the Russian action to the American Civil War and, by implication, Yeltsin to Lincoln—and bombing the Serbs for trying to keep their country together? That is a point of view.

Which of the many Kosovar factions are we supporting? How much top-down control and professional discipline do we expect from all sides involved?

The mission order for Bosnia, which has been referred to as a good case study for Kosovo, was, "Attack across the Sava River," and we went in with overwhelming force, which we then scaled down as the threat receded. We are doing it the other way regarding Kosovo. Why aren't we following that model? Remember the strategic insight of an 18-year-old Marine in Beirut: "If we are here to fight, we are too few; if we are here to die, we are too many."

All of these questions I have mentioned—some of which I share with a great deal of support from others—I think certainly should be debated, should certainly come to the floor. That has not been the case. I do hope the administration will submit their report soon. I hope they don't submit the report after the President has given the order and the troops are there, for at that time every Member of the Senate and House will certainly want to support our troops.

I worry about this, Mr. President. We are going to war. The President has spoken to the issue, other Cabinet officials have spoken to the issue, but many questions remain.

I yield the floor.

Mr. WYDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### TOBACCO SETTLEMENT FUNDS

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss an issue that is vital to improving health care in America—specifically, whether the States are actually going to use a portion of the billions of dollars they received in tobacco settlement funds to keep America's youngsters from starting to smoke. The Senate has discussed this issue over the last few weeks, but I think it may be appropriate to have a new context as we go forward with these discussions.

To get an indication of how the tobacco industry believes it is doing and why the Senate ought to be concerned about this issue, you can take a look at how the tobacco industry assesses its executives' job performance. Recently, the public got a look at information concerning the 1998 compensation packages for several of the CEOs of the major tobacco companies. The combined compensation package for the CEO of Philip Morris and the CEO of RJR equals \$36 million.

Last week, Mr. President, you and I marked up the Federal budget in the Budget Committee with our colleagues, but even when you spend a week dealing with the Federal budget, \$36 million certainly sounds like a lot of money.

I am not against CEOs being compensated for their work. My guess is that the CEOs, in this case, earn their salaries. I don't think they would be pulling down \$36 million a year unless they were doing a pretty good job of keeping the ashtrays filled in America.

Now, the combined compensation packages for just these two CEOs is more than 39 of our States and the District of Columbia would have received under the legislation Congress voted on last week. Let me be clear. Two of the tobacco CEOs were making more money in 1998 than the vast majority of our States would have received for programs to keep young people from getting started with tobacco.

For example, my home State of Oregon would receive just over \$15 million under the legislation which was considered last week. That is less than half of the CEOs' compensation. The State of Wyoming would have received \$3.61 million, 10 percent of the combined compensation packages. I believe that the traditional targets of tobacco in harvesting new smokers—women, children, and minorities—are certainly worth 10 percent of the combined compensation for 1 year of these two executives.

Let us also remember that it is not just the money the tobacco industry is spending on high-priced executives that the Congress should be concerned about. There is another threat to our children, and that comes from the \$5 billion the tobacco industry spent last year on advertising and marketing. That is \$96.2 million every week, or \$13.7 million every day. Again, that is far more than many of our States would have received to protect young people from smoking.

Last year, in the Senate Commerce Committee, I wanted to make sure that the individuals who had historically been targeted by the tobacco companies would have been eligible to receive funds for tobacco control and prevention programs. I wanted to make sure that just as the tobacco companies have poured billions of dollars into advertising in the inner cities and for ads targeted to children, the Federal Government would make a special effort to prevent smoking in those communities.