

ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN KOSOVO

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to speak on a couple of issues that concern me greatly in the arena of foreign policy.

First, a couple of comments concerning the administration's recent policies in Kosovo. I am very, very concerned that the administration, in the negotiations in France, is making a mistake. I hope that is not the case. I wish that is not the case. Maybe I don't have all the information the administration has. But I have been to Kosovo. I have been in Pristina. I have met with Mr. Milosevic. I do happen to think he is a tyrant. I think he has conducted a lot of atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo against people—right now the Albanians in Kosovo. I think he is a bad guy. I think the international community needs to stand up to him.

But I am very, very concerned about the administration's policy, or objective, where they are talking about committing 4,000 U.S. troops out of a contingency of 28,000, where they are sending our military in without a militarily achievable objective and without an exit strategy. I am really concerned because I think we are going to be there for a long, long time. It seems like we are duplicating what happened in Bosnia, which the administration calls an outstanding success. But it looks to me like we are stuck in Bosnia. We are spending billions and billions of dollars there. Nobody seems to know exactly how much money we have spent in Bosnia. I heard some people say we have already spent \$12 billion in Bosnia. Some people say the real figure is closer to \$20 billion or \$22 billion. But we are spending billions of dollars.

I remember in 1995 the President, when he committed the troops, said they would only be there for a year. As a matter of fact, the year would expire right around election time in 1996. He thought he was going to get them out before election time. But he didn't. Then he said he would extend them another year. And now they are on 3 years plus, and they are still in Bosnia, and we know they will be in Bosnia for a long, long time.

I visited our troops there. They are very dedicated and very committed. They are also very, very expensive peacekeepers. I have urged the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, that if we are going to get involved in Kosovo let's not repeat what we have done in Bosnia. It is not the same amount of cost and consternation for European troops, who live in Poland or live in Germany or live in Italy, to spend a little time in Bosnia or Kosovo as it is for somebody in the United States. They are able to go home at various points. We are not able to do that. We are awfully expensive.

So I just make the point that I am very concerned about the administration's strategy. I am concerned about

this idea that if we just get the Kosovars to agree, then we can bomb Mr. Milosevic and he will now be a compliant partner for peace. That has not proven to be the case. I don't think it will be the case. I think we will be stuck there for a long time.

That is the main point I wish to bring as far as my objective. I don't see an exit strategy. I am afraid that we will be there for tens of years instead of 1 year or a very short period of time.

Mr. President, I make those comments on Kosovo.

FAILED POLICY ON IRAQ

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, the primary reason I came to the floor this afternoon is to speak about the administration's failed policy on Iraq. I say it is a failed policy. I wish that weren't the case, but it is. It is a failed policy.

The administration, this administration, President Clinton, inherited a situation where President Bush and the Secretary of State had won the war with Iraq. We achieved our military objective, which was to get Iraq out of Kuwait. We stated that was our objective. We accomplished that objective. We came home. We implemented sanctions against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990. We had a total embargo on Iraqi products, including oil. Oil was the No. 1 product, or commodity, that Iraq exported. It provided 95 percent, I believe, of its foreign currencies.

We put that embargo on because they invaded a neighbor. And, frankly, they probably intended to invade other neighbors—maybe Saudi Arabia—and really became the dominating power in the Persian Gulf. We didn't think that was right. We sent 550,000 troops. We stopped them. We kicked them out of Kuwait, and we imposed sanctions to make sure that we would get rid of their weapons of mass destruction, because we knew they were building chemical and biological weapons and possibly nuclear weapons.

And so we set up an international regime called UNSCOM to inspect to make sure they wouldn't be doing this again, that they wouldn't be building these weapons of mass destruction to cause more problems for their neighbors and surrounding countries in the foreseeable future. The entire world community supported us, applauded us in that effort. I think we had 30 countries that were involved in the coalition aligned against Iraq in 1990, 1991, 1992. That is what President Clinton inherited.

Well, what has happened since? Let me walk you through what has happened since.

Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis and the Iraqi Government have really baffled the Clinton administration and, in my opinion, they have beaten the Clinton administration if you look at their objectives.

I will show you. The war was in 1991. They were producing over 2 million

barrels of oil per day in 1990. After the embargo, they averaged—in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, about 4- or 500,000-barrels per day. We really curtailed their production. Basically, we had the implied reward that said, if you will allow arms control inspectors—if we know that you are not building weapons of mass destruction, we will allow you to produce more oil, there won't be an embargo, but we have to know that you are not building weapons to export throughout the world.

What did this administration do? Well, we had a conflict. Actually it happened in 1994 and 1995; Iraq amassed about 80,000 troops near the Kuwaiti border. We started activating troops. We said, well, we wouldn't let this stand; we will respond militarily, if necessary, and then the problem went away. How did they go away? In April of 1995, the United Nations approved Resolution 986, and this resolution allowed Iraq to sell \$2 billion worth of oil every 6 months, \$4 billion of oil per year.

Well, you might notice, all right, this happened in April of 1995. Their oil infrastructure took awhile to be rebuilt, but, as a result of the U.N. resolution, a couple of years later they doubled their oil production. And this was supposedly to get their cooperation. We didn't have to go to war at the time. We were able to, supposedly, have arms control inspectors, and so they had a little cooperation.

In March of 1996, Iraq blocked inspections. In June of 1996, we passed U.N. Resolution 1060 that deplores the refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by UNSCOM. In August, Iraq launched a campaign against the Kurds. The United States launched a few cruise missiles. The crisis continues. Our arms control inspectors are continually denied access.

In June of 1997, Iraq demands that UNSCOM finish their business. In June, the United Nations passed a resolution that demands—demands—Iraq comply fully with UNSCOM. In October of 1997, Iraq bars American inspectors totally. In October, the United Nations passed Resolution 1134 which condemned Iraq's refusal to allow UNSCOM access to certain sites. Boy, the United Nations is standing tough.

In November of 1997, we passed another resolution, Resolution 1137. We, again, condemned Iraq because they wouldn't allow these arms control inspectors to have access. We are getting close to finding their weapons of mass destruction.

Now, this is only a year ago. A year ago in January this administration was sending 35,000 troops to the Persian Gulf. We are getting ready to go to war again. We are going to have a significant strike. We had significant debate in this body: Is this the right thing to do? Will this bring about compliance? The administration is getting close to going to war. And then what happened? The standoff continues. The inspectors are not allowed access to any of these

sites. And then you might remember, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, well, he flies to Baghdad and they come to an agreement. Peace is at hand. Arms control inspectors will be allowed back in.

Well, guess what. There was a little deal made that not too many people were aware of. I venture to say there weren't two colleagues in the Senate who were aware the administration already cut a deal with Iraq and on U.N. Resolution 1153, they allowed Iraq to sell \$5.2 billion worth of oil every 6 months; in other words, allowed Iraq to more than double its oil sales.

This is in February of last year. One year ago, February of 1998, the administration signed a deal. We are getting ready to go to war with Iraq because they wouldn't let us have our arms control inspectors in, and all of a sudden we delegate the authority to the Secretary General. He runs to Baghdad. They signed a deal. Everybody is shaking hands. War is avoided. Everybody can be at ease—no real problems now. We have an agreement. We have Kofi Annan's signature. We have the Iraqis saying they are going to comply; they are going to let in arms control people. And, yes, there was a little deal that they could double oil sales, the Iraqis could double their oil exports to as much as \$5.2 billion of oil every 6 months. That was February, a year ago, 12 months from this time.

What happened last August? Let's see. Last August, the Iraqis stopped inspectors again. Now, they have done this repeatedly.

What happened in September and October? They announced they would no longer cooperate. We withdrew the inspectors because they weren't doing anything. They were sitting in hotel rooms. They weren't allowed to have any inspections. And so we started saying this is not satisfactory.

President Clinton, again, he is talking tough—we are going to go to war. We are going to bomb them. We have the international community on our side now because they kicked the arms control inspectors out. We have the international community on our side. We are ready to go.

Well, the administration wasn't ready to go to war so we will give peace a little more of a chance. And we gave peace a little more of a chance, but they still didn't cooperate. We negotiated more. And so in September the United Nations passed another resolution demanding Iraq cooperate. That was in September.

In November, we passed another resolution, U.N. Resolution 1205. We demanded that Iraq cooperate. And then in December we had 3 days of bombing, December 17, 18, and 19. Iraq didn't cooperate. We had 3 days of bombing. Some people called them the impeachment bombings. They happened to be on the day of impeachment. Maybe that is coincidence; maybe it isn't. I don't know.

So we had 3 days of bombing. Boy, that taught them a lesson because they

weren't complying, and we are going to make sure they are going to comply. So we bombed them for 3 days. And then what happened? And I don't know if anybody can read this or not, but then on December 23 "U.S. Offers To Raise Crude Sales Cap." Just days after the bombing, Clinton administration officials are negotiating to lift the oil sales cap.

My point is that we have rewarded Iraq three times in the past for non-compliance with arms control inspectors by raising the oil sales cap. In April of 1995, we allowed them to go from a total embargo to where they could sell \$2 billion of oil every 6 months.

That was in April of 1995. Why? Because they weren't allowing the inspectors. Then in February of 1998—again, we are ready to go to war, Kofi Annan, negotiates this deal that will allow them to double it again. So, yes, we had a promise that the inspectors would be allowed to have access. Maybe they had access for a few months. The inspectors start getting close to finding something and Saddam Hussein kicks them out again. We threatened to go to war again. This time we actually did bomb them for 3 days and then, guess what. Days later, we can't wait; we run back and say, hey, we are going to reward you for your noncompliance. That has been the administration's policy dealing with Iraq. Let's reward their noncompliance with arms control inspectors. Let's reward them; we will let them sell more oil. And that is exactly what has happened.

This was the administration's statement days after the bombing. But it is interesting. And this was made by Tom Pickering.

Incidentally, I might mention, Mr. President, we are trying to get the administration to testify at a hearing, and they have been very reluctant to do so. But I think we have a commitment from Secretary of Energy Richardson, and I hope we will have Secretary Albright, or at least Under Secretary Pickering to testify, to explain this position.

His statement is interesting. It says: Outlining U.S. policy in the wake of last week's airstrikes against Iraq, Undersecretary of State Thomas R. Pickering said the United States would be prepared to review the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein gives guaranteed cooperation to U.N. weapons inspectors. If not, the sanctions will remain in place in perpetuity and the United States will use force as needed to block weapons development.

In other words, if Iraq doesn't give cooperation, we are going to guarantee that those sanctions will remain in place forever. That was our administration's policy on December 23, just days after the bombing.

Well, guess what. I am critical of this administration. Their policy here, 3 weeks later, on January 14—again in the Washington Post, it says, "Gore Signals Flexibility on Iraq Sanctions; France Proposes Ending Oil Embargo, Changing Weapons Inspections."

But guess what. Vice President GORE proposed eliminating weapons sanctions. That is our own Vice President who said that. Three weeks after we said we would never lift sanctions unless we had total cooperation, we had the Vice President of the United States talking about—I will just quote part of the article:

A ceiling on how much oil Iraq can sell to provide humanitarian aid to its people should be lifted and the approval process streamlined, Vice President Gore said tonight. . . .

"The ceiling should be lifted." He didn't say in exchange for cooperation. He didn't say in exchange for having arms control inspectors in. He just said we should lift it. That is very inconsistent, totally overriding what the Under Secretary said 3 weeks before, but totally consistent with what this administration has done.

What this administration has done—Saddam Hussein has tested them. He has pushed them up to the edge of going to war, defied arms control, defied the international community and the arms control community—by kicking the inspectors out. We would talk tough, and then at the last second we would say, "Well, wait a minute, just give us a little inspection, let us have some inspections, let us do it, and you can sell more oil."

So what has happened? The Iraqis have done just that. Their oil sales have gone way up. Guess what. They have no inspections—none—zero. They are selling as much oil today as they were prior to the war. That is 95 percent of their currency that they earn for all sorts of things.

The administration will say this is only used for food or humanitarian reasons. Hogwash. Money is fungible. If they are ready to take care of humanitarian needs with this money, that means with the other money they have, they can use that to buy arms and weapons and anything else they desire—maybe more castles that they happen to have.

So the administration's policy has been a total disaster. Here is just the oil production charts. It shows for years, 1996 and so on, they were only producing 550,000 barrels a day. Then the administration policy where they allow more and more changes—and you notice now we are up to over 2½ million barrels per day, exactly 2 million barrels a day more than it was in 1996. That has also had the consequence of glutting an already flooded market and is driving a lot of producers totally out of business—totally out of business.

We have a depression going on right now in the oil industry. You have 111 oil rigs running today. Last year we had 372. You go from 370 rigs to 111 in 12 months, and part of the reason happens to be this administration's policy dealing with Iraq.

So I have some concern on what is happening with the domestic oil industry. But my biggest concern is that the administration has had a habit of rewarding Iraqi noncompliance with

more oil sales. Now the administration's policy, as stated by the Vice President of the United States, is we should not have a cap on oil sales.

Incidentally, we do not need—or, they don't say this, but we do not have arms control inspectors in; so there is no connection. We are not saying, "Hey, you can sell all the oil you want to; all you have to do is make sure we have access, have arms control inspection; then we'll take all the embargo off." That should be our policy. But until they do that, we should keep the embargo on. Let's put a little squeeze on.

I said, "What are we doing today?" We are flying daily flights over the no-fly zones. They are shooting at our pilots. Thank goodness they haven't been successful yet. But how successful is our policy? We have already proven to Saddam Hussein, if he denies us, we will reward him. That is what we have done. This is what this administration has done throughout their policy.

Our administration policy has been pretty poor in dealing with Iraq. We have continued to reward their non-compliance, going all the way back to April 1995, and I think it has made the world a lot more dangerous as a result. Saddam Hussein is able to produce all the oil he wants. He is able to generate the moneys he needs, able to build the weapons of mass destruction without anybody checking him whatsoever—not the United States, not the United Nations. As a result, the world is a much more dangerous place.

The administration should be held accountable for their failed policies in Iraq. I also think it is important that we speak up now so we don't have failed policies in Kosovo.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the newspaper articles and tables to which I referred printed in the RECORD, and I yield the floor.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 23, 1998]

U.S. OFFERS TO RAISE IRAQI CRUDE SALES CAP

(By Thomas W. Lippman)

The Clinton administration offered yesterday to allow Iraq to export more crude oil to raise money for food and medicine, but held out little prospect that Iraq can escape from other U.N. economic sanctions any time soon.

Outlining U.S. policy in the wake of last week's airstrikes against Iraq, Undersecretary of State Thomas R. Pickering said the United States would be prepared to review the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein gives guaranteed cooperation to U.N. weapons inspectors. If not; the sanctions will remain in place "in perpetuity" and the United States will use force as needed to block weapons development, he said.

Given the administration's conviction that Saddam Hussein will never give the inspection force known as UNSCOM the unfettered access that the United States and Britain demand—a view supported by official Iraqi pronouncements this week—Pickering's state-

ment amounted to a declaration that Russia, France and other advocates of modifying the inspection system and the economic sanctions will confront strong U.S. and British opposition.

Senior U.S. officials have made clear that they will not return to the previous situation in which Iraq promised to cooperate with inspectors and then obstructed their work, controlling the agenda and forcing Washington to choose between military force or breaking its word to defend the inspections.

Pickering's tone, however, was conciliatory toward the Security Council. He welcomed Russia's announcement that its ambassador to Washington, recalled last week for "consultations," will return this week.

He also raised the possibility of U.S. assent to an increase in the amount of crude oil Iraq is allowed to sell through U.N.-supervised channels to buy food and medicine. Now Iraq is permitted to sell \$5.2 billion of oil every six months.

Administration officials described Pickering's remarks as part of an effort to assuage anger in the Security Council about the four days of U.S. and British airstrikes.

Russia in particular has complained that the strikes circumvented the will of the Security Council and violated international law. Foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin said in Moscow yesterday that "there is now a chance to reaffirm the leading role of the Security Council," an important objective for Russia because its veto in the council is one of its few sources of diplomatic leverage over Washington.

France, which also opposed the strikes, has proposed a modification of the inspection system to make it more palatable to Iraq. Both countries have called for the replacement of UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler, who is anathema to the Iraqis.

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John W. Warner (R-Va.) said the president should "seize the initiative" to make a deal with the Russians, French and other nations to restructure UNSCOM.

But Pickering said UNSCOM was created to be a technically competent weapons inspection force and should not be replaced by an alternate mechanism developed for political reasons.

[From the Washington Post, January 14, 1999]

GORE SIGNALS FLEXIBILITY ON IRAQ SANCTIONS—FRANCE PROPOSES ENDING OIL EMBARGO, CHANGING WEAPONS INSPECTIONS

(By John M. Goshko)

UNITED NATIONS, Jan. 13—A ceiling on how much oil Iraq can sell to provide humanitarian aid to its people should be lifted and the approval process streamlined, Vice President Gore said tonight as Security Council members searched for agreement on how to deal with Iraq in the aftermath of a U.S.-led bombing campaign.

France proposed ending the embargo on Iraqi oil sales and replacing intrusive weapons searches by the United Nations with a plan that would ensure that Iraq does not acquire more of the weapons of mass destruction forbidden by the council following Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Until now, the focus of U.N. efforts has been on locating and destroying any prohibited weapons in Iraq's existing arsenal.

Iraqi resentment of that policy caused President Saddam Hussein's government to defy the inspectors from the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and led to American and British air and missile strikes against Iraq from Dec. 16 to 19. Since then, the defiant Iraq government has refused to permit UNSCOM to return, and the U.N. council has

been divided about how to coax or force Iraq to resume cooperation.

The division has been especially deep among the Security Council's five permanent members, each with the power to veto any decision. Gore's speech tonight to the Israel Policy Forum in New York was designed to show U.S. openness to the flexibility France, Russia and China have sought as a way to ease the crippling economic sanctions.

"The United States is looking at ways to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian programs in Iraq, including lifting the current ceiling on funds which can be used to purchase food and medicine," Gore said of the oil-for-food program, now capped at slightly more than \$5 billion a year.

The goal is twofold: to keep the permanent Security Council members, which also include Britain, united, and to demonstrate that the fight is with President Saddam Hussein, whom Gore called "a ruthless dictator ruling unjustly," and not with the Iraqi people themselves.

"It was Saddam's regime that for four long years, at great cost and human suffering, refused to allow his people the benefits of this program," Gore said. "Saddam has consistently shown he has cared more about developing weapons of mass destruction than developing the welfare of his people."

Gore's remarks reflected a position stated by other administration officials soon after the bombings began last month: The United States would agree to lift the ceiling on oil exports for humanitarian needs but will not go as far as lifting the sanction entirely. Gore added that U.N. approval of what Iraq can purchase with its modest oil profits, which can take weeks or months, should be revised to speed the approvals.

Earlier today, State Department spokesman James P. Rubin said the French proposal contains "some positive elements that deal with the essential task of ensuring that Iraq does not rearm and is disarmed."

The French plan calls for:

Long-term weapons monitoring under a "renewed control commission" that would either replace or substantially modify UNSCOM "so that its independence will be ensured and its professionalism strengthened." Monitoring "would no longer be retrospective but would become preventive," relying on sensors and television cameras to keep track of what Iraq does in the future.

Ending the embargo on Iraq's sales and exports of oil, its principal commodity. Under present council resolutions, the sanctions are supposed to remain in place until the council determines that Iraq no longer has prohibited weapons.

A program of strict economic and financial controls allowing the United Nations to monitor Iraqi oil sales and ensure that export revenue is not used to acquire new military equipment or dual-use items. However, this monitoring would not interfere with the purchase of legitimate civilian goods and services.

[From the Washington Post, January 15, 1999]

U.S. SEEKS TO ALTER IRAQ "OIL FOR FOOD" PROGRAM

(By John M. Goshko)

UNITED NATIONS, Jan. 14—The United States tried today to defuse growing international criticism of American-backed sanctions on Iraq by proposing eliminating the ceiling for how much oil Iraq can sell abroad as long as the proceeds are used to buy food and medicine.

The proposal was presented by acting U.S. Ambassador A. Peter Burleigh as the Security Council renewed its search for agreement on how the United Nations should deal

with Iraq in the aftermath of last month's U.S.-led bombing campaign. The U.S. plan followed a more far-reaching proposal by France that would end the embargo on Iraq oil sales and replace intrusive U.N. weapons searches with a program to monitor any future attempts by Iraq to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

The 15-nation council's consensus on Iraq, intact through most of the decade since Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait was repelled by U.S.-led forces in the Persian Gulf War, has crumbled in recent months because of differences among the five permanent members with the power to veto any decision. The divergences have pitted the United States and Britain, both insistent on maintaining a hard line, against Russia, France and China, which advocate a more flexible and tolerant approach.

Burleigh told reporters that Washington does not regard its proposals as "an alternative to the French plan" because the U.S. ideas deal only with humanitarian issues and do not address the question of how best to pursue Iraqi disarmament. He said the United States disagrees with France's approach to arms inspections, which would shift the focus of U.N. efforts away from locating and destroying prohibited weapons in Iraq's existing arsenal.

"The U.S. government does not believe that it is documented that the disarmament process for Iraq has been completed," he said. "It appears that the French proposal makes that assumption—either that Iraq is disarmed or that there is nothing further to be known."

The United States, he added, believes that overseeing Iraqi disarmament should continue to be the responsibility of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the two organizations originally assigned that job by the Security Council. The UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors left Iraq before last month's bombing, and Iraq has vowed that those from UNSCOM, which it charges are American spies, will not be allowed to return.

The U.S. proposals would overhaul aspects of the "oil for food" program designed to allow Iraq to reduce suffering caused by the broad U.N. sanctions on the economy. In addition to liberalizing Iraq's opportunities for oil sales, the U.S. proposals call for streamlining procedures for approving Iraqi contracts to buy food and medicine, and allowing Iraq to borrow money from an escrow account held by the United Nations to finance such purchases on condition the funds are repaid when Iraqi oil sales reach a higher level. The plan also would expand U.N. programs

for the health and welfare of Iraqi children and make it easier for Iraqi Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

But the most important U.S. proposal was to end restrictions on how much oil Iraq can sell under the oil-for-food exemption. At present, Iraq may sell \$5.25 billion worth of oil every six months under tight U.N. controls. As a practical matter, its oil industry, which is badly in need of repair and modernization, has been barely able to produce and sell about \$3 billion worth of oil each six months.

To help alleviate that problem, Burleigh said, the United States is willing to relax the scrutiny it has applied to contracts for spare parts and other equipment needed to get the Iraqi industry working better. But he warned that Washington opposes any equipment purchases that would increase Iraq's ability to refine its oil domestically because the refined product could be smuggled out of the country, with the proceeds being pocketed by the regime rather than put to humanitarian purposes.

"Our problem is with the Iraqi government; we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people," Burleigh told reporters. He repeated the frequent U.S. contention that Saddam Hussein's government has failed to take advantage for the oil-for-food program in order to use the propaganda value of the populace's deprivation to win international support for ending sanctions.

The growing sense in many countries that the sanctions have outlived their usefulness seemed a major factor in spurring the U.S. proposals. It is an open secret that a growing majority of countries on the Security Council favor or are leaning toward lifting the sanctions. If the trend continues, many diplomats here believe the United States soon may be so isolated that it would be able to maintain the sanctions only by using its veto. In that case, the same diplomats predict, it would be only a matter of time before Arab countries and possibly France and Russia, which are in line to win concessions in the Iraqi oil industry, start to break the embargo.

By proposing measures that could relieve substantially the shortages and hardships affecting the Iraqi people, the United States hopes to turn aside the mounting pressure for ending sanctions. And if the Iraqi government, which has accepted the oil-for-food program with great reluctance, fails to take advantage of any liberalized opportunities, Washington, would be able to argue that the continued plight of the people is the fault of Saddam Hussein.

Whether the U.S. move will succeed was not immediately clear. Delegates from other

council nations said they would have to study the U.S. proposals more closely and consult with their governments before making any judgments. Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations, Nizar Hamdoon, was quoted by Reuters as saying the U.S. proposal was meaningless. "It is a cover up for their entire Iraq policy," he said.

Most attention for the moment was on the French plan, whose elements were made known to council members earlier in the week and have been the subject of informal discussion among various delegations. Delegates said privately that given the strong U.S. opposition to ending sanctions outright and Washington's continued insistence on tough inspections, there seems little chance of the French plan being accepted in anything like its present form.

But as French diplomats said, the potential value of their plan is as "a catalyst" that might stimulate fresh thinking about Iraq and eventually lead to a narrowing of the differences that recently have paralyzed the council.

IRAQ TIMELINE

	Iraq	US response
1990:		
Aug.—Iraq invades Kuwait.		UN Resolution 661 bars the export of oil.
1994–1995:		
October—Iraq amasses 80,000 troops on the Iraq/Kuwait border.		April 1995—approved UN Resolution 986. This resolution allows Iraq to sell \$2 billion in oil every six months.
1996:		
March—Iraq blocks inspections.		June—UN Resolution 1060 deplores the refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by UNSCOM.
Aug.—Iraq launches a campaign against the Kurds.		Sept.—U.S. launches cruise Missile attacks.
1997:		
June—Iraq demands UNSCOM finish.		June—UN Resolution 1115 "Demands that Iraq cooperate fully with UNSCOM."
Oct.—Iraq bars American inspector.		Oct.—UN Resolution 1134 condemned Iraq's refusal to allow UNSCOM access to certain sites.
		Nov.—UN Resolution 1137, another condemnation of Iraq's action.
1998:		
Jan.—Iraq continues standoff.		Feb.—UN Resolution 1153 allows Iraq to sell \$5.2 billion in oil every six months.
Aug.—Iraq stops inspections of new facilities.		Sept.—UN Resolution 1194 demands Iraq cooperate.
Oct.—Iraq announces it will no longer cooperate with UNSCOM.		Nov.—UN Resolution 1205 demands Iraq cooperate.
		Dec.—Three day bombing campaign.
1999:		
No UNSCOM activity ..		Press reports possible removal of oil sale caps.

WORLD OIL PRODUCTION: PERSIAN GULF NATIONS, NON-OPEC AND WORLD

[In thousand barrels per day]

Persian Gulf Nations ^a	Selected Non-OPEC Producers								Total Non-OPEC	World
	Canada	China	Egypt	Mexico	Norway	Former U.S.S.R.	Russia	United Kingdom		
1973 average	20,668	1,798	1,090	165	465	32	8,324	NA	2	9,208
1974 average	21,282	1,551	1,315	150	571	35	8,912	NA	2	8,774
1975 average	18,934	1,430	1,490	235	705	189	9,523	NA	12	8,375
1976 average	21,514	1,314	1,670	330	831	279	10,060	NA	245	8,132
1977 average	21,725	1,321	1,874	415	981	280	10,603	NA	768	8,245
1978 average	20,606	1,316	2,082	485	1,209	356	11,105	NA	1,082	8,707
1979 average	21,066	1,500	2,122	525	1,461	403	11,384	NA	1,568	8,552
1980 average	17,961	1,435	2,114	595	1,936	528	11,706	NA	1,622	8,597
1981 average	15,245	1,285	2,012	598	2,313	501	11,850	NA	1,811	8,572
1982 average	12,156	1,271	2,045	670	2,748	520	11,912	NA	2,065	8,649
1983 average	11,081	1,356	2,120	727	2,689	614	11,972	NA	2,291	8,688
1984 average	10,784	1,438	2,296	822	2,780	697	11,861	NA	2,480	8,879
1985 average	9,630	1,471	2,505	887	2,745	788	11,585	NA	2,530	8,971
1986 average	11,696	1,474	2,620	813	2,435	870	11,895	NA	2,539	8,680
1987 average	12,103	1,535	2,690	898	2,548	1,022	12,050	NA	2,406	8,349
1988 average	13,457	1,616	2,730	848	2,512	1,158	12,053	NA	2,232	8,140
1989 average	14,837	1,560	2,757	865	2,520	1,554	11,715	NA	1,802	7,613
1990 average	15,278	1,553	2,774	873	2,553	1,704	10,975	NA	1,820	7,355
1991 average	14,741	1,548	2,835	874	2,680	1,890	9,992	NA	1,797	7,417
1992 average	15,970	1,605	2,845	881	2,669	2,229	—	7,632	1,825	7,171
1993 average	16,715	1,679	2,890	890	2,673	2,350	—	6,730	1,915	6,847
1994 average	16,964	1,746	2,939	896	2,685	2,521	—	6,135	2,375	6,662
1995 average	17,208	1,805	2,990	920	2,618	2,768	—	5,995	2,489	6,560

WORLD OIL PRODUCTION: PERSIAN GULF NATIONS, NON-OPEC AND WORLD—Continued
[In thousand barrels per day]

Persian Gulf Na- tions ^a	Selected Non-OPEC Producers								Total Non-OPEC	World
	Canada	China	Egypt	Mexico	Norway	Former U.S.S.R.	Russia	United Kingdom	United States	
1996:										
January	17,265	1,788	3,115	920	2,795	3,085	—	5,839	2,600	6,495
February	17,340	1,718	3,100	920	2,800	3,165	—	5,944	2,625	6,577
March	17,390	1,814	3,050	920	2,870	2,990	—	5,830	2,570	6,571
April	17,180	1,854	3,020	920	2,860	3,160	—	5,839	2,467	6,444
May	17,190	1,768	3,195	920	2,875	2,980	—	5,866	2,512	6,394
June	17,305	1,829	3,205	920	2,880	3,150	—	5,839	2,457	6,458
July	17,395	1,808	3,150	920	2,870	3,201	—	5,813	2,537	6,338
August	17,325	1,872	3,130	920	2,830	3,022	—	5,857	2,385	6,360
September	17,425	1,854	3,140	920	2,860	3,095	—	5,826	2,517	6,482
October	17,385	1,936	3,165	920	2,860	3,005	—	5,813	2,642	6,481
November	17,355	1,889	3,190	930	2,860	3,210	—	5,909	2,743	6,476
December	17,842	1,905	3,115	930	2,900	3,198	—	5,830	2,760	6,506
Average	17,367	1,837	3,131	922	2,855	3,104	—	5,850	2,568	6,465
1997:										
January	18,040	1,874	3,210	885	2,940	3,268	—	E 5,789	2,693	6,402
February	18,245	1,920	3,240	885	2,970	3,263	—	E 5,729	2,660	6,514
March	18,460	1,900	3,215	890	2,970	3,063	—	E 5,772	2,638	6,452
April	18,615	1,823	3,230	890	2,945	3,388	—	E 5,893	2,515	6,441
May	18,385	1,737	3,275	880	2,990	3,194	—	E 5,902	2,315	6,474
June	17,980	1,835	3,220	870	3,005	3,025	—	E 5,902	2,135	6,442
July	17,965	1,889	3,190	880	3,035	3,194	—	E 5,923	2,447	6,409
August	18,975	1,895	3,190	870	3,080	2,890	—	E 5,945	2,407	6,347
September	19,005	1,930	3,195	860	3,105	2,927	—	E 5,958	2,483	6,486
October	19,045	1,956	3,195	860	3,087	3,209	—	E 5,954	2,610	6,467
November	18,810	1,970	3,158	860	3,085	3,192	—	E 5,945	2,602	6,459
December	18,416	1,985	3,090	860	3,056	3,229	—	E 5,893	2,700	6,531
Average	18,496	1,893	3,200	874	3,023	3,153	—	E 5,884	2,517	E 6,452
1998:										
January	19,061	1,912	3,240	860	3,085	3,293	—	E 5,979	2,597	E 6,438
February	19,513	1,944	3,155	860	3,140	3,230	—	E 5,997	2,583	E 6,538
March	19,380	1,952	3,170	860	3,160	3,123	—	E 5,962	2,600	E 6,465
April	19,680	1,988	3,140	860	3,140	3,160	—	E 5,876	2,602	E 6,484
May	19,680	1,943	3,210	870	3,149	2,917	—	E 5,789	2,499	E 6,384
June	19,225	1,932	3,260	870	3,050	3,140	—	E 5,928	2,495	E 6,290
July	19,290	2,045	3,200	880	3,120	3,120	—	RE 5,923	2,525	E 6,322
August	19,250	R 2,016	R 3,180	R 870	3,055	2,440	—	E 5,910	R 2,536	E 6,276
September	19,385	2,033	3,160	870	2,906	2,896	—	E 5,902	2,632	E 6,069
9-Mo. Avg.	19,383	1,974	3,191	867	3,090	3,033	—	E 5,918	2,563	E 6,362
1997 9-Mo. Avg.	18,408	1,866	3,218	879	3,005	3,133	—	E 5,869	2,476	6,440
1996 9-Mo. Avg.	17,313	1,812	3,123	920	2,849	3,093	—	5,850	2,519	6,457

^a The Persian Gulf Nations are Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Production from the Neutral Zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is included in "Persian Gulf Nations."

R=Revised. NA=Not available. —=Not applicable. E=Estimate.

Notes: (1) Crude oil includes lease condensate but excludes natural gas plant liquids. (2) Monthly data are often preliminary figures and may not average to the annual totals because of rounding or because updates to the preliminary monthly data are not available. (3) Data for countries may not sum to World totals due to independent rounding. (4) U.S. geographic coverage is the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. ABRAHAM pertaining to the introduction of S. 482 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.

OPERATION WALKING SHIELD

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this Congress, now that it will turn its attention to the committee structure and the agenda that will be developed in the authorizing committees and Appropriations Committee, will talk about a lot of different issues, will describe many different priorities. Among those priorities will be, for example, a piece of legislation we just passed in the Senate dealing with military pay. I assume that very soon there will be a national missile defense bill that will come to the floor that will be subject to dramatic and interesting debate, and there are a range of these kinds of issues. I want to raise one issue today that I think we ought to act on with some priority.

There is a program that not many people know of called Walking Shield. It is a program to move houses that are surplus houses scheduled to be demol-

ished on our military bases when those houses are to be replaced with more modern houses. Instead of demolishing the old houses, they are now moved out increasingly under the project Operation Walking Shield and moved to Indian reservations where there is a desperate need for good housing.

Operation Walking Shield is a wonderful program that takes houses that would have been demolished and moves them to a foundation someplace on an Indian reservation to provide housing for those Americans who do not have housing.

We have a real emergency in this country, particularly on Indian reservations, dealing with housing, health care, and education.

I want to read a few paragraphs from a letter to describe this emergency and why this Congress must respond to it with some priority and why I hope the President will do the same.

I want to read about a woman named Sarah. Her name was Sarah Swift Hawk. Sarah died January 2. Sarah Swift Hawk died on the Rosebud Indian Reservation in South Dakota. She froze to death. Let me read to you a letter that describes the circumstances leading to Sarah's death:

The night of January 2 was truly a dreadful night for the Swift Hawk family. They had run out of propane to heat their house. They also had no wood for their wood stove, although they tried desperately to obtain some wood, but without any success.

The Swift Hawk house is but one of 100,000 terribly substandard houses that exist on our nation's Indian reservations. The house had

only thin plastic sheeting covering two large openings where windows were supposed to be. As night fell, and the temperature plummeted from 16 degrees below zero to 45 degrees below zero, Sarah's daughter and her son-in-law, who live in the same house with their six children, put two blankets on Sarah in an attempt to keep her warm. The mother then took the other two blankets they had, and placed them over her six children who were all huddled together on the floor where she and her husband would also sleep. Since there was only one cot in the house, that bed was given to Sarah who was the grandmother in the family. Everyone else in the Swift Hawk family has to sleep on the floor because the family is too poor to buy any furniture.

When the Sun came up on Sunday morning, January 3rd, the daughter got up from the floor to check on her mother, and she found that her mother had died during the night, frozen to death as a result of exposure to extreme cold. Fortunately, the body heat from the parents and the children, all huddled together on the floor, kept them alive that terrible night.

Sarah Swift Hawk's needless death is repeated again and again on our nation's Indian reservations, particularly those in the Northern Plains States.

This is a letter from Phil Stevens. Phil Stevens runs the program called Walking Shield. I have met with him a number of times, helped them on legislation to try to move some houses to Indian reservations. I have seen the joy on the faces of those who received a home—one put on a foundation for them—a home that they could move into for the first time, a home for their children. But, frankly, there is just a trickle—a few hundred homes here and