

to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 209

Whereas the independence of Peru's legislative and judicial branches has been brought into question by the May 29, 1997, dismissal of 3 Constitutional Tribunal magistrates;

Whereas Peru's National Council of Magistrates and the National Election Board have been manipulated by President Alberto Fujimori and his allies so he can seek a third term in office;

Whereas the Department of State's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, dated February 26, 1999, concludes, with respect to Peru, that "government intelligence agents allegedly orchestrated a campaign of spurious attacks by the tabloid press against a handful of publishers and investigative journalists in the strongly pro-opposition daily La Republica and the other print outlets and electronic media";

Whereas the Department of State's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, dated January 30, 1998, states that Channel 2 television station reporters in Peru "revealed torture by Army Intelligence Service Officers" and "the systematic wire-tapping of journalists, government officials, and opposition politicians";

Whereas on July 13, 1997, Peruvian immigration authorities revoked the Peruvian citizenship of Baruch Ivcher, the Israeli-born owner of the Channel 2 television station; and

Whereas Baruch Ivcher subsequently lost control of Channel 2 under an interpretation of a law that provides that a foreigner may not own a media organization, causing the Department of State's Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 to report that "threats and harassment continued against Baruch Ivcher and some of his former journalists and administrative staff...In September Ivcher and several of his staff involved in his other nonmedia businesses were charged with customs fraud. The Courts sentenced Ivcher in absentia to 12 years' imprisonment and his secretary to 3 years in prison. Other persons from his former television station, who resigned in protest in 1997 when the station was taken away, also have had various charges leveled against them and complain of telephone threats and surveillance by persons in unmarked cars": Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved,*

**SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MEASURES BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU.±**

It is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) the erosion of the independence of judicial and electoral branches of the Government of Peru and the blatant intimidation of journalists in Peru are matters of serious concern to the United States;

(2) efforts by any person or political movement in Peru to undermine that country's constitutional order for personal or political gain are inconsistent with the standard of representative democracy in the Western Hemisphere;

(3) the Government of the United States supports the effort of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to report on the pattern of threats to democracy, freedom of the press, and judicial independence by the Government of Peru; and

(4) systematic abuse of the rule of law and threats to democracy in Peru could undermine the confidence of foreign investors in, as well as the credit worthiness of, Peru.

**SEC. 2. TRANSMITTAL OF RESOLUTION.**

The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this resolution to the Secretary of State with the request that the Secretary

further transmit such copy to the Secretary General of the Organization of the American States, the President of the Inter-American Development Bank, and the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

**SENATE RESOLUTION 210—RECOGNIZING AND HONORING THE NEW YORK YANKEES**

Mr. SCHUMER (for himself, Mr. MOYNIHAN, and Mr. LIEBERMAN) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to:

S. RES. 210

Whereas the New York Yankees are 1 of the greatest sports franchises ever;

Whereas the New York Yankees are the winningest sports franchise in professional sports history;

Whereas the New York Yankees have won 25 World Series, the most by any major league franchise;

Whereas the New York Yankees have played 86 seasons in the city of New York;

Whereas the New York Yankees became a baseball icon in the 1950's by winning 5 World Series in a row;

Whereas the New York Yankees' dominance was ignited in 1920 by the appearance of the indomitable Babe Ruth in pinstripes;

Whereas the New York Yankees have retired 11 numbers for 12 baseball legends;

Whereas the New York Yankees have had a player win the American League batting title 9 times;

Whereas the New York Yankees are represented in the Baseball Hall of Fame by 16 players who were inducted wearing the distinctive New York Yankee cap;

Whereas the New York Yankees have fielded teams such as the 1927 "Murderers' Row"; and

Whereas the New York Yankees have finished the 20th century meeting the standards they set throughout it: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved,*

**SECTION 1. CONGRATULATION AND COMMENDATION.**

The Senate recognizes and honors the New York Yankees—

- (1) for their storied history;
- (2) for their many contributions to the national pastime; and
- (3) for continuing to carry the standards of character, commitment, and achievement for baseball and for the State of New York.

**SEC. 2. TRANSMITTAL OF RESOLUTION.**

The Senate directs the Secretary of the Senate to transmit an enrolled copy of this resolution to the New York Yankees owner, George Steinbrenner, and to the New York Yankees manager, Joe Torre.

**SENATE RESOLUTION 211—EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING THE FEBRUARY 2000 DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S.S. "EISENHOWER" BATTLE GROUP AND THE 24TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT TO AN AREA OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES AND THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS THAT THE BATTLE GROUP AND EXPEDITIONARY UNIT HAVE RECEIVED THE ESSENTIAL TRAINING NEEDED TO CERTIFY THE WARFIGHTING PROFICIENCY OF THE FORCES COMPRISING THE BATTLE GROUP AND EXPEDITIONARY UNIT**

Mr. WARNER submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

S. RES. 211

Whereas the President, as Commander-in-Chief of all of the Armed Forces of the United States, makes the final decision to order a deployment of those forces into harm's way;

Whereas the President, in making that decision, relies upon the recommendations of the civilian and military leaders tasked by law with the responsibility of training those forces, including the Commander of the Second Fleet of the Navy and the Commander of the Marine Corps in the Atlantic;

Whereas the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility has been since World War II, and continues to be, an essential part of the training infrastructure that is necessary to ensure that maritime forces deploying from the east coast of the United States are prepared and ready to execute their assigned missions;

Whereas according to the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Island of Vieques is a vital part of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility and makes an essential contribution to the national security of the United States by providing integrated live-fire combined arms training opportunities to Navy and Marine Corps forces deploying from the east coast of the United States;

Whereas according to testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the report of the Special Panel on Military Operations on Vieques, a suitable alternative to Vieques cannot now be identified;

Whereas during the course of its hearings on September 22 and October 19, 1999, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate acknowledged and expressed its sympathy for the tragic death and injuries that resulted from the training accident that occurred at Vieques in April 1999;

Whereas the Navy has failed to take those actions necessary to develop sound relations with the people of Puerto Rico;

Whereas the Navy should implement fully the terms of the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding between the Navy and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico regarding Vieques and work to increase its efforts to improve the economic conditions for and the safety of the people on Vieques;

Whereas in February 2000, the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit are scheduled to deploy to the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf where the battle group and expeditionary unit will face the possibility of combat, as experienced by predecessor deploying units, during operations over Iraq and during other unexpected contingencies;

Whereas in a September 22, 1999, letter to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, the President stated that the rigorous, realistic training undergone by military forces "is essential for success in combat and for protecting our national security";

Whereas in that letter the President also stated that he would not permit Navy or Marine Corps forces to deploy "unless they are at a satisfactory level of combat readiness";

Whereas Richard Danzig, the Secretary of the Navy, recently testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that "only by providing this preparation can we fairly ask our service members to put their lives at risk";

Whereas according to the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Vieques provides integrated live-fire training "critical to our readiness", and the failure to provide for adequate live-fire training for our naval forces before deployment will place those forces at unacceptably high risk during deployment;

Whereas Admiral Johnson, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Jones, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, recently testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that without the ability to train on Vieques, the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit scheduled for deployment in February 2000 would not be ready for such deployment "without greatly increasing the risk to those men and women who we ask to go in harm's way";

Whereas Vice Admiral Murphy, Commander of the Sixth Fleet of the Navy, recently testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that the loss of training on Vieques would "cost American lives"; and

Whereas the Navy is currently prevented as a consequence of unrestrained civil disobedience from using the training facilities on Vieques which are required to accomplish the training necessary to achieve a satisfactory level of combat readiness: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should not deploy the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group or the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit until—

(1) the President, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, reviews the certifications regarding the readiness of the battle group and the expeditionary unit made by the Commander of the Second Fleet of the Navy and the Commander of the Marine Forces in the Atlantic, as the case may be; and

(2) the President determines and so notifies Congress that the battle group and the expeditionary unit are free of serious deficiencies in major warfare areas.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, a letter from the President of the United States to this Senator.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, September 22, 1999.

Hon. JOHN WARNER,  
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter on the United States Navy's training facilities on Vieques.

I share your concern for the combat readiness of deploying Navy and Marine Corps forces. Military readiness is one of my top defense priorities. I have ordered our forces into action several times, most recently in Kosovo, and every time have seen that the rigorous, realistic training they undergo is essential for success in combat and for protecting our national security. As Commander in Chief I will not permit Navy or Marine Corps units to deploy unless they are at a satisfactory level of combat readiness.

I believe that we can meet Navy and Marine Corps combat readiness requirements will ensuring the safety and well being of the people of Vieques. The U.S. Armed Forces work hard to ensure that their training activities throughout the United States, and abroad as well, do not adversely impact the safety and livelihood of nearby civilian residents. The Defense Department is also required by law to be conscientious guardians of the environment. I am sure you would agree that these requirements apply no less on Vieques than in any other location where our forces train.

As you know, Secretary Bill Cohen established a special panel to conduct an independent review of our training operations at Vieques. I understand that Bill recently was briefed by the panel members and that he is considering next steps in the process. At the conclusion of the panel's efforts, I expect to receive a recommendation from Bill on the future of Navy training facilities on Vieques. In reaching a decision, I will review carefully Bill's recommendation, weighing Navy and Marine Corps combat readiness requirements, the alternatives that may be available to meet their training needs, and the safety, environmental and economic concerns raised by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the people of Vieques.

Again, thank you for your letter. I hope that, working together, we will be able to find a solution that fulfills our essential national security needs and meets the concerns of the residents of Vieques Island and the people of Puerto Rico.

Sincerely,

BILL.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senate Armed Services Committee has taken cognizance of this very critical situation of our east coast fleet units being deployed, their state of readiness, and the degree of risk these units are facing as they deploy into the operations in Iraq, the operations in the Persian Gulf, and the unforeseen risks that seem to be ever present in that region of the world, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, that arise so quickly and demand the instantaneous reaction, if so directed by the President, hopefully as a deterrence and then, if necessary, the actual combat.

We have seen this now for a decade. When we stop to think of the risks taken by these young men and women flying aircraft off these ships, and performing other military missions, the Senate owes them no less than the highest possible standard of training, the best possible equipment to reduce that risk.

Therefore, having chaired the hearings of the Committee of Armed Services of recent and, indeed, under the chairmanship of Senator INHOFE, a subcommittee of our full committee, and under the chairmanship of Senator SNOWE, a second subcommittee—two

subcommittee hearings and a full committee hearing on that state of readiness and particularly as that state of readiness could be affected adversely by the absence of the ability of the United States to continue the use of the ranges on the islands of Vieques in Puerto Rico. That is the reason why I offer this sense-of-the-Senate resolution.

I shall read in general from this resolution and comment as I go:

In the Senate of the United States Mr. Warner submitted the following resolution;

Resolution

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the February 2000 deployment—

That is coming in just a matter of months—

of the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit to an area of potential hostilities and the essential requirements that the battle group and expeditionary unit have received [that] training needed to certify the warfighting proficiency of the forces comprising the battle group and expeditionary unit.

Whereas the President, as Commander-in-Chief of all of the Armed Forces of the United States, makes the final decision—

Under our Constitution—

to order a deployment of those forces—

And all our forces. That is his role under the Constitution. We respect that role.

Whereas the President, in making that decision—

With reference to the Eisenhower battle group—

relies upon the recommendations of the civilian and military leaders tasked by law—

Laws passed by this body and predecessor Congresses—

with the responsibility of training those forces, including the Commander of the Second Fleet of the Navy and the Commander of the Marine Forces in the Atlantic;

Whereas the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility—

At Vieques—

has been since World War II, and continues to be, an essential—

Underline "essential"—

part of the training infrastructure that is necessary to ensure that maritime forces deploying from the east coast of the United States are prepared and ready to execute their assigned missions.

Not only execute their assigned missions, but to accept the risk of life and limb in executing those missions.

Whereas according to the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Island of Vieques is a vital part of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility and makes an essential contribution to the national security of the United States by providing integrated live-fire combined arms training opportunities to Navy and Marine Corps forces deploying from the east coast of the United States;

Whereas according to testimony before the Committee on Armed Services—

Just weeks ago—

and the report of the Special Panel on Military Operations on Vieques—

Again, issued a week or so ago—

a suitable alternative to Vieques cannot now be identified;

Much less identified and put into an operational status.

Whereas during the course of its hearings on September 22 and October 19, 1999, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate acknowledged and expressed its sympathy for the tragic death and injuries that resulted from the training accident that occurred at Vieques in April 1999;

We did that with heartfelt expression during the course of our hearings just weeks ago.

Whereas the Navy—

In the judgment of the committee—has failed [at times] to take those actions necessary to develop sound relations with the people of Puerto Rico;

Indeed, with the people most specifically on Vieques. The Navy has not done a good job, in this Senator's judgment, and collectively, I think, in the majority of the committee in carrying out its responsibility of important relationships with the people and assuring them, first, of the essential need and their contribution to our national security and how to operate this range in a manner that is safe. We acknowledge that.

Whereas the Navy should implement fully the terms of the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding between the Navy and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico regarding Vieques and work to increase its efforts to improve the economic conditions for and the safety of the people on Vieques;

Whereas in February 2000—

Just months away—

the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit are scheduled to deploy to the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf where the battle group and expeditionary unit will face the possibility of combat, as experienced by predecessor—

Units deploying in the past years—during operations over Iraq and during other unexpected contingencies—

That arise in that dangerous region of the world.

Whereas in a September 22, 1999 letter to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, the President—

The Commander in Chief—

stated that the rigorous, realistic training undergone by military forces "is—

I quote the President of the United States—

"is essential for success in combat and for protecting our national security";

The President realizes this. It is not a political document I am handling. This is the recitation of the statements by the President this year on this very subject, and he has put it down here very clearly. The purpose of this sense of the Senate is to give him the support necessary to make the tough decisions and resolve this problem.

Whereas in that letter the President also stated that he would not permit Navy or Marine Corps forces to deploy "unless they are at a satisfactory level of combat readiness";

Whereas Richard Danzig, the Secretary of the Navy, recently testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that "only by providing this preparation can we fairly ask our service members to put their lives at risk."

Whereas according to the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps—

This testimony was just three days ago—

Vieques provides integrated live-fire training "critical to our readiness", and the failure to provide for adequate live-fire training for our naval forces before deployment will place those forces at—

Listen carefully—

at an unacceptably high risk during deployment.

Whereas Admiral Johnson, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Jones, the Commandant of the Marine Corps—

On October 19, 1999—

testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that without the ability to train on Vieques, the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit scheduled for deployment in February 2000 would not be ready for such deployment "without greatly increasing the risk to those men and women who we ask to go in harm's way";

Whereas Vice Admiral Murphy, Commander of the Sixth Fleet of the Navy, recently testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that the loss of training on Vieques would "cost American lives"; and

Whereas the Navy is currently prevented as a consequence of unrestrained civil disobedience—

I repeat:

Whereas the Navy is currently prevented as a consequence of unrestrained civil disobedience—

In defiance of law, in defiance of a court order—

Whereas the Navy is currently prevented as a consequence of unrestrained civil disobedience from using the training facilities on Vieques which are required to accomplish the training necessary to achieve a satisfactory level of combat readiness: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should not—

I repeat: Not—

deploy the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group or the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit until:

(1) the President, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, reviews the certifications regarding the readiness of the battle group and the expeditionary unit made by the Commander of the Second Fleet of the Navy and the Commander of the Marine Forces in the Atlantic, as the case may be; and

(2) the President determines and so notifies Congress that the battle group and the expeditionary unit are free of [any] serious deficiencies in major warfare areas.

Mr. President, I feel very serious about this issue. I thank the indulgence of my colleagues and the Senate to come before you this afternoon to introduce this resolution.

I draw this resolution to the attention of all of my colleagues because this great body of the Senate, together with the House of Representatives, is a coequal—is a coequal—partner with regard to the training, the safety, above all, and the missions undertaken by the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Today's military has been put to one of the highest peaks of stress, stress on

the actual men and women at sea and in the air and under the sea and on the land, stress on their families at home because of the high tempo, the high number of deployments of these forces all over the world.

Statistically, President Clinton—and this is pure statistics—has deployed the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States into more contingency operations than any other President prior. I repeat that: More times. I am not questioning, in any way, his authority or his judgment. The fact is, he has done this.

The simple sense of the Senate says: Mr. President, in your own letter you talked about the seriousness of this situation at Vieques. The Senate is on notice that you, your Secretaries of Navy and Defense, and the military are working to resolve this. But we, the Senate, exercising our coequal responsibility, are placing the concern we have for the welfare of the men and women undertaking this deployment, and the risks they share with their families at home, we, Mr. President, most respectfully say to you we want to see absolute clarity in the certifications from those military commanders and those civilian bosses of the military commanders.

We have a system in our country which is the right system. We have civilian control of the military. They have the joint responsibility—the civilian/military control, fleet commanders—to make those certifications to our President that this group is ready, or, Mr. President, respectfully this group is not ready, to undertake this mission and assume those risks.

That is what we ask.

I request all Senators, as an obligation to those men and women of this battle group—and I daresay there are soldiers and Marines and airmen from every one of the 50 States in that battle group—so I ask all Senators to review this and hope you will join me as a cosponsor.

According to Article II, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the President is the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. As such, he bears the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the men and women in uniform he orders into harm's way, receive the training necessary to protect their lives.

I have been working to preserve the access of the United States Navy and Marine Corps to the essential training facility on the island of Vieques, since I was Secretary of the Navy. This facility is absolutely vital to the readiness of our naval forces.

Over the past several weeks, the Armed Services Committee has held a series of hearings on this important issue. Over the course of these hearings, I have become increasingly convinced that it would be irresponsible to deploy our naval forces without the training provided by the Vieques facilities.

On Tuesday, September 22, 1999, the Readiness and Management Support

Subcommittee, under the leadership of Senator INHOFE, held a hearing to review the need for Vieques as a training facility and explore alternative sites that might be utilized. At that hearing both Admiral Fallon, commander of the Navy's Second Fleet, and General Pace, commander of all Marine Forces in the Atlantic, testified that the Armed Forces of the United States need Vieques as a training ground to prepare our young men and women for the challenges of deployed military operations.

On October 13th, the Seapower Subcommittee, under the leadership of Senator SNOWE, heard from Admiral Murphy, commander of the Navy's Sixth Fleet and the commander who receives the naval forces trained at Vieques, who stated that a loss of Vieques would "cost American lives."

Earlier this month, after the release of the report prepared by the Special Panel on Military Operations on Vieques, I held a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee to discuss with Administration and Puerto Rican officials the recommendations of that report, and to search for a compromise solution that addresses the national security requirements and the interests of the people of Vieques. At that hearing, Secretary Danzig, the Secretary of the Navy, stated that only by providing the necessary training can we fairly ask our service members to put their lives at risk. Admiral Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the *Eisenhower* Battle Group would not be able to deploy in February without a significant increase in risk to the lives of the men and women of that battle group unless they are allowed to conduct required training on Vieques. Furthermore, General Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps, testified that the loss of training provided on Vieques "will result in degraded cohesion on the part of our battalions and our squadrons and our crews, decreased confidence in their ability to do their very dangerous jobs and missions, a decreased level of competence and the ability to fight and win on the battlefield."

At that hearing, I asked Admiral Johnson and General Jones "Is there any training that can be substituted for Vieques live fire training between now and February that will constitute, in your professional judgment, a sufficient level of training to enable you to say to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the *Eisenhower* Battle Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit are ready to go." In the response they stated "no, sir, not without—not without greatly increasing the risk to those men and women who we ask to go in harm's way, no, sir."

I remain convinced that the training requirement is real and will continue to directly affect the readiness of our Carrier Battle Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units. As General Shelton recently testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the train-

ing on Vieques is "critical" to military readiness. He further stated that he "certainly would not want to see our troops sent into an area where there was going to be combat, without having had this type of an experience. We should not deploy them under those conditions."

All of the military officers with whom we have spoken on this issue have informed us that the loss of Vieques would increase the risk to our military personnel deploying to potential combat environments. The Rush Panel, appointed at the request of the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico and at the direction of the President, recognized the need for Vieques and recommended its continued use for at least five years.

What we have learned in these hearings is that Vieques is a unique training asset, both in terms of its geography with deep open water and unrestricted airspace and its training support infrastructure. The last two East Coast carrier battle groups which deployed to the Adriatic and Persian Gulf completed their final integrated live fire training at Vieques. Both battle groups, led by the carriers U.S.S. *Enterprise* and U.S.S. *Theodore Roosevelt*, subsequently saw combat in Operations Desert Fox (Iraq) and Allied Force (Kosovo) within days of arriving in the respective theater of operations. Their success in these operations, with no loss of American life, was largely attributable to the realistic and integrated live fire training completed at Vieques prior to their deployment.

Those calling for the Navy and Marine Corps to cease training operations on the island and convey Navy-owned land to the Government of Puerto Rico often point to the struggling economy of Vieques and the banter posed by Navy training to the local citizens as supporting evidence. They express disappointment in the Navy's failure to more fully implement the terms of the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding which outlined the responsibilities of the Navy for assisting the economic development and safety of the local community. To address those concerns, we can, and should, work together to initiate new programs to assist the Navy and the residents of Vieques in stimulating the local economy and ensuring that all possible safety measures are adopted. However, economic concerns and correctable safety concerns should not force the Navy to cease vital training when that would increase the risk to the safety and security of our men and women in uniform.

Mr. President, as long as we are committing our nation's youth to military operations throughout the world; and as long as Vieques is necessary to train these individuals so that they can perform their missions safely and successfully; it would be irresponsible to deploy these forces without first allowing them to train at their vital facility. I hope that all of my colleagues will support this resolution.

## AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED

## AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT

## DEWINE AMENDMENT NO. 2413

(Ordered to lie on the table.)

Mr. DEWINE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment No. 2398 submitted by him to the bill (H.R. 434) to authorize a new trade and investment policy for sub-Saharan Africa; as follows:

On page 4, line 5, of the matter proposed to be inserted, strike all through line 13 and insert the following:

"(E) RETALIATION LIST.—The term 'retaliation list' means the list of products of a foreign country or countries that have failed to comply with the report of the panel or Appellate Body of the WTO and with respect to which the Trade Representative is imposing duties above the level that would otherwise be imposed under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.

"(F) FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS.—The Trade Representative shall include on the retaliation list and on any revised lists reciprocal goods, of the industries affected by the failure of the foreign country or countries to implement the recommendation made pursuant to a dispute settlement proceeding under the World Trading Organization except in cases where existing retaliation and its corresponding preliminary retaliation list do not already meet this requirement."

## MACK AMENDMENT NO. 2414

(Ordered to lie on the table.)

Mr. MACK submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to amendment No. 2361 submitted by Mr. CONRAD to the bill, H.R. 434, supra; as follows:

At the appropriate place in the amendment insert the following:

**SECTION 1. ENFORCEMENT OF CERTAIN ANTI-TERRORISM JUDGMENTS.**

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the "Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act".

(b) DEFINITION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1603(b) of title 28, United States Code, is amended—

(A) in paragraph (3) by striking the period and inserting a semicolon and "and";

(B) by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively;

(C) by striking "(b)" through "entity—" and inserting the following:

"(b) An 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' means—

"(1) any entity—"; and

(D) by adding at the end the following:

"(2) for purposes of sections 1605(a)(7) and 1610 (a)(7) and (f), any entity as defined under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1), and subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) shall not apply."

(2) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 1391(f)(3) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking "1603(b)" and inserting "1603(b)(1)".

(c) ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS.—Section 1610(f) of title 28, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1)—

(A) in subparagraph (A) by striking "(including any agency or instrumentality or such state)" and inserting "(including any