the fundamental principles and values of our constitutional democracy.

The ''We the People * * * The Citizen and the Constitution'' program is the most extensive educational program in the country developed specifically to educate young people about the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The three-day national competition is modeled after hearings in the United States Congress. These hearings consist of oral presentation by high school students before a panel of adult judges. The students testify as constitutional experts before a ''congressional committee,'' that is, the panel of judges representing various regions of the country and a variety of appropriate professional fields. The student testimony is followed by a period of questioning during which the judges probe students for their depth of understanding and ability to apply their constitutional knowledge.

Administered by the Center for Civic Education, the ''We the People * * * The Citizen and the Constitution'' program has provided curricular materials at upper elementary, middle, and high school levels for more than 26.5 million students nationwide. Members of Congress and their staff enhance the program by discussing current constitutional issues with students and teachers and by participating in other educational activities.

The student team from Milford High School is currently conducting research and preparing for the upcoming national competition in Washington, D.C. As a former history teacher, I recognize the importance and value of this unique educational experience. I wish the students and their teacher, Mr. David Alcox, the best of luck at the ''We the People * * * The Citizen and the Constitution'' national finals. I look forward to greeting them when they visit Capitol Hill, and I am honored to represent them in the United States Senate.●

ST. PAUL'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF LANSING 150TH ANNIVERSARY

● Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to St. Paul's Episcopal Church of Lansing, Michigan, and its members who are currently celebrating its 150th Anniversary. The congregation can be proud of the founding members' faith and devotion which brought about the organization of this church in 1849.

Members of St. Paul's Church met in Michigan's Capitol building for a decade until the continued growth of the congregation required that a separate building be constructed. Further growth necessitated the completion of a newer church in 1873, and again in 1914. As our country begins to rediscover the importance of family and personal values, the building of faith by St. Paul's Episcopal Church is of great significance to us all.

I extend my warmest regards and best wishes to all of the members of St. Paul's congregation as they celebrate this great achievement.●

SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT

● Mr. DODD. Mr. President, last week the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, voted on Senator BYRD's motion to dismiss the articles of impeachment brought by the Managers from the House of Representatives. I voted in support of this motion, and would like to briefly state my position on this important question.

While the motion failed, it received the support of forty-four senators—eleven more votes than needed to acquit the President of the charges made by the Articles. Therefore, this vote demonstrates to a near certainty that there are insufficient votes to support the Managers' position that the President should be convicted.

This result comes as a surprise to no one—including most if not all of those who support the President's removal. These Articles should never have been presented to the Senate. The President's actions were undoubtedly reprehensible. They deserve condemnation and may warrant prosecution after he leaves office. But they do not warrant removal—a sanction unprecedented in our nation's history, and one that the Framers of our Constitution envisioned would be used in only the rarest of circumstances to protect the country.

The case presented by the Managers is fatally deficient in three respects:

First, the facts presented, even if viewed in the light most favorable to the Managers' case, do not allege conduct that meets the high standard laid out by the framers for the impeachment, conviction, and removal from office of a president.

Second, the articles as drafted are vague and contain multiple allegations—denying the President the fairness and due process that is the right of every American citizen, and depriving senators of the clarity that is essential to discharging their responsibility as triers of fact.

Third, the Managers have failed to present facts that meet their heavy burden of proving the allegations contained in the Articles.

Let me address these points in turn.

The conduct alleged by the Managers to be worthy of conviction arises out of a private, civil lawsuit and a private, consensual, yet improper relationship between the President and Ms. Monica Lewinsky. It is the President's conduct in that lawsuit and in that relationship that are the basis of the charges at issue here. No charges arise from his official conduct as President.

(It is worth noting that, with regard to the Jones matter, the Supreme Court itself considered the conduct alleged therein to be private. The Court ruled that, while the President may delay or avoid until leaving office lawsuits based on his official conduct, he may claim no such immunity in an action based on private conduct unrelated to official duties.)

The Managers claim that what is at issue is not the President's private actions but his actions in connection with efforts to prevent his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky from becoming known to his family and others. These actions, the Managers argue—including his testimony in the grand jury and his statements to staff and others—are official in nature. However, these actions clearly arise out of the President's efforts to keep secret a personal relationship which he admitted to be wrong. Under no reasonable analysis can they be understood to relate to the President's official duties.

It follows, then, that the President's actions certainly do not rise to the level of ''treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors'' set forth by the Framers as the standard for removing a president from office. As Alexander Hamilton explained, impeachment is to be reserved as ''a remedy for great injuries done to the society itself''. The impeachment process is intended to protect the nation from official wrongdoing, not punish a president for personal misconduct.

It is not in my view reasonable to conclude that the President's actions—while by his own admission wrong and offensive—pose a danger to the institutions of our society. The President's past behavior did not—and his continuation in office does not—pose a threat to the stability of those institutions.

Indeed, I submit that convicting and removing the President based on these actions, not the actions themselves, would have a destabilizing effect on our institutions of government. Were this scenario to come to pass, then henceforth any president would have to worry that he or she could be removed on a partisan basis for essentially personal conduct. That standard would weaken the presidency. In the words of Madison, it would in effect make the president's term equivalent to ''a tenure during pleasure of the Senate'', and upset the careful system of checks and balances established by the Framers to govern relations between the legislative and executive branches.

The Articles also deserve to be dismissed because of the fatally flawed manner in which they are drafted. Those flaws are of two separate kinds.

First, the Articles fail to allege wrongdoing with the kind of specificity required to allow the President—or indeed, any person—to defend himself, and to allow the Senate to fully understand and judge the charges made against him. White House counsel described the articles as an ''empty vessel'', a ''moving target'' where neither the President nor the Senate knows with precision what has been alleged. Senators were presented with videotaped testimony of former federal prosecutors who stated that standard prosecutorial practice requires that allegations of perjury and obstruction

must be stated with particularity and specificity. The allegations here have not been so stated. That lack of specificity is manifestly unfair to the President. And it is detrimental to the Senate's ability to discharge its responsibility as the trier of fact in this case.

The second fatal structural flaw in the Articles is that the Managers have aggregated multiple allegations of wrongdoing into single Articles. Article I allows the President to be impeached for ''one or more'' of four enumerated, unspecified categories of alleged misconduct. Similarly, in Article II he is alleged to have obstructed justice in ''one or more'' of seven ways. This smorgasbord approach to the allegations creates the deeply troubling prospect that the President could be convicted and removed without two-thirds of the Senate agreeing on what precisely he did wrong. For this reason, too, dismissal is appropriate.

Dismissal is, finally, appropriate because the facts undergirding the managers' case do not prove the criminal wrongdoing the managers allege. Manager MCCOLLUM told the Senate that it must first find criminal wrongdoing and then determine whether to remove the President from office. While it is left to each Senator to determine the standard of proof he or she will use to judge the evidence, manager MCCOLLUM's own analysis suggests that that standard should be beyond a reasonable doubt. After all, that is the standard used in all other criminal cases; why should the President be subjected to any lower standard than that to which all citizens are entitled? Indeed, he should not—not only because he deserves no less fairness than other citizens, but also because this high standard of proof is appropriate to the gravity of the sanction the Senate is being asked to impose.

In my view, the Managers have failed to prove criminal culpability on the part of the President beyond a reasonable doubt. The record is replete with exculpatory, contradictory, and ambiguous facts.

Consider, for example, these:

(1) Ms. Lewinsky—who was questioned some 22 times by investigators, prosecutors, and grand jurors (not to mention twice by the Managers themselves)—said under oath that neither the President nor anyone else ever asked her to lie.

(2) She also said—again, under oath—that no one ever promised her a job for her silence.

(3) Further, she stated without contradiction that the President did not suggest that she return the gifts given her by the President to him or anyone else on his behalf.

(4) Betty Currie, the President's secretary—who was questioned some nine times—likewise testified that the President did not suggest that the gifts to Ms. Lewinsky be returned.

(5) She also said that she never felt pressure to agree with the President when he spoke with her following the Jones deposition, and, indeed, felt free to disagree with his recollection.

(6) Lastly, the Managers argued that a December 11, 1997 ruling by the judge in the Jones case, permitting the calling of witnesses regarding the President's conduct, triggered intensive efforts that very day by the President and Vernon Jordan to help Ms. Lewinsky find a job. We now know that the facts contradict that account of the Managers. A meeting on that date between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky was scheduled three days earlier. It was held several hours before the judge's ruling. And at the time of that ruling, Mr. Jordan was on an airplane bound for Holland.

In addition, factual discrepancies between the President and Ms. Lewinsky—about when their relationship began, about the nature of the inappropriate contacts between them, about the number of those contacts, and about the number of inappropriate telephone calls between them—amount to differences in recollection that in no way can be considered criminal on the part of the President. More fundamentally, they cannot be considered material to this proceeding. Not even the Office of Independent Counsel considered these discrepancies relevant or material to the matter at hand. It cannot reasonably be argued, in any event, that the President should be removed from his office because of them.

For all of these reasons—the failure of the Managers to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the President committed criminal wrongdoing, the structural flaws in the Articles themselves, and the failure of the allegations, even if proven, to warrant the unprecedented action of conviction and removal—these Articles should be dismissed. We have reviewed enough evidence, heard enough arguments, and asked enough questions to know with reasonable certainty that the flaws in the Managers' case cannot be remedied. We know enough to decide this matter now. The national interest is best served not by extending this proceeding needlessly, but by ending it.

I regret that the Senate has failed to do that. But I continue to believe that we must dispose of this matter as soon as possible so we can return to the other important business of the nation.●

OPPOSITION TO MANAGERS' MOTION FOR THE APPEARANCE OF WITNESSES

● Mr. DODD. Mr. President, last week the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, voted on a motion by the Managers for the appearance of witnesses and to admit evidence not in the trial record. I opposed this motion, and would like to briefly state my reasons for doing so.

While the motion carried, the fact that it was opposed by forty-four Senators demonstrates that a large number of our colleagues believe that the record of this case is sufficient to allow Senators to decide on the articles of impeachment. Indeed, it is not merely sufficient, it is voluminous. As I will discuss more fully below, neither the Managers nor counsel for the President would in any way be harmed by a requirement that they rely on the record as presently constituted.

Let me concede at the outset that this motion is not an easy one to decide. There is an argument to be made for calling witnesses. Our colleagues who believe there ought to be witnesses are motivated by earnest reasons.

However, the issue for us is not whether there is a case for witnesses. It is this: do we need to hear from witnesses in order to fulfil our responsibility as triers of fact? The answer to that question, in my opinion, is no. We know enough to decide this case, and decide it now.

There may be legitimate reasons for calling witnesses. But the reasons for not calling them are compelling.

There are five reasons, in particular, that strongly argue against the motion.

First, the record is more than sufficient to allow the Senate to decide this case. We are all painfully familiar with the essential details of this matter. Like most Americans, we have been subjected to the blizzard of media attention paid to it from its very start just over a year ago.

This is not 1868, when only a handful of people could witness the last presidential impeachment. One hundred and thirty years later, we can receive an Independent Counsel's voluminous and graphic report over the Internet literally at the moment it is made available to the public. We can witness the proceedings of the House Judiciary Committee live on television. We can observe the televised impeachment proceedings in the House chamber as if we are there.

This trial is now in its fourth week. We have been provided with massive portions of a record that exceeds 67,000 pages in length. We have heard days of arguments. Ninety of us have asked some 105 questions to the House Republican Managers and to counsel for the President.

So I daresay that the facts of this case have been drilled into our consciousness—relentlessly, overwhelmingly, and, it seems endlessly.

I should add one more adverb: repeatedly. And that leads to the second reason for not calling witnesses: they have testified repeatedly and without contradiction on the key facts.

Again and again, the record shows the same questions asked of the same witnesses. Ms. Lewinsky has been questioned a total of twenty-three times, Ms. Currie nine times, Mr. Jordan six times, and Mr. Blumenthal five times. They were asked hundreds upon hundreds of questions—by some of the toughest, shrewdest legal minds in the country. Their testimony fills in excess of two thousand five hundred pages of the trial record.