

The conferees apparently did not think that the Middle Peace Process is of critical interest to the United States because nowhere can a find funding in support of the implementation of the Wye Agreement—clearly a critical component in ensuring that the peace process more forward. I believe that this omission is extremely unwise and is reason enough alone for Members of this body to oppose it.

But that is not the only problem with this bill. Let me discuss some of the other deficiencies as well.

First, Mr. President, we all know how much bipartisan support the Peace Corps engenders in both Houses of Congress. Peace Corps volunteers are our "citizen diplomats" abroad. The lasting good will and friendship that results from American men and women serving as volunteers for two years in countries that need and want their presence is immeasurable. No one that I know of has any complaints about the organization. Yet, this bill would short change its fiscal year 2000 budget by \$35 million, making it nearly impossible for the Peace Corps to meet its congressionally mandated goal of placing 10,000 volunteers in the field early in the next decade.

Nor does this conference report contain a penny for use by the Clinton administration as its initial responses to the tragic natural disasters that have just occurred in Turkey and Taiwan. Surely we could have provided some start up monies to assist our friends in their hour of need. Similarly, money was not included in this bill to assist the people of Kosovo begin the painful process of rebuilding after the devastation wrought by Serbian forces earlier this year.

The phrase "penny wise and pound foolish" comes readily to mind as one reviews the provisions of this bill. Let me highlight some of the most important deficiencies as I see them: \$175 million reduction in loan programs designed to help the poorest nations address their critical needs; \$157 million reduction in global environmental protection programs; \$26 million below the Senate passed appropriated amounts for the U.S. Export Import Bank and additional unnecessary Congressional notification requirements that could delay approval of export credit applications; \$85 million reduction in debt relief for the poorest countries; \$200 million reduction in regional democracy building and economic development programs for Africa, Latin America and Asia; \$297 million reduction in democracy and civil society programs in the independent states of the former Soviet Union; and \$20 million reduction in funds to support the Korean Peninsula Development Organization and seriously restrictive legislative conditions which jeopardize important ongoing U.S. diplomatic efforts to contain the North Korean nuclear threat to the Korean Peninsula.

This is certainly not an exhaustive listing of all the problems I have with

this bill, but merely the highlights, or low lights as the case may be, of the serious inadequacies with the foreign operations conference report. Having said that I believe that the issues I have cited are more than enough reason for members to vote against this legislation and I urge them to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURNS). The Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I am sorry my friend and colleague, the Senator from Vermont, is not going to be able to support the bill. But I do want to commend him for his ongoing effort with regard to demining. The Leahy War Victims Fund has had a dramatic impact not only on rehabilitation but also on safety; in addition, Senator LEAHY's interest in and devotion to the subject of infectious diseases. He has single-handedly driven the funding levels up. The surveillance, control, and treatment have improved throughout the world because of his commitment.

I commend him for that.

Mr. President, it is my understanding that both sides are interested in having this vote at noon. I am prepared to yield back my time, if Senator LEAHY is, and we will proceed with the vote.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, my understanding is that no one else on this side wishes to speak.

In that case, I yield our time.

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded.

The yeas and nays have not be ordered.

Mr. LEAHY. I request the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative assistant called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 51, nays 49, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 313 Leg.]

YEAS—51

Abraham	Enzi	Mack
Allard	Fitzgerald	McCain
Ashcroft	Frist	McConnell
Bennett	Gorton	Murkowski
Bond	Gramm	Nickles
Brownback	Grams	Roberts
Bunning	Grassley	Roth
Burns	Gregg	Santorum
Campbell	Hatch	Sessions
Chafee	Helms	Shelby
Cochran	Hutchinson	Smith (NH)
Collins	Hutchison	Smith (OR)
Coverdell	Inhofe	Specter
Craig	Jeffords	Stevens
Crapo	Kyl	Thomas
DeWine	Lott	Thompson
Domenici	Lugar	Thurmond
Enzi	Mack	Voinovich

Dodd	Kerry	Reid
Dorgan	Kohl	Robb
Durbin	Landrieu	Rockefeller
Edwards	Lautenberg	Sarbanes
Feingold	Leahy	Schumer
Feinstein	Levin	Smith (NH)
Graham	Lieberman	Smith (OR)
Hagel	Lincoln	Torricelli
Harkin	Mikulski	Voinovich
Hollings	Moynihan	Wellstone
Inouye	Murray	Wyden
Jennings	Reed	

The conference report was agreed to.

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. BENNETT. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND EDUCATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2000—Continued

VOTE ON AMENDMENT NO. 1889

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 1889 to amendment No. 1851. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 54, nays 46, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 313 Leg.]

YEAS—54

Abraham	Fitzgerald	McConnell
Allard	Frist	Murkowski
Ashcroft	Gorton	Nickles
Bennett	Gramm	Roberts
Bond	Grams	Roth
Brownback	Grassley	Santorum
Bunning	Gregg	Sessions
Burns	Hagel	Shelby
Campbell	Hatch	Smith (NH)
Chafee	Helms	Smith (OR)
Cochran	Hutchinson	Snowe
Collins	Hutchison	Specter
Coverdell	Inhofe	Stevens
Craig	Jeffords	Thomas
Crapo	Kyl	Thompson
DeWine	Lott	Thurmond
Domenici	Lugar	Voinovich
Enzi	Mack	Warner

NAYS—46

Akaka	Feingold	Lincoln
Baucus	Feinstein	McCain
Bayh	Graham	Mikulski
Biden	Harkin	Moynihan
Bingaman	Hollings	Murray
Boxer	Inouye	Reed
Breaux	Johnson	Reid
Bryan	Kennedy	Robb
Byrd	Kerry	Rockefeller
Cleland	Kerry	Sarbanes
Conrad	Kohl	Schumer
Daschle	Landrieu	Torricelli
Dodd	Lautenberg	Wellstone
Dorgan	Leahy	Wyden
Durbin	Levin	
Edwards	Lieberman	

The amendment (No. 1889) was agreed to.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. COVERDELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the next order of business be 9 minutes for the Senator from North Carolina, Mr. HELMS. I

Akaka	Bingaman	Byrd
Baucus	Boxer	Cleland
Bayh	Breaux	Conrad
Biden	Bryan	Daschle

further ask consent that Senator LAUTENBERG be recognized to offer a second-degree amendment and there be up to 1 hour for debate equally divided in the usual form. I further ask consent that upon the use or yielding back of the time, the vote on the Lautenberg amendment be stacked for consideration later today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BUNNING). Is there objection?

Mr. WELLSTONE. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I withdraw the request. Why, I don't understand, but I will withdraw the request because it is faster to do that than to find out what the reason is why we can't stack. I say, by way of explanation, if we stack the votes, we can move more expeditiously to dispose of the Senate's business. But I hear an objection to that.

I ask unanimous consent that after Senator HELMS is recognized for 9 minutes, that we proceed to Senator LAUTENBERG's second-degree amendment for 1 hour, equally divided, and that the Senate vote in relation to the Lautenberg second-degree amendment without intervening action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SPECTER. Might I add, before proceeding to Senator HELMS' recognition, Senator HARKIN and I are in agreement, as are others managing the bill, to try to get time agreements for 30 minutes equally divided. If we are to move the bill, we need to do that. I think it is not inappropriate to say that we can get as much done in 30 minutes equally divided as we can with an hour equally divided. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HARKIN. I concur with the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from North Carolina is recognized for 9 minutes.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, as the Senate proceeds toward its still-scheduled debate on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, I am confident that the record will show most former senior U.S. government officials remain strongly opposed to Senate ratification of the CTBT.

The Senate—and the American people—will hear from many distinguished officials in the coming days, as they speak out against the CTBT. Of course, the Clinton Administration will try to counter that other well-known people support the CTBT, but those who support ratification of this proposed total nuclear test ban are a distinct minority.

In looking over the record, however, I found that many of the very people

the Clinton Administration claims now support such a permanent and total nuclear test ban treaty in fact explicitly rejected it when they served in the U.S. Senate and in uniform.

They argued at that time (a) that such a test ban was unverifiable, and (b) that the U.S. needs to preserve the ability to conduct nuclear tests if the American people are to be assured of the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons.

Make no mistake: These are all great Americans, whom I admire and respect, who served their country with distinction. In calling attention to their statements of the past for the record today, I certainly imply no disrespect.

To the contrary, I hope the record will reflect their judgements at that time because I believe that those judgements on a zero-yield test ban were right back then—and those judgements are still right today.

For example, as a U.S. Senator, our distinguished former colleague, Bill Cohen of Maine, was a leading light on defense issues in the U.S. Senate. Indeed, he vigorously objected to the termination of nuclear testing when he served here as a U.S. Senator. He objected, he said, because the termination of nuclear testing would undermine efforts to make U.S. weapons safer.

Throughout the months of August and September 1992, Senator Cohen vigorously fought efforts by Senators Mitchell, Exxon, and Hatfield to kill the United States nuclear test program.

Here is a sample of Senator Cohen's 1992 views as expressed on the Senate floor on September 18 of that year seven years ago:

We have made, in fact, remarkable progress in negotiating substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals. While we have made substantial reductions, we are not yet on the verge of eliminating nuclear weapons from our inventories. We are going to have to live with nuclear weapons for some time to come, so we have to ask ourselves the question: Exactly what kinds of nuclear weapons do we want to have during that time?

Senator Bill Cohen declared further seven years ago:

... [W]hat remains relevant is the fact that many of these nuclear weapons which we intend to keep in our stockpile for the indefinite future are dangerously unsafe. Equally relevant is the fact that we can make these weapons much safer if limited testing is allowed to be conducted. So, when crafting our policy regarding nuclear testing, this should be our principal objective: To make the weapons we retain safe.

... The amendment that was adopted last week ... does not meet this test ... [because] it would not permit the Department of Energy to conduct the necessary testing to make our weapons safe.

Similarly, Vice President AL GORE likewise adamantly opposed a "zero-yield" test ban—i.e., one that would ban all nuclear tests—as a United States Senator, on the grounds that such a ban was unverifiable.

Indeed, on May 12, 1988, Senator GORE objected to an amendment (offered to

the 1989 defense bill) because it called for a test ban treaty and restricted all nuclear tests above 1 kiloton.

A 1 kiloton limit ban, Senator GORE said at that time, was unverifiable. At Senator GORE's insistence, the proposed amendment was modified to raise the limit for nuclear testing from a 1 kiloton limit to a 5 kiloton limit.

For the RECORD, here's what Senator GORE's position as taken on the Senate floor in 1988:

Mr. President, I want to express a lingering concern about the threshold contained in the amendment.

Without regard to the military usefulness of lack of usefulness of a 1 kiloton versus the 5 kiloton test, purely with regard to verification, I am concerned that a 1 kiloton test really pushes verification to the limit, even with extensive cooperative measures. . . . I express the desire that this threshold be changed from 1 to 5.

If Senator GORE argued on the Senate floor that a 1 kiloton test ban was unverifiable, surely the zero-yield—ban—i.e. a ban on all nuclear tests would be equally unverifiable.

President Clinton has argued that several former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly back his call for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty banning any and all nuclear tests.

It's interesting that their statements, when they were still in uniform, however, raise doubts about Administration's claims that they vigorously support the CTBT. Consider, for example, what General Colin Powell, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said on December 1, 1992:

With respect to a comprehensive test ban, that has always been a fundamental policy goal of ours, but as long as we have nuclear weapons, we have a responsibility for making sure that our stockpile remains safe. And to keep that stockpile safe, we have to conduct a limited number of nuclear tests to make sure that we know what a nuclear weapon will actually do and how it is aging and to find out a lot of other physical characteristics with respect to nuclear phenomenon. . . . As long as we have nuclear weapons, I think as good stewards of them, we have to conduct testing.

General Powell previously had made much the same declaration during a Senate hearing on September 20, 1991:

We need nuclear testing to ensure the safety, surety of our nuclear stockpile. As long as one has nuclear weapons, you have to know what it is they will do, and so I would recommend nuclear testing.

What General Powell said was as true back then as it is today.

Similarly, Admiral William Crowe also opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty while he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 5, 1986, he stated:

[A comprehensive test ban] would introduce elements of uncertainty that would be dangerous for all concerned.

He further declared:

I frankly do not understand why Congress would want to suspend testing on one of the most critical and sophisticated elements of our nuclear deterrent—namely the warhead.

General David Jones likewise stated, during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee: