

because of Iraq's control of our oil supply, Kosovo has no similar claims to American intervention.

America may have a humanitarian responsibility to help bring stability to the region, but we have no obligation to carry the heaviest load. Our NATO allies have more reason to intervene and are capable of doing so. They should shoulder more of the burden.

After five weeks of bombing, we now know that our stated goals in Kosovo have turned to ashes. Our hostile actions against Yugoslavia, we were told by the Administration, would stop the exodus of refugees and bring the surrender of Yugoslavia within days. The Administration has failed in its mission. Our actions likely have made the situation worse.

A realistic solution is to seek a negotiated settlement that protects the rights of Kosovars to remain safely in their homeland. There is much we can do to encourage this without declaring war: provide logistical support to our allies, seize Yugoslavia's assets in foreign banks, and encourage Russia, Yugoslavia's historical ally, to mediate a peace agreement.

For Congress to declare war and give the President a blank check would continue America's level of involvement and even escalate it. In fact, the President announced yesterday he is calling up 32,000 reservists. That's not the direction we should be going.

Based upon numerous conversations with many constituents, I sense a growing unease with putting the lives of Americans at risk, especially when our objections are not being achieved.

Our allies should take responsibility for a greater share of the war effort and the U.S. should do more to bring about a negotiated settlement.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, it would be difficult, and probably inappropriate, for me to publicly express the despair I feel over our policy in the Balkans. With noble motives, we have waded into complex, ancient hatreds, and we have only aggravated the situation. In a place and situation where the United States has no vital national security interests, we have become deeply involved. We have staked the credibility of the United States and NATO on achieving an acceptable solution where none may exist.

I did not believe that the U.S. should participate in a peacekeeping force and voted accordingly on March 11. I did not support U.S. involvement in the air campaign which is now underway. It is very tempting to vote to require that our forces be withdrawn immediately from this conflict.

Yet, whatever differences we may have with past decisions, we are where we are. Where we are today is that we are left with no good options. That is particularly true with the provisions upon which we are forced to vote today.

I believe it would be better not to have these votes today. I do not want the outcome of a vote to be seen as authorizing an escalation in the conflict without clear objectives and the will to carry it through until those objectives are achieved. But neither do I want any vote to be seen as undercutting the efforts of the brave men and women conducting the current air offensive. Nor do I wish for any vote to give comfort to Mr. Milosevic.

Two of the votes today are on resolutions submitted pursuant to the War Powers Act. As I noted during debate related to Bosnia a year ago, I believe that the War Powers Act is unconstitutional.

Section 5(c) of the War Powers Act attempts to give Congress authority to force the President to remove U.S. forces by passing a concurrent resolution. The Supreme Court's 1983 Chada decision struck down a similar provision, and most scholars and observers believe that section 5(c) is also unconstitutional because it would require the President to remove troops by a concurrent resolution, which require the signature of the President.

I believe that the War Powers Act is unconstitutional on broader grounds as well, as I detailed in the debate last year. I will vote against both War Powers Resolutions because I believe that the Act is unconstitutional and because I do not believe it is prudent for Congress to declare war against Yugoslavia or to force the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from an ongoing NATO military operation.

Congress certainly has the constitutional authority to restrict funding for a military operation. While I have real concern about any measure which takes a military option off of the table, I believe that the Administration should get Congressional approval before using ground troops in this conflict. Therefore, I will vote for the provision requiring prior authorization for use of ground forces, although I do so with some hesitation.

Mr. Speaker, I continue to harbor some hopes that a negotiated solution to this conflict can be found through the efforts of Russia and others. Certainly, we should carefully consider the consequences of any U.S. action upon a number of factors, including: U.S. credibility and the effectiveness of our deterrent now and into the future; the reaction of other significant powers, especially Russia; the best interests of the refugees and of the people still in Kosovo; long-term stability in the Balkan region; the effects on the NATO alliance; and the consequences for the military position of the United States around the world.

Today, the United States finds itself in a quagmire which may be only a taste of what's to come. I hope that an honorable solution can be achieved, but I am not sure that any of the measures we consider today will move us any closer to that goal. I also hope that our nation can come to a clear understanding and establish guidelines for the proper role of the United States and of NATO in a complex world and especially for the circumstances under which we are willing to risk the lives of the men and women who defend our nation and our freedoms.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, to close debate, I yield the remainder of my time to the gentleman from Southern California (Mr. ROHRABACHER).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. ROHRABACHER) is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, what we have to understand in debating this is there is a false dichotomy that is being presented. And the American people can understand that. The option is not doing nothing or sending in our U.S. troops to do the fighting. That is not the option.

The American people need no longer bear the burden for maintaining stability throughout the world, especially in Europe's backyard. Our forces right now are flying 9 out of 10 combat missions, and we Americans are paying two-thirds of the cost.

We have done our part in this conflict already. If the Balkans are so important, let the Europeans step forward and finish the job. Let them deploy their troops if they think it is so important.

This operation has been confused since its inception. The Kosovars were willing to fight for their own freedom, for their own stability, for the protection of their families. Helping them do this would have cost us a pittance compared to the tens of billions of dollars this will drain from our coffers.

There goes Social Security reform. There goes our surplus. No, America need not bear this burden itself. People are willing to fight for themselves. Other people can pick up the cost and meet the responsibilities.

We can be the arsenal of democracy, yes, and help others. But we cannot be the policemen of the world or it will break our banks and put us in jeopardy in other places in the world.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, all time for general debate has expired.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA LIMITATION ACT OF 1999

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 151, I call up the bill (H.R. 1569) to prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense from being used for the deployment of ground elements of the United States Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unless that deployment is specifically authorized by law, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of H.R. 1569 is as follows:

H.R. 1569

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Military Operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Limitation Act of 1999".

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION BY LAW.

(a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds appropriated or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the deployment of ground elements of the United States Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unless such deployment is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the enactment of this Act.

(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to the initiation of missions specifically limited to rescuing United States military personnel or United States citizens in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or rescuing military personnel of another member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a result of operations as a member of an air crew.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution

151, the gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER) and the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. TAYLOR) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER).

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from San Diego, California (Mr. CUNNINGHAM).

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, this is a difficult time for most of us. And I heard my colleague a minute ago say we want to stop ethnic cleansing.

The Pentagon told the President, and I know every one of them by their first names and I have fought in combat with most of them, told the President not to do this, that it would only cause more problems. And that is what we have done.

There was only a little over 2,000 people killed in Kosovo prior to the bombing. NATO and the United States have killed more Albanians than the Serbs had in the year prior. We would not have a million refugees in the outlying countries. We have forced that.

The Pentagon told the President that Milosevic would increase the ethnic cleansing. And when my colleague says that no more will we stand up, Tudjman murdered 10,000 Serbs in 1995, 750,000 refugees, where was he then? There are other ways.

Maybe some of us who have fought in combat and have held our friends in our arms do not want to get in and see this again. Do not let us put ground troops into this thing. And there is a peaceful way to resolve this and we can do that. I went through it just a minute ago.

Russia: Seventy percent of the Russians support the overthrow of Yeltsin. Let them be part of the solution. Let them come in with their peacekeepers and divide this. Serbs will agree to this. The Orthodox Catholic Church agrees with this. The 200,000 Serbian Americans agree with this.

We can get Milosevic's troops out of there and restore some sanity into Kosovo without killing a bunch more and having another Vietnam.

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL).

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Mississippi for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, I was one of those Democrats in 1991 that crossed party lines to support President Bush in the Persian Gulf War. In my estimation, President Bush was right then and President Clinton is right now. And I wish my friends on the other side of the aisle would give President Clinton the same flexibility that we wanted to give President Bush back in 1991.

This bill sends the wrong signal to Milosevic, the absolute wrong signal. I have met with Milosevic. I know what he is all about. I have seen him face to face. The man is a liar and a tyrant. And this will encourage him to hunker down. This will encourage him to hold out. This will encourage him to think

that, somehow or the other, the Congress will step in and deny the President the right to win this war.

We hear from our friends on the other side of the aisle that the President, once he moves in, ought to be allowed to win, that our people should not be fighting these wars with their hands tied behind their backs. And I agree.

So why would we want to do this? Why would we want to make it difficult for the President to be the Commander in Chief? Why would we want to tie the hands of the President? Why would we want to hurt our men and women in the area? Because that is what this will do.

Instead of authorizing the way we did with President Bush, this is negative, this places negative restrictions. This is exactly the wrong signal that we should be sending.

I am co-chair of the Albanian Issues Caucus. I have dealt with Kosovo for years and years and years. We hope the bombing will work. But if it does not, in my estimation, all options should remain on the table, including the option of ground troops. If not, if those options do not remain on the table, we tell Milosevic just hunker down, wait us out and he will win, because we are announcing ahead of time what we will not do. This, in my estimation, aids and abets Milosevic. Ethnic cleansing should not be allowed. Ethnic cleansing and genocide should not be allowed on the Continent of Europe or anywhere in the world in 1999.

The previous speaker mentioned that the bombing somehow was responsible for the genocide. This ethnic cleansing was going on for the past 10 years by Milosevic and his people. Oh, it was slower. It was what I call slow ethnic cleansing. But make no mistake about it, my colleagues, it was going on and would continue to go on.

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He has accelerated it now because I said on the floor of the House 3 years ago that Milosevic wanted to drive a million Albanians over the border and kill half a million Albanians. I am right about the million Albanians. I hope I am wrong about the half a million. But I think when we finally get into Kosovo, we are going to see mass graves and tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of people will have been ethnically cleansed.

I introduced a bill last week with the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SANFORD) to arm and train the KLA. The KLA is the only counterbalance to the Serbs on the ground. In my estimation if we do not want American troops on the ground for years, we ought to be strengthening them and drop them antitank weaponry. The only solution in my estimation long-range for Kosovo will be independence, because it is clear that ethnic Albanians have no future in Serbia. This is ill-timed, it undermines the President, and it ought to be rejected.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the very distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. GOODLING).

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I want to make sure that everybody understands what the legislation says and what the legislation does.

First of all, it basically very simply says that no DOD funds can be used to send ground forces into battle in Yugoslavia without the approval of the Congress. It does not interfere with our intelligence ability to support our air war, it does not interfere with our ability to rescue downed airmen of our forces or of NATO, it does not restrict ground forces all around Yugoslavia. It just basically says, "You come to the Congress of the United States if you are going to use DOD funds to send ground forces into Yugoslavia."

Why did I introduce that legislation? I introduced it primarily because I do not believe the President can conduct a war in Yugoslavia without the consent of Congress. Opposite of what Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright said in their note, they said H.R. 1569 would unacceptably restrict the President's ability to carry out his responsibility as Commander in Chief. I do not believe he can carry that out with a ground war without the consent of Congress. That is exactly what this legislation says: "You come to Congress."

I think we have to be very, very careful when we talk about committing ground troops at this particular time. Where are the ground troops that we are going to commit? If you speak to a college group as I have the last 10 days to three different colleges, the first things I mention is the word "draft."

Why do I mention the word "draft"? Where are we going to get the ground troops? We have 250,000 now spread all over the world. You have to have that draft. We make that decision, not the President of the United States.

So we have to become involved. If we do not become involved, then we are going to see something much worse than what we saw during Vietnam. Members are now getting, I am sure, all sorts of e-mails and letters from senior citizens. They are saying, "You're taking my Social Security money." We are getting e-mails from college students because they are concerned about being drafted. We are getting e-mails from parents of teenagers who have this concern.

Congress just has to be involved. The President cannot carry on this responsibility without our involvement. So we take the time as Congress to make sure that, first of all, we have the troops, that they are well prepared, that they have the material, they have the armaments, they have the equipment, they have the machinery in order to protect them, a decision we have to make because we are going to be responsible for their safety.

I was very disappointed, apparently I did not know the gentleman as well as

I thought I did, who spoke during the rule and made a statement that I did not know what was in my bill, that the leadership put it before me. The leadership did not even know I was introducing the legislation and I do not even know if they support the legislation.

What he asked me was, the last paragraph, and I made it clear to him that I introduced H.R. 1368. The last paragraph became part of H.R. 1569. So again, I call on everyone to make sure that we, the Congress of the United States, gets an opportunity to be involved if we are going to send troops on the ground into Yugoslavia.

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, I have heard on two or three occasions this morning that the operation in Kosovo will come at the expense of the Social Security trust fund. I find it ironic that many of the people who made that statement just a few weeks ago were advocates of massive tax cuts for hundreds of billions of dollars which they assured the American people would not come at the expense of the Social Security trust fund. Either it is or it is not. And we do have to set priorities.

I do agree with the gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER) that equipping our troops, that we have as a Nation already sent into this combat, is a higher priority than anything else at the moment.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. KING).

Mr. KING. I thank the gentleman for yielding time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Goodling amendment. I do so despite the fact that I have serious differences with the President on the conduct of this war, specifically the command authority as far as selecting targets and the fact that he took ground troops off the table before the engagement began. But I oppose this amendment because it flies in the face of traditional Republican philosophy.

Mr. Speaker, throughout our history, certainly for the last 50 years, the position of the Republican Party has been to support the constitutional right of the Commander in Chief to deploy ground troops. That is why the overwhelming majority of Republicans oppose the War Powers Act. That is why the overwhelming number of Republicans opposed attempts by the Democrats to require President Bush to seek prior approval before troops went into Saudi Arabia.

It is also important to note, Mr. Speaker, the original commitment in Kosovo was made by President Bush on Christmas of 1992, when he said he would unilaterally send in American troops if Milosevic in any way moved on Kosovo. It is also significant to note that the Republican candidate for President in 1996 supports the action in Kosovo, as did President Reagan's former Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Speaker, the powers of the President as Commander in Chief transcend

whoever the President is at the moment. I ask that this House vote down this amendment to preserve the constitutional powers of the President as long defined by the Republican Party.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the very distinguished gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER).

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1569, which is not an amendment, this is a freestanding bill, would make it clear that this body has a vital role in determining whether U.S. military forces should be dispatched to participate in a ground war in Yugoslavia.

Last month the Congress authorized the President to send peacekeeping troops into Kosovo in the context of Rambouillet and a permissive environment. Now, since that time, Rambouillet has collapsed and we have engaged in hostilities, changing the context for any such deployment.

Today our Nation is fighting an air war against Yugoslavia and dictator Slobodan Milosevic. The President commenced U.S. participation in hostilities without any congressional authorization. Today our airmen are in harm's way as a result.

Now, while the President and his national security team have stated that they do not intend to deploy ground forces to Yugoslavia, there is a real possibility that this conflict will escalate to involve them. Administration officials have clearly indicated that contingency planning is proceeding. Heavy armor and several thousand ground troops have been deployed to countries that neighbor Yugoslavia, and could become the nucleus of an invasion force. Meanwhile, questions about the air campaign's efficacy have led several NATO allies to push for ground forces.

The situation in Kosovo is a tragedy. My heart truly aches for the people there, just as it does for so many who are victims of war and hatred around this world. But it simply is not within our power to solve all of the world's problems. We should not compound the tragedy in Kosovo by deploying American ground troops there and subjecting them to virtually certain casualties.

Simply put, I do not believe that our national security interests in Kosovo rise to a level that warrants the commitment of U.S. ground troops.

Moreover, I am deeply concerned that this administration has not articulated an exit strategy for U.S. forces.

I would also note that U.S. ground operations would severely undermine our ability to meet the requirements of the national military strategy which calls for being able to fight and win two major regional wars, in Korea and the Persian Gulf, not in the Balkans. Yesterday the administration authorized the call-up of 33,000 reservists. The Joint Chiefs have apparently formally determined that the air war against Yugoslavia has increased the level of risk associated with meeting these re-

quirements from high to very high. Ground operations there will further erode our ability to meet vital national security commitments.

Now, let me clarify that the intent of this bill is to preclude the deployment of a large-scale invasion ground force unless and until Congress authorizes it. This bill does not tie the President's hands. It simply requires him to come to the Congress first. It will not impair search and rescue missions, the use of Apache helicopters or, hypothetically, small numbers of personnel for intelligence or targeting functions. These are not invasion forces. Also, because our NATO allies have limited search and rescue capabilities, we allow U.S. forces to perform that mission.

Whether one believes that the air operation in Yugoslavia is in the Nation's best interests or not, it is only appropriate that this body exercise its prerogatives with regard to the expansion of this conflict to a full-blown ground war. I urge support for this bill.

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. DICKS).

(Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman from Mississippi for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in very strong opposition to H.R. 1569. I believe that this restriction, which is in essence a limitation on spending, is premature. I think the President has conducted this air campaign in a very vigorous, forthright way. I think all of us recognize the problem with ethnic cleansing and what the Serbian forces have been doing in Kosovo. I think to put this restriction, and the language, by the way, I think is very poorly drafted.

I urge my colleagues to look at the second section which talks only about limited rescue opportunities, only in Yugoslavia. What if we need to use ground forces somewhere else? I just think this is premature. I would hope that if the President makes a decision that we are going to have to use ground forces, that in fact Congress would vote on it at that time, but not at this time. This is premature.

And so I urge our colleagues to reject this and to support the Senate resolution that was passed with bipartisan support, carefully worked out, that basically expresses our support for the ongoing air campaign. I have had an opportunity to go over to the Pentagon to see how the air war is doing. It is becoming very effective. And so I think there is a lot of hand wringing here that is premature. I think we ought to give the air war additional time to work. I think we are weakening Mr. Milosevic. I think there is still a prospect that we may achieve our objective.

To have this Congress divided and not have a bipartisan effort here to find common ground I think is extremely disappointing. I think, to the

majority, there was a bipartisan effort in the other body, I think there needs to be a bipartisan effort here to support our troops and to support the air war in Yugoslavia.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the very distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. DELAY), the Republican whip.

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Mr. DELAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to state that no defense funds should be used for ground forces in Kosovo unless authorized by Congress.

The Secretary of Defense last year, just last year, opposed sending troops to Kosovo, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that our military strength has already been compromised.

Since all the whereas clauses have been struck from this resolution, I will add my own whereas clauses:

Whereas fighter planes are being cannibalized for parts to repair other aircraft,

Whereas we are running out of cruise missiles,

Whereas the Navy is undermanned by 18,000 sailors and the Air Force will be 1,300 pilots short within a year,

Whereas to pursue bombing campaigns in Iraq and Serbia, the administration has played musical chairs with aircraft carriers and left the Pacific without a single carrier to defend our allies and our forces there,

Whereas this is the reality of a downsized force, cutting military budgets has direct consequences, and vulnerability and trouble spots are a very real problem today.

Despite these growing military deficiencies, the administration is considering sending ground forces for an open-ended, peacemaking mission that would further erode military readiness.

Bosnia has already cost the United States over \$10 billion. The administration has projected that Kosovo will cost \$5 billion just this year, but has already admitted that it is impossible to determine how long the NATO mission will take. Considering that two withdrawal deadlines have already been broken in Bosnia, and considering that the President thought this would only take a week or two and now has extended it to open endedness, it is clear that any deployment to Kosovo will similarly drag on and go enormously over budget.

So sending troops and carriers to the Balkans only makes a weakened military even weaker. If nothing else, Kosovo shows us that we have to rebuild our forces and not hollow them out even more. And before sending troops to Yugoslavia, Macedonia or Albania, the President is obligated by law to report to Congress on the cost, and the funding, the schedule and the exit strategy for deployment. He has not done this, and so today we should vote to forbid any deployment without congressional approval.

Mr. Speaker, the Republicans in support of Bush were actually consulted

and listened to and advised, and President Bush came to Congress for those votes. This President has given us briefings and then gone and done what he wanted to do in the first place.

So, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote to bar defense funds from being spent on ground forces in Kosovo unless Congress actually allocates such funding.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. TANNER).

(Mr. TANNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, I was in Brussels about a month ago as part of the North Atlantic Assembly, now NATO Parliamentary Group, and had a briefing with General Clark who is Supreme Allied Commander in Europe as well as the Commander of Operation Allied Force, and it was his opinion then and it is his opinion now that we are going to have to deal with Milosevic sooner or later; sooner being preferable, speaking militarily, to later. For one to think for a moment that a war in Europe will not engage directly the United States sooner or later is to turn a blind eye to history this century, No. 1.

No. 2, Mr. Speaker, I would like to remind everyone that this is a NATO operation. NATO has been the most successful military alliance this country has ever engaged in. Since NATO was formed, no country in Europe has fallen under the Iron Curtain, and this is a part of a much bigger operation than just the United States.

One other thing:

To send a signal to one's enemy that we are not going to do something or take something off the table is a mistake, whether it is this vote, or whether it is a time line, or whether it is any other signal that sends a conflicting message.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the very distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this measure, and I commend the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. GOODLING), a senior member of our committee, for bringing this measure before the House along with the gentleman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER).

Those of us who believe that the Congress should have a say in both the actual assignment of U.S. armed forces to conflict overseas as well as the funding of such deployments should join in voting in favor of this measure. Regardless of where our Members stand on our present policy in Kosovo, I believe it is indisputable that the Congress does have a constitutional role where U.S. military personnel are sent abroad into hostilities; and although the President

has indicated he has no plan to send our troops into Kosovo on the ground unless there is an agreement from the Yugoslav authorities permitting such a presence, none of us can rule out the possibility that if circumstances do change, if the humanitarian situation worsens, or if the conflict spreads, that the President could decide to send in ground troops.

I believe that it would now be prudent and timely for the administration to seek statutory authorization for the deployment of our armed forces in Yugoslavia. The President and his key officials have thus far, however, not requested the Congress for such an authorization. I think it is incumbent upon the administration to request such an authorization.

This bill, I believe, is a proper response to where we now find ourselves in the terms of asserting our congressional role under the Constitution, under the War Powers Resolution. Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I urge our Members to vote in favor of H.R. 1569.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. CALLAHAN).

(Mr. CALLAHAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Speaker, let me say that these resolutions always pose problems for me because I believe so strongly in the separation of the branches of our government. I think that 1569 certainly expresses my sentiments with respect to the sending of American land troops into Kosovo, and I am going to vote today in favor of this resolution, but I do it with some reservation. The President informed a group of us this morning that he will not, and I repeat, he will not send American land troops into Kosovo until he brings this message to the Congress to allow a full debate by the Congress.

I appreciate the President recognizing the concern of those of us in the legislative branch of government about this endeavor in Kosovo.

My vote today is with hesitation, with some reservation, but simply because of the word "funds." The bill says it prohibits the use of "funds" by the President or by the Department of Defense for deploying forces. I think that a more clearer resolution would be an expression of Congress to not deploy U.S. ground forces in Yugoslavia until the deployment is authorized by law.

I have expressed so many times on this floor that I did not vote for Bill Clinton, but the American people did, and in that expression of the American people they gave him express authority to do what he is doing. However, we in the legislative branch have authority also to express our views. I intend to vote for this, and I am going to vote no on the other two House resolutions. But my favorable vote on this amendment is simply an extension of what I have personally already expressed to the President, what I have expressed to the people I represent in south Alabama; that I do not want to send the

first American soldier into any part of Yugoslavia. But I think, in the expression of our views that we should not have use the word "funds." We do not want to give an indication to our soldiers we do not want to pay them when we simply could have said that the Defense Department is not authorized to deploy ground troop into Yugoslavia.

I think we should be very careful. There is always the possibility that this endeavor is on the verge of some type of diplomatic settlement, and we want to be very certain that we do not tie the hands of the President by expressing opinions that could send a message to the enemy that conceivably could be construed by Milosovic that the President will not be able to carry out his threats of military action if a diplomatic resolve is not reached.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. ANDREWS).

(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Speaker, having the power to do something does not mean it is the right thing to do. I have very little doubt that we have the constitutional power to tell the President he may not consider the option of ground troops, but I have even less doubt that that is the wrong thing to do for us in these circumstances.

Decisions that are about life and death are not decisions that lend themselves to decision-making by a committee. As young Americans are put in the line of fire as we speak, the idea that 435 people, each with a separate point of view, each with a separate analysis, is somehow going to weigh into a process that is ongoing, communicate a message to a foreign enemy and make a right decision on behalf of those people in uniform, is to me preposterous.

As someone who speaks with some grave doubt about the initiation of this mission, I have no doubt about its morality, and I have no doubt about the impropriety of the resolution that is before us. We should each of us, Republican and Democrat, oppose it.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I had a law school professor that in difficult discussions in class, he would say, "Read it." I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that every Member read the bill that is before them. This is not a bill that prohibits the use of ground troops. This is a bill that prohibits the use of ground elements, a far broader, more difficult-to-define definition.

Look at this through the eyes of a sergeant stationed in Albania, working on helicopters as a mechanic; look at it through his eyes. Does this term, does this prohibition of ground elements, include helicopters because it is an air-to-ground weapon system? What is that sergeant going to think of what Congress is doing?

Even if not, what if a helicopter lands in Kosovo for whatever reason; does it then become a ground element if they engage in a firefight, therefore illegal under this bill? Are the rescue operations which are permitted under this bill limited to those who are in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a result of their operations only? What if troops, Mr. Speaker, of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cross the border into Albania, or into Macedonia, and capture U.S. personnel? And that happened. Would a rescue operation then be prohibited if we saw them a hundred yards away and we could bring them back? That would be illegal under this bill.

Is hot pursuit of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia troops prohibited by this? Do they have a safe haven? Remember the argument, the discussions, in the Korean War that there was a sanctuary north, north of the Yalu River?

□ 1415

This is creating a sanctuary for those troops who could cause harm to the sergeant and his men and women who serve under him.

We cannot allow this bill to pass. This is not a prohibition of ground troops; this is a prohibition of a much broader definition.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER) to address the statement the gentleman just made.

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I want to clarify the statement made by my good friend from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON). As we all have dealt with the Legislative Counsel, and this is where the language came from, whenever we submit a bill to this body and it goes through that process, the legislative counsel informed us that the term "ground elements" has been used for many, many years in this body to refer to our ground forces, just like we used the words "aviation elements" of the U.S. Army to refer to the aviation part of the Armed Forces of the U.S. Army.

This language is from the Legislative Counsel. They said this has been used for years and years and years in this body to refer to our ground forces. That is where it came from. That is clearly the intent of this bill, to refer to the ground forces, as opposed to the aviation elements of our U.S. Army. I want to clarify that for the record, that that is clearly the intent and meaning of this bill.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, I had the privilege of practicing law some 20 years, of helping debate definitions in court, and I can read a proposed statute. "Ground elements" is all inclusive. It disallows preparation, it disallows hot pursuit, it disallows so many things other than just ground forces.

If we are talking about ground forces, why does the bill not say that? Why does it not limit it to ground troops or ground forces? It does not do that.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. HEFLEY), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I rise in support of this resolution to prohibit the use of funds for the deployment of ground troops in Yugoslavia unless specifically approved by Congress.

Now, this does not prohibit ground troops from ever going into this area for combat, but if the people of America are going to be sent into war, it seems to me the representatives of the people of America should be in a position to approve that. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I believe we should actually remove our forces from that area that are already there.

In the last 6 years the manner in which this administration has circumvented Congress when it comes to deployment of the U.S. military forces around the world has been unprecedented, so it should come as no surprise that the House is here on the floor pleading to at least have a say in the process.

The President is the commander-in-chief, but Congress should not relax in its role as a consultative partner when it comes to the deployment of our servicemen and women.

So I agree with this measure wholeheartedly, but I want to talk about why I believe that we should not be there at all.

In any military exercise, there should be a clear, succinct mission and exit strategy, similar to our successful efforts in Desert Storm. The Kosovo plan, and I hesitate to even call it that much, does not have a clear mission, clear goals, a way to measure accomplishment standards, or an exit strategy.

For United States ground forces to enter that region, I also believe a more stable environment must be achieved by diplomatic means. This is not a desert. Our technological superiority will only give us so much of an advantage in the rugged terrain of Yugoslavia. It will not take only 4 days, as it did in the Gulf. The Serb army has entrenched itself over hundreds of years, and, unlike in Iraq, they appear to have complete loyalty to their leader, Mr. Milosevic. In other words, if we go into this hostile situation, we will lose American troops.

Look at the history. Hitler had many, many divisions in Yugoslavia during the Second World War, and look how much good that did him.

Mr. Speaker, I would hope that we would all support this measure.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT), the minority leader.

(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members, Republican and Democratic, to vote against this resolution, and I urge you to do it for three simple reasons: First, the language in this resolution is unnecessary.

I was at a meeting a few minutes ago in the White House. Many of the Members here were in the meeting as well. The President was asked, as I have asked him many times, if as a practical matter he would change the policy and ask for ground troops in this situation without a vote of the Congress. And his unequivocal answer then and every time that I have asked him this was that he would not. He would not as a practical matter ask for an introduction of ground troops without coming here, talking to us and allowing time for a vote.

As minority leader I believe strongly that if there is to be a change in the policy by NATO or the United States and we should be seeking ground troops, that it must be debated in the Congress and a vote must be taken in the Congress. I do not know how I would vote. I would want to hear what they have to say, why they want to do it, how it would be done and what the feasibility of it would be.

So I would say to all Members in both parties, on both sides of the aisle, you have my pledge that if there is a change in the policy, I will be asking the Speaker to put on the floor an authorization, and we will debate it and decide it and vote on it.

Secondly, I think this bill, if it passes, would be harmful to our effort. I say that because you have got to think about who is going to be listening to what we are saying.

Mr. Milosevic will be listening carefully to what we say here today. Over the weekend he got a message of unity and resolve by 19 NATO countries. He is probably having to think today, wow, maybe NATO really means this; maybe they really are going to stay with this air campaign; maybe they really do have their act together.

Do you really want to say to him today that we do not know what we are doing, we probably will not be for ground troops? Do you want to take that option off the table? I do not think so.

Third, and most important, is what the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) said: The language in this resolution is unclear, not as well put as it could be, and it leaves in question what can be done in the prosecution of the air war, which has been going on for 30 days.

There are lots of questions about people going across the border to do this, that and the other thing in cooperation with the air war that has nothing to do with the big ground force going over to try to reclaim all or part of Kosovo that I do not think you want to get into.

I appreciate tremendously and respect the sentiment of the gentleman and the gentleman that

brought this resolution. I share their view. I do not think there ought to be a ground war, unless we vote on it and debate it. I totally share their view. But I, with all respect, believe this is not the way to do it. I believe that will happen if that is the decision of NATO.

I urge Members to vote against this so that we can send the right message to Mr. Milosevic and to the American public and to the world. I urge Members to vote no on this. Let us keep the right message out there and stand behind our troops, that are out there every day trying to do the right thing to get this done without a ground war.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ARMEY), the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by thanking the gentleman from Pennsylvania and the gentlewoman from Florida for bringing this measure forward, and commending them for the care by which they have drawn their language and the willingness that they have to listen to people, to respond to people, and to amend the language to meet the concerns of so many people. Indeed, I would take exception to the previous speaker in that regard. I think they have done a very good job and the language is very clear and precise.

What is the problem here? The problem is we really want to reaffirm our partnership relationship with the administration along the lines of what the President has already, with so many of us, made as a commitment, and we want to reverse something of what has been the discouraging history of this.

The President first began working and talking with NATO on this and made a commitment to NATO. After first saying to NATO we would participate in an air war and we would participate in peacekeeping troops on the ground and having made an agreement with various allied nations in NATO, he then came to Congress and said, "Will the Congress endorse or reject this? But, if you reject that, understand it hurts our relationship with NATO." Well, perhaps he should have talked to us before NATO.

Then later on he says, "Well, we will threaten the air campaign." He agrees with NATO, and then comes to us to confirm or reject. Again, perhaps we should have been consulted first. Now when we begin the bombing, they have already made the commitment with NATO, and then he asks us to reject or accept.

With our troops committed to the field we are facing a fait accompli, where any measure, any statement we make, can be misconstrued as failure to support our troops in the field, misconstrued by Milosevic as a failure of will on the American people, misconstrued by NATO as an unwillingness of this Congress to support this President's ability to make agreements with NATO.

We want to change that cycle. We want to say, Mr. President, your relationship between the executive branch in this government and the Congress of the United States, the legislative branch of this government, comes before your relationship with allied nations; that in order to have a unified American government presence on any position we should take, Mr. President, we should come to agreement within this great government first. Then when we make an agreement with our NATO allies, there can be no doubt about it that we are in agreement.

If Mr. Milosevic should ever see American troops on the ground, he should have no doubt that that has been the product of a unified decision between the presidency and the Congress prior to those troops being present on that soil. In that case, he can have no doubt that we mean business.

But let us not put our young men and women, those brave young men and women that accept this responsibility and put their lives at risk, in the position where they are on the ground, under fire, and the President is consulting with the Congress of the United States after the fact of their being in harm's way.

Let us make this relationship very clear. If you put on the uniform of this great land, if you are willing to risk your life, if you allow your son or daughter to be at risk and take on the horrible, fearful worries that families accept, let the families of America know that these young brave people will not be made as people in a theater of open conflict without first the prior unified agreement between the legislative branch and the executive branch of this government.

Congress and the President together can make a commitment to those troops to define a mission and equip them to complete that mission at the highest possible degree of effectiveness with the lowest conceivable level of personal threat. We can do this if we do it together, Mr. President. We cannot do that for these brave young men and women if you act first and consult with us later. Let us straighten out the cycle.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. ROTHMAN).

(Mr. ROTHMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I believe that if and when the President and our military commanders come to the conclusion that they need to introduce American ground forces into Kosovo, that they should come to the Congress and make the case before us. However, I do believe that the Goodling-Fowler bill, while well-intentioned, is the wrong way to go about this.

The bill before us prevents American troops in NATO from rescuing refugees just across the border into Kosovo,

even if the tragedy and the massacre is occurring right before our soldiers' eyes.

□ 1430

It would prevent the prepositioning of supplies and ammunition in the event we and NATO need to intervene on the ground in the future, and it would prevent our military from providing necessary intelligence assistance to conduct our air campaign. But worst of all, it tells Slobodan Milosevic that he will have plenty of time to do what he wants to do and slaughter and mutilate and rape almost 1 million people in Kosovo, because the United States Congress and my Republican colleagues have decided they are going to tie the President's hands, even in the case of an emergency military intervention, should it be necessary; to require the President to come back to the Congress, convene the Congress, hold a debate in order to rescue people or to take emergency steps.

I think that that is wrong, and I urge my colleagues, let us not decide on the necessity of ground troops until the President and the military commanders of NATO ask us for them. But let us not prevent the President and NATO now from using our ground forces, if necessary, only in the case of an emergency. That would be a wrong message for Milosevic; that would endanger our military men and women, and it is a step we should not take. I urge a "no" vote on this bill.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KASICH), the chairman of our Committee on the Budget.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, I guess some could debate the timing of this debate today, but let us not be confused. Our founders really did believe that one man should not have the authority to send our people to war. That is why the Constitution of the United States involves the Congress of the United States, because it is through the Congress of the United States that the people of this country are recognized, their opinions are recognized. So this idea that we are meddling is something our people do not understand if we take that position. The people deserve to be involved in terms of committing our men and women to an armed military conflict.

In addition, one could make the case that we could intervene in a civil war if, in fact, we could be successful. The fact is, the civil war in Kosovo has been raging on since 1389, since the 14th century. That is six centuries' worth of internal fighting, ethnic conflict, religious strife.

The fact is, our intervening in the middle of an ethnic religious civil war that has gone on for six centuries is not likely to be successful. We found this out when we intervened in Somalia. We furthermore found this out when we intervened in Lebanon, even under Ronald Reagan. Being in the middle of civil wars that are not re-

solvable is a mistake for a major power.

The question is when, then, should we intervene militarily? Well, on three grounds. One, when it is in the direct national interests of the United States. Number two, when there is an absolute achievable goal. And number three, when there is a credible exit strategy. None of these criteria can be met in terms of Kosovo. There is no direct national interest, there is not an achievable goal, and finally, there is no credible exit strategy.

If we continue down this road of open-ended military commitments, what we will do is diminish our power. Some people accuse those who are opposed to Kosovo of being isolationists. It is just the opposite. I am a robust internationalist, but what I do know is there must be a balance between military and diplomatic means when it comes to resolving these international problems. If the United States wants to be the policeman of the world, we will find that we will diminish ourselves over the long run and we will find when it is necessary to act against terrorism or to provide worldwide stability in some part of this world, we will be too spread out, we will be too thin, and we will not be able to be effective. That is the prescription for the eroding of a national power of a superpower status into the 21st century.

So, what do we do now? Well, the first thing we do not do is to step on the accelerator. We should not introduce ground troops; we should not escalate the violence. Dropping bombs in a region of the world where fighting has been going on for six centuries and thinking that by more violence we will impose a solution on people in that region is, I believe, false. In fact, to put troops on the ground reinforces a failed policy that is frankly a sign of arrogance.

What should we do? Mediate. We ought to look for a third party that can help us to be able to restore stability, Democratic institutions, and build an economy in that region. We should not let ego or we should not let reputations stand in the way of reaching an agreement that will send the refugees home, stabilize the world, and be able to continue the superpower status of the United States by making good choices of when we should intervene and when we should not.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3½ minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER).

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, as kindly as I can, let me say that Neville Chamberlain rose up and said, let us mediate.

I believe we are doing the right thing with our allies, for the right reason, in the right way to minimize risks to our people. I rise in strong opposition to the two resolutions sponsored by the gentleman from California (Mr. CAMPBELL) and to this bill sponsored by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER) and the gentleman from Penn-

sylvania (Mr. GOODLING). Unlike the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER), I do not believe that this resolution or this bill has the limited effect that she argues that it does. That perhaps is a legitimate and honest difference of opinion.

Mr. Speaker, we have seen an extraordinary event occur here in Washington last week. Not just 19 NATO nations, but 42 nations came to America and celebrated 50 years of commitment to keeping the peace. We are now confronting, in the midst of Europe, where NATO has pledged to keep the peace, the most egregious violation of human rights, the most egregious disruption of the security of the European region as we have seen since 1968.

The bill that is presently before us says that we shall not use elements. I agree with the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON); I am not sure of what that definition is. But I do know and believe that our enemies will interpret that as a constriction on our maneuverability and ability to act. That is a dangerous policy. We should not be engaged in this conflict with that constriction on our troops. It is dangerous, in my opinion, for them. It gives to our enemy a false sense that he may act to the detriment of our people. We ought to reject this bill as not only premature, but as unwise policy.

Mr. Speaker, to my colleagues on the Republican side, let me say that we bombed in the Persian Gulf for 44 days. There was no vote on this floor. We deployed over half a million troops in harm's way. There was no vote on this floor. Why? Because President Bush and Secretary Baker talked to Speaker Foley and said, if you have such a vote, it will undermine our position. So Speaker Foley did not allow a vote until yes, President Bush, as he agreed, came to this floor for the authorization of troops to go in to Kuwait. Not to be deployed, to go into Kuwait.

Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. CALLAHAN) has said, and as our President said as late as this morning to an assembled group of Members of the House, Republicans and Democrats, Senators and House Members, the Speaker of the House and the minority leader, that he would not, without consulting the House, take this action. Let us be united with our President and with our fighting men and women in this important endeavor.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1569.

First, however, I am compelled to express my outrage that we are here today, in this House, engaging in debate about the most serious issues we are ever called upon to consider—the conduct of war and the making of peace—in such a desultory manner.

The Gulf War Resolution was the subject of 16 hours of debate—16 hours, Mr. Speaker. Today we are faced with four separate, conflicting, and mutually exclusive resolutions and we have been limited to 1 hour on each of them.

It is absolutely unconscionable and irresponsible to be considering legislation which requires the arbitrary withdrawal of our forces

participating in the NATO action against Serbia, as does House Concurrent Resolution 82. Such a course would hand Milosevic victory, confirm the genocide he has perpetrated against the Kosovar Albanians, and destroy NATO.

As I have said before, Mr. Speaker, intervention to stop the aggression against civilians in Kosovo is both morally compelling and clearly in our country's national interest. Let us be very clear about what is happening in Kosovo. This is not a civil war.

It is a continuation of the conflict Milosevic instigated in Croatia in 1991 and in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991 to 1995. His aim all along has been the consolidation of his own political power within Serbia. Milosevic is a tyrant and a war criminal.

Former President George Bush recognized this fact in 1992 when he warned Milosevic that aggression by his forces against the civilian population of Kosovo would be met by an immediate military response by the United States. President Clinton reiterated that warning in early 1993.

Having made the commitment to our NATO allies, to the people of Kosovo and, indeed, to the world, that we will not stand by and watch ethnic cleansing and butchery in the heart of Europe, it is my firm belief that we must see this action through to the end.

Last week, in a speech before the National Fire and Emergency Services Caucus dinner which I cochair with my good friend CURT WELDON, Senator JOHN MCCAIN called for such a commitment, including the use of ground troops. Senator MCCAIN stated that he did not recommend this course lightly and was prepared to bear responsibility for the outcome. He said:

I would rather face that sad burden than hide from my conscience because I sought an advantageous political position to seek shelter behind. Nor could I endure the dishonor of having known my country's interests demanded a course of action, but avoided taking it because the costs of defending them were substantial, as were its attendant political risks.

America must lead, Mr. Speaker; we must not equivocate. Such a course would encourage the enemies of peace, the bullies of the world, and would surely endanger our men and women in uniform. As we enter the 21st century, America stands as the beacon of democracy, freedom, and human rights. People around the world look to our country's strength in their struggle for democracy and basic human rights. We must not, Mr. Speaker, stand now in the shadow of weakness and isolationism.

Our cause is just. Let us act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GUTKNECHT). The Chair would advise Members that the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) has 10 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPENCE) has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SCARBOROUGH).

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to remind my good friend, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER) that it was 4 years ago that the President of the United States also promised a group of assembled Congressmen and Senators over at the

White House that the Bosnian operation would last 1 year. Today we find ourselves 4 years and \$10 billion into a quagmire, still engaged in a Balkan civil war.

It is all too clear that this administration does not understand what they are getting into. While the gentleman reminds us of lessons learned in 1938 with Chamberlain, I would recommend we also look at 1948. That was the year that Tito told the Soviet Union to get out of the Balkans three short years after the beginning of Soviet control. The Soviet Union got out, because they understood better than us the six century civil war that continues to rage on.

This administration does not understand the delicate dynamics of this Balkan civil war. We have a Secretary of State who had guaranteed on public television that this was going to be a short, clean war. We have a President, mirroring what LBJ did in the 1960s, actually selecting targets in this civil war. They do not understand what they are getting into, and before we accelerate, like the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KASICH) said, we better take a long, hard look at what we are doing.

This is constitutionally and practically correct, and as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I support it wholeheartedly.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Guam (Mr. UNDERWOOD).

(Mr. UNDERWOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I emphatically oppose H.R. 1569. This bill is a slap in the face of the commander's ability to use a combined armed force in battle. Conflicts are not won by air, land or sea forces alone. It is a joint nature of a combined arms campaign that provides the flexibility and firepower for a commander to accomplish his or her mission, responding to a changing environment.

This bill is not well crafted or thought out. Passage of this bill would seriously degrade the operational commander's ability to respond to any and all contingencies. It would not allow us to pursue attacking enemy forces across international borders, thus giving Milosevic a safe area. It will not allow us to rapidly introduce ground troops even in a permissive environment. It will hamstring the operational commander's ability to adopt and adapt to the ever-changing situation in the Balkans.

This is not a preemptive strike against the use of ground troops as it is advertised. It is a preemptive strike on the flexibility to respond to emergency conditions. It is a preemptive strike on the safety of our troops. It is a preemptive strike which will make Mr. Milosevic very happy.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. GRAHAM).

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that there seems to be a con-

sensus building along two lines: timing and trust. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT), the minority leader, took to the microphone and says that he agrees with the idea that this body, this Nation, should debate whether or not we send ground troops. It is a matter of timing. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER) that just spoke said that the President has given us his word. That is a matter of trust. I do not have the confidence he does to trust this President without having an engagement in this debate now.

I want more rather than less debate on this issue. I want it sooner rather than later, because I see three big problems for ground troops. The coalition will not hang together; the political stomach is not there for a ground war. The dominance in the air that we have militarily will be lost, and the Russian instability that will come from a U.S.-led NATO invasion would start the Cold War all over again, potentially.

If anybody criticizes this bill on drafting, then they have to look this operation in the face and see if they can find any flaws with it. This bill is properly drafted. Now is the time to speak. More rather than less, sooner rather than later, before we get a lot of people killed for no good reason.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. TIERNEY).

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I believe that Mr. Milosevic is wrong and that the War Crimes Tribunal will eventually have its course and way with him. I believe that whatever brought us into this situation, whether people agree or disagree with the events, we are not going to be able to undo the past.

I believe that we should and must try to reach a diplomatic solution to this situation which resolves the refugee situation, which resettles people, which leaves Mr. Milosevic subject to the War Crimes Tribunal and which gets us back on track, and I believe that we have to do something about making sure Mr. Milosevic has encouragement to come to the table, which is why the war strikes will continue.

With regard to ground troops, I ask the sponsors of this bill whether or not they might be willing to have a unanimous consent to change the word "elements" to "troops" and resolve whatever disagreement we have on that. I would hope to get an answer to that.

□ 1445

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH).

(Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I support the Goodling resolution. Some say we must listen to the President, some say we must listen to military leaders. I say we must listen to the now still voices of those Americans who made the ultimate sacrifice more than a generation ago in an undeclared war, in an

unwinnable war, a bright, shining lie of a war where truth was the first casualty.

Now we are engaged in a great humanitarian mission, or so we are told. But humanitarians do not excuse the bombing of Albanians and Serbian civilians. Humanitarians do not bomb passenger trains. Humanitarians do not bomb refugees fleeing the battle. Humanitarians do not bomb residential areas. Humanitarians do not blow up water systems, electric systems, sewage systems, and create an ecological catastrophe in the name of peace. Humanitarians do not leave thousands of bomblets in the ground so refugee children can lose their lives after the battle.

No more bombing the villages to save the village, no more ground troops sacrificed to redeem our failure in the air. All we are saying is to give peace a chance. All we are saying is to give peace a chance through negotiation and mediation and through diplomacy. Give peace a chance.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. SNYDER).

Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Speaker, I am voting against this bill today. Number one, I think it is poorly written. We have already had discussions about the phrase "ground elements," but hey, I think we can get some lawyers to help us command.

I think it is also rushed. We have had ever-changing language. First there was no language to deal with our own downed pilots. Then we had no language to deal with U.S. citizens and pilots. Now we have language to deal with allied crew members. Be wary of an ever-changing bill.

Third, this is the wrong message to our allies. What if we have British or French troops kidnapped like our ground troops were kidnapped in Macedonia, and they come to us and ask us to help, and we say, are they a member of air crew, and they say, no, they are relief workers. We will say, we will file a bill next week and take care of that.

Very poor language. That is what happens when we rush things on through. This is a poorly-worded bill at the wrong time. Please vote no.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER).

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Speaker, this resolution has a noble purpose in that it attempts to assert the role of the Congress in any decision to commit American forces to a ground war in Kosovo. It does so, however, in the wrong way and at the wrong time. It prohibits deployment of ground elements unless Congress specifically authorizes deployment by law.

I represent one of the soldiers who is held captive today in Yugoslavia, Stephen Gonzalez, of Huntsville. If this resolution had been the law on March 31 when those three were captured, this resolution would have prevented our forces from pursuing the captors of

those three American soldiers. Mr. Speaker, line 24, page 2 of the bill makes it very clear, the only exception is to recover someone who is a member of an air crew.

Mr. Speaker, this bill also approaches this issue not only in the wrong way, but at the wrong time. It prohibits deployment of ground elements in a way that sends a very bad signal to President Milosevic. The threat of the use of ground troops should be on the table, because it sends a message of NATO resolve to Milosevic, a message that he must hear.

Contrary to promoting the congressional interest in bringing a just, diplomatic settlement to the Yugoslavian conflict, this resolution makes diplomatic settlement more difficult and strengthens the hand of President Milosevic. It increases the likelihood of the campaign of ethnic cleansing and suffering being waged against innocent people for a prolonged period of time.

Mr. Speaker, the President said today that he will seek the support of this Congress if he makes the decision to send ground troops into a major deployment in Kosovo. I believe that we need to take him at his word and we need to reject this resolution, which could do harm both to American troops and to our national interests.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. TRAFICANT).

(Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I support this resolution. Europe should be providing the ground troops. We have been propping up Europe much too long.

But I am more concerned about what we are not doing here today. We should be arming the KLA so they can help protect their own citizens. We should be supporting independence, because they will never coexist and there will never be a lasting peace. We should be going after Milosevic for war crimes.

One thing for sure, now I know why the President of the United States has usurped the congressional power to declare war. Congress has no backbone for it. Today is a good debate. It will now separate the powers the way the Constitution determined it should be. Let us let Europe provide the ground troops.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, our problem is not with the idea of authorization. The President legally should seek our authorization before committing ground troops, and politically he would be well advised to get it.

Our problem is with the text of this resolution, because it creates a potential legal quagmire for troops that we have deployed. It uses the word "ground elements," not exactly a word of art, but instead of using "ground troops" or "ground forces," it says

"ground elements," so as to include not just personnel but materiel, not just troops but equipment and weapons, as well.

So the first casualty of this sweeping ban, this language in this resolution, is going to be foredeployed and prepositioned equipment. Why do we want to preposition? Because if we need M-1 tanks, if we need Bradleys in this theater, we will have to begin today prepositioning those tanks and Bradleys and the other heavy equipment, because we will not have time when the need arises.

That does not mean we may need them for a ground force that will be conducting a ground war. We may need them for a multinational implementation force.

If we have learned anything from Beirut to Mogadishu, it is that when we send in one of these peacekeeping forces, they had better be tough. They had better be imposing. They had better have the equipment, so that nobody dares take them on.

If we read this resolution, it says, don't you dare spend a dime on anything like that for deployment of prepositioning that might be introduced into this theater. Keep on reading and we can come up with all sorts of scenarios that this would potentially prohibit or bar.

Let us assume, for example, that our intelligence told us that Serb troops were massing just outside Macedonia or just outside Albania. This would prohibit us from taking a preemptive first strike.

Let us assume that we did know in advance if they crossed the border of one of these countries and we counterattacked, drove them out of the country, and wanted to pursue them. We would have to stop at the border.

Let us assume, and I hope we have, some on-the-ground military intelligence in Montenegro, in Kosovo. This would bar that, it would prohibit that. Let us assume we have some special forces operations covertly operating at night in one of those countries. This would bar that. It would deny us the kind of information we need to be intelligent.

Mr. Speaker, the authors of the resolution have tried to solve this problem by rewording Subsection B and making an exception for air crews that are shot down. But that limited exception shows us just how strict the language is.

When we go through this we understand, and it is complex for us to understand, and we can certainly conceive of many circumstances this would prohibit. This is going to create a legal quagmire for our troops in this theater. We should not do that to them.

We have the President's assurance he will come and seek our authority before he goes on a ground war, if he does. We should not impose these additional complications.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. NORWOOD).

Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to simply point out that the right to start a war or declare a war is left to the American people. They get to do that through their elected representatives. The reason the Constitution gives that right to the American people is that we are going to ask them to sacrifice their sons and daughters and our Treasury on behalf of the war that they asked us to start.

This amendment was mentioned earlier, that it takes a lot of the options off the table. It takes only one option off the table, and that is the option of the President to start a war with ground troops without the permission of the American people.

Mr. Speaker, if we need to have a ground war, the President can come to Congress, where he should come, because this is what is known as the balance of power, when the legislative branch has some power and the executive branch does. When the Executive is wrong, and I think they are wrong, they should come to the Congress. I ask Members to support this amendment.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GUTKNECHT). The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I take this opportunity to close, and to mention briefly that the President sent a letter to the Speaker dated April 28, part of which reads as follows: "However, were I to change my policy with regard to introduction of ground forces, I can assure you that I would fully consult with the Congress." That should put an end to that.

Let me tell the Members what this legislation does. If this is passed, this legislation would prohibit any preemptive attack by American forces based on an intelligence assessment of an impending attack by enemy forces.

It would prohibit American forces from pursuing attacking enemy forces following an enemy incursion across international borders. It would prohibit the rescue of any non-U.S. headquarters personnel. It would prohibit the rescue or support of any non-U.S. personnel from a nongovernmental agency. It would prohibit the rescue of any military personnel from Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, or Romania. It would also prohibit the rescue of peacekeeping forces in a peacekeeping role in a permissive environment.

Again, I say, read this. This bill, with the language thereof, has been a moving target. We cannot allow this to pass. If a bill should come up at a time that is proper, based upon what the President says, that is what we should debate at that time. This is out of time. This improper bill is poorly written. I certainly urge a no vote thereof.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MRS. FOWLER

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment, and I ask unanimous

consent that the amendment be considered and adopted.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mrs. FOWLER: On page 2, Line 12, strike "elements" and insert "troops".

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I wish to point out that my friend, the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER) a few moments ago stated that this was language inserted and written by the legislative counsel, and that they knew what they were doing.

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The language in this bill, since it was first initiated, has been a moving target. We cannot allow it to go forward with the uncertainty of this language, the uncertainty of this bill, and I very, very sadly, because she is a friend, I very sadly have to object.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GUTKNECHT). Objection is heard.

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I am sorry, because this was at the request of several Members of the minority who wanted that word change. I was certainly willing to do that, but I still stand by my previous explanation of the intent of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPENCE) has 1 minute remaining.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I apologize to the Members on my side for not being able to recognize them, but we do not have enough time. As a matter of fact, I am revising and extending my own remarks because I have not got the necessary time to deliver what I would like to deliver at this time.

I rise in support of H.R. 1569 to prohibit the use of Department of Defense funds for the deployment of U.S. ground forces in Yugoslavia absent a specific Congressional authorization. Since the initial 1995 deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia, I have opposed the use of ground troops in the Balkans, and I continue to do so today.

First and foremost, my opposition is based on the recognition that our military forces have been reduced so dramatically over the past decade that an enlarged, open-ended commitment in the Balkans will unquestionably jeopardize our ability to protect U.S. interests in other critical regions of the world where the threat is serious and imminent. Prior to the beginning of Operation "Allied Force," the Joint Chiefs of Staff had assessed the ability of U.S. armed forces to execute our own national military strategy as entailing "moderate to high risk." This risk has grown worse over the past

several months as we have poured scarce military resources and assets into the Balkans. Just today I read an article in Jane's Defense Weekly indicating that the Joint Chiefs are on the verge of changing their assessment of this risk from "high" to "very high." As General Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, and every theater commander-in-chief have testified, "risk" in this context means longer wars and significantly higher casualties.

Based on planning efforts last fall, defeating the Serb army on the ground in Yugoslavia would require a NATO force of 200,000 ground troops or more. While NATO plans have not specified what percentage of such a force would be Americans, precedent tells me that such a NATO force would include tens of thousands of U.S. ground troops—at least several divisions' worth.

The implications of U.S. ground troops serving even as peacekeepers or as part of an international occupation force would have serious consequences for our broader global interest.

Administration policy-makers are currently discussing a possible NATO occupation force in Kosovo that would be roughly the same size as the force initially deployed to Bosnia. That force included 60,000 NATO troops, about 20,000 of which were American. This size American ground contingent would, directly or indirectly, one way or another, involve much of the active Army. Rotating such a large ground force through Kosovo, with no near-term prospect of withdrawal, combined with the ongoing deployments in Bosnia, would make it all but impossible for the Army to play its essential role in fighting and winning two major regional conflicts in places like Korea and the Persian Gulf—in other words, to be able to execute the national military strategy.

Tying down a large U.S. ground force in the Balkans will cause our friends—and our enemies—to legitimately question our ability to protect and promote our interests and to remain a force for stability in other critical regions of the world. How will Saddam Hussein gauge our ability to defend Kuwait if much of our Army is stuck in the Balkans? Will we be able to rapidly reinforce South Korea in the event of an attack by the North? Would we be able to effectively react to an escalating crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait? The answers to these questions are far from reassuring, and should concern us all.

In anticipation of the inevitable and oversimplified response that we surely cannot abandon our commitment to NATO, let me just say that I am not suggesting that the United States would walk away from its responsibilities or should not play a critical role in any NATO combined air and ground campaign if the alliance heads down this controversial path.

While I remain strongly opposed to the commitment of U.S. ground troops in the Balkans, we should not lose sight of the reality that the United States is leading the air war and would continue to do so in the event of a ground campaign. In addition, the United States is currently providing the vast majority of the operation's strategic lift, communications, logistics and intelligence support. Is this shirking our responsibilities to NATO? Can anyone honestly say we are failing to do our fair share? I do not think so.

We simply cannot afford to ignore our interests and the growing threats around the world by allowing ourselves to fall into the trap set

by our allies, as happened in Bosnia, that NATO military operations cannot succeed and the alliance will fall apart unless U.S. ground troops are leading the way. If we continue to view the Balkans in isolation from the rest of what is becoming an increasingly dangerous world, we do so at our own peril.

Mr. Speaker, there's an old adage that says, "When you're in a hole, stop digging." We've already dug ourselves a big hole in Bosnia and we ought to think twice before we dig that hole deeper in Kosovo. Unless some balance is restored between the nation's diplomatic and foreign policy commitments and the ability of U.S. armed forces to underwrite them, history is likely to look back on the post-Cold War world "peace dividend" as resulting in a more dangerous world in which America's credibility and resolve were put to the test with alarming frequency.

Mr. Speaker, I would just like to say simply, in closing, that I support this resolution. I have been opposed to ground troops in Bosnia under any conditions. As a matter of fact, we should not even be in the Balkans. The national security of this country is not at stake. Even for those who think that it is, it does not rise to the level of importance that other areas of this world do, and we are unprepared to defend against the many serious threats we have in other parts of the world today. This further lessens our ability to defend against these threats. And for that reason, I oppose sending ground troops into this area.

Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1569, a bill to prohibit the funding of ground elements in Yugoslavia without prior Congressional authorization.

Let me be clear. If at some point in the future our military commanders determine that ground troops are necessary to achieve our military objectives in Yugoslavia, I believe Congress ought to vote on their deployment. This bill, however, extends far beyond that simple objective and could seriously jeopardize the security of U.S. forces currently in the region.

This bill does not just prohibit the funding of ground troops prior to Congressional authorization, but rather prohibits the funding of all U.S. ground "elements" in Yugoslavia. This ill-defined language would create a legal quagmire for the U.S. forces already deployed in the Balkans. For example, would this bill prohibit the funding of Apache maintenance crews in Albania because the Apache is as an air-to-ground weapon that is deployed in Yugoslavia? It is an open question. There is no question, however, that this bill would legally prohibit U.S. forces in the region from launching a preemptive strike against forces in Yugoslavia even if they received intelligence that they were about to be attacked. If Yugoslavia were to attack beyond its borders, this bill would legally prohibit U.S. forces from carrying the battle into Yugoslavia even if our military commanders considered such action vital to the protection of American troops.

In the name of protecting U.S. troops, Mr. Speaker, this bill actually endangers the brave men and women who are already serving in the region. I support Congressional approval before ground troops are deployed in a hostile environment, but I cannot support legislation that ties the hands of our nation's military

commanders. For this reason, I oppose H.R. 1569 and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the decision to go to war is one of the most important decisions that our country can make. As elected representatives, we have to consider our international and domestic obligations, as well as our individual and collective moral beliefs.

There is no question that Slobodan Milosevic has committed horrible atrocities in Kosovo and I do not believe the international community should stand by idly. The votes today though, require us to look at the international context of this conflict and some of the consequences of our response thus far. I believe the evidence leads us to the view that Congress should have a say before any kind of ground troops are deployed and that is why I will support H.R. 1569.

The political process that gauges the appropriateness of humanitarian intervention needs to catch up with the military's ability and willingness to undertake those operations. In that respect, today's debate serves a useful purpose. Regardless of how you intend to vote on today's measures, an open and fair debate on real, credible options is democratically healthy and Constitutionally necessary. I opposed the rule earlier today because I do not think it rose to this standard. It imposed an absurdly small amount of time for debate and took the unprecedented step of precluding further House consideration of any resolutions under the War Powers Resolution dealing with Yugoslavia during the remainder of this Congress.

I also must observe that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have taken an excessively captious approach to the president's strategy in Yugoslavia and the administration's foreign policy generally. Yet I believe this Congress has been derelict in its own duties, happy to sit back and criticize the president. First it avoided action for the first month of the war, limiting itself to a vote on peacekeeping troops after hostilities have ended and a symbolic vote to support the troops. Now the House is voting on a group of four resolutions, none of which present real, credible alternatives to bombing.

I think there are some very difficult questions that should inform a thorough debate on war in Yugoslavia, starting with how we define what we are trying to accomplish.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

The military objectives in Kosovo have been variously described as (1) forcing Milosevic to make peace; (2) severely degrading his capacity to carry out military action in the future; (3) deterring an even bloodier offensive against civilians in Kosovo; and (4) allowing the return of refugees and ensuring their self-governance. What I'm wondering, is what thresholds have been established to determine when we have accomplished these goals? What role do we envision for Congress in determining when the mission objectives have been completed and what criteria will be used to make that determination? I am voting for H.R. 1569 because I believe it will preserve those Congressional prerogatives.

I also do not think we have adequate assurances from regional states such as Russia that they will refrain from participating in the war; we have boxed Mr. Yeltsin into a very tight corner domestically. I know that the Deputy Secretary of State has been working hard on that issue, but the public statements from

Russia are nevertheless alarming. For example, earlier this week a high ranking Russian official noted that the NATO embargo on fuel does not apply to Russia, since it is not a member of NATO. And there is strong nationalist momentum in the Duma to supply the Serbs.

I also wonder if the removal of the current regime in Belgrade a prerequisite for a negotiated settlement to the conflict in the Balkans. I've seen what happened with our Iraq policy and I'm afraid we may be headed down the same kind of path, where compliance is unilaterally defined and goals are arbitrarily shifted.

VIGOROUS, MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

Regardless of how Congress votes today, I hope we will vigorously pursue diplomatic options. As Admiral Eugene Carroll (ret.) of the Center for Defense Information has suggested, we cannot have a solution to the Yugoslav conflict that is overly reliant on military force. The situation demands a political solution eventually, no matter how you feel about the ongoing bombing. There have been numerous attempts at diplomacy thus far.

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's peace proposal on April 9 demanded: "First, an end immediately to the campaign of intimidation and expulsion of the civilian population; two, to cease all activities of military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo and to withdraw these forces; three, to accept unconditionally the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes; four, to accept the deployment of an international military force to ensure a secure environment for the return of refugees and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid; and finally, to permit the international community to verify compliance with these undertakings." In order to make this proposal work, Annan called for a cessation of hostilities as "a prelude to a lasting political solution to the crisis, which can only be achieved through diplomacy."

The European Union made a peace proposal placing Kosovo under international protectorship if Yugoslavian forces agreed to withdraw. And of course Russia has been to the bargaining table a number of times. These efforts have gotten scant attention and minimal diplomatic support. Much of this is a result of the deliberate marginalization of the UN.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

It is inappropriate for NATO to be bombing without specific authorization from the United Nations Security Council. When the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1199 on September 23, it called on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to stop repression against civilians and withdraw forces from Kosovo. The Resolution specifically noted that should progress on this and other stated matter be inadequate that the Security Council would "consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region" and remained seized of the matter.

Moreover, since Article 53 of the UN Charter specifically states that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council", I think it was inappropriate for NATO to proceed without specific Security Council authorization. Article 39 of the Charter clearly states that "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." The fact of the

matter is that the Security Council should have made any determination regarding the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression in Kosovo. It is also not clear that the Security Council ever made any determination under Article 42 as to whether force could be employed by NATO. I am aware of the Secretary General's public statements, but I think these issues remain unresolved.

The United States should address these issues before the UN Security Council along with the authority for and composition of a post-war peacekeeping force. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State told the Speaker today in a letter that the Administration is "willing to consider a U.S. contribution to an international security presence," but they insist that it must have "NATO at its core." This kind of inflexibility is not justified.

One of the key stumbling blocks from the beginning has not been a restoration of autonomy for Kosovo or the withdrawal of troops, it has been whether the implementation force will be NATO-led or include more of our allies who have an interest in peace. I think the peacekeeping operation must have at its core an international institution broader than NATO, such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The fact of the matter is that NATO has a very limited mandate and limited membership.

THE FUTURE OF NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty clearly limits NATO to acts of self defense. Article Five states that "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack on them all. . . ." NATO does not have any legal authority to engage in military action that is not self-defense such as humanitarian intervention; I'm saying this independent of whether this intervention is morally correct or not.

The escalation of the conflict has had devastating consequences for non-combatants. On April 6, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) took the highly unusual step of asking NATO to take over relief coordination due to the extraordinary demands being placed on their resources. I do not think we have fully studied the propriety of a military alliance making decisions that greatly impact the care, maintenance and legal status of refugees—work that is ordinarily carried out by a non-political relief agency.

There has also been a great many civilian deaths, partly as a consequence of NATO's decision to target non-military facilities such as TV stations. It is also an unintended consequence of flying at high altitudes in the interest of minimizing the risks to pilots. This happened on April 12, when NATO planes struck a civilian train on a bridge over the Juzna Morava River. The pilot fired his missiles before he even saw the target. The next day, 16 patients in a hospital in Banica were wounded by flying glass during a bombing raid. On April 6, dozens of people were hurt or killed in an attack on Aleksinac when bombs went 1500 yards astray. When the Pentagon admitted that a bomb went astray, the *New York Times* reported the next day that in fact more than one missile was used. The *Washington Post* reported on April 13 that NATO had acknowledged bombing residential areas of Kosovo, Pristina and the Southern Serbian town of Aleksinac where at least 20

people were killed. For exactly these reasons, the head of the International Red Cross, Cornelio Sommaruga, called this week for an end to bombing civilian targets by NATO.

I know it is extremely difficult to avoid civilian casualties during war. I mention these incidents because I think we need to be cognizant of the fact that the more frequently they occur, the more difficult it is going to be to build a political solution on the ground after the war.

EXIT STRATEGY AND WAR BY PROXY

I do not think that I have adequate assurances that neither the U.S. nor any third party country will arm (or has armed) the KLA as part its war-fighting or exit strategy. We are all already aware of the atrocities that have been committed by Milosevic's forces but I was appalled by some information I received just today about the KLA. According to Human Rights Watch, the KLA began its first major offensive, an attack on the town of Orahovac on July 18, 1998. "At least forty-two people were killed in the fighting, and on estimate, another forty remain unaccounted for. Reports of mass graves and summary executions surfaced, but remain unconfirmed." The press release also notes that on August 27, 1998, "twenty-two civilians were reportedly executed by KLA members in the village of Kle ka" and on September 9, 1998, "the bodies of thirty-five people, including both ethnic Serbs and Albanians, were found in an artificial lake near the village of Glodjane. The evidence strongly suggests that they were killed by the KLA." The Associated Press notes that the KLA publicly claimed responsibility for bombing government targets in 1996.

Some of my colleagues are in favor of arming the KLA. I think we need to be concerned about the KLA not just because they may be perpetrators of the same kind of violence that NATO is supposedly trying to stop but also because there is such strong potential for mission blowback.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Let me repeat that I do not think we should have looked the other way. There is an obvious tension in international law between the obligation to respect the sovereignty of nations versus the duty to intervene to stop genocide and crimes against humanity. The UN Charter begins by stating its purpose is to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind." The Charter condemns violations of sovereignty and states that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . . ." At the same time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the rights of individuals against oppressive states, and the parties of the Genocide Convention are committed to prevent and punish the crime of genocide.

The answer is that both U.S. and international law need to be a part of determining when atrocities warrant humanitarian intervention. This combination ensures multilateralism, helps to share the costs of operations and takes into consideration the opinions of our allies, which in this case should include countries who are not NATO members and who could contribute to a peaceful resolution of this crisis.

When I learned that an F-117 had been shot down and that troops were being held in captivity, it brought home the horrors of war

even sooner than I feared. Congressional oversight and involvement must stay in sync with this rapidly unfolding war. I urge my colleagues to vote for H.R. 1569 and to not abandon the path to peace.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I wish to share my remarks today on the current situation in Kosovo with my colleagues and the American public. The systematic campaign of brutality by Slobodan Milosevic has forced the United States and NATO to take forceful action. As the human tragedies mount—a growing number of refugees existing in desperate conditions, families being ripped apart, torture, rape and murder—the House considered important measures about how the United States should proceed.

I joined my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in supporting H.R. 1569 to assert the constitutional authority of Congress. We made it clear that the President cannot commit the United States military to a ground war without the explicit consent of Congress. The House today made it clear that the President must first receive the approval of Congress should the nature of the mission require a shift in military operations. At this time, the President and his military advisors have not signaled a change in the current strategy of air strikes, but if and when they do, I want the opportunity to vote on whether or not it is in fact necessary to deploy ground troops to end the genocide.

I cast a vote in favor of Resolution 21 explicitly authorizing the President to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in Yugoslavia. By doing so, I put myself firmly on record in support of the United States and our NATO allies in this moral struggle to rescue the victims of ethnic cleansing and to put an end to such atrocities. As an American who believes in freedom and a Jew who remembers the lessons of the Holocaust, I could do no less.

Even as we engage in these air strikes, the United States must place the highest priority on exploring and implementing all diplomatic options to end the conflict and to redouble our commitment to humanitarian relief.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Speaker, at the outset, let me say this Congress is unified in its support for our military when involved in operations around the world. The men and women in uniform have our full and unequivocal support. With that said, I have deep reservations about the foreign policy of this administration that is now being conducted by the military in Operation Allied Force.

Two weeks ago, Defense Secretary Bill Cohen and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Hugh Shelton testified before the House Armed Services Committee to try to explain the Clinton Administration's policy and objectives in Kosovo. Specifically, why this Balkan civil war is vital to America's national security interests and to define the end game. I regret to say they were not convincing. Moreover, it is very apparent that there is no end game—no exit strategy. I voted against sending our troops into this internal conflict, and unless a compelling case is made, I will continue to oppose sending in U.S. ground forces into Kosovo.

It is clear that the President chose to ignore the professional advice of the military leadership, and sided with his foreign policy team who made this into a humanitarian plea. Frankly, I think the air campaign may have

precipitated the ethnic cleansing and suffering in Kosovo.

We have interjected ourselves into a centuries-old conflict, where both the Serbs and Albanians have each been the aggressor over Kosovo. By virtue of Operation Allied Force targeting Serbia assets, we are siding with the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) which has strong ties to organized crime, gun running, drug trafficking and international terrorist groups like Bin Laden. With the Administration's mishandling of the Balkan crisis, I can only think of the old saying that "those who fail to remember the lessons of history, are destined to repeat its mistakes."

To compound matters, this is the first time in NATO's history, a defensive coalition by charter, that military action has been conducted against a sovereign nation over internal strife. While there is consensus among the 19 member nations of NATO for the Air Campaign, there is no consensus about a ground campaign. It's evident that Milosevic has not been deterred by only an air campaign. An assessment has been made that more than 200,000 troops would be needed to invade Serbia, yet no ground plan even exists. President Clinton is leading our nation down the path of "mission creep" that will suck our military into a quagmire that resembles Vietnam—a situation that America has vowed never to repeat.

Mr. Speaker, we have an opportunity to prevent Operation Allied Force from becoming a full blown war if we act now. The European Union must step up to the plate and assert its responsibility for its own region. If the EU determines that the strife between the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians warrants military intervention, so be it; they can prove the forces.

Diplomacy is still an option. Russian efforts to broker a settlement in Kosovo were never allowed to succeed; these efforts should be vigorously pursued. We must re-examine all of these options before we go down this path of no return; support the resolution HR 1569.

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this resolution. This resolution would prohibit funds to deploy ground elements without prior authorization. Mr. Speaker, this resolution goes far beyond the concerns of many who believe Congress should express its will before a ground invasion of Yugoslavia is contemplated.

I do believe that Congress should express the views of our constituents as we proceed with action in the Balkan region. I however do not want to limit the flexibility of our military in their efforts to make Slobodan Milosevic comply with international norms. Mr. Speaker, I find it ironic that this body is even considering this resolution in light of past precedent. When President Bush asked this body to authorize action in Kuwait, this body had sufficient time to debate the matter. Secondly, this body did not attempt to block our commanders' flexibility and ability to respond to emergency situations.

I believe that NATO's operations are making a difference in the region both militarily and in providing comfort to thousands and thousands of refugees. But it is important for us to remember that when conducting operations like this one that it is going to take time. I want to ensure that Milosevic pays a heavy price for his present policy of repression against the Kosovar Albanians, to alter his calculation about continuing on this course, and to seri-

ously diminish his military capacity to exert his will over Kosovo.

In addition, Mr. Speaker there are thousands and thousands of ethnic Albanians who have received the full brunt of the Yugoslavian army and police force in Kosovo. These people have lost their homes and possessions. They have lost countless loved ones to unspeakable atrocities. We may never know the full extent of the horrors committed by the Yugoslavian army. We are left with the words of refugees fleeing this country. Their eyes have witnessed and their words speak of men and boys who have been led off to die.

The 37,000 refugees in Montenegro, the 262,000 refugees in Albania, and the 120,000 in Macedonia; place the responsibility for the Kosovo tragedy squarely on the shoulders of Slobodan Milosevic. Mr. Speaker, we cannot deny the evidence of mass graves nor the humanitarian crisis ongoing in Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania.

Mr. Speaker, we must be patient in this endeavor, for the stability of Europe is at risk. I believe that we must stay the course, for this is a battle that Milosevic cannot be allowed to win and that NATO must not lose.

There is a great deal at stake in this operation including the stability of Europe. We cannot lose sight of the fact that on two occasions we have sent young men and women to fight and die in order to restore the stability of Europe. Mr. Speaker, if Milosevic is allowed to succeed then we will be establishing a dangerous precedent for the next century. NATO must succeed in its endeavor to restore order to Kosovo and to establish a lasting peace based on fairness and justice.

Although I do not support the use of ground forces, I feel that this resolution goes too far. This sweeping resolution threatens to severely restrict the ability of our military commanders to conduct operations in the Balkans. There are situations, which could arise that require the deployment of ground troops. I cannot support H.R. 1569 because it imposes a risk to both our forces and those of our allies.

Mr. Speaker, this effort is in our national interest, our current policy best represents our interests. We must prevail in this struggle because the interests and the values, which embody our nation and those of our allies, are at stake.

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this resolution, which would prohibit funding for ground forces unless deployment is specifically authorized. The only narrow exception provided in this measure is for rescuing US service personnel.

This resolution would undermine our ability to achieve NATO objectives in Kosovo and, more importantly, would send the wrong signal to President Milosevic about our resolve in the Balkans.

I encourage my colleagues to consider the ramifications of this resolution, which limits our country's military leaders. If we are to ensure a stable Europe and stop the atrocities, then we must destroy Milosevic's ability to wage his campaigns of ethnic cleansing.

I believe that the United States should continue to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) efforts in the Balkans. NATO has been principally responsible for the relative stability and economic prosperity that Europe has enjoyed over the last fifty years. Our experience in two world wars clearly demonstrates that a stable Europe is in the national interest of the United States.

By putting unwise restrictions on our armed forces, this resolution could ultimately jeopardize our involvement in the 19-nation NATO operation.

In attempting to make a political statement, the Republican leadership hastily put this resolution together without involving the minority and has circumvented the committee process.

I urge my colleagues to oppose this resolution, which could do more to harm our national security interests and jeopardize our men and women in uniform involved with this operation.

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1569, a bill that would prohibit the appropriated funds of the Department of Defense from being used to deploy ground troops to Yugoslavia without the consent of Congress.

I still have grave concerns about NATO actions in Kosovo because I see no direct U.S. interests at stake, no clearly defined mission and no exit strategy. After five weeks of bombing, there is no evidence that our actions are either convincing Slobodan Milosevic to agree to a peace treaty or protecting the thousands of ethnic Albanians who are fleeing Kosovo. The recent deployment of Apache helicopters, tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers to the Balkans, and the Monday's call up of 33,000 reservists, is clear evidence that President Clinton intends to introduce ground forces to Kosovo itself sometime in the near future. H.R. 1569 simply requires the President to consult Congress before he does so.

While I abhor the ethnic violence and the forced eviction of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, I am still not convinced that this situation merits sending in U.S. ground troops. With that said Mr. Speaker, I urge the passage of this bill because it sends a clear and concise message to President Clinton—that Congress has a constitutional role to play and that the President must get the authorization of the Congress before he can commit ground troops to Yugoslavia.

Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of H.R. 1569.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, if you don't believe we should send troops into the Balkans—then there is a clear pattern of how you should vote today.

If you believe that the War Powers Resolution offers the best means for preventing the president from taking us to war—then you know the course to follow.

What we are discussing today is the war in the Balkans. This region is a tapestry of overlapping ethnic rivalries where medieval and modern history are intertwined. As with the Middle East, the situation is very complicated. But where the Middle East resembles a game of checkers, the Balkan region is more like three dimensional chess.

The central point is that the Balkans represent a process of history and memory which has created a multiplier effect for violence. It is not a phenomenon of "modern hate," but a monstrous creation partially wrought by the collapse of the multinational Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. It is not a situation open to easy solutions. We are dealing with a primitive ferocity there.

Today, we must decide if the President can take the United States further into the Balkan conflict without the approval of Congress. After all, the Constitution invests Congress with the power to make war.

To my knowledge, no substantial war with the accompanying carnage has ever been

fought solely on the basis of human rights. If they were, then surely we would be fighting around the globe in many countries. Yes, human rights are among the noblest of causes, but wars are fought over national interests.

If the President had started this campaign in the right way, by using the full measure of our airpower, this conflict might have been resolved by now. However, this gradual approach has not worked. In fact, this approach has been a common strategic flaw in most of this Administration's military excursions.

Who in America would willingly send their son or daughter to die in the Balkans based upon the President's explanation of the events? President Clinton has put our troops in precarious positions over and over again. We should say today that not one service man or woman should be placed in harm's way based upon the President's empty threats or hollow promises.

Vote yes to prevent ground troops from being sent into the Balkans. Vote for the Goodling/Fowler Bill. When you find yourself in a hole, it makes sense to stop digging. We need a better policy in the Balkans than we now have, we need to stop digging.

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, today, Congress is faced with one of its most important and difficult constitutional duties. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution clearly states that Congress shall have the power to declare war and to raise and support armies. Today, our Armed Forces are engaged in a NATO-led bombing campaign designed to force Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to the negotiating table. The choices we must make are what actions we must take, declaring war, continuing on our current course or removing our troops, and what are our international responsibilities in the region.

We face a stark reality and a difficult decision. The reality is that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian military forces are engaged in ethnic cleansing—attempting to systematically exterminate the Kosovar citizens. Reports have confirmed this and the atrocities have intensified since the NATO bombing campaign began on March 24, 1999.

Since the bombing campaign began, hundreds of thousands of Kosovars have fled the fighting. The pictures and stories of their escape are both tragic and disturbing. The decision facing Congress today is how to put an end to Slobodan Milosevic's organized efforts to harm these innocent people, how to return the refugees to their homeland and how to restore stability to the region.

President Clinton has put our Armed Forces on an unfamiliar and unclear path. His stated goals are to end the ethnic cleansing and to restore stability to the region. As news reports have shown, the bombing campaign is having little impact on the Serbian military's infrastructure. More importantly, it is doing little to prevent his systematic extermination of the Kosovar people. It can be argued that far from restoring peace and stability to the region, the bombing campaign is causing further disruption and intensifying Milosevic's ethnic cleansing efforts.

President Clinton has expressed concern about the introduction of ground troops into the region. I agree with his assessment. However, President Clinton recently authorized the mobilization of up to 33,000 reservists for de-

ployment to the region—an act that could be interpreted as the first move toward the introduction of ground troops.

I question the efficacy of the bombing campaign and our current course of action. No military action can be won by limiting military options and creating a convoluted and confusing decisionmaking process. President Clinton's poll-driven policies ignore his military advisor's advice, endanger our servicemen and women and may involve the U.S. in a long-term military occupation with an ever increasing escalation reminiscent of Vietnam.

Our decision today is among the most important votes I've cast. Declaring war should be the last act of the Congress and the Administration after all diplomatic efforts have been exhausted and every avenue possible to resolve the conflict has been pursued. I don't believe we've exhausted these options at this time and that's why I will vote against declaring war.

The introduction of ground troops escalates our involvement to an unnecessary level at this time. I'm not prepared to put our servicemen and women in a hostile situation and will vote to remove our troops. The situation in Kosovo is the result of centuries of conflict and will not and cannot be quickly resolved using military force.

Any military victory will be offset by the fact that U.S. troops will remain a part of a long-term occupation force. As any neighboring nation should, the European nations have a responsibility to take a leadership role in working toward a permanent solution instead of temporary answers to this regional dispute.

Finally, the U.S. Constitution is clear that Congress has the ability to declare war and raise and provide funding for our nation's Armed Forces. That's why I will support the Fowler Resolution, which clarifies the role of Congress and which outlines that no U.S. ground troops will be deployed unless such deployment is authorized by law.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 151, the bill is considered read for amendment, and the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 249, noes 180, not voting 5, as follows:

[Roll No. 100]

AYES—249

Abercrombie	Barr	Bilbray
Archer	Barrett (NE)	Bilirakis
Armey	Barrett (WI)	Blagojevich
Bachus	Bartlett	Bliley
Baker	Barton	Blunt
Baldwin	Bass	Bonilla
Ballenger	Bereuter	Brady (TX)
Barcia	Biggart	Bryant

Burr	Hill (IN)	Pitts
Burton	Hill (MT)	Pombo
Buyer	Hilleary	Portman
Callahan	Hobson	Pryce (OH)
Calvert	Hoekstra	Quinn
Camp	Horn	Radanovich
Campbell	Hostettler	Ramstad
Canady	Hulshof	Regula
Cannon	Hutchinson	Reynolds
Castle	Hyde	Riley
Chabot	Inslee	Rivers
Chambliss	Isakson	Rogan
Chenoweth	Istook	Rogers
Coble	Jackson (IL)	Rohrabacher
Coburn	Jenkins	Ros-Lehtinen
Collins	Johnson (CT)	Roukema
Combest	Johnson, Sam	Royce
Condit	Jones (NC)	Ryan (WI)
Cook	Kaptur	Ryan (KS)
Cooksey	Kasich	Salmon
Costello	Kingston	Sanders
Cox	Klecza	Sanford
Cramer	Knollenberg	Saxton
Crane	Kolbe	Scarborough
Cubin	Kucinich	Schaffer
Cunningham	Kuykendall	Schakowsky
Danner	LaHood	Sensenbrenner
Davis (VA)	Largent	Serrano
Deal	Latham	Sessions
DeFazio	LaTourette	Shadegg
DeLay	Lazio	Shaw
DeMint	Leach	Shays
Deutsch	Lee	Sherman
Diaz-Balart	Lewis (KY)	Sherwood
Dickey	Linder	Shimkus
Doolittle	Lipinski	Shuster
Doyle	LoBiondo	Simpson
Duncan	Lofgren	Skeen
Dunn	Lucas (KY)	Smith (MI)
Ehlers	Lucas (OK)	Smith (NJ)
Ehrlich	Manzullo	Smith (TX)
Emerson	Markey	Souder
English	McCollum	Spence
Everett	McCrery	Stark
Ewing	McDermott	Stearns
Fletcher	McGovern	Stump
Foley	McHugh	Sununu
Fossella	McInnis	Sweeney
Fowler	McIntosh	Talent
Frank (MA)	McIntyre	Tancredo
Franks (NJ)	McKeon	Taylor (NC)
Frelinghuysen	McKinney	Terry
Gallely	Metcalfe	Thomas
Ganske	Mica	Thompson (CA)
Gekas	Miller (FL)	Thornberry
Gibbons	Miller, Gary	Thune
Gilchrest	Miller, George	Tiahrt
Gilman	Mink	Tierney
Goode	Moran (KS)	Toomey
Goodlatte	Myrick	Trafficant
Goodling	Nethercutt	Udall (CO)
Goss	Ney	Udall (NM)
Graham	Northup	Upton
Granger	Norwood	Visclosky
Green (WI)	Nussle	Walden
Greenwood	Ose	Walsh
Gutknecht	Oxley	Wamp
Hall (TX)	Packard	Watkins
Hansen	Paul	Watts (OK)
Hastert	Pease	Weldon (PA)
Hastings (WA)	Peterson (MN)	Weller
Hayes	Peterson (PA)	Whitfield
Hayworth	Petri	Wicker
Hefley	Phelps	Wilson
Herger	Pickering	Young (AK)

NOES—180

Ackerman	Brown (CA)	Dixon
Allen	Brown (FL)	Doggett
Andrews	Brown (OH)	Dooley
Baird	Capps	Dreier
Baldacci	Capuano	Edwards
Bateman	Cardin	Engel
Becerra	Carson	Eshoo
Bentsen	Clay	Etheridge
Berkley	Clayton	Evans
Berman	Clement	Farr
Berry	Clyburn	Fattah
Bishop	Conyers	Filner
Blumenauer	Coyne	Forbes
Boehlert	Crowley	Ford
Boehner	Cummings	Frost
Bonior	Davis (FL)	Gedjenson
Bono	Davis (IL)	Gephardt
Borski	DeGette	Gillmor
Boswell	Delahunt	Gonzalez
Boucher	DeLauro	Gordon
Boyd	Dicks	Green (TX)
Brady (PA)	Dingell	Gutierrez

Hall (OH)	Matsui	Rothman
Hastings (FL)	McCarthy (MO)	Roybal-Allard
Hilliard	McCarthy (NY)	Rush
Hinchey	McNulty	Sabo
Hinojosa	Meehan	Sanchez
Hoeffel	Meek (FL)	Sandlin
Holden	Meeks (NY)	Sawyer
Holt	Menendez	Scott
Hooley	Millender	Shows
Houghton	McDonald	Sisisky
Hoyer	Minge	Skelton
Hunter	Moakley	Smith (WA)
Jackson-Lee	Mollohan	Snyder
(TX)	Moore	Spratt
Jefferson	Moran (VA)	Stabenow
John	Morella	Stenholm
Johnson, E. B.	Murtha	Strickland
Jones (OH)	Nadler	Stupak
Kanjorski	Napolitano	Tanner
Kelly	Neal	Tauscher
Kennedy	Oberstar	Taylor (MS)
Kildee	Obey	Thompson (MS)
Kilpatrick	Olver	Thurman
Kind (WI)	Ortiz	Towns
King (NY)	Owens	Turner
Klink	Pallone	Velazquez
LaFalce	Pascarell	Vento
Lampson	Pastor	Waters
Lantos	Payne	Watt (NC)
Larson	Pelosi	Waxman
Levin	Pickett	Weiner
Lewis (CA)	Pomeroy	Weldon (FL)
Lewis (GA)	Porter	Wexler
Lowey	Price (NC)	Weygand
Luther	Rahall	Wise
Maloney (CT)	Rangel	Wolf
Maloney (NY)	Reyes	Woolsey
Martinez	Rodriguez	Wu
Mascara	Roemer	

NOT VOTING—5

Aderholt	Tauzin	Young (FL)
Slaughter	Wynn	

□ 1521

Ms. LOFGREN and Mr. DEUTSCH changed their vote from "no" to "aye." So the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H.R. 1569.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 151, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 82) directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The text of H. Con. Res. 82 is as follows:

H. CON. RES. 82

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA.

Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), the Congress hereby directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within 30 days after the passage of this resolution or within such longer period as may be necessary to effectuate their safe withdrawal.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 151, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. DELAHUNT) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H.Con.Res. 82.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, let me begin by saying to the gentleman from California (Mr. CAMPBELL) that I fully respect and appreciate his diligent efforts to ensure that the Congress is appropriately involved in any decisions on war and peace, and we highly commend him for his efforts in that respect.

As I stated to Secretary Albright at our Committee on International Relations hearing last week, I believe that the administration had made a serious mistake in trying to prosecute a war against Yugoslavia without full involvement of the Congress.

The gentleman from California (Mr. CAMPBELL) is earnestly trying to rectify that situation, and I believe he should be commended for taking pains to ensure that the prerogatives of the Congress are respected.

At the same time, however, I cannot support this measure that the gentleman from California (Mr. CAMPBELL) introduced in April and which is before us today, House Concurrent Resolution 82. This is a concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove our armed forces from Yugoslavia.

□ 1530

With regard to the merits of the Campbell resolution, we all know that Operation Allied Force has not been as successful as we would have liked, but now is certainly not the time to suspend our military operations in Yugoslavia. Doing that would only compound the humanitarian tragedy that has been unfolding before our eyes. It

would reward President Milosevic for his murderous strategy of depopulating Kosovo of its ethnic Albanian majority and remove all pressure on him to agree to any diplomatic settlement that would protect the rights of the people of Kosovo.

The NATO military air operation now taking place over Serbia is a response, belatedly in my opinion, to more than a year of the most callous and brutal acts of repression aimed at innocent men, women and children in Kosovo whose only crime has been that they are Albanians.

The architect of these policies is Slobodan Milosevic, a man who has already accumulated a horrendous record in the former Yugoslavia and who should be indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague.

The cost of Milosevic's aggressive nationalism has been the uprooting of hundreds of thousands of people. While the Serbs have used NATO bombing as a pretext to escalate their hideous policy of ethnic cleansing, it is clear that they had prepared to embark on this course for Kosovo when the spring weather permitted better conditions for their military operations. There are alarming reports that in addition to the mass expulsions that we see on our television, there have been numerous atrocities and even mass killings perpetrated by the Serb forces, including civilian paramilitary groups notorious for their crimes that were committed in Bosnia and in Croatia.

In addition to these compelling humanitarian concerns that have led to our involvement, there is a threat to neighboring countries like Albania and Macedonia that could create a much wider conflict in Europe that could even result in the involvement of our NATO allies Greece and Turkey on opposite sides.

To prevent that kind of destabilization and escalation, our Nation has decided to act now. We have learned in two previous occasions this century that wars in Europe inevitably involve our own national interest, and that we pay a higher price by pretending that they do not and by delaying our involvement.

For these reasons, I strongly urge my colleagues in the House to oppose this resolution, H. Con. Res. 82, and indicate to the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that we will not cut and run when the going gets tough.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I find considerable irony in the question of what is our national interest in Kosovo, for I thought we unequivocally answered that question with American blood and American tax dollars.

If we have no national interest in Kosovo, why did we lose so many lives in Europe in two World Wars? If we have no national interest in Kosovo, why did we spend billions of tax dollars