

Mr. COVERDELL. That is correct.

Mr. MCCAIN. Does that not mean then that the language of the amendment would be changed to say, on line 4, "of Health and Human Services may carry out activities" and then on line 9 would say, "The Secretary of Health and Human Services may carry out the following"? Would that not be the change that would provide this to be done at the discretion of the Secretary, because presently the copy of the amendment I have says "shall," which does not provide discretion for the Secretary. It just says "shall."

Mr. COVERDELL. It does not have to. She doesn't have the discretion not to spend it. They are directed to perform these activities.

Mr. MCCAIN. OK. Then the fact is it is not at the discretion of the Secretary when it says "shall." The reality is that when it says "shall" in the amendment, it means there is no discretion involved.

In fact, \$1 million goes to Atlanta, GA, is exactly what this amendment means. The Senator from Georgia knows very well that I have for 11 years opposed this kind of earmarking, and I intend to oppose it now. But let us not have the Senate be deceived by what the Senator from Georgia just said. The discretion of the Secretary is not the case. There is no discretion when the amendment says "shall."

If the Senator from Georgia would be willing to change that word to "may," then I would be more than happy not only to agree with the amendment but support it. The fact is that now it means that \$1 million to fund ongoing research to detect E. coli, or prevent E. coli in live cattle only goes to one place and that happens to be, by coincidence, in Atlanta, GA, which is something I strongly object to. If this kind of practice goes on and continues, we will see the unbridled earmarking of funds for specific projects in specific places, which the American people rejected in concept. There is an authorization process and there is an appropriations process. This meets neither one of those criteria.

I understand that the Senator from Georgia will carry this amendment overwhelmingly. I also support the research for detection and prevention of E. coli and infections. It is a worthy cause. There is a system and procedure that we go through, which the Senator from Georgia is violating grossly with this amendment, and therefore I will ask for a rollcall on this amendment. I fully expect it to carry overwhelmingly in his favor, but I wanted the Senator to know that I am deeply disappointed that he will not change the language of this amendment to the proper form which is "may" rather than "shall."

So, Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. COVERDELL. We do have a management problem here.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair did not understand the Senator from Arizona to ask for a rollcall vote.

Mr. COVERDELL. I think the Senator from Arizona is asking for the yeas and nays, for a rollcall vote at the appropriate time later in the day. I believe that is his motion.

Mr. MCCAIN. My motion is, Mr. President, that I ask for the yeas and nays now.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is not a sufficient second at the moment.

Mr. MCCAIN. Then I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I ask further unanimous consent that the yeas and nays be set aside until such time as the managers of the bill decide the sequence of the votes that will take place later this afternoon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, in response to the good Senator from Arizona, I know he has been long an advocate of nonearmarking, but we just simply disagree on the substance of the amendment. There is no discretion about whether this research will be engaged in or the consumer studies, that is correct, but it is up to the discretion of the Secretary as to how and where that is funded. And that is the difference between us.

The Senator is wrong in his assertion that \$1 million of this would go to Atlanta, GA. It is possible that some of these funds would go to the University of Georgia, although it is not directed. The reason that it is possible, I would say probable, is that unbeknownst to me until very recently but long known in the industry, the University of Georgia has been among the several isolated universities that has advanced research on how to deal with E. coli in the live

herds versus the contemporary process of trying to somehow spot this disease and irradiate it in the processing of the meat itself. Indeed, a discovery on this would be at the level of discovering penicillin, and it just happens that that research is highly advanced at this university at a time when this problem is such a focus of the attention of health concerns in the United States.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to cosponsor Senator COVERDELL's amendment. Americans need to have the cleanest and safest meat and other foods. The emergency of E. coli:0157H7 is a real threat which we must quickly respond to. The Coverdell amendment provides funding to address this important issue.

There are several ways to reduce E. coli and other microbial contamination and we need to take a multifaceted approach. More research is one of those. The new hazard analysis and critical control point inspection system will start to be implemented on January 1, 1998. That will be a considerable benefit. I believe that an additional improvement that can be made is the use of electronic pasteurization. Through that means, we can kill a wide variety of pathogens that may come into accidental contact with foods with no downside to the consumer other than a very small cost.

I would expect that the Department should coordinate its research efforts with USDA in those areas where the Department of Agriculture has expertise.

I am hopeful that we will move along all of these paths in order to provide the safest and most reliable possible food supply.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time, if any is left.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be able to proceed for 15 minutes as if in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, a generation ago, President John F. Kennedy called for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. President Kennedy's visionary appeal met with modest but important success: the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

One year ago today, the world community took a major step toward fulfilling President Kennedy's vision.

With the United States once again in the lead, the U.N. General Assembly voted 158 to 3, with 5 abstentions, to endorse the so-called CTBT, drafted by the U.N. Conference On Disarmament. Two weeks later, all the declared nuclear powers signed that treaty.

Soon this treaty will be submitted to the U.S. Senate for our advice and our consent to ratification. Much work is needed to educate this body and to assure us that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be effectively verifiable and will not undermine nuclear deterrence. But it is time to begin that effort, and I welcome the administration's commitment to do so.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not enter into force for some time. This is because all nuclear-capable States must ratify this treaty before it can enter into force, at least during the next 3 years, and India has refused to do that—although I am given to understand that the President will be traveling there, to try to change that view on the part of the Indian Government.

Timely U.S. ratification is still needed, however, to prevent the CTBT from becoming a dead letter and to maintain the pressure on all states not to test a nuclear device. The 144 states that signed the CTBT are largely bound not to undermine it, even before it enters into force. But nonnuclear states will feel little obligation to ratify or obey a test ban if the powers with admitted nuclear weapons programs fail to ratify it themselves.

A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing is no minor matter. This is not your father's arms control agreement, Mr. President. You remember that old commercial—I know, the old automobile man that my father was—"this isn't your father's Oldsmobile." This is not your standard arms control agreement, merely codifying actions already planned by the two superpowers, which most of our arms control agreements were. This treaty will pinch, it will hurt; but the CTBT will pinch other countries far more than it pinches us, and the world will be a safer place for that.

There is always a risk, of course, that a State Party—a fancy foreign policy phrase for another country—will violate this test ban treaty rather than do without nuclear testing. Last month's so-called—it's amazing the phrases we use—"seismic event" at or near the Russian nuclear test site of Novaya Zemlya is a timely reminder that arms control compliance can be assured only through effective verification.

Article 4 of the test ban treaty and the treaty's accompanying protocol do include, in fact, some very welcome verification provisions. An international monitoring system will combine seismic, radionuclide, hydro-acoustic and infrasound monitoring. This monitoring system will provide States Parties with both raw and processed data, as well as with analyses of those data.

Article 4 requires prompt clarification by States Parties in "any matter which may cause concern about possible noncompliance with the basic obligations of the treaty."

In addition, the United States, if supported by 29 of the 50 other members of the Organization's Executive Council, will be able to force a truly extensive onsite inspection by the CTBT Organization's Technical Secretariat. We would be in a much stronger position to investigate last month's possible Russian explosion if the CTBT were in effect and Russia were required, as a consequence of that, to accept onsite inspections.

Verification of this treaty will not be cheap, and the United States will be expected to help other countries participate in seismic monitoring, in particular. We have provided such assistance for many years, for a simple reason: not out of our generosity and our charitable instinct, but because it is in our naked self-interest, it is in our national interest, both to monitor nuclear tests by other countries and to obtain timely and accurate data on earthquakes.

It is important to keep up this effort, whether we eventually ratify the CTBT or not, and I urge my colleagues, as an afterthought here, to support full funding of the international monitoring systems that I am talking about.

How will this treaty really pinch—I mentioned that at the outset—assuming that the verification provisions deter any violations? For the five countries with a history of nuclear testing, among which we are one, the CTBT will mean an end to that testing. We, and other declared nuclear powers, will need to use other means in order to ensure that our nuclear weapons are safe and are in working order, or to modify those weapons in any way.

Let me explain the meaning of that. Most people say, "Why don't you have to worry about testing anymore? A nation like ours wouldn't want to test in any circumstance." To raise a legitimate point raised by others who don't support this treaty, however, in order to ensure that our nuclear arsenal is accurate and working and functioning, you occasionally have to test it, you occasionally have to know what you have. You can't just let it sit there and let the components of it sit there for 20, 30, 40, 50 years and not test it, and still have confidence in its deterrent capacity. That is the reason why even nations like ours that do not have any desire to increase their nuclear capacity, that want to reduce nuclear weapons, might still want to be able to test.

In our country, the Department of Energy plans to use tests that do not actually cause a nuclear explosion, known as subcritical experiments, as well as computer analyses and simulations to assure the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear weapons. Ground was broken just last month for a billion-dollar National Ignition Facility at the Lawrence Liver-

more National Laboratory in California to do some of that very work. One hoped-for side benefit is further progress toward controlled fusion, an important potential power source for the next century.

Many of my colleagues question whether this Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, as it is referred to, will suffice in the absence of nuclear testing. The Energy Department, where the scientists and experts are, says "yes," while opponents of arms control say "no."

I say nobody knows for sure. We can't guarantee that stockpile stewardship will work because this is a new scientific frontier. But the executive branch must take stockpile stewardship—that is, those tests other than actually exploding nuclear devices—seriously, and we must—we must—fund it appropriately, in my view. Senator DOMENICI has warned that the current funding plan is insufficient for that job. I hope and expect that the administration will take that concern to heart and not just blow smoke at it.

Mr. President, even if we were not going to sign a test ban treaty, it should be very much in America's interest for us not to test nuclear weapons if we have an alternative that can guarantee the safety, stability, security, and usability of our nuclear stockpile. So, for whatever the reasons, even unrelated to this treaty, it makes sense to follow the admonition of Senator DOMENICI and give the Energy Department the resources it needs to maximize the chances that the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program will suffice in the absence of nuclear testing.

Stockpile stewardship, Mr. President, is an opportunity, however, not just a challenge. It is precisely this sort of high-technology activity at which the United States excels. Recent press stories on our improved earth-penetrating nuclear bomb make clear that the United States is capable of maintaining nuclear capabilities, even without nuclear testing, that other countries can only dream of. The truth is that we may well extend our nuclear advantage in a test-free world.

So let me be clear about this. I do not think we are seeking any greater advantage in nuclear weapons, over other countries in the world, but if we, in fact, move all the acknowledged nations and those we think have nuclear capacity and nuclear weapons to enter into this treaty, then there will be no more testing.

You hear opponents say, "Well, that will put us at a competitive disadvantage in terms of our nuclear capacity." My argument would be if the verification is real, which it is in this treaty, we are potentially at a competitive advantage because we would be able to continue to develop and assure the capacity of our nuclear stockpiles and capabilities—thanks to our testing capacity, our ability to measure their utility absent an actual nuclear explosion.

So this is an argument that I know we will engage in, but I would just like to lay a marker down now. I think our security is enhanced and our capability can be enhanced with this treaty in place.

But we will not be so likely to develop a whole new generation of nuclear weapons, and that is important. Why? Because there is a deal here between the nuclear weapons "haves" and the nuclear weapons "have-not" states. For the vast majority of countries, those that have never tested nuclear weapons, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will greatly impede any efforts on their part to develop nuclear weapons, but it will also reassure those countries that the nuclear powers will be much more limited in their development of still newer weapon designs.

Mr. President, think about it. If you are a developing country and you are late into the game of nuclear weapons, you are asked to say, "OK, these other guys got theirs, we don't have ours yet, but let's make sure no one can test any more so that we, in fact, can never develop nuclear weapons." Well, you sit there and say, "Wait a minute, the other guys have these things, they have these weapons and the only way they developed them is they tested them. Now you are telling us we can never test them, which is synonymous to saying we can never have them."

OK, in order for them to give up that, because they then are locked into this inferior status in terms of nuclear capability, we have to give something to them. What they get in return for this is that, although we will maintain that capacity and be able to maintain it without testing, none of the nations of the world will be able to move to whole new generations of those nuclear weapons, which is some reassurance to a nation that knows the argument that I made to such countries and their leaders, which is, "Look, you can never catch up, you can never get ahead of the curve; you may get nuclear weapons, but you're never going to get to the point in your lifetime or the lifetime of your children where you are going to be able to match the capacity of the nuclear powers. So isn't it better for us to freeze or to build down, in effect, to use an expression that Bill Cohen used to push years ago during the arms control debates of the late seventies and early eighties?"

How will this test ban impede other countries' nuclear weapons programs? We hope to maintain our nuclear weapons without further testing and non-nuclear powers might hope similarly to develop or obtain nuclear weapons without ever testing them. But developing a new weapon without testing is risky, especially for a country with no experience in nuclear weapons; after all, even the advanced nuclear powers have test failures.

Military leaders are hardly eager to go into battle with untested weapons, Mr. President. In fact, they get downright cranky about that, and once they

start questioning the reliability of their weapons, they begin to think more about the dangers that come with war than about the glory of it all. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty thus may limit the progress that we and other nuclear powers can make in further developments of nuclear weapons, but its greatest benefit will be in non-proliferation by foreclosing nuclear weapons from many countries and making it difficult for new entrants even to approach the sophistication of our existing nuclear weapons.

The power of the CTBT as a non-proliferation tool explains why Pakistan was unwilling to sign the CTBT if it could enter into force without India's ratification. If their nuclear weapons program is going to be hobbled, they want India to be hobbled as well. And the CTBT's likely effectiveness is probably also a real reason why India has been unwilling to sign the treaty at all. Both of those countries have rudimentary nuclear weapons capabilities, but they know that a ban on testing, which may eventually come into force despite India's objections, will severely hamper their ability to develop those devices into a stable of weapons that they can count on in a real war.

Just as India and Pakistan appreciate CTBT's power to hamper the development of nuclear weapons, so should we. We rightly value the stability that mutual deterrence has brought us over the last 50 years. That is why we want reassurance that "stockpile stewardship" will be adequately funded and that the experts expect it to succeed.

But the gravest threat to security of our Nation, Mr. President, may not be from Russian or Chinese missiles, but rather from nuclear weapons in the hands of others—Iraq, Iran, Libya, or North Korea, just to name a few, or even terrorist groups that a rogue state might befriend.

The biggest risk of nuclear weapons actually being used may not be against us, against Russia or even against Taiwan, but rather by India and Pakistan against innocent civilians in the teeming cities which are within range of each country's bombers or shorter range missiles.

With U.S. leadership in ratifying this treaty, the CTBT will gain near unanimous international support and keep pressure on India and any like-minded countries to ratify it—or at least to refrain from testing. A comprehensive test ban, once in force, will reduce substantially the threats of regional nuclear wars or terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons. And that is reason enough, Mr. President, in my view, to support ratification.

But, Mr. President, as I have said, serious observers are sincerely divided over whether the United States will be able to maintain nuclear deterrence without nuclear testing. Achieving the Senate's advice and consent to ratification depends, therefore, in my opinion,

upon careful and intensive education both of the public and of this body, myself included. It is time for the administration to begin the sustained effort that will be required to assure that 67 U.S. Senators will feel that this CTBT is in our national interest.

The world in which we live today, Mr. President, is, as I said before, not your father's cold war. But there has been no end of history as has been prophesied. Neither will there be any end of arms control. Already this year the Senate has acted on the Chemical Weapons Convention and the "Flank Document" to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, referred to as CFE. Measures awaiting Senate action include: the Convention on Nuclear Safety; protocols to the Convention on Conventional Weapons on undetectable landmines, blinding lasers, and incendiaries; and two treaties to establish nuclear-free zones.

Over the next 2 years, the executive branch will likely submit to the Senate a START III treaty, an extension of the START II weapons destruction deadlines, an amendment or protocol making START I a permanent treaty, a CFE adaptation agreement, a succession memorandum and demarcation agreement regarding the ABM treaty, a new safeguards protocol between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, a nuclear liability convention, a nuclear waste convention, and a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention.

Given that lengthy agenda, Mr. President, I am not in a position to say that the CTBT must be taken up as the next item for the Senate's attention. Indeed, I hope we will approve some of these less controversial measures—such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the protocols to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and a new safeguards protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency—before we bring this issue to the floor.

But that need not stop the administration from submitting this treaty and beginning the work of educating us as to its merits. Chairman HELMS and I have shown that the Foreign Relations Committee can get things done, and I am confident that we will secure agreement on many more issues, hard ones as well as the easier ones.

The time has come, Mr. President, to move ahead on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as other arms control initiatives and NATO enlargement. The end of the cold war has made all these both possible and—I would emphasize—also necessary. This is an ambitious agenda for the Senate in the field of foreign relations, and the issues will be difficult.

But we represent the citizens of the world's greatest country. Or, the best phrase I have heard in my 25 years here to describe us is President Clinton's phrase. He said, we are the "essential nation." We are the "essential nation." We represent the citizens of the essential nation. We are charged with the

historic task of making the world a safer place for coming generations—not through war, but through fashioning of durable agreements and institutions. We must not—and I am sure we will not—flinch at that challenge.

This is a rare opportunity that you and I have, to serve at a time when we are setting down a whole new institutional framework for the conduct of world affairs. It has not happened in 50 years; it is happening now. I pray we are as wise as our fathers and grandfathers and grandmothers and mothers were when they did the job at the end of World War II.

I thank the Chair for its indulgence and for listening to me. I appreciate it very much.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND EDUCATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1998

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, we are, for the information of our colleagues, in a position soon to vote on three pending amendments, and I think a fourth amendment which will be offered by the distinguished Democratic leader, Senator DASCHLE. And we expect to proceed soon to the amendment to be offered by Senator DASCHLE. And as soon as that is done, we will be proceeding to rollcall votes on four amendments. The time should not be too extensive. I just give notice to my colleagues that that will be occurring in relatively short order.

Then following the votes we will proceed to debate on the Gorton amendment, and that will leave then two principal outstanding issues—the issue of school testing, where the parties have been negotiating and may be in a position to give us a final answer soon whether they could come to agreement or whether we will have to move ahead with Senate debate on that, and the issue with respect to the pending Nickles amendment. We will see what will happen on that, if we are in a position to move ahead there. I am not sure exactly what will occur there.

Mr. President, I have just been advised that Senator DASCHLE is engaged in a meeting that he cannot leave at the moment. So we will have to defer action on his amendment.

On behalf of the leader, I have been asked by staff, at the request of the majority leader, to propound this unanimous consent request. I ask

unanimous consent that at the hour of 5 o'clock today, the Senate proceed to a vote on or in relation to the Murray amendment, No. 1118; to be followed by a vote on or in relation to the Wellstone amendment, No. 1087; to be followed by a vote on the Coverdell amendment, No. 1098. And I further ask unanimous consent that there be 2 minutes of debate equally divided prior to each vote. I ask, finally, unanimous consent that no amendments be in order to any of the previous amendments prior to the vote, and that the first vote be with the customary 20 minutes, and that each additional vote be—the first vote be 15 minutes, but we have the automatic extension of 5 minutes, and each subsequent vote be limited to 10 minutes, with the extension of 5 minutes, so they can expedite the vote process.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The remarks of Mr. SPECTER pertaining to the submission of Senate Resolution 121 are located in today's RECORD under "Submission of Concurrent and Senate Resolutions.")

Mr. SPECTER. Seeing the hour of 5 o'clock having arrived, I yield the floor.

AMENDMENT NO. 1118

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be 2 minutes of debate equally divided on the Murray amendment.

Mr. SPECTER. I am advised, Mr. President, that Senator MURRAY is on her way. We do not want to use up her 2 minutes. She is on her way.

So I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There will now be 2 minutes of debate equally divided on the Murray amendment.

Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, this body is about to go to a vote that is not one that is unknown to this Senate. It is regarding the welfare bill that was passed a year or so ago, an amendment that we offered at that time that was unanimously approved by this body and sent to the conference committee that merely allows a woman who is a victim of domestic violence a temporary waiver from the work requirements if she needs to get medical care or she needs to change her Social Security number so that she is not pursued by her abuser, or to put her children in a safe place so she is not worried about them and can work without being concerned about what happens to her children while she is at work.

It is a temporary waiver. It has been passed by the Senate three times. Not one Senator has spoken against it. Not one Senator has voted against it. But every time it goes behind closed doors in a conference committee it is pulled out.

That is what happens to abused women constantly. In the light of day, everyone is there to say, "I support you," but when they go behind closed doors they are abused.

I call on the Senate to vote with a strong voice to the members of the conference committee. We want this amendment to remain in so women across this country, children across this country, communities across this country, and police who are required to come to the scenes of domestic violence incidents are safe once again.

I yield my remaining time to Senator WELLSTONE, who has been helpful in this debate and has been very good at working through this.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired so the Senator must seek unanimous consent.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 30 seconds.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I am very pleased to have worked on this with Senator MURRAY going way back when. I think it is extremely important for the protection of many women and many children in all of our States. Our States are looking for clear direction from the Congress, from the White House, and from Health and Human Services.

This amendment is very important. I hope we will have a resounding, strong vote.

The Murray-Wellstone amendment is an amendment I think the Senate will be proud to support.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 1118 of the Senator from Washington, Senator MURRAY.

The yeas and nays have been ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk called the roll.

Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. BINGAMAN] is necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ABRAHAM). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 98, nays 1, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 228 Leg.]

YEAS—98

Abraham	Daschle	Inhofe
Akaka	DeWine	Inouye
Allard	Dodd	Jeffords
Ashcroft	Domenici	Johnson
Baucus	Dorgan	Kemthorne
Bennett	Durbin	Kennedy
Biden	Enzi	Kerrey
Bond	Faircloth	Kerry
Boxer	Feingold	Kohl
Breaux	Feinstein	Kyl
Brownback	Ford	Landrieu
Bryan	Frist	Lautenberg
Bumpers	Glenn	Leahy
Burns	Gorton	Levin
Byrd	Graham	Lieberman
Campbell	Gramm	Lott
Chafee	Grams	Lugar
Cleland	Grassley	Mack
Coats	Gregg	McCain
Cochran	Hagel	McConnell
Collins	Harkin	Mikulski
Conrad	Hatch	Moseley-Braun
Coverdell	Hollings	Moynihan
Craig	Hutchinson	Murkowski
D'Amato	Hutchison	Murray