

ROOTS OF FAMINE

Why is the North experiencing a famine? North Korean authorities attribute the shortages to a string of bad weather, including serious flooding in 1995 and 1996. Truth be told, however, the famine is largely the result of wrong-headed, discredited Communist economic policies and the devotion of vast resources to the North Korean armed forces.

But this does not make the North Korean people less deserving of emergency relief. It is not ethically permissible to use starvation as a weapon to force the North Korean dictatorship to undertake essential economic reforms.

Some observers worry that the North might divert our food aid from those who are truly hungry to the military or party elite.

But international relief agencies are able to send their monitors throughout the famine-stricken areas where supplies are being delivered. The World Food Program has even chartered a helicopter to facilitate oversight.

United States private voluntary organizations will soon begin directly supervising the distribution of American assistance, opening another window into life inside the hermit kingdom.

The bottom line? We can have a high degree of confidence that the vast majority of any assistance we provide will reach the intended targets.

WHY NOT STARVE THEM OUT?

Opponents of emergency famine relief for North Korea wonder aloud whether the famine might not be a blessing in disguise; the perfect mechanism to bring about the downfall of one of the most repressive regimes left on the planet. But this cynical view is not only immoral, it displays a total disregard for the potentially explosive results of such a policy of strangulation.

Famines are profoundly destabilizing events. No one can predict with confidence how North Korea might respond. But it is obvious to me that we do not want the North—which may possess one or two nuclear weapons—to experience panic, massive population migrations, and instability.

In testimony earlier this month before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Andrew Natsios, director of foreign disaster assistance during the Bush administration and now vice-president of World Vision, a nongovernmental relief organization operating in North Korea, warned that the North's famine could soon reach the irreversible stage.

He added that by the time the world sees CNN broadcasts or emaciated North Korean children too weak to lift themselves off their cots, it will be too late to save them.

FOOD FOR PEACE

Next Tuesday, August 5, representatives of North Korea, South Korea, China, and the United States are scheduled to convene talks aimed at replacing the tattered 1953 Armistice with a peace treaty. If history is any guide, these historic negotiations are likely to be both difficult and protracted.

But while the diplomats talk and the world waits and prays for peace, famished innocent North Koreans move closer to death.

It is time for the United States to lead a comprehensive, humane response to the North's famine.

Not because the North has agreed to peace talks;

Not because the North has frozen its nuclear program and accepted international atomic energy agency monitoring of its Yongbyon nuclear facility; and

Not because the North is cooperating for the first time in 50 years in the search for the remains of America's 8,000 missing servicemen from the Korean war.

We should respond because it is the smart thing to do. It is the noble thing to do. It is an expression of all that is best about America that cannot help but resonate in the hearts of the North Korean people.

NATO ENLARGEMENT AFTER MADRID

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, earlier this month in Madrid the North Atlantic Treaty Organization held a momentous summit meeting, which brought together the heads of state and government of its 16-member countries to discuss the future of the Alliance in the 21st century.

Mr. President, I was privileged to be a member of a bipartisan, bicameral Congressional delegation to the summit meeting. Today, I would like to discuss the results of Madrid and their important implications for American foreign policy.

At Madrid, NATO took the historic step of inviting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to begin accession talks with the alliance.

The alliance now has several pressing priorities as a followup to the summit.

As its first priority, NATO must complete these accession talks this fall with the three prospective new members. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have all met the basic alliance membership requirements—democracy, civilian control of the military, the rule of law, no conflicts with neighbors, and the willingness and ability to assume alliance responsibilities.

NATO and the candidates must now assess the military capabilities of each of the three in detail, and must plainly state each country's responsibilities and tasks within the alliance.

Of particular importance is that the issues of cost of enlargement must be forthrightly addressed, both by the three prospective members and by all the current members of the alliance.

The goal is to successfully conclude the talks with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in time for the Protocol of Accession to be signed at the NATO ministerial meeting in December of this year. The next step is for each of the 16 current NATO members to begin the process of ratification

of amending the Washington treaty. Of course, Mr. President, according to our constitution, it is the U.S. Senate that is responsible for advice and consent to treaties, and we anticipate that we will consider the NATO enlargement treaty amendment next spring.

NATO's second major priority after Madrid is developing a strengthened cooperative relationship with those countries that were not invited to be in the first group of new members. At Madrid, NATO re-emphasized an "Open Door" policy by which the first group of invited countries will not be the last. Additional candidacies will be considered, beginning with the next NATO summit, to be held here in Washington in April 1999 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the alliance.

In an important gesture, the Madrid summit communicate singled out for special mention the positive developments toward democracy and the rule of law in Slovenia and Romania. As many of my colleagues will remember, I was a strong advocate of Slovenia's being included in the first group of new members.

I anticipate that both Slovenia and Romania, and perhaps other countries, will be invited to accession talks with NATO in 1999.

In addition, in a thinly veiled bow to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Madrid summit communicate reiterated conditions set forth in NATO's 1995 study whereby no European democratic country will be excluded from consideration for membership because of its geographic location.

Translated into real English that means that NATO will not allow Moscow to give the three Baltic states a double whammy.

In other words, the Soviet Union's illegal, forcible incorporation of the Baltic states in 1940—which, I am proud to say, was never recognized by the United States—will not be used as a pretext to veto their consideration for NATO membership.

Mr. President, Ukraine, with an area and population the size of France, is arguably the most strategically important country in East-Central Europe. At Madrid, NATO and Ukraine signed a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. Ukraine is currently not seeking NATO membership, but under President Kuchma (KOOCH-ma) it has undertaken democratic and free-market reforms in an attempt to move closer to the West. This charter should reinforce this trend.

In order to keep the enlargement momentum going in the countries not yet ready for membership, a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was inaugurated at Madrid. This body will direct an enhanced Partnership for Peace Program—a program involving more than two dozen countries, which, incidentally, has already far exceeded our most optimistic expectations.

Of vital importance to the new security architecture in Europe is NATO's

new relationship with the Russian Federation. Based on the Founding Act between NATO and Russia, that new relationship has begun to take shape.

The permanent joint council, whose consultative functions are outlined in the Founding Act, recently held a preliminary meeting, and more are planned for the autumn.

Rather than being a rival for to the North Atlantic Council, as some critics have asserted, the permanent joint council will be a proving ground where Russia can show its intention to cooperate in a positive spirit with the West.

I hope and expect that it will act in this manner. If, however, Moscow chooses the old path of propaganda and confrontation, then the permanent joint council will atrophy. But, I re-emphasize, in no way will the permanent joint council usurp the leading role in NATO played by the North Atlantic Council.

The third and final immediate priority for NATO after the Madrid summit is to finalize the internal adaptation of the alliance. This, Mr. President, is a complex and crucially important issue.

Beginning in 1991, NATO approved a new strategic concept, which moved beyond the cold war focus on collective defense and toward more diverse tasks in a global context. In order to carry out these new tasks, the new strategic concept emphasized the need for NATO to achieve an effective force projection capability.

At the January 1994 Brussels summit, NATO agreed to set up a more flexible set of options for organizing and conducting military operations. This goal was, and is, to be achieved through the mechanism of the combined joint task force, known by its acronym CJTF. Although there has been considerable disagreement between the United States and France as to the theoretical details of how the CJTF is to be controlled, in practice both the IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia have been unofficial combined joint task forces under NATO command and control.

Mr. President, I am going into this level of detail because, as I will discuss shortly, the question of post-SFOR Bosnia is inextricably tied in with the ratification of NATO enlargement.

Another aspect of NATO's internal adaptation concerns reforms in the alliance's command structure. At the June 1996 ministerial meeting in Berlin, NATO agreed that a European security and defense identity—known by its initials ESDI—would be created within the framework of the alliance by allowing European officers to wear a Western European Union [WEU] command hat as well as their NATO hat.

As part of the restructuring, NATO has already reduced the number of its strategic commands from three to two, and it is also planning to reduce the number of major subordinate commands. It is at this intersection of ESDI and command structure, Mr. President, that the expressed interests

of France and the United States have collided.

The French want to have a European officer take over from an American as Commander of Armed Forces South [AFSOUTH] in Naples. We have rejected this proposal since it would impact upon our Sixth Fleet, even if the Fleet would formally remain under American command. Until now, the dispute remains unresolved, but at Madrid the French agreed to keep talking. In any event, disagreements over internal adaptation will not threaten the enlargement process.

Mr. President, having been privileged to have been at Madrid and having followed the immediate follow-up to the summit, I find my belief reinforced that NATO is on the right track. There remain, however, two challenges, which if not satisfactorily met, could well torpedo ratification of NATO enlargement by this body. They are, first, burdensharing and, second, post-SFOR Bosnia.

The first challenge is an existential one for NATO. The heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid directed the Council to "bring to an early conclusion the concrete analysis of the resource implications of the forthcoming enlargement." The coming months will see serious discussion and study on the actual costs of enlargement.

The Pentagon Report to the Congress in February 1997 was an excellent starting point. Personally, I find its methodology and conclusions convincing, but they have already been challenged by some of our European NATO partners. On other occasions I have discussed the details of the Pentagon study, so I will not take time today to repeat most of them.

One aspect, though, bears special mention. Because the United States spent considerable sums of money in the 1980's and early 1990's to make our Europe-based forces deployable and sustainable, the Pentagon study calculates our share of the total bill to be less than some Europeans apparently would like. I believe that, in making that criticism, the Europeans are forgetting that in 1991 they signed onto the new NATO strategic concept that emphasizes force projection, to which I referred earlier.

If our European friends disagree, let them offer an alternative methodology in the cost negotiations that were mandated at Madrid.

Even if the absolute cost to the United States of NATO enlargement is well within our capabilities—as it is likely to be—we must insist that the costs are fairly apportioned within the alliance.

I regret that the Madrid summit communique did not specifically call for an equitable sharing of the burden of providing the resources for enlargement.

Moreover, the immediate post-Madrid statements by French President Chirac who said that France would not

spend an extra franc for enlargement, and by German Chancellor Kohl, who said that United States cost estimates of enlargement were exaggerated, were not encouraging. They may accurately reflect Chirac's and Kohl's views, or they may merely be opening negotiating positions.

In any event, I must emphasize in the strongest possible terms that the North Atlantic alliance is a partnership, not an American charity enterprise.

While some of our European allies are making significant contributions to alliance multinational military activities, to cost-sharing for stationed U.S. forces, and to foreign assistance—all of which have been listed by the Pentagon as relevant burden-sharing criteria—only Italy, Greece, and Turkey met congressional targets last year on defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product. And, Mr. President, one might add that the motivations of the last two countries include arming to defend against each other.

I will be very surprised if NATO's definitive enlargement cost study—to be completed in the coming months—does not call for outlays that will force Western European parliaments to increase considerably their appropriations for defense.

At that point, Mr. President, we will reach the alliance's moment of truth. Eleven NATO members are also members of the European Union. I have great sympathy for the European Union's strenuous efforts to achieve an ever closer union. Merely trying to fulfill the criteria for launching a common European currency is proving extremely difficult and causing social tensions in several Western European countries.

But, Mr. President, we in the United States have also been taking painful steps to balance our own budget. The U.S. Federal work force is being reduced by more than a quarter-million, and our appropriations for many worthy social, medical, and educational causes have been drastically pared down on austerity grounds.

So, Mr. President, I don't think it is too much to ask of our European allies what we have been asking of the American people. If one Europe, whole and free is worth ensuring through an enlarged NATO, then our European allies will take up the challenge and make the sacrifices that we have made. If they feel it is not worth the price, then I fear that the future of the entire alliance will be cast in doubt.

A corollary of burdensharing in NATO is the responsibility that the United States takes for the entire free world through its military activities outside of Europe, especially in the Pacific and the Middle East. As we proceed with NATO enlargement, we must be certain not to use a disproportionate share of our defense funds in Europe and thereby weaken our ability to carry out our responsibilities elsewhere.

I am confident that with equitable burdensharing of enlargement, this will not happen.

The second looming challenge, Mr. President, is creating a post-SFOR force for Bosnia. I have long called for applying the CJTF concept, to which I referred earlier, to Bosnia, so that our European allies can provide ground forces there after June 30, 1998, supported by awesome American air, naval, communications, and intelligence assets and an over-the-horizon U.S. Ready Reserve Force in the region.

An amendment to that effect was included in the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization Bill passed by the Senate.

If our European allies follow the logic of their repeated calls for a European security and defense identity within NATO, which has been officially recognized by the alliance, then they should seize the opportunity offered by the expiration of SFOR's mandate next June.

By taking up our offer of a CJTF they can consolidate the Dayton peace process and remove a major impediment to the ratification of NATO enlargement by the U. S. Senate.

If, on the other hand, our European allies persist in their in together, out together mantra, oblivious to the Madrid communique's call for—"a true, balanced partnership in which Europe is taking on greater responsibility" then this body will come to the obvious conclusion that the alliance's official policy upon which enlargement is based no longer obtains. Such a development would have the gravest consequences, not only for enlargement, but for the future of NATO itself.

Mr. President, I sound these warnings in the firm belief that my two doomsday scenarios will not come to pass. For all but the most provincial Europeans and isolationist Americans recognize the need for the United States to remain intimately involved with Europe and will not want to jeopardize that involvement. The history of the 20th century has shown that when the United States absents itself from European affairs, the Europeans—unfortunately—are unable peacefully to resolve their disputes. The result in World War I and World War II was an enormous American sacrifice of blood and treasure.

In order that we should never repeat that isolationist mistake, the United States in 1949 led the founding of NATO, the most successful defensive alliance in history.

For nearly half a century it has kept the peace in Western Europe, allowing its European members to rebuild, overcome their own ethnic and national animosities, and eventually to prosper.

Mr. President, NATO enlargement involves serious policy commitments for the United States, and therefore must be held up to the closest scrutiny. Many of us have been posing relevant questions to the administration for

several months, and we have received satisfactory answers. There will, of course, continue to be new issues to be faced as we get deeper into the details of enlargement. But I believe that it serves no useful purpose to repeatedly recycle already answered questions, as if possessed with a need to reinvent the wheel.

For example, some of my colleagues recently asked, once again, what threat NATO enlargement is designed to counter. But both the Clinton administration and NATO long ago answered that question: the threat is instability in Central and Eastern Europe, the crucible for two world wars in this century. NATO enlargement will extend the decades-old zone of stability eastward on the continent.

In case anyone thinks that I am only spouting theoretical political science phrases, let me cite an article in the July 28, 1997 edition of *The Washington Times*, which quotes the head of the Security Policy Division of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry. Saying that his country was delighted by NATO's decision in Madrid to invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join, the Lithuanian official explained—"because that extends the zone of stability to our borders."

By now we surely know that the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, NATO is not drawing new dividing lines on the continent, as some of my colleagues recently suggested. I think the jubilant crowd that welcomed the President in Bucharest—after the Madrid summit—has laid that myth to rest. The Romanians knew that NATO, by emphasizing its open door policy at Madrid, had once again made clear that its goal is an undivided, peaceful, and free Europe—and an alliance that will welcome Romania as a member in the near future.

Some of my colleagues would like to come up with a finely delineated taxonomy of ethnic quarrels, border disputes, external aggression, and the like, as a precondition for moving ahead with NATO enlargement.

But, of course, such theoretical discussions are rapidly being made superfluous by the lure of NATO membership. Since enlargement became a real possibility Hungary and Romania have formally improved their relationship, as have Hungary and Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine, Slovenia and Italy, Poland and Lithuania, Germany and the Czech Republic, Russia and Ukraine, and other European countries that I am probably forgetting.

Mr. President, these historic reconciliations did not happen by accident. With the notable and sad exception of parts of the former Yugoslavia, the various peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are no longer wallowing in the swamp of ancient, tribal hatreds. Rather, they are attuned to the 21st century and the opportunities that NATO enlargement, above all, can offer.

Some of my colleagues have asked whether NATO membership will force

the new Eastern European democracies to spend too much on arms when expenditures for infrastructure critical to economic growth are more pressing. Leaving aside the rather patronizing tone of the question, the answer has been clear for months: Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest each has no trouble defining its national interest. Pending verification in this fall's accession negotiations, the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian procurement plans fall well within prudent limits of the free-market economic reforms that all three have been implementing for several years.

Some of my colleagues have asked whether membership in the European Union might be a better option for these countries to achieve economic stability than NATO membership.

Again, Mr. President, I think we must treat the Central and East Europeans like adults. They know what is vital to them.

Moreover, why—other than to throw up roadblocks in the NATO enlargement process—would one posit an artificial dilemma? It's not an either or choice: many of these countries are viable candidates for both NATO and EU enlargement.

In fact, earlier this month the European Union invited the first three NATO enlargement candidates—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—plus Slovenia, Estonia, and Cyprus to membership talks for the next round of EU enlargement.

Some of my colleagues have asked, what have we given up in terms of NATO's own freedom of action to deploy forces throughout the expanded area of the alliance in order to obtain Russian acquiescence to the expansion plan?

Well, Mr. President, the answer is a simple, nothing. We have known since NATO made crystal clear last March as part of its famous three no's declaration that the alliance has no reason, intention, or plan in the current and foreseeable security environment permanently to station substantial combat forces of current members on the territory of new members. Obviously, if the security environment changes, so too will NATO's troop stationing policy. In short, we have retained our freedom of action and have given up nothing—zero. I hope that issue has been laid to rest.

While everyone by now admits that Russia's leaders have acquiesced to NATO enlargement, some of my colleagues have asked the unanswerable question: But what of tomorrow's Russian leaders? They wonder whether NATO enlargement will create an incentive for Moscow to withhold its support for further strategic arms reductions.

First of all, no one can categorically disprove a negative. Some Russian leaders are against further strategic arms reductions for a variety of reasons. NATO enlargement may be one of them, although I seriously doubt that

it is one of the more important ones. Ultimately, I believe that the next generation of Russian leaders will see that arms control is in their own national self-interest.

Additionally, we should not forget that through the NATO-Russia Founding Act the Russians will have the opportunity not only to observe NATO first hand, but will also be able to work cooperatively with it. They may not learn to love NATO, but at least they will see that it does not correspond to the aggressive, rapacious Stalinist caricature that they grew up with.

Many of us in this body are justifiably concerned about the cost to the American taxpayer of NATO enlargement, and I have talked myself blue in the face to Europeans making clear my insistence on equitable burdensharing. But I would also remind my colleagues that freedom is not cost free. As a deterrent to aggression, ethnic conflict, or other kinds of instability, an enlarged NATO is far less expensive than conducting a military operation after hostilities have broken out would be.

Here again the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is instructive. Had we become directly involved earlier with the lift and strike policy that I advocated as early as 1992, we could have prevented many of the quarter-million deaths and 2 million displaced persons in that tormented country. Moreover, we would not be saddled with the enormous reconstruction costs that the United States and the rest of the world community are now bearing.

So while we persist in our goal of a North Atlantic alliance of truly shared responsibilities, let us not lose sight of the bigger picture that American expenditures on NATO are the best security investment that this country can ever make.

Mr. President, I would summarize my thoughts since Madrid in the following way: NATO enlargement is on the right track. It is a vital force in the integration of the new Europe. Tough negotiating and bargaining lie ahead. Several key questions must be definitively answered in the coming months, above all the actual cost of enlargement and how it will be apportioned. We must work out a satisfactory NATO-led, post-SFOR force for Bosnia. The Committee on Foreign Relations, for example, will hold an extensive series of hearings on these topics. But let us not confuse the debate by repeating already answered questions.

I am convinced that after thorough scrutiny and debate, NATO enlargement will occur on schedule and will contribute to expanding and enhancing stability in Europe, and thereby will strengthen America's security.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

AMBASSADOR RICHARD GARDNER'S OUTSTANDING SERVICE

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, too often we take for granted the excep-

tional work done by our Ambassadors and members of the foreign service. These individuals perform their duties in countries throughout the world, often in difficult conditions. Their service is a great tribute to their ability and their loyalty to our Nation, and they deserve America's enduring gratitude for the job they do so well in representing our country in other lands.

Earlier this month, one of our most respected ambassadors, Richard Gardner, completed his service as Ambassador to Spain. Dick has previously served as Ambassador to Italy, and is widely recognized as one of the Nation's foremost experts on foreign policy. The knowledge, enthusiasm, and diligence he brought to his post in Madrid significantly strengthened the political, economic, and cultural ties between our Nation and Spain.

I commend Ambassador Gardner for his outstanding service.

Leaders in Spain have recognized the remarkable contributions made by Ambassador Gardner, and I ask unanimous consent that a recent article by Miguel Herrero de Minon be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the Article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From "El Pais", July 1, 1997]

A FORTUNATE AMBASSADOR
(by Miguel Herrero de Miñón)

The U.S. Ambassador, Professor Gardner, and his wife, Danielle, will soon conclude their mission in our country. The time for farewells is the time for praise and the Gardners have made so many friends here, and even established family ties, that they will receive more than enough accolades. That is why I only want to bear witness to a simple, objective fact: Ambassador Gardner has been a fortunate ambassador and good fortune, an excellent attribute for the one who has it and, particularly in the position he holds, requires two ingredients: specific circumstance and the ability to be able to navigate through to a safe port. The former is mere chance; the latter comes through character, good fortune consists of building a destination between the two.

The circumstance of Gardner's embassy in Spain is no less than the maturation of the U.S.-Spanish relationship, which led naturally to it becoming a truly "special" one. I think I was the first, now a number of years ago, to suggest this term, remarking that of all the countries in the European Union with the exception of the United Kingdom, Spain is potentially the one that has the most interests in common with the United States. Accordingly, the sometimes embarrassing security relationship begun over 40 years ago, has been growing while increasing economic, cultural, strategic and political ties have come to light.

Massive student and teacher exchanges contributed to making Spain better known in the U.S. and to doing away with mistrust here; the restoration of democracy in our country opened the way to fuller cooperation, and the Gulf War marked a basic turning point, at least in Spanish public opinion.

But Gardner has had the historic opportunity to contribute decisively during these important recent years, to the acceleration and maturation of this trend, by preparing visits at the highest level in both directions, and collaborating in common, bilateral and multilateral undertakings, bringing the two

societies closer together with better knowledge of each other. It was during his tenure that President Clinton launched the Transatlantic Agenda in Madrid and, also in Madrid with the Spaniard Solana at the helm, Atlantic Alliance reform took place, not to mention good political collaboration in other areas of mutual interest. It was also when economic and trade relations were intensified between our two countries, and educational and cultural relations between our two societies.

Gardner has been not only the representative of one Nation and its Government in another, but also an excellent mediator between two societies. He has come to learn and to teach, opened up possibilities and launched institutions, mobilized initiatives that in many cases are more private than public. His professorial talents—the ability to turn Embassy breakfasts into seminars—and his intellectual talents—he has even enriched our bibliography with a masterpiece of economic-diplomatic history—have served his mission well, as has his liberal patriotism in the best tradition of American internationalism—as opposed to unilateralism and isolationism—which has always held that the implementation of manifest destiny involves making oneself known, understood and making friends.

The growing number of Spaniards who believe in the Atlantic community will miss him, because good fortune, doing such a good and timely job, is a rare and beneficent attribute.

TRIBUTE TO DONALD MARTIN

MR. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to a member of my staff who has served me and the Commonwealth of Virginia as a legislative correspondent for the past 2 years.

Don Martin will be leaving my office to attend law school this fall. He will be sorely missed by those who have grown to respect him and his tremendous talent and hard work.

Don is a native of Wytheville, VA, in the southwest portion of our State. He joined my staff in the summer of 1995, just weeks after graduating from Yale University, in New Haven, CT. Don is the first member of his family to attend college and the first to graduate from high school. At Yale, Don was a top student recognized for his contributions as a community leader.

While attending George Wythe High School, Don was honored as class president and recognized as the school's outstanding student. Don Martin was also Virginia's top high school debate champion in both 1990 and 1991.

Don's legislative responsibilities have focused on issues related to the Committee on Environment and Public Works, on which I serve, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, and the Committee on Government Affairs.

Mr. President, in the sincerest sense, Don has a goal to give back to his family and community the same kind of love and commitment they gave him. His goal is to get back home and make a positive difference in his community of Wytheville. I respect him and wish him all the best.