

or the House of Representatives tied up in such partisan knots. I find that it is personally distressing to me. I have enormous respect for the U.S. Senate and enormous respect for the House of Representatives.

I have felt it a great privilege to serve with distinguished Republican and Democrat leaders of both the House and the Senate. I think I have been a personal friend of nearly every leader in the House and the Senate in both parties. And I have considered that as one of the great joys of serving in the U.S. Senate. I can think of a number of times I have joined with Members of both parties to push difficult legislation through. The last farm bill was an example when it was completely tied up. Then it became the Lugar-Leahy-Dole farm bill and passed this Senate with the highest number of votes which I believe a farm bill had ever passed before. The next closest one was probably the Lugar-Leahy farm bill of 5 years before.

I am not suggesting that the two parties hold hands on every issue by any means. I don't think that would serve the country well. But there are certain issues where we come together for the country. We have done this on major foreign policy issues. We have done it at times when this country desperately needed it. We did it recently on the budget agreement.

Mr. President, each one of us should search our souls and ask whether the country is well served by the bitterness that has gone on in some of the partisanship, by the personal attacks against each other and against the institution that we should be proud to serve, or the attacks against the President that have become so personal.

We should ask ourselves if we benefit this great Nation that we are privileged to serve if we diminish and chip away and even destroy some of the independence of our Federal judiciary because, if we do that, Mr. President, some day we will no longer be here. Nobody holds a seat in the U.S. Senate. The distinguished Presiding Officer will leave sometime, and the Senator from Vermont will leave the U.S. Senate sometime. All of us will.

But when we leave, we should look back, and ask, "What did we do here? What mark in history did we leave?" If we have left as our mark that we made the Government better, that we made the Senate better, that we made the Congress better, that we protected the institutions of our Government, that we protected the people of our democracy, then we can go home knowing that we served our Nation well.

But we should ask ourselves, each and every one, if we leave here and say that as a result of our partisanship on either side of the aisle that the Federal judiciary was diminished—one of the great institutions of this country, one of the reasons we have remained a democracy, one of the things which guaranteed our diversity, which allows the most powerful nation that history has

ever known to be a democracy and not a dictatorship—then we cannot feel that we have served our Nation well. We cannot feel that we can be proud of our time in the U.S. Senate.

So I urge Senators to think about this story. I realize that we are in a different time—and I am reminded that I have spoken before on the floor of the Senate about the experience my father had in Vermont in 1937, 3 years before I was born. Vermont was one of the most Republican States back in 1936 in the Roosevelt great landslide. Alf Landon—the distinguished father of our distinguished former colleague, Senator Kassebaum—Alf Landon carried two States: Maine and Vermont.

And the head of our largest insurance company, the National Life Insurance Co., basically the titular head of the Republican Party, was standing next to my father on State Street in Montpelier, VT, as President Roosevelt was making a visit to Vermont and went by in an open car. The president of the National Life Insurance Co. stood at attention and took off his hat—all men wore hats at that time—and he held it over his heart as President Roosevelt's car went by. My dad said, "I can't believe you took off your hat for Franklin Roosevelt." He looked with arched concern at my father and said, "Howard, I took off my hat for the President of the United States, not for Franklin Roosevelt."

I have disagreed with Presidents of both parties since I have been here. I have agreed with President Ford, President Carter, President Reagan, President Bush, and President Clinton. I have voted with each of these President's on occasions. I have voted against them on occasions. I felt it a privilege to meet with them and argue with them. I stated my position as clearly as I could, but always respectfully because of the office that they held—the same way those of us who have been lawyers, who have practiced, know the respect that we hold for the courts that we enter. We all rise. We say "Your Honor," and so forth. We have done this not because we felt that every judge that ever appeared before us was the most brilliant person we have ever known, but we have done it because we know this is an institution that must be protected for the sake of our country. Our State courts must be protected for the sake of our States because without an independent judiciary, then our system of government all breaks down.

We looked, following the tragedy of Oklahoma City, at the trial that has just been completed, looked at a judge who commanded the respect of that courtroom. Both sides—the prosecution and the defense—knew the judge who ran that case. I contrast that to a case of a year ago where a judge allowed the case to just fall apart, and how much that damaged our judicial system. Then we go back to the Federal court and see a judge who knows that both sides will have their opportunity and

their rights protected, and they will try this case. The lawyers on both sides knew and respected the Federal court. They knew that this was a case that would be handled under our judicial system, even one involving one of the most horrible acts, certainly the most horrible domestic act of my lifetime, and one of the most horrible domestic acts of this Nation's history. But because we can count on the Federal court, the whole Nation could watch, the whole Nation feeling the anguish that we all felt that terrible day in Oklahoma City. We could watch that court and know that our system works, that we could trust that system, because all of us—the distinguished Presiding Officer, myself, and every one of us who—have always protected the integrity of our courts.

Let us not do anything as Senators, for whatever short-term political gain, to tear apart the integrity of our courts. Let us work together and call on the distinguished majority leader, and those who make the decision of when these judges can come up, to work with all of us, not as Democrats nor as Republicans but as U.S. Senators, doing what is best for this Nation, what is best for our judiciary, what is best for our democracy, and what is best for the independence of our judiciary that has made us the great Nation that we are.

Mr. President, I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is now closed.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1997

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of S. 903, which the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 903) to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies of the United States, to authorize appropriations for the Department of State for the fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and to provide for reform of the United Nations, and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, the day and the time have arrived. The pending business, as the distinguished clerk has just indicated, is the Foreign Affairs Reform

and Restructuring Act of 1997, legislation which was reported from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this past Thursday, June 12, by a vote of 14 to 4.

This legislation provides sweeping and long overdue reforms in America's foreign affairs agencies. It also mandates tough reforms at the United Nations.

As I have tried to emphasize from the beginning, it has been my hope that the effort to produce this legislation would be a bipartisan one, dedicated to reorganization and revitalization of our foreign policy institutions. That is what this legislation is, and that is what has brought this bill to its present pendency in the Senate. It has been bipartisanship in the Senate, the same kind of honest give and take that led to some of the truly great decisions by this Senate in years past and in past decades.

There is no point now in rehashing past difficulties or actions either by the Senate or by the President of the United States. The important point is that this time around there has been a remarkable degree of working together, of give and take, and a determination by almost everybody involved that this time a piece of legislation will be enacted by the Congress and signed into law by the President of the United States.

I would be remiss if I did not mention the distinguished Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who has made very clear and voluntary public assurances about this legislation. And that lady, Mr. President, has as always stood by her word.

While all of that is obviously personally meaningful to me, it is no more so than the splendid cooperation and genuine interest of the distinguished Senator from Delaware, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator BIDEN, who not only has made clear his bipartisan support, he has worked tirelessly to make sure that he would be on this Senate floor this afternoon to demonstrate his genuine support for a bill which hereinafter should be and will be known as the Helms-Biden Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1997. I suspect that Senator BIDEN is aware of how grateful I am to him. He is an able colleague for whom I have enormous respect.

That said, Mr. President, both President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright came forward with recommendations addressing many, though not all, of my key concerns, and in the ensuing months Senator BIDEN and I, along with our respective and competent staffs, devoted countless hours putting together this final package which so overwhelmingly was approved by the Foreign Relations Committee this past Thursday.

None of us got everything we wanted, but we worked together, and the legislation before us today is a bipartisan bill that will abolish two of those tem-

porary Federal agencies that were created a half-century ago—the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agency. Moreover, this bill will move some of the functions of a third such “temporary” Federal agency known as the Agency for International Development. These functions will move to a position within the State Department under the direct control and supervision of the Secretary of State.

I must be candid. If I had my way, and many other Senators feel precisely the same way, the so-called Agency for International Development would be abolished entirely. But that is going to take a little time. So, instead, this bill is the first of many steps in a perhaps lengthy process of reinventing the foreign affairs apparatus of the U.S. Government. But, have no doubt about it, further reforms will happen a little further down the legislative line in the years ahead.

The ball has begun to roll. But, for now, the pending legislation wipes away the Agency for International Development's often arrogant independence from the Department of State by transferring many of the functions of that independent 50-odd-year-old temporary agency to the State Department, and to assure that the allocation of foreign aid will soon be controlled by the Secretary of State, who will at long last have policy control over our foreign aid program.

I have thought many times, during the lengthy hours that we have worked on this particular piece of legislation, of what Ronald Reagan once said about temporary Federal agencies. He said, “There is nothing so near eternal life as a temporary Federal agency.” I think the three agencies that we are working on today are an illustration of that.

In any event, the pending bill will also contain U.N. reform benchmarks that we have been negotiating with the administration for the past 4 months. I think it is fair to say that this bill represents the most comprehensive and most far-reaching U.N. reform package ever considered by this Congress. Indeed, the Washington Post, which is no fan of anybody who wants to reform the United Nations—the Washington Post referred to the plan before the Senate today, and I quote the Washington Post, “* * * as one which would mark the most fundamental shift in relations between the United States and the United Nations since the United Nations was established after World War II.”

Let's look at a few details a little more closely. Among other reforms, the pending bill will require the United Nations to reduce the amount of money the American taxpayers are now required to contribute to the United Nations, reduce it from the present 25 percent of the total operations cost to 20 percent of the total U.N. operating costs. If you do not think that is much, I will discuss that with you in

just a minute. This reduction is going to be in effect, by the way, no later than fiscal year 2000. That one, single reform, two or three lines in this bill, had it been enacted 5 years ago, would have saved the American taxpayers more than \$500 million. The bill looks a little bit better as you talk about it and examine it.

What else is in this bill? This bill requires the United Nations to adopt a real negative growth budget, one that will eliminate at least 1,000 bureaucratic U.N. posts, so that the American taxpayers in the future will pay a smaller percentage of a smaller budget.

It will forbid future U.N. global conferences, for example the Beijing women's summit that caused such a stir in this country and elsewhere, and the Rio Earth summit, meaning that the American taxpayers will never, never again be forced to pay the exorbitant costs of such boondoggles as those two that I mentioned.

The pending bill will require the United Nations to reimburse the American taxpayers for U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. And that means that the U.S. defense budget will no longer be raided to support U.N. experimentation with peacekeeping operations.

Most important, this bill provides a very significant aspect. It forbids requiring the American taxpayers to furnish the money to pay any so-called U.N. arrearages unless and until the requirements in this bill have been met by the United Nations.

A lot of crabbing is going on about it, and a lot of speculation about whether they will like it or not up there. They don't like it. You know who doesn't care one whit whether they like it or not? You are looking at him, Mr. President. My message to the United Nations is simple but clear: No reform, no American taxpayers' money for arrearages.

Last, and certainly not least, this legislation imposes very strict and very specific disciplines on spending and authorizing funding for the Department of State and other related agencies.

Let me repeat for the purpose of emphasis. This legislation is bipartisan. It does not contain everything that I wanted. Senator BIDEN is a tough and fair negotiator. Nor does it reflect everything that the other side—JOE BIDEN and the Democrats—not everything that they wanted is in here. But, in the end, at the end of the day, as is so often said these days, I believe it is evident that the Foreign Relations Committee is proposing important reforms that will be highly beneficial to this country and to the American taxpayers.

So I say again, it is truly a team effort by both sides, and I hasten to mention that it would not have been possible without the extraordinary efforts of the chairman of the International Operations Subcommittee, Senator ROD GRAMS, who devoted so many

hours presiding over oversight hearings on important aspects of this bill. Senator GRAMS worked with us every step of the way in crafting the legislation which I have just described in some detail. Moreover, Senator GRAMS' special expertise, gained by his having served as the U.S. Congressional Delegate to the United Nations, has been enormously helpful in the crafting of this comprehensive U.N. reform proposal. And then the committee has also worked closely with Senator JUDD GREGG, the distinguished chairman of the appropriations subcommittee which has the responsibility, don't you know, for the Departments of Commerce, State, and Justice. Senator GREGG's support for this bill, this pending bill, sent a message to the administration early on that the appropriators as well as the authorizers of the U.S. Senate would be standing together, united in support of this pending bill.

Needless to say, I sincerely hope that the spirit of bipartisanship will continue and that the Senate will expeditiously complete action on it.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, both majority and minority, be given the privilege of the floor for the duration of the Senate's consideration of S. 903, the pending legislation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Senator BIDEN is on his way to the Senate floor. While we await the arrival of the distinguished Senator from Delaware, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, is there controlled time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUTCHINSON). There is no controlled time. The pending business is S. 903.

Mr. BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I rise today to speak to the legislation before us. Today, the Senate begins consideration of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, comprehensive legislation regarding the institutional structure of and the funding for America's foreign policy. This bill contains much more than the usual 2-year authorization and funding for our foreign affairs agency which we attempt to bring to the floor out of the Foreign Relations Committee. It addresses two important issues which were the focus of much-heated debate in the last Congress.

Specifically, this bill provides for the payment of U.S. back dues to the United Nations—I need not say a very con-

troversial and hotly debated subject in this body—contingent, I might add, on specific reforms in that body.

I note parenthetically that I spoke on Friday with the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and he indicated to me that it was his hope and expectation that the Senate as a whole, that I in particular and the chairman of the full committee, Senator HELMS, would be pleased with a number of the reforms he has initiated consistent with what he indicated he would do. Hopefully, they will be acted upon by the General Assembly this summer. But whether they are or not, the back dues are contingent upon specific reforms in that body.

Additionally, the bill establishes a framework for the reorganization of U.S. foreign policy agencies, which is, in my view, totally consistent with the plan announced by the President of the United States in April. The bill, Mr. President, that we have before us is not only complex and wide ranging, in that it covers more than one specific subject, but it is also the product of what I think most people would acknowledge is a serious bipartisan effort on the part of the chairman of the full committee, members of the subcommittee in the majority, members of the subcommittee in the minority, and me as the ranking member of the committee representing the Democratic position. In addition to that, the administration has been part of this lengthy and very detailed negotiation for the past several months.

Last Thursday, after a markup that lasted less than 3 hours in the Foreign Relations Committee, the Committee on Foreign Relations voted overwhelmingly, 14 to 4, to report this bill, with a majority of the members on each side of the aisle voting in favor of it. I am grateful to the majority leader, Senator LOTT, and to the chairman of the full committee, Senator HELMS, for working together to bring this bill to the floor so promptly. The bipartisan cooperation on this bill thus far is a testament to the commitment of both the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Republican leadership, along with the administration, to attempt to construct what we all talk about a lot but seldom occurs: a truly bipartisan consensus on American foreign policy.

This bill is quite detailed, so with the indulgence of my colleagues, I will take, which is the norm around here and the requirement, a few moments to explain, as the Democratic manager of the bill, what its major provisions are.

First, the bill contains the basic authorization legislation for the Department of State, or, put in everyday parlance, money, the money for running the Department of State and our suggestion, as all authorizers do, to the appropriators as to how much money we should be spending.

First, it contains the basic authorization legislation for the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency,

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Peace Corps.

The funding levels in the bill closely reflect that of the President's budget. The total amount authorized for fiscal 1998 is \$6.1 billion, as compared to the President's request of \$6.2 billion. In fiscal year 1999, and this is a 2-year authorization, the amount provided in this bill is \$5.9 billion. This modest reduction represents the reduction in the international organization account consistent with the administration's commitments. During debate on this legislation, I will explain that in more detail.

Within this framework, we have provided, first, full funding for the Department of State's core activities; that is, the diplomatic and consular programs, salaries and expenses, and protection and maintenance of our embassies—full funding. It provides 99 percent of the funding for the U.S. Information Agency's diplomatic programs; full funding for our exchange programs, the Fulbright program and others; and full funding for international broadcasting. It provides full funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, a bipartisan operation that has had very great success; full funding for the Peace Corps and the Asia Foundation; and \$819 million over 3 years to pay our U.N. arrears.

After several years of reductions in spending for diplomatic readiness, I am heartened we are restoring funds to the international affairs account, particularly to the core activities of the State Department. Although the cold war has ended, Mr. President, the need for American leadership in world affairs has not. Our diplomats often represent the frontline of our national defense, and with the downsizing of the U.S. military presence overseas, the maintenance of a robust and effective diplomatic capability has become all the more important, in my opinion, and in the opinion of a vast majority of people who study the issue.

Despite the reduction in our military readiness abroad, the increased importance of diplomatic readiness to our national security has not been reflected in recent Federal budgets. According to a study of the Congressional Research Service prepared earlier this year at my request, foreign policy spending is now at its lowest level in 20 years. Stated in 1998 dollars, the budget in the current fiscal year is \$18.77 billion, which is 25 percent below the annual average of \$25 billion over the past 2 decades, the past 20 years, and 30 percent below the level of 10 years ago, which was very near the end of the Reagan administration.

Mr. President, I emphasize, again, that this is a lot of money, but out of a \$1.7 or almost \$1.8 trillion budget and in light of the fact we are the world's only superpower it is a small percentage. To continue to reduce our commitment to foreign affairs at a time when

we are necessarily reducing our military activity abroad, our military presence abroad, seems to me to be counterproductive. It seems to me that in the former Soviet Union, the former Soviet states, the newly independent states, we should be having an increased diplomatic presence there. We should be opening consulates; we should have a robust economic presence there; and yet, as a matter of fact, we have been cutting back. This bill reverses that trend.

Let me put it another way. This halts the trend of downward movement and recognizes our need to engage the world with diplomacy and our foreign policy, not with our military.

So I am pleased that we are reversing the hemorrhaging of funds away from foreign policy, according to this bill.

Second, the bill provides a framework for the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies that is consistent with the President's announced plan on April 18. The backdrop for this, I know the Presiding Officer knows very well, is that the world has changed drastically. The world has changed drastically, as we all discuss and talk about, but we have not reorganized the foreign policy establishment in our country. We have not reorganized our foreign policy apparatus.

Although it made a great deal of sense, in my view, in the past years to have, for example, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency separate and apart from the State Department and our Agency for International Development separate and apart, and other departments separate and apart, it seems to me, and it seems to most observers, including the administration, that it no longer makes sense. Here the credit must go to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. He has been consistently advocating a major overhaul of the State Department, as well as these other agencies, in terms of consolidation.

I might add that there are provisions in this legislation that, obviously, I should have said at the outset that I don't like. There are provisions I would like to change. For example, I think we should be funding more money for the United Nations, although I acknowledge the amount we funded can get the job done. I think we should be making additional changes and giving greater flexibility to AID than we do in this legislation. The fact of the matter is, this is a product of a compromise on three major, major, major initiatives. As a consequence of that, neither Senator HELMS nor I got all that we bargained for in this. That is the nature of compromise. So this has been a very important element of this whole package for the chairman of the committee.

Like the President's plan, the bill that we bring to the floor today provides for integration of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency within the State Department within 1 year and ensures that the arms control function is maintained in a position of

prominence within the Department of State.

When I went months ago to negotiate or lay out how I would like to proceed and was willing to proceed with the chairman of the full committee, I indicated to him that I would work in a bipartisan way to deal with the reorganization, deal with the United Nations and deal with the funding of the State Department, assuming that he was not using this reorganization and other methods as merely a means for us to withdraw from the world. He not only indicated that it was not his objective, he has followed through and has shown it was not his objective, evidence the fact that we essentially fully fund the State Department for the next 2 years and he has agreed to significant latitude for the State Department in the bill and its reorganization efforts, compared to the bills he has introduced for the last 2 years.

So, like the President's plan, the bill we bring to the floor today provides for the integration of not only ACDA, but also the U.S. Information Agency [USIA], into the State Department. It provides for a 2-year transition for that to occur and creates a position of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy.

Again, I indicated that my concern was that as we bring these specialized agencies of significant consequence into the State Department, where they have never been before, that they be brought in at a level commensurate with their significance, that they not be subsumed in the State Department and essentially lose their visibility and significance.

It seems to me, Mr. President, arms control will be the single most important element of American foreign policy over the next two decades. For it to be taken out of its independent status and subsumed into the State Department would be a mistake. What we do is we establish in this bill a position of prominence for the person who heads ACDA, as well as for USIA, and we create the position of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. There is only one difference in that it integrates the Office of Public Liaison and Legislative Affairs into the State Department within 1 year.

The reason for that is, we think, quite simple. It is nothing complex. We think it can be done quickly and that it saves bureaucracy and it saves money.

Additionally, this bill puts some flesh on the bones of the President's plan with regard to international broadcasting. The President's plan was virtually silent on this question, stating only that "the distinctiveness and editorial integrity of the Voice of America and the broadcasting agencies would be preserved."

That is just what we have done here.

This bill just holds and protects that principle by maintaining the existing Government structure established by Congress in 1994 consolidating all U.S.

Government-sponsored broadcasting. I might add, this was a money-saving effort led by the Senator from Wisconsin, Senator FEINGOLD. He has succeeded, at least in large part, in one of his objectives, which was to save the American taxpayers a great deal of money. We have eliminated a bloated bureaucracy. We have consolidated services, we have consolidated technical capability, and we have preserved the integrity of the radios.

By radios I mean Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty—the things that Lech Walesa said helped bring down the Berlin Wall more than anything else. We established Radio Free Asia and Radio Marti and TV Marti relating to Cuba. All of these maintain their journalistic integrity because of their editorial integrity.

So we have done, I believe, what the administration indicated it wished to do; that is, maintain the distinctiveness and editorial integrity of these radios as well as the Voice of America. This bill upholds and protects that principle.

As I said, what we have done is consolidated from 1994 all the U.S. Government-sponsored broadcasting, that is Voice of America, Radio and TV Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Worldnet TV, under the supervision of one oversight board known as the Broadcasting Board of Governors. That has been done.

Importantly, however, the board and the broadcasters below them will not be merged into the Department of State where their journalistic integrity would be questioned and greatly at risk. The radios will, however, continue to play an important role in advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The board will have what I call a dotted line relationship with the State Department in that the new Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the same function now performed by the Director of USIA, will have a seat on the board. Additionally, the Secretary of State will provide foreign policy guidance to the board and will be consulted about additions or deletions of language services currently performed by the radios.

Like the President's plan, the bill maintains the Agency for International Development, that is AID, as a separate agency, but provides for its partial integration into the State Department.

This has been the most controversial part of all of this, I might say, Mr. President. There is a constituency that has a very solid case to be made—I think a very strong case to be made—suggesting that the expertise buildup by AID, headed now by Brian Atwood, and by many other distinguished persons before him, is unique in that it is the outfit that literally goes out and provides for digging the wells, bringing the water, and bringing the new projects to those areas that need the help.

It was very important that we not take that expertise and merge it into

the State Department, get it lost with every other GS-15 or 17 or 12 and lose the distinctive nature of those experiences. There is a difference between those who do foreign policy and those who dig wells. It is this distinctive nature—the ability to produce and deliver services—that says we, the United States of America, through our aid program, are going to assist populations in need.

But it has been, I think, a legitimate concern, in light of the new world we now face, that there be more policy sway on the part of the person dealing with the foreign policy of America—the Secretary of State. We have tried to accommodate that, Mr. President. Just as the President announced, the AID administrator will be placed under the direct authority of the Secretary of State and, consistent with the plan's objectives of improving coordination between the regional bureaus at State and AID, the Secretary of State will have authority to coordinate this aid policy.

This is causing a bit of a flap, though. This has been the single biggest thing that, to the average American and I suspect the average Senator, sounds merely like a giant bureaucratic snafu in that somebody's turf is being stepped on and somebody else's turf is not being accommodated, et cetera. It is more than that. It is more serious than that. But I suspect we have not heard the end of what we attempted to do in this legislation.

The concept of aid coordinators, that is, having aid coordinated by the State Department, is not new in this legislation. Since the early 1990's, the State Department has had such coordinators that have supervised the aid programs in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Under the leadership of President Bush and, prior to that, under the leadership of the Democratically controlled Foreign Relations Committee, we first had a thing called the SEED program and then the President expanded that, President Bush expanded it into the Freedom Support Act. That aid program involved deciding how much aid would go to the Ukraine, how much aid would go to Russia, et cetera. And we set up a special coordinator within the State Department to do that.

So this is not a new notion we are applying here. This legislation, quite frankly, is modeled on that concept. Indeed, the language we use here is borrowed directly from the Freedom Support Act. But nonetheless we are going to hear more about this because some of my colleagues, on both sides of the aisle, have very, very strong views about this. I suspect we will be debating this aspect of the reorganization more than any other.

Two other issues bear emphasis and belie any charge that we are micromanaging the reorganization of the State Department.

First, unlike the bill reported by this committee in the last Congress, this

reorganization bill does not—and I thank the chairman for doing this because it is one of the major disagreements he and I had—this bill does not, as the last bill introduced in the Congress did, mandate specific reductions in budget or personnel. Instead, it requires only a periodic report on savings that are achieved.

Second, the committee has provided no directives—none—on the promised reinvention of the State Department itself.

Let me be clear about this. The President's plan stated that a central element in the plan would be an "intensified, comprehensive internal reform program at State." In other words, the reorganization of State by itself.

Again, for my colleagues listening to this, there are basically three pieces to this reorganization. One is you have the State Department sitting here and then you have these very important agencies, USIA, AID—I think those are the acronyms—U.S. Information Agency, the Administration for International Development and the Arms Control Disarmament Agency.

For historical reasons, they had all been, if you will, satellite agencies outside the direct, immediate control of the State Department, although all related to the State Department. That is one big piece. What do you do about that matrix?

There is a second big piece here. The second big piece is, within the State Department, how many Undersecretaries of State do you have? How many Assistant Secretaries of State? What do you do in terms of how they relate to one another? How many personnel should be in the field and not in the field? How many consulates should you have and not have? These are all very important decisions.

That is part of this \$6.1 billion we are giving them to run this year and \$5.9 billion in the second year of this 2-year authorization. We do not fool with that. We do not micromanage that. We respond to the concerns of the last administration and this administration. We say, "Look, you present us with a plan. You come up and you go ahead and reorganize that. We're giving you authority to go out and do it. You do it."

We are not micromanaging, but we are going to deal with this big, controversial subject that has been sort of rattling around for the last decade. We are going to take AID, ACDA, and USIA, and we are going to merge them in varying degrees into the State Department.

There are those who are going to come out on the floor and say that Senator HELMS and I are into micromanaging the State Department's day-to-day activities. That is simply not true. That is not what we are doing. But we are tackling the one issue no administration has really been able to successfully deal with. And that is, what do you do about these three very

important agencies that have very important constituencies and very important functions? We are taking them—they have been out there by themselves now for a number of years, with good reason—and we are merging them, in light of this changed world, into the State Department. We are doing that. We are doing that, in my opinion, for several reasons.

I will tell you my motivation for doing it. First, internally handled, I am not sure how it would ever get settled in the administration. The constituencies are significant. The bureaucracies are real. They are important. Second, I worried that if we were essentially just going to use this as an excuse to eliminate their functions, we would be doing a great disservice to the Nation. Senator HELMS agreed. Senator HELMS said, let us bring them into, in commensurate positions of responsibility and authority, the State Department. So we are doing that. But even within that, we leave a great deal of flexibility for the Secretary of State and the President of the United States.

Mr. President, I believe I speak for the chairman when I express my hope that the type of reform effort that the President has indicated he wishes to undertake—that is the actual reorganization of the State Department itself, which we do not do—my sincere hope that he will in fact vigorously pursue the long overdue internal management reform needed because the State Department's problems could be compounded by the absorption of two new agencies unless reforms are made.

So the irony here is, Mr. President, we are subsuming these organizations into the State Department, and now it is real important that the internal management and reforms within the State Department take place because, if there is difficulty in terms of organizational structures at State now, they are going to be compounded by bringing in these additional agencies.

We leave all of the aid personnel outside here. We take policy and we put it in, but the personnel, the people who actually go out and make sure the water goes to the village, their unique capability stays out here as an independent agency.

So the point is that we are giving the State Department and the President ample opportunity to do what they say they needed. And I believe the administration—the administration; Freudian slip—my administration, in effect, on the floor that I have to deal with is the majority party. The majority party, led by Senator HELMS, has given a great deal more flexibility than they intended to give for the administration to be able to do that. Obviously, the administration would prefer, as a matter of principle, passage of legislation that delegates broad authority to the President to reorganize the whole shooting match.

Well, in a perfect world I would prefer that as well. The truth of the matter is, it is not a perfect world. My

team does not control this place. The other team controls this place. They have very different views. And I think we have worked out, in light of that, a very, very important compromise that is consistent with the overall objective the President has stated.

But under the administration's approach, which is basically just delegate, the only moment for congressional action would be a resolution of disapproval of a plan. What the administration wanted, and if I could have waved a wand—put it another way; if I had 51 votes—I might attempt to accommodate their wish.

But what the administration wanted was that they send a plan to us when they have the opportunity to go through it and vet it. They will say, "This is our reorganization plan, including the whole shooting works. Now, you, the Congress, either approve or disapprove it." You can only—excuse me, you have to disapprove it. If you do not disapprove it, then it becomes law; it is changed. If you disapprove it, it has the benefit, if you are a President, of allowing you to get your plan passed with only one-third of the Congress plus one voting for it, because we can come along and get 51 votes and say, "No; we don't like the plan you submitted," and disapprove it. The President then vetoes our disapproval of his plan. Now we have to override his veto. So we come back up here and we have to find a supermajority if we do not like the plan.

So it is not something Congress would usually buy on to, any more than administrations like to buy on to giving up any prerogative, and one of their prerogatives is to reorganize the executive branch. They do not like the fact that we are doing part of that for them, which is understandable. If I were President, I would feel the same way, or if I were the Secretary of State, I would feel the same way. Conversely, Congresses are not real crazy about offers made to them that allow Presidents essentially to control the agenda, control the outcome by only getting one-third of the Congress plus one person to vote with them.

So here we are. I now am joining the chairman of the full committee in preferring that Congress should place its positive stamp on the President's plan rather than having the chance only to give a stamp of disapproval and to be overridden by one-third plus one.

In general terms, the committee's approach does not provide any less flexibility to reorganize. To be sure, the committee locks in the date for ultimate integration of the two agencies in question. And we are only fully integrating two agencies, USIA and ACDA. And it speeds up the partial integration of AID into State.

Within those broad outlines the administration has considerable flexibility to implement the thousands of decisions required under reorganization. Ultimately, Mr. President, the administration will have to return to the

Congress for certain authorities to carry out the complicated integration of two large agencies into the State Department. However, I would be surprised if the administration contends that this requirement to return to Congress is unduly burdensome.

I hope the administration will work with the committee on this procedure. If the administration is committed to the reorganization outlined by the President's April 18 statement, as I believe it is, then it should have no trouble implementing the legislative framework laid down in this bill.

Finally, Mr. President, the bill provides for the payment of U.S. arrearages to the United Nations. Now, in my almost 25 years of being a U.S. Senator, there is little that generates as much enthusiasm for debate than when we talk about paying arrearages to the United Nations. Maybe when we talk about the question of abortion more vigor is displayed on this floor, but only abortion and a few other issues raise the combative instincts of my colleagues more than paying back U.S. arrearages.

Now, the proposal contained in our bill, this bipartisan proposal, led by my friend from North Carolina, I believe will serve three important purposes. One, it should finally end the long festering feud between the United Nations and Washington about our unpaid dues. Second, it should bring much needed reform to the world's body so that it can more efficiently perform its missions, missions which we acknowledge in this legislation that we support. Third, it should, I hope, restore some of the bipartisan support in Congress for the U.N.'s system, support that has existed for most of the U.N.'s 50-year history.

The agreement before the Senate will allow us to pay \$819 million in arrears to the United Nations over a 3-year period contingent upon the United Nations achieving specific benchmarks, to borrow Chairman HELMS' expression.

Now, the payments are broken down as follows: In year 1, we will pay \$100 million. I might add, even if we wanted to pay more, the budget agreement we passed does not accommodate us paying any more than that, so even if we wanted to pay all the rest, the Congress and the President have limited us to what we can pay under that budget agreement. Now, in year 2—and this was a significant compromise, and he is on the floor, and I want to publicly thank him for accommodating my request on this—in year 2, we pay \$475 million, assuming the benchmarks are met. In year 3, we will repay the remaining \$244 million.

The significant feature of this payment scheme is that it will allow the administration to pay off virtually all our arrears in the first 2 years for the two most important accounts, which are the regular and peacekeeping budgets. With these two accounts current, our diplomats will have the leverage they need to push through the tough reforms that are needed.

Let me mention a few of the particularly noteworthy benchmarks, again using the chairman's term. The plan calls for a two-stage reduction in our regular U.N. assessment rate from 25 percent to 20 percent. Now, I have been criticized a great deal for going along with this, as my friend from North Carolina, I suspect, has been criticized for going along with paying the arrears. I am told, "JOE, as a supporter of the United Nations how can you possibly insist that the U.S. portion of the United Nation's regular dues be reduced from 25 percent to 20 percent?" And I say I would rather just pay our arrears and then negotiate that. But on the issue of what should we pay, Mr. President, I would respectfully suggest that if the meeting in San Francisco organizing the U.N. were today rather than 50 years ago, we would not be sitting down with economic giants like Japan and the European countries and others and saying, "By the way, we should pay 25 percent."

I argue it made sense after World War II when we were the only economic power left standing in the world. We are not the only economic power left standing in the world. I want to pay our fair share. I do want to carry our burden. But I am hard pressed to see why I am doing such a terrible thing, siding with the chairman, saying our numbers should get down to 20 percent from 25 percent.

As I said, I challenge anyone to tell me why you think there would be a consensus in the world that we should pay 25 percent if we were starting from day one. Now, agreed, admittedly, the chairman and I do not agree on how we should go about this. I would like to pay the arrears, not make it conditional and negotiate our dues because this is a little bit heavy handed, but I am a realist. Politics in the best sense of the word is the art of the practical. We have to get 51 votes to get this thing moving. The chairman and I have to make compromises. He has come a long way. I am willing to go a long way because I think this meets the most important requirement.

I hear people telling me now, and I see my friends on the floor, saying, "JOE, this is great. You worked out this compromise with Senator HELMS, but if you got him to compromise this much, if you were just a little tougher you would have gotten a billion 300 million for U.N. arrears." First, they do not know my friend like I do. We have worked together for almost 25 years. We came here at the same time. Second, it is amazing how people in hindsight say, "Hey, this is great, this is great. We are moving along in the right direction." This is the end of the road, this direction.

As I told the chairman, he came up to that \$819 million, and the administration says they can get the job done with that—it is a bottom-line number with me. If we go to conference and the House cuts that number, I am not voting for this. And the chairman did not

like going up that high but he is sure going no higher, unless I misread him. So people say, "Well, JOE, you are forcing the United Nations to make these decisions. It is not fair." Well, I remind them, can the United Nations take another year, can we handle another year of nonpayment without doing permanent damage or additional damage to our status within that agency, which I think is an important agency? Everybody tells me it is important this get done. I asked those folks who now are saying this is not enough, I asked them, you figure out how to get 51 votes for something more than that, and if you do not get 51 votes and this carries over for another year, what damage have we done? If damage would be done by not paying the disputed amount between \$819 million and what others say we owe, if damage would be done by that, how much damage would be done if this thing goes over another year? I respectfully suggest, a lot more damage by not acting. And, by the way, I have had this conversation with the President of the General Assembly and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. They both want action now because they say what our fellow nations in the United Nations are wondering, are we ever going to pay? Do we think we have an obligation? This, at a minimum, establishes that. It is very important, very important.

We may have a slight disagreement, my friend from North Carolina and me, but I see the United Nations as a valuable tool. I do not want to be sending U.S. troops everywhere in the world where there is a need for international action, where there is a need for the world to respond so it does not blow out of control. I do not want to do that. The United Nations can be and is a very valuable adjunct and tool. I do not want to see it come apart. To me, this is the single best way to meet our foreign policy needs now. It is important we act now.

Let me mention a few of the particular noteworthy benchmarks beyond moving from 25 to 20 percent. The plan also requires that the United Nations make a commitment that the United States be reimbursed for support we provided for the peacekeeping operations, something that is very important to the chairman. Some of my colleagues, all of whom I respect, will come to the floor and say, "Well, you know, JOE, look at what our share of the world's resources are and look at what our share of the world's economy is and look at what our share of our involvement in the United Nations is, and it really should be 25 percent." I say, does the rest of the world take into consideration the billions of dollars American taxpayers are paying to keep peace in the world? How about Korea? How about Japan? How much do they pay? How about the billions of dollars we have committed in Bosnia? How about the billions of dollars we have committed around the world? Now, I am not asking the United Na-

tions to credit us for that. I do not know how they would calculate that. I am asking them to recognize it.

I am asking, by us coming up with these arrearages, to stop the bashing, to stop the U.S. bashing, as well as, hopefully, to stop the U.N. bashing. This is a time for us to take advantage of the institutions in the best sense of the word that exist to maintain world peace without our having to be the world cop.

In addition, the plan calls for a number of budgetary and oversight reforms that promise to improve the efficiency both at the U.N. Secretariat and in its largest specialized agencies.

I say again to my friend who is on the floor, he may have been off the floor earlier, I spoke with Kofi Annan on Friday. I suspect the Senator may have, as well. He indicated he appreciated our efforts. Obviously, he would like more. He said something interesting. He said that he was hopeful that you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be pleased with the reforms he has already suggested and that he hopes the United Nations will act upon this year prior to—prior to—commitments mandated by us in these benchmarks. He did not get specific about each, but I am sure, knowing him as I do, he is committed to reasonable reform just like every other major business in the world is reforming and every major governmental institution is reforming and streamlining. I believe that it is the intention of the Secretary-General to do the same thing. The end result will be to increase the efficacy of the United Nations and the fairness of those nations that contribute to its function.

There are many of my colleagues that will look at the list that I mentioned here today and wonder why such detailed restrictions are attached to the payment of this money. In an ideal world, as I indicated in committee, I indicated to the chairman, and I indicate now, I would prefer far fewer restrictions. I support the United Nations with all its flaws because I believe, more often than not, it advances our national interests by providing a forum for combating problems that no single nation can address on its own, or at least no single nation can efficiently address on its own. We should not have to be the nation to address problems solely on our own. Placing conditions on U.S. payment is not unprecedented. Congressional pressure has often been an important catalyst for change in New York.

For example, were it not for the efforts of our former colleague, Nancy Kassebaum—and everybody thinks of Nancy Kassebaum as a supporter of the United Nations and looks to Senator HELMS as the person who stopped all these payments to the United Nations, Senator Nancy Kassebaum, now Nancy Kassebaum Baker, when she was a leader on this floor—her efforts required that the U.N. system would have to adopt a consensus-based budgeting

process. Were it not for her efforts, that would not have occurred. Were it not for the initiative of Congress in 1994, then under Democratic control, in fairness to the chairman, there would be no inspector general at the United Nations. That was a condition we placed. That was a Democratically-controlled Senate, that was a Democratically-controlled committee.

So this notion of benchmarks is not an unprecedented notion. What is unprecedented is the Senator from North Carolina saying, "I will sign on to pay our arrearages." That is the unprecedented part, from my standpoint, and the benchmarks that he has insisted upon, I cannot look him in the eye and say that they are not reasonable. I would prefer not to have them, but they are not unreasonable. I would prefer to do it another way, but they are not unreasonable, and consequently I am supporting him because this is all part of an overall agreement to deal with the entire foreign policy of the United States of America.

Mr. President, the achievements I mentioned earlier, the inspector general and others, were reasonable conditions. So, too, are those contained in the Senate bill now before the Senate.

The original plan offered by the majority, in my view, did not meet the same standard, but as a result of good faith negotiations with the majority, we now have a set of conditions, which the administration, including our Ambassador to the United Nations, our former colleague and now Ambassador Bill Richardson, believes are achievable.

Mr. President, I am often asked what it takes to be a U.S. Senator, and I say it takes two very important things: One, you have to be an optimist. If you are not, you are in the wrong business. It is not the place to be. The second thing it requires, I think, is that you be a pragmatist, because we have to achieve a consensus in this body. We represent over 250 million people with very different views. We represent very different constituencies and very different ideologies. Pragmatically, we have to get to the point where we get 51 votes.

I recognize that no plan to pay our U.N. arrearages can get through a Republican-controlled Congress without some of the conditions that are on here. Again, I think the ones that remain are not unreasonable. I believe it is important to get this issue behind us and move toward a bipartisan foreign policy. This legislation should contribute considerably to straightening out our relations with the United Nations.

For those colleagues on my side of the aisle who remain unconvinced, let me state clearly that the administration was involved every step of the way in the U.N. negotiations, and it has signed off on every element of this U.N. package and supports the proposal as the best deal that can be achieved, because they believe, as I do, that we must put this behind us. So I don't

want to hear that the chairman did this by fiat, or the chairman—which he is capable of doing—got the ranking member in and convinced him, or has mesmerized him into changing his view. That is not true—possible, but not true. That is not what happened. The administration was either in the room or informed of everything we have done on this point. They, like me, believe that this is the best we can get and that it can get the job done.

Now, I say to some of my colleagues, very bluntly—I will state it on the record—they say that they think the administration is wrong as well. Well, look, I have to sign on with some team here, you know. They are the ones running the show. They are the ones with the expertise. They know a lot more about what is needed to satisfy the 150 some nations of the United Nations. I take their word for it and I believe they are correct—substantively correct—that it can be done. The administration doesn't love this; I don't love it; the chairman doesn't love it. But that's what this legislation is about. That is why we have a Congress. That is how it is supposed to work to arrive at a consensus.

Let me conclude by saying, Mr. President, that I have been here a long time. I have worked on a lot of big bills. I have been, like the chairman of the committee, in the majority and the minority. I like one better than the other. I have been both places, and I have been in both places twice. As I said, I have had the responsibility on my side of the aisle of shepherding through some very comprehensive legislation, not the least of which was the crime bill. But I think if the chairman of the committee and I stood here in January, the first week we were in session, and said that JESSE HELMS of North Carolina and JOE BIDEN of Delaware are going to sit down in a room over the next 5 or 6 months and work out an entire package on how to deal with all this—when is the last time we passed an authorization? It was in 1994. That was the last time we passed any legislation to pay arrearages. It was the last time we got any consensus on how to reorganize. Well, we have done that. We both may be wrong, but we have done it.

We have brought to the floor a comprehensive package. So that I don't confuse anybody, the most important thing to me is, first of all, to maintain my principle, and, second, to maintain the commitments I make. There are going to be amendments on this floor that I would like to vote for. For example, my friend from Indiana, Senator LUGAR, one of the most informed men in the United States of America on foreign policy, believes, as I do, that we should dedicate more than \$819 million toward paying our arrearages. As a matter of fact, I am the guy who called him when I thought my friend from North Carolina and I could not work out an agreement, and said, "If I introduce an amendment to raise the arrear-

ages, will you vote for me in committee?" But then the chairman came along and said, "I will agree." I ended up voting against my friend from Indiana in the committee to raise the number higher. I did that because I made a commitment.

This is an overall package, all of this. It is not fair for me to say to the ranking member or to the chairman, who has made significant concessions from his former positions, I want to take this one piece out of the overall agreement and still keep the agreement, any more than it would be fair for him to go into a committee and vote to reduce the number from \$819 million to \$600 million. He will not do that to me, and I will not do that to him. This is not a matter of us making a personal deal. This is meeting the commitment given to us by the Senate: Can we put together a bipartisan consensus on this?

I want to announce to everybody that I am probably going to be casting votes here, and I will state why at the time—they may say, "How can BIDEN vote that way?" If it stood all by itself, I probably would not vote that way. But I believe the package we brought for the Senate's consideration is serious, balanced, important to the foreign policy of this Nation, and workable. I will stick with it. It is not a perfect bill. Like any document that is the result of negotiations between two opposing parties, it represents compromise and it contains some elements that neither of us like. But it represents, in my judgment, an incredibly constructive compromise. I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. President, unless my friend from North Carolina wishes to take the floor, I have nothing further to say.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KYL). The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I shall not devote a lot of time to expressing my appreciation to Senator BIDEN. He knows how I feel. Beginning in January, he is correct, I wasn't sure that we would work this out. He is a fair man, and I try to be. As I look back on it, it was an inspiring experience for me. I thank him, and I hope we can expedite the proceedings from now on.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the bill is open for amendment. This is a good time for Senators who have amend-

ments—and I hope only a few, if any, do, but I expect there will be some—this would be a good time for them to come over. We will accord them as much time as they need. But I say with all the earnestness that I have, it would be helpful if Senators will come and offer their amendments because the bill is open to amendment at this time.

I thank the Chair, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 15 minutes as if in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FIGHTING JUVENILE CRIME

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, we are facing a crisis in juvenile crime in America. At no time in our Nation's history have we experienced such severe and pervasive juvenile violence.

The statistics tell a frightening story. From 1983 to 1992—in just 9 years—juvenile arrests for violent crimes increased 57 percent. Specifically, juvenile arrests for aggravated assaults increased 95 percent while juvenile arrests for murder rose 128 percent. To put it in more concrete terms, over 2 million juveniles are arrested each year, many for violent crimes. In 1995 alone, teenagers committed almost 4,000 murders. Sadly, the worst is yet to come.

A huge demographic explosion will occur early next century. By 2006 the teenage population will top 30 million, the most in 30 years. Respected criminologists, such as James Q. Wilson and Marvin Wolfgang, agree that this demographic bulge could have a disastrous effect because of the large increase in young males in their crime-prone years. The number of juveniles will increase 31 percent by the year 2010. Experts predict this increase, particularly in young males, will mean at least 3,000 more murderers, rapists, and muggers on the streets than exist today. A U.S. Department of Justice report confirms these dire predictions. The Justice report estimates that by the year 2010 juvenile arrests for violent crime will more than double.

So today I want to discuss how we can help the States fight juvenile crime. As chairman of the Youth Violence Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, I am greatly interested in crafting a bipartisan juvenile justice bill. But before we begin, let's face the facts.

The Federal Government has only a limited role in fighting juvenile crime. Ninety-nine percent of all juvenile