

follow us in this august body. I look forward to the likely possibility that one or more of this fine group of young people will return here to serve as Members of the U.S. Senate.

In closing, I hope the experiences the pages have gained here will inspire them to return to their respective communities as better citizens and with a greater appreciation for public service. Speaking on behalf of all Democratic Members, we wish them well and thank them for a job well done. Good luck and best wishes for a bright and successful future.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a list of the 1997 spring pages be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1997 SPRING SENATE PAGES

DEMOCRATIC

Mary Elizabeth Begin (RI).
Brian Burton (NY).
Matthew Canter (WI).
Amanda Croushore (WI).
Andrea Hoekman (SD).
Charlotte Houghteling (MA).
Christina Monico (IL).
Robert Mook (VT).
George Nelson (MT).
Karoline Pershell (MI).
David Robinson (AR).
Timothy Smith (TX).
Shatika Starks (MD).
Nathan Zukas (WI).

REPUBLICAN

Carmen Anderson (SC).
LaKeisha Applegate (RI).
Kathryn Brotherton (WA).
Leslie Carter (SC).
Danielle DeArment (VA).
Hamilton Frey (MS).
Whitney Gilliam (SC).
Sarah Gregg (NH).
Jayne Merner (RI).
Catherine Mitchell (NC).
Jordan Raphael (VT).
Brian Reagan (UT).
Joanna Steckler (VA).
Matthew Wales (IN).
Mercedes Weyher (UT).

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Wednesday, June 11, 1997, the Federal debt stood at \$5,355,419,342,837.75. (Five trillion, three hundred fifty-five billion, four hundred nineteen million, three hundred forty-two thousand, eight hundred thirty-seven dollars and seventy-five cents)

One year ago, June 11, 1996, the Federal debt stood at \$5,136,928,000,000. (Five trillion, one hundred thirty-six billion, nine hundred twenty-eight million)

Five years ago, June 11, 1992, the Federal debt stood at \$3,942,238,000,000. (Three trillion, nine hundred forty-two billion, two hundred thirty-eight million)

Ten years ago, June 11, 1987, the Federal debt stood at \$2,293,413,000,000. (Two trillion, two hundred ninety-three billion, four hundred thirteen million)

Fifteen years ago, June 11, 1982, the Federal debt stood at \$1,075,173,000,000 (One trillion, seventy-five billion, one hundred seventy-three million) which reflects a debt increase of more than \$4 trillion—\$4,280,246,342,837.75 (Four trillion, two hundred eighty billion, two hundred forty-six million, three hundred forty-two thousand, eight hundred thirty-seven dollars and seventy-five cents) during the past 15 years.

THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REUNIFICATION OF JERUSALEM

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, today, I would like to comment on this historic anniversary that we have reached. Today marks the 30th anniversary of the end of the Six-Day War, and the reunification of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. It is not only a landmark for the people of Israel, and for Jews around the world, but for people of all faiths and all nationalities.

The 19 years that East Jerusalem was under the control of Jordan saw Jews and Israelis denied the chance to visit the holy sites in the eastern side. The dividing walls and the barbed wire have now come down. When Jerusalem was reunited, Israel opened the city up to all faiths, and that practice continues. Jews, Christians, and Muslims now mingle freely in the entire city.

Reunification did come at a great cost—the price paid was the Six-Day War. Israel launched a preemptive strike against the Arab troops massed against her, and was successful. It ended the dividing of Jerusalem, but it did not end the gunfire. There is still turmoil in Israel.

However, although the Mideast peace process is by no means over, we have perhaps reached a point, as described by Churchill, at the end of the beginning. The recognition and continuation of Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel is crucial to the ongoing peace process.

The United States Congress has recognized this fact, and through a series of actions has sought to insure that an undivided Jerusalem is the capital of the State of Israel. Senate Concurrent Resolution 106, in 1990, declared that Jerusalem must remain the undivided capital and called for Israel and the Palestinians to undertake peace negotiations. This war later cited by Prime Minister Rabin as having helped bring participants of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements to the negotiating table. In 1995, the Jerusalem Embassy Act stated as a matter of U.S. Policy that Jerusalem should remain the undivided capital.

We now celebrate the 30th anniversary of the reunification of Jerusalem, and affirm our desire for that ancient city to remain reunited eternally. I ask, too, that Jerusalem eternally remain a symbol of freedom where all religions can share in visiting the holy city and be a model for religious tolerance and freedom throughout the globe.

NATO ENLARGEMENT AFTER PARIS

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, having recently returned from Paris and the signing of the NATO-Russia charter, I rise today to discuss what is one of the most important foreign policy questions facing the United States—and facing this body: The enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include several new democracies of Central Europe.

Mr. President, I know that what I have just said will at first seem counterintuitive to many Americans. Why is NATO enlargement so important? After all, the Soviet Union is but a bad memory, communism in Europe lives on in stunted form only in Serbia and Belarus, and no military threat in Europe is in sight.

Moreover, some will correctly point out, the Pacific Rim has become the world's premier area for economic growth, and Latin America, while also a prime opportunity for trade and investment, is vitally important to the United States because of problems like illegal immigration and drug trafficking.

So why are we bothering with Europe, much less tinkering with a hugely successful alliance like NATO?

Mr. President, these are legitimate questions that must be answered. I would submit, first of all, without minimizing the importance of Asia and Latin America, that Europe remains a vital area of interest for the United States for political, strategic, economic, and cultural reasons. A sizable percentage of the world's democracies are in Europe, and the continent remains a major global economic player and partner of the United States.

The European union, composed of 15 vibrant free-market democracies, has embarked upon an ambitious program to create an ever closer union with greater political, economic, and social integration. Most of Central and Eastern Europe has gone through several free elections, and democracy is putting down firm roots.

In economic terms, the European union, with a combined population a third larger than ours, has a combined gross domestic product that exceeds ours. While the United States has a larger—and, I might add, less balanced—trading relationship with Asia than with Europe, we invest far more in Europe.

Several new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have highly educated work forces, already boast rapidly expanding economies, and already attract considerable American investment.

Moreover, most Americans trace their cultural roots to Europe, and millions retain personal ties to it. By any geopolitical standard, it would be a catastrophe for U.S. interests if instability would alter the current situation in Europe.

How might that instability occur? Well, no one believes that the Russian

army is poised to pour through the Fulda Gap in Germany—NATO's horror scenario for 45 years. The Russian army is in such pitiful shape that it could not even reconquer little Chechnya, a part of the Russian federation.

No, the threats to stability in Europe have changed, but they are, if anything, even more real than those of the cold war. We all know what they are. They are ethnic and religious hatred as horrifyingly shown in the hundreds of thousands killed, raped, made homeless, or otherwise brutalized in Bosnia.

They are the well-organized forces of international crime, whose tentacles extend from Moscow and Palermo to New York and Los Angeles.

True—but some might ask why the Europeans can't take care of their own problems? Mr. President, life is not fair. Unfortunately, the history of the 20th century has demonstrated that the United States must play a leading role in organizing the security of Europe. In World War I, in World War II, and lately in Bosnia and Herzegovina, without American leadership the countries of Europe have been unable to resolve their differences peacefully.

While American idealism has certainly played a role in our various interventions to rescue Europe, enlightened self-interest has been the dominant motive. Put simply: It is in the vital interest of the United States that stability be preserved in Europe.

How does that translate into 1997 terms? It means that we must lead the Europeans to create what is called in current policy jargon a new security architecture to guarantee stability to the areas most vulnerable to disruption.

To no one's surprise, I am talking about Central and Eastern Europe, where Newly Independent States are striving to create and solidify political democracy and free markets. It is a difficult process, which if not put into a larger framework could spin out of control.

It is in this context that the enlargement of NATO must be seen. During the cold war, NATO provided the security umbrella under which former enemies like France and Germany were able to cooperate and build highly successful free societies.

It was the framework in which former pariahs like Germany, Italy, and Spain could be reintegrated into democratic Europe. And it was NATO that kept the feud between Greece and Turkey from escalating to warfare.

The enlargement of NATO can now serve to move the zone of stability eastward to central Europe and thereby both prevent ethnic conflicts from escalating and forestall a scramble for new bilateral and multilateral pacts along the lines of the 1930's from occurring.

For if NATO were not to enlarge, the countries between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to protect themselves. The question for

today is not "enlarge NATO or remain the same." The status quo is simply not an option.

In fact, we already have clear evidence of how NATO can act as a stabilizing influence in the region. Two years ago, NATO listed friendly relations with neighbors as one of the core criteria for joining the alliance. Merely the possibility of attaining membership rapidly induced centuries-old enemies like Hungary and Romania to bury the hatchet, conclude a treaty of friendship, and even begin intensive military cooperation. The same is true to a lesser extent between Hungary and Slovakia.

Italy and Slovenia have settled a long-festering property dispute. The Czech Republic and Germany have formally come to terms with the Nazis' war-time atrocities and with Czechoslovakia's post-war expulsion of 3 million sudeten Germans. I submit that none of these highly encouraging developments would have occurred without the carrot of admission to NATO having been offered.

Mr. President, there is one additional argument for NATO enlargement: The moral one. For 40 years the United States loudly proclaimed its solidarity with the captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe who were under the heel of Communist oppressors. Now that most of them have cast off their shackles, it is our responsibility to live up to our pledges to readmit them into the West through NATO and the European Union when they are fully qualified.

Let me be precise in my policy formulation. I believe it would be in our national interest for NATO to extend invitations to final negotiations for membership at its July summit in Madrid to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia.

All of these countries have fulfilled the basic criteria for NATO membership—Political democracy, free-market economy, civilian control of the military, peaceful relations with neighbors, and a commitment to NATO principles and Trans-Atlantic security.

In each of these countries democracy and free-market capitalism are on sound footings. All four are able to assume the political, military, and financial responsibilities of membership.

Mr. President, this morning the administration announced that it will only support the candidacies at Madrid of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. I regret the omission of Slovenia from this list, but I recognize the political realities—especially among the current European members of NATO—that argued for this decision.

After my discussions last night with the President and his advisers, I am convinced that Slovenia will be the No. 1 candidate for membership in the second round of NATO enlargement—and in a short time.

For me, the logic of enlargement is inescapable. But because the issue is complex and remote from the daily

lives of most Americans, I also believe that it is critically important immediately to initiate a national debate on NATO enlargement.

No foreign policy, no matter how well-formulated, can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people, which is why we need to launch a national debate to explore the costs, obligations, and benefits to the United States of NATO enlargement. I have asked Chairman HELMS to hold hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; I believe they will be an essential part of this debate.

Meetings in non-governmental forums across the country are likewise essential if our people are to understand the profound importance of the issue before us.

I believe that when they have examined the facts, the American people will support us in our effort to enlarge the alliance and build the new European security architecture.

For 40 years after World War II, NATO bound together the democracies of Western Europe and North America in a military alliance to counter the threat of Soviet communism. The statesmen who crafted the Washington treaty of 1949 bequeathed their successors an alliance of unparalleled effectiveness, one that deterred aggression for four decades until its adversary collapsed from internal weakness.

Ironically, within the fruits of NATO's success lie the seeds of its possible demise. Alliances are formed to fight wars or to deter them. Once the adversary is gone, unless they adapt to meet changing threats, they lose their reason for being. My good friend from Indiana, Senator LUGAR, recognized this fact when he said that NATO must "go out of area or go out of business," and I wholeheartedly agree with him. For this reason too, the status quo is simply not an option.

Enlargement must be accompanied by a redefinition of NATO's mission. The Alliance's primary mission as outlined in article 5 of the Washington Treaty of April 4, 1949, remains the same: Treating an attack on one member as an attack on all and responding through the use of armed force if necessary. Now, in the current post-cold-war situation, non-article 5 missions like peacekeeping, sometimes in cooperation with non-NATO powers have become possible.

The SFOR joint effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Russia and several other non-NATO countries is an excellent example.

But what about our erstwhile adversary, Russia? Many ask whether enlarging NATO will not rekindle the cold war and strengthen the hand of hostile nationalists and communists in Russia. Again, this is not only a legitimate question to ask, but a necessary one.

Mr. President, I firmly believe that NATO enlargement need not adversely affect United States relations with Russia. I came to this conclusion on a

trip to Moscow and several central European capitals earlier this spring. My observations are contained in greater detail in a Foreign Relations Committee report that I wrote entitled: "Meeting the challenges of a Post-Cold War World: NATO Enlargement and U.S.-Russia Relations."

Although few Russians are fond of NATO enlargement, policymakers in Moscow have accepted it. Moreover, no Russian politician whom I met—from communist leader Zyuganov, to liberal leader Yavlinsky, to the nationalist General Lebed—believed that NATO enlargement constitutes a security threat to Russia.

In fact, nearly all politicians and experts whom I met understood the non-aggressiveness implicit in NATO's "three no's"—the Alliance's declarations of having no reason, intention, or plan in the current and foreseeable security environment permanently to station nuclear weapons or substantial combat forces of current members on the territory of new members.

Rather, the Kremlin's public opposition to enlargement is largely a psychological question connected with the loss of empire, wounded pride, and—most importantly—an uncertainty about Russia's place in the world of the 21st century.

As part of this uncertainty, most Russian leaders are worried about their country's being marginalized, and as a result they are eager to move forward with its bilateral relationship with the United States.

Mr. President, let us not kid ourselves. Never is a long time, and Russia's current weakened condition is sure to improve. We must continue to engage Russia politically, militarily, and economically.

The Clinton administration, together with our NATO allies, has already begun to do so. As I mentioned earlier, 2 weeks ago in Paris, the heads of government of the 16 NATO members and President Yeltsin signed the so-called "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation." President Clinton asked me to accompany him to represent the United States at the signing ceremony.

Time does not permit me to go into detail about this lengthy document, except to say that it is a good start at binding Russia closer to the West and soothing its bruised feelings, without giving Moscow a decision-making role in NATO's core structures.

It creates a new body called the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which will serve as a forum for consultation on matters such as peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention, and combatting terrorism.

But let me reemphasize to my colleagues that the Alliance will not in any way be subordinated to the NATO-Russia Joint Council.

When NATO members gather to discuss alliance policy, no outside country will have any right or privilege to pre-

vent NATO from doing what is best for its member states. And no outside country will have any say in whether new countries are admitted to NATO.

Its purely consultative mandate, however, does not mean that the Joint Council cannot evolve into a truly valuable mechanism for promoting mutual trust.

As Russian officials better understand that NATO is not the rapacious caricature of Soviet propaganda, but rather a defensive alliance and force for security and stability in Europe, their animosity toward the organization may dissipate.

And by working together in the Joint Council, Russia can prove that it is a responsible partner for the West.

Through this mechanism and others, over time Moscow can come to realize that the enlargement of NATO by moving the zone of stability eastward to Central Europe will increase Russia's own security.

One problem, however, requires immediate attention. There needs to be a mechanism by which the countries invited at Madrid can participate in NATO before their full accession to membership.

I would suggest in this regard making the candidates observers to the North Atlantic Council.

I am pleased that the chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, my friend from Oregon, Senator SMITH, plans to hold a hearing on the NATO-Russia Founding Act to examine these issues in detail.

Mr. President, it is also essential that arms control agreements with Russia be ratified and expanded. Of special importance is getting the State Duma to ratify the START II Treaty and then, together with the United States, to move on to further reductions in START III. Despite recent press commentaries, I do not believe that the NATO-Russia Founding Act or NATO enlargement will substantially affect START II's ratification prospects in the Duma.

Moreover, as the NATO-Russia Founding Act recognizes, the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [C.F.E.] must be adapted to reflect the changed environment. The overwhelming Senate ratification last month of the C.F.E. Flank document, together with its approval by the other twenty-nine states parties to the C.F.E. Treaty, augurs well for the C.F.E. adaptation negotiations.

In addition, it is vitally important that the United States continue its economic engagement with Russia, not through massive infusions of money, which Moscow, especially if it cleans up its corruption, does not need, but more through broadened investment and trade, expanded grassroots partnerships, and some targeted technical assistance.

Significantly, not a single senior official in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, or Ljubljana whom I met wanted to isolate Russia from the West.

In order for NATO enlargement to proceed, both our current allies and the candidate countries invited to join at the Madrid Summit next month must agree to shoulder their fair share of financial costs and all mutual obligations. An agreement on sharing these costs is essential not only to enlargement, but to the continued viability of NATO itself.

The candidates for membership in NATO must assume the financial burden of making their armed forces interoperable with those of NATO members, in addition to meeting the costs of modernizing their militaries, which they must undertake in any event.

Other obligations are political and military, such as agreeing to come to the aid of allies, as described in article 5; allowing basing of NATO troops on their territory, if necessary; and allowing overflights of NATO aircraft, if necessary.

The February 1997 Pentagon study on NATO proposed a distribution of direct costs of enlargement whereby 15 percent would be assumed by the United States, 35 percent by the new members, and 50 percent by the other current members of NATO.

Calculating these ratios begins with the estimate that about 40 percent of direct enlargement enhancements could be nationally funded, and 60 percent common funded.

Estimated direct costs of enlargement total between \$9 and \$12 billion over 12 years, through 2009. Let me point out to my colleagues that it is only these direct costs that the United States would help pay for. Additional costs not directly related to enlargement will have to be paid for by our current allies and our new allies.

The central European countries must modernize their militaries—a cost they will incur whether or not they join NATO. Those costs are estimated at \$10 to \$13 billion through 2009. And the responsibility for bearing these costs rests solely with the governments of the four leading candidates.

Another pivotal issue is that our current allies must develop power projection capabilities, which the United States achieved in the 1980's, if they are to contribute to the new missions of the alliance.

While these capabilities will allow them to help defend new members, they are necessary even if NATO were not to enlarge. As a result, these costs of \$8 to \$10 billion over 12 years are, likewise, not a direct cost of enlargement, but they are essential to the future of NATO, and they must be borne alone by our current allies.

The expected U.S. contribution of \$150 to \$200 million per year for 10 years, although a small fraction of our total defense budget, is nonetheless not trivial, given our mandate to balance the U.S. Federal budget by the year 2002.

Mr. President, prospective new NATO members must keep that basic political fact of life in mind, lest they get

the erroneous impression that their accession to the alliance would be a painless, free ride.

The candidate countries must make the financial means available if they expect current members to ratify their accession to membership. As I told one Polish military official, "If you want to fly first class, you have to buy a first class ticket." They must realize that freedom isn't free, and security isn't cheap.

Having given this warning, I fear that the 50 percent share of direct enlargement costs allocated to the Western European NATO partners and Canada may, in fact, be politically more difficult than the 35 percent allocated to the new members, particularly after our current allies pay for their power projection enhancements.

One of the complicating factors is that the 11 European NATO members who are also members of the European Union are currently engaged in painful budget cutting in order to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria for Economic and Monetary Union [E.M.U.] on January 1, 1999. Those who qualify may be held to rigid fiscal discipline thereafter, if a stability pact is enforced without "political" criteria.

Resentment against this belt-tightening played a key role in the defeat of President Chirac's conservative coalition in the French elections on June 1st.

As a politician, I empathize with the challenge our European friends face. But we all have to make difficult choices, and if our European allies want continued American involvement in their security, they must step up to the plate.

In order for NATO to remain a vibrant organization with the United States continuing to play a lead role, the non-U.S. members must assume their fair share of direct enlargement costs and for developing power projection capabilities.

To do otherwise would cast the United States in the role of "the good gendarme of Europe"—a role that neither the American people, nor the Senate of the United States, would accept.

Mr. President, there is one more dark cloud looming on the horizon of European-American relations. I fear that a coincidence of events in the late spring of 1998 may make Senate ratification of NATO enlargement problematical. Just when the Senate is likely to be voting on amending the Washington Treaty to accept new members, American ground forces will be completing their withdrawal from Bosnia.

As it now stands, our European NATO allies will follow suit, repeating an "in together, out together" mantra, despite a United States offer to make air, naval, communications, and intelligence assets available to a European-led follow-on force, with an American Rapid Reaction Force on standby alert "over the horizon" in Hungary or Italy.

Many of my colleagues, mindful of the repeated calls by some European

NATO members, led by France, for more European leadership in the alliance and a sturdier "European pillar" within NATO, may see in the European refusal to maintain troops in Bosnia evidence of inequitable burden-sharing or—worse still—may question the worth of NATO altogether.

Therefore, I believe that our European NATO partners, especially France and the United Kingdom, should reconsider their unwillingness to lead a post-SFOR ground force in Bosnia after mid-1998.

Mr. President, international organizations other than NATO also have meaningful security components and should be encouraged to intensify their efforts.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [O.S.C.E.], which during the past few years has undertaken conflict-prevention, crisis management, and electoral missions in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Albania, will likely continue to grow in importance. The United States is playing an increasingly important role in the O.S.C.E. And should continue to do so.

The European Union also plays a profound role in stabilizing the continent. The E.U.'s immense economic clout has made it vital to the development of central and Eastern Europe, and it is therefore virtually inconceivable that even a non-NATO E.U. member state would be the object of aggression.

The E.U. hopes some day to create a common foreign and security policy, and in the recent past France concentrated on giving the E.U. an independent military dimension through the Western European Union [W.E.U.].

Two events in the 1990's have altered this development. First, the gulf war revealed how far the U.S. was ahead of Europe in military technology. Second, NATO endorsed a European security and defense identity within the alliance, which would allow European members to carry out contingency operations under W.E.U. political control and strategic direction.

As a result, Paris reconsidered and now intends to re-enter NATO's integrated command. Its demand, however, for European control of the southern command in Naples—a nonstarter idea, totally rejected by the United States—is complicating the issue.

There is, though, a sub-surface tension between NATO and the E.U. from the early 1990's the E.U. firmly proclaimed that NATO enlargement had to precede E.U. expansion [the accession 2 years ago of Austria, Finland, and Sweden excepted]. Some observers have feared that the E.U. has used NATO enlargement as a pretext for postponing the admission of qualified central and Eastern European countries.

Now that NATO has set a 1999 date for completion of its first round of enlargement, the E.U. should move ahead with its own expansion. A first-round target date of 2002 has been cited and should be met.

In the meantime, as President Clinton advocated 2 weeks ago in the Hague, western governments and private enterprise should cooperate on investment mechanisms to assist the economies of the new democracies to move rapidly forward.

Public opinion polls in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary reveal that, to a greater or lesser degree, the citizenries are unclear about the mutual military obligations that NATO membership entails.

With these data in mind, I have personally urged the three national governments quickly to embark upon public education campaigns so that invitations to join NATO in Madrid in July will not catch their populations off guard and unaware of the action their governments are proposing.

The process of NATO enlargement must not lead to the drawing of new lines through Europe. In order to prevent such a development, NATO must make unmistakably clear that the first round of enlargement is not the last, but rather the beginning of an ongoing process.

Moreover, NATO should take steps to strengthen and deepen ties with candidate countries that do not receive invitations at Madrid, in preparation for their joining the alliance at a future date. The newly created Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, an enhanced partnership for peace program, and bilateral agreements should all be used to underscore the ongoing nature of the NATO enlargement process.

To sum up, NATO is necessarily transforming itself from an alliance that defended its members against the Soviet threat into an alliance that allows democracies to maintain stability in Western Europe and that extends that zone of stability to central and Eastern Europe to deter conflicts and prevent crises from escalating.

An enlarged NATO will allow the new, free-market democracies of Central Europe to undertake their share of the burden of the common defense of their continent. It will allow them to cooperate with one another and with neighboring alliance members. And, contrary to what many critics have argued, it will allow them to save money in providing for their defense.

There will continue to be other institutions essential for European security affiliated with NATO such as the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to enable closer cooperation between NATO and nonalliance countries in the partnership for peace.

There will be a joint commission between NATO and Ukraine similar to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. And there continue to be fundamentally important organizations like the European Union and the O.S.C.E., all of which I discussed earlier.

By combining NATO enlargement with a formalized relationship with Russia in the new permanent joint

council, the United States and its allies can take advantage of the historic opportunity presented by the end of the cold war and lay the foundation for long-term European security.

I believe it is squarely in our national interest to do so, and in the coming year as the Senate prepares to exercise its constitutional responsibility of ratifying or rejecting the accession protocols to the Washington Treaty, I will continue to speak out on the course of NATO enlargement.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Williams, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

At 11:04 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Ms. Goetz, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker has signed the following enrolled bill:

S. 543. An act to provide certain protection to volunteers, nonprofit organizations, and governmental entities in lawsuits based on the activities of volunteers.

At 12:05 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Ms. Goetz, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following bill, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 1757. An act to consolidate international affairs agencies, to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related agencies for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and to ensure that the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) proceeds in a manner consistent with United States interests, to strengthen relations between the United States and Russia, to preserve the prerogatives of the Congress with respect to certain arms control agreements, and for other purposes.

At 5:37 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Mr. Hays, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following bill, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 1871. An act making emergency supplemental appropriations for recovery from natural disasters, and for overseas peacekeeping efforts, including those in Bosnia, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1997, and for other purposes.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, delivered by one of its

reading clerks, announced that the Speaker has signed the following enrolled bill:

H.R. 1871. An act making emergency supplemental appropriations for recovery from natural disasters, and for overseas peacekeeping efforts, including those in Bosnia, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1997, and for other purposes.

The enrolled bill was signed subsequently by the President pro tempore [Mr. THURMOND].

ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on June 12, 1997 he had presented to the President of the United States, the following enrolled bill:

S. 543. An act to provide certain protection to volunteers, nonprofit organizations, and governmental entities in lawsuits based on the activities of volunteers.

EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, which were referred as indicated:

EC-2142. A communication from the Chairman of the Board of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2143. A communication from the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2144. A communication from the Acting Administrator of the General Services Administration, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2145. A communication from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2146. A communication from the Chairman of the Railroad Retirement Board, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2147. A communication from the Chairman of the Railroad Retirement Board, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2148. A communication from the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2149. A communication from the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2150. A communication from the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2151. A communication from the Secretary of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2152. A communication from the Secretary of the Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2153. A communication from the Chairman of the International Trade Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2154. A communication from the Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2155. A communication from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2156. A communication from the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2157. A communication from the Secretary of Labor, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2158. A communication from the Attorney General, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2159. A communication from the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2160. A communication from the Chairman of the Board, National Credit Union Administration, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2161. A communication from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2162. A communication from the Chairman of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2163. A communication from the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation for National Service, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Inspector General Act for the period of October 1, 1996 through March 31, 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.