

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 24—RELATIVE TO THE EASTERN ORTHODOX ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE

Ms. SNOWE submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. CON. RES. 24

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) the Ecumenical Patriarchate is the spiritual center for more than 250,000,000 Orthodox Christians world-wide, including approximately 5,000,000 in the United States;

(2) in recent years the Ecumenical Patriarchate has experienced a number of security threats in Turkey;

(3) His All Holiness Patriarch Bartholomew and those associated with the Ecumenical Patriarchate are Turkish citizens and have the full protection of Turkish law; and

(4) the reopening of the Halki School of Theology, the only educational institution for Orthodox Christian leadership in Turkey, would assist the long-term viability of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should—

(1) continue to support the Ecumenical Patriarchate's non-political, religious mission;

(2) encourage the continued maintenance of the institution's physical security needs, as provided for under Turkish and international law; and

(3) use its good offices to encourage the reopening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki Patriarchal School of Theology.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 25—RELATIVE TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Ms. SNOWE submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. CON. RES. 25

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) Iran is aggressively pursuing a program to acquire and/or develop nuclear weapons;

(2) the Director of Central Intelligence, in September of 1994, confirmed that Iran is manufacturing and stockpiling chemical weapons;

(3) Iran has opposed the Middle East peace process and continues to support the terrorist group Hezbollah in Lebanon and radical Palestinian groups;

(4) Iran has asserted control over the Persian Gulf island of Abu Musa, which it had been previously sharing with the United Arab Emirates;

(5) during the last few years Iran has reportedly acquired several hundred improved Scud missiles from North Korea;

(6) Iran has moved modern air defense missile systems, tanks, additional troops, artillery, and a surface-to-surface missiles onto islands in the Persian Gulf, some of which are disputed between Iran and the United Arab Emirates;

(7) Iran has already taken delivery of as many as thirty modern MiG-29 fighter aircraft from the Russian Federation;

(8) The Russian Federation has sold modern conventionally powered submarines to Iran, which increase Iran's capability to blockade the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf; and

(9) the Russian Federation continues to move forward on implementing a commercial agreement to provide Iran with critical

nuclear technology despite having been provided with detailed information by the President of the United States on Iran's nuclear weapons program in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Russian Federation should be strongly condemned for continuing to implement a commercial agreement to provide Iran with nuclear technology that could assist that country in its development of nuclear weapons, and

(2) the continued implementation of its commercial nuclear agreement with Iran makes the Russian Federation ineligible for United States economic assistance under the terms of the Freedom Support Act.

SENATE RESOLUTION 82—EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE TO URGE THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION RELATIVE TO C-802 CRUISE MISSILES

Mr. BENNETT (for himself, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. HELMS, Mr. DODD, Mr. ASHCROFT, Mrs. HUTCHISON, and Mr. BROWNBACK) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 82

Whereas the United States escort vessel U.S.S. Stark was struck by a cruise missile, causing the death of 37 United States sailors;

Whereas the China National Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation is marketing the C-802 model cruise missile for use against escort vessels such as the U.S.S. Stark;

Whereas the China National Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation has delivered 60 C-802 cruise missiles to Iran for use by vessels of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy;

Whereas Iran is acquiring land batteries to launch C-802 cruise missile which will provide its armed forces with a weapon of greater range, reliability, accuracy, and mobility than before;

Whereas 15,000 members of the United States Armed Forces are stationed within range of the C-802 cruise missile being acquired by Iran;

Whereas the Department of State believes that “[t]hese cruise missiles pose new, direct threats to deployed United States forces”;

Whereas the delivery of cruise missiles to Iran is a violation of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); and

Whereas the Clinton Administration “has concluded at present that the known types [of C-802 cruise missiles] are not of a destabilizing number and type”: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate urges the Clinton Administration to enforce the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) with respect to the acquisition by Iran of C-802 model cruise missiles or to carry out an alternative policy that would address such acquisition in a manner similar to that provided for in that Act.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I am submitting today a resolution to address a matter that I consider vital to our national security. I have here a picture of the U.S.S. *Stark* that was disabled 10 years ago by an Exocet missile fired by the Iranians. Thirty-seven American sailors were killed in this disaster.

I call your attention to a new missile patterned after the Exocet, only it is

described by its sales brochures as having a “mighty attack capability with great firepower.” This is the C-802, an antishipping cruise missile. The sales group that is touting the mighty power of the C-802 is the Chinese. The Chinese have taken the Exocet and increased its power and increased its deadliness.

The C-802 is being shipped. This picture shows a Chinese vessel, on the deck of which there are five smaller vessels, each one of which is equipped with four C-802's. You can see them on the back of the ships. These are the smaller ships on the back deck of this larger cargo vessel.

Those ships are en route to Iran. The Chinese have now sold to Iran some 60 C-802's for their use in the Persian Gulf. Some 60 are mounted on 15 patrol boats. These patrol boats, again, have four missiles each.

If one missile could damage the *Stark* as badly as we saw in the first picture, you see what 15 missiles could do. But the Chinese are not stopping with shipboard missiles. Here is an example of a land-based C-802, and the Chinese are now in the process of selling these to the Iranians.

Why should we be concerned about the land-based C-802? Here is a map of the Persian Gulf. This land mass is Iran. There are 500 miles of Iranian coastal waters facing the Persian Gulf. This is the Strait of Hormuz through which a very large percentage of the world's oil must go every day, something in excess of 25 percent. The Iranians have repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if the rest of the world does not do what Iran wishes it to do in a variety of ways. We heard such a threat, again, over the weekend with the Iranians saying that if the Americans were to try to take any kind of retaliatory action against Iranian terrorism, they would close this Strait of Hormuz.

With land-based C-802's, they could hide them in caves or put them in other locations all along this 500-mile area, so that any shipping coming out of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, or Saudi Arabia into the Persian Gulf would be vulnerable to an attack from a land-based C-802. With 15 patrol boats, each one having 4 missiles, or 60 sea-based missiles, the Iranians could actually attack from either side, having the patrol boats out here on one side of the shipping lanes, with the land-based missiles on the other, and effectively seal off the world's supply of oil from the Middle East without too much difficulty.

In personal human terms, there are about 15,000 U.S. servicemen and servicewomen within the range of the C-802 missiles in the gulf.

Mr. President, there is a law known as the Gore-McCain Act passed in 1992 which says that foreign companies that deliver cruise missiles to Iran are subject to sanctions. I raised this issue with Secretary Albright, and I have raised it since in subsequent hearings. In January, Secretary Albright informed me that the administration will

not enforce the terms of the Gore-McCain Act on the grounds that the missiles are not "destabilizing."

I am not quite sure what the word "destabilizing" means in this kind of a circumstance, but that is where the administration has chosen to come down.

I believe that a nondestabilizing missile can be just as deadly to a ship as a destabilizing missile. Once a missile is fired, it knows no semantic definition, as it goes on its course for a kill. Ask the sailors on the *Stark* whether the presence of the Exocet missiles were destabilizing in the circumstance in the Middle East or not. Thirty-seven of them are dead.

Given our obligation to those that we would place in harm's way in the name of this country, I believe the time has come to put this issue on the front burner. I have asked the administration about it. I have used the congressional oversight circumstance to bring it to their attention. Now, Mr. President, today, I submit a resolution outlining the sense of the Senate that the administration either enforce the Gore-McCain Act in this circumstance or take some other appropriate action.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter which I sent to Madeleine Albright on the 17th of April and a fact sheet relating to the C-802 missile be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC, April 17, 1997.

Hon. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT,
Secretary of State,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: During 1996 Chinese defense companies delivered a number of missile boats to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy. Each missile boat was armed with four C-802 cruise missiles. Recently, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn told the Senate, "These cruise missiles pose new, direct threats to deployed U.S. forces."

It is now my understanding that China is about to deliver the land variant of the C-802 to Iran. When the Iranian Revolutionary Guard acquires C-802s in quantity, it will have a weapon with greater range, reliability, accuracy, and mobility than anything currently in its inventory.

The delivery of advanced cruise missiles to Iran is a violation of the Gore-McCain Act. However, in answer to my query on this issue in January, you answered, "The Administration has concluded at present that the known transfers (of C-802s) are not of a destabilizing number and type."

However, I believe that the arrival of additional C-802s in Iran is a matter of grave concern to the United States, and the Administration has an obligation either to sanction the perpetrators or put in motion an alternative policy of equivalent strength.

Sincerely,

ROBERT F. BENNETT,
U.S. Senator.

C-802 FACT SHEET

U.S.S. Stark: American Navy escort vessel struck by two Exocet type cruise missiles in May 1987 killing 37 sailors and disabling the ship for sixteen months.

C-802: Chinese cruise missile similar to the Exocet and marketed for use against naval

escort vessels. According to its manufacturer, the China National Precision Instrument Import-Export Corporation, the C-802 is characterized by "mighty attack capability, great firepower." It has a range of 120 km [75 miles] and a high explosive warhead of 165 kg [363 lbs.].

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy: Iran is believed to possess sixty C-802 missiles aboard 15 Chinese and French missile boats.

Land-based Variant: Iran is believed to be acquiring an undetermined number of C-802 missiles which will be mounted on Transporter-Erector-Launchers [TELs]. For over a year Iran has been constructing tunnels and other fortifications along its Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman coastlines which could accommodate these TELs.

Threat to U.S. forces: 15,000 U.S. servicemen and women are potentially within range of these missiles. On April 11, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn told the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, "These cruise missiles pose new and direct threats to deployed U.S. Forces." During 1996 Admiral Scott Redd, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fifth Fleet declared the missiles to be a "360 degree threat which can come at you from basically anywhere at sea in the gulf or out in the Gulf of Oman."

U.S. Law: The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) prohibits foreign persons from delivering advanced conventional weapons, including cruise missiles, to Iran.

Administration Position: The Administration "has concluded at present that the known types [of C-802 missiles] are not of a destabilizing number and type."

[Sources: New York Times, various Jane's publications]

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT

GRAMS (AND OTHERS) AMENDMENT NO. 54

Mr. GRAMS (for himself, Mr. JOHNSON, and Mr. DASCHLE) proposed an amendment to the bill (S. 672) making supplemental appropriations and rescissions for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1997, and for other purposes; from the Committee on Appropriations; as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following new title:

TITLE — DEPOSITORY INSTITUTION DISASTER RELIEF

SEC. 01. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Depository Institution Disaster Relief Act of 1997".

SEC. 02. TRUTH IN LENDING ACT; EXPEDITED FUNDS AVAILABILITY ACT.

(a) TRUTH IN LENDING ACT.—During the 180-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the Board may make exceptions to the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) for transactions within an area in which the President, pursuant to section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), has determined that a major disaster exists, or within an area determined to be eligible for disaster relief under other Federal law by reason of damage related to the 1997 flooding of the Red River of the North and its tributaries, if the Board determines that the exception can reasonably be expected to alleviate hardships to the public resulting from such disaster that outweigh possible adverse effects.

(b) EXPEDITED FUNDS AVAILABILITY ACT.—During the 180-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the Board may make exceptions to the Expedited Funds Availability Act (12 U.S.C. 4001 et seq.) for depository institution offices located within any area referred to in subsection (a) if the Board determines that the exception can reasonably be expected to alleviate hardships to the public resulting from such disaster that outweigh possible adverse effects.

(c) TIME LIMIT ON EXCEPTIONS.—Any exception made under this section shall expire not later than the earlier of—
(1) 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act; or
(2) 1 year after the date of any determination referred to in subsection (a).

(d) PUBLICATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 60 days after the date of a determination under subsection (a), the Board shall publish in the Federal Register a statement that—
(1) describes the exception made under this section; and
(2) explains how the exception can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public that outweigh possible adverse effects.

SEC. 03. DEPOSIT OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS.

The appropriate Federal banking agency may, by order, permit an insured depository institution, during the 18-month period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, to subtract from the institution's total assets, in calculating compliance with the leverage limit prescribed under section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1831o), an amount not exceeding the qualifying amount attributable to insurance proceeds, if the agency determines that—

(1) the institution—

(A) had its principal place of business within an area in which the President, pursuant to section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, has determined that a major disaster exists, or within an area determined to be eligible for disaster relief under other Federal law by reason of damage related to the 1997 flooding of the Red River of the North and its tributaries, on the day before the date of any such determination;

(B) derives more than 60 percent of its total deposits from persons who normally reside within, or whose principal place of business is normally within, areas of intense devastation caused by the major disaster;

(C) was adequately capitalized (as defined in section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1831o)) before the major disaster; and

(D) has an acceptable plan for managing the increase in its total assets and total deposits; and

(2) the subtraction is consistent with the purpose of section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1831o).

SEC. 04. BANKING AGENCY PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—During the 180-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, a qualifying regulatory agency may take any of the following actions with respect to depository institutions or other regulated entities whose principal place of business is within, or with respect to transactions or activities within, an area in which the President, pursuant to section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, has determined that a major disaster exists, or within an area determined to be eligible for disaster relief under other Federal law by reason of damage