

virtually tied in knots with a procedural tree, which is not unusual? It has been used before, and used by Democrats as well. But it is rarely used. And it is used in most cases, I am told, to stop legislation.

Mr. BAUCUS. That is correct.

Mr. DORGAN. The point is the tree was developed with the longest hanging fruit a second-degree amendment. If that is acceptable to the Senate, my point was, let's come here and ask for the yeas and nays, and have a vote on it. And if the vote is yes, as I expect it would be, then the tree is open, and we can offer amendments.

My expectation would be that someone would come and say, "We are not going to allow you to offer amendments. We will fill the tree again." I say that is fine. Let's vote again. Let's keep voting, and maybe at some point we will start making forward progress. You can have your car engine idling, and you can say, "Well, the engine is running." Yes. But you are not going anywhere. That is kind of what is happening here. What I want to do is have the engine running with the lights on, with the heat going, and some discussion on the floor of the Senate. But we are not going anywhere. I want to go somewhere—both on campaign finance reform, and I want to make progress on the highway reauthorization bill. And we are going nowhere on both of those fronts.

Mr. BAUCUS. The Senator is absolutely correct. We are at dead center. We are not moving at all.

One way to perhaps get a little more momentum is the procedure outlined by the Senator. I hope that we could count on the same objective by the leadership sitting down and working out an agreement so that we don't have to go through this process. But we may have to.

Mr. DORGAN. I would observe, finally, that the chairman and ranking member are enormously patient. The bill is brought to the floor with a procedure that really doesn't allow any movement on the bill. I expect you will remain on the floor while the bill is being considered, and perhaps at some point when the bill is further considered that we will ask for the yeas and nays and see if by that manner we can make some additional progress.

Mr. BAUCUS. I thank the Senator. I very much hope, as I said many times, that the leadership works out an agreement so we can solve this thing and get moving.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

INTERMODAL SURFACE TRANSPORTATION EFFICIENCY ACT OF 1997

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the pending business. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 1173) to authorize funds for the construction of highways, for highway safety programs, and for mass transit programs, and for other purposes.

Pending:

Chafee-Warner amendment No. 1312, to provide for a continuing designation of a metropolitan planning organization.

Chafee-Warner amendment No. 1313 (to language proposed to be stricken by the committee amendment, as modified), of a perfecting nature.

Chafee-Warner amendment No. 1314 (to Amendment No. 1313), of a perfecting nature.

Motion to recommit the bill to the Committee on Environment and Public Works, with instructions.

Lott amendment No. 1317 (to instructions of the motion to recommit), to authorize funds for construction of highways, for highway safety programs, and for mass transit programs.

Lott amendment No. 1318 (to Amendment No. 1317), to strike the limitation on obligations for administrative expenses.

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator majority leader.

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk on the pending highway legislation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the modified committee amendment to S. 1173, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act:

Senators Trent Lott, John H. Chafee, Paul Coverdell, Christopher Bond, Jesse Helms, Michael B. Enzi, John Ashcroft, Don Nickles, Craig Thomas, Mike DeWine, Richard S. Lugar, Pat Roberts, Ted Stevens, Wayne Allard, Dirk Kempthorne, and Larry Craig.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, this cloture vote will occur on Thursday, October 23, at a time to be determined later. However, I do ask unanimous consent that the mandatory quorum under rule XXII be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I send a second cloture motion to the desk to the pending bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the modified committee amendment to S. 1173, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act:

Senators Trent Lott, John Chafee, Paul Coverdell, Christopher Bond, Jesse Helms, Mike Enzi, John Ashcroft, Don Nickles, Craig Thomas, Mike DeWine, Richard Lugar, Pat Roberts, Ted Stevens, Wayne Allard, Dirk Kempthorne, and Larry Craig.

Mr. LOTT. For the information of all Senators, this cloture vote will occur on Thursday also, if necessary. It will be the intention of the majority leader to schedule the vote in the afternoon Thursday, if cloture is not invoked Thursday morning.

I now ask unanimous consent that the mandatory quorum under rule XXII be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent there now be a period of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ENCRYPTION

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I would like to report to my colleagues on the activities in the House to establish a new export policy on encryption. This is an issue that is still at the top of my list of legislation I hope this Congress can resolve within the next 2 months. The House's actions last month turned a spotlight on how this issue should ultimately be resolved.

Let me briefly review the issue. Encryption is a mathematical way to scramble and unscramble digital computer information during transmission and storage. The strength of encryption is a function of its size, as measured in computer bits. The more bits an encryption system has, the more difficult it is for someone else to illegally unscramble or hack into that information.

Today's computer encryption systems commonly used by businesses range from 40 bits in key length to 128 bits. A good hacker, let's say a criminal or a business competitor, can readily break into a computer system safeguarded by a lower-technology 40-bit encryption system. On the other hand, the 128-bit encryption systems are much more complex and pose a significant challenge to any would-be hacker.

Obviously, all of us would prefer to have the 128-bit systems. And equally as important, we would like to buy such systems from American companies. Firms we can routinely and safely do business with. Foreign companies and individuals also want to buy such systems from American companies.

They admire and respect our technological expertise, and trust our business practices. The United States remains the envy of the world in terms of producing top-notch encryption and information security products.

However, current regulations prohibit U.S. companies from exporting encryption systems stronger than the low-end, 40-bit systems. A few exceptions have been made for 56-bit systems. Until recently, it has been the administration's view that stronger encryption products are so inherently dangerous they should be classified at a level equal to munitions, and that the export of strong encryption must be heavily restricted.

While we are restricting our own international commerce, foreign companies are now manufacturing and selling stronger, more desirable encryption systems, including the top-end 128-bit systems, anywhere in the world they want. Clearly, our policy doesn't make sense. Just as clearly, our export policies on encryption have not kept up to speed with either the ongoing changes in encryption technology or the needs and desires of foreign markets for U.S. encryption products.

My intention is neither to jeopardize our national security nor harm law enforcement efforts. I believe we must give due and proper regard to the national security and law enforcement implications of any changes in our policy regarding export of encryption technology. But it is painfully obvious we must modernize our export policies on encryption technology, so that U.S. companies can participate in the world's encryption marketplace. The legislative initiative on this issue has always been about exports, but this summer that changed.

During the past month, the FBI has attempted to change the debate by proposing a series of new mandatory controls on the domestic sale and use of encryption products. Let me be clear. There are currently no restrictions on the rights of Americans to use encryption to protect their personal financial or medical records or their private e-mail messages. There have never been domestic limitations, and similarly, American businesses have always been free to buy and use the strongest possible encryption to protect sensitive information from being stolen or changed. But now, the FBI proposes to change all that.

The FBI wants to require that any company that produces or offers encryption security products or services guarantee immediate access to plain text information without the knowledge of the user. Their proposal would subject software companies and telecommunications providers to prison sentences for failure to guarantee immediate access to all information on the desktop computers of all Americans. That would move us into an entirely new world of surveillance, a very intrusive surveillance, where every communication by every individual can be accessed by the FBI.

Where is probable cause? Why has the FBI assumed that all Americans are going to be involved in criminal activities? Where is the Constitution?

And how would this proposal possibly help the FBI? According to a forthcoming book by the M.I.T. Press, of the tens of thousands of cases handled annually by the FBI, only a handful have involved encryption of any type, and even fewer involved encryption of computer data. Let's face it—despite the movies, the FBI solves its cases with good old-fashioned police work, questioning potential witnesses, gathering material evidence, and using electronic bugging or putting microphones on informants. Restricting encryption technology in the U.S. would not be very helpful to the FBI.

The FBI proposal won't work. I have talked with experts in the world of software and cryptography, who have explained that the technology which would provide compliance with the FBI standard simply does not exist. The FBI proposal would force a large unfunded mandate on our high technology firms, at a time when there is no practical way to accomplish that mandate.

Rather than solve problems in our export policy, this FBI proposal would create a whole new body of law and regulations restricting our domestic market.

This and similar proposals would also have a serious impact on our foreign market. Overseas businesses and governments believe that the U.S. might use its keys to computer encryption systems to spy on their businesses and politicians. Most U.S. software and hardware manufacturers believe this is bad for business and that nobody will trust the security of U.S. encryption products if this current policy continues. In fact, this proposal appears to violate the European Union's data-privacy laws, and the European Commission is expected to reject it this week.

So, the FBI proposal would: Invade our privacy; be of minimal use to the FBI; would require nonexistent technology; would create new administrative burdens; and would seriously damage our foreign markets.

This is quite a list.

Mr. President, the FBI proposal is simply wrong. I have learned that even the administration does not support this new FBI proposal. So why does the FBI believe it must now subject all Americans to more and more surveillance?

This independent action by the FBI has created confusion and mixed signals which are troublesome for the Senate as it works on this legislation. Perhaps the FBI and the Justice Department need to focus immediately on a coordinated encryption position.

Mr. President, I congratulate the members of the House Commerce Committee for rejecting this FBI approach by a vote margin of more than 2 to 1.

I am sure all of my colleagues are sympathetic to the fact that emerging

technologies create new problems for the FBI.

But we must acknowledge several truths as Congress goes forward to find this new policy solution. People increasingly need strong information security through encryption and other means to protect their personal and business information. This demand will grow, and somebody will meet it. In the long term, it is clearly in our national interest that U.S. companies meet the market demand. Individuals and businesses will either obtain that protection from U.S. firms or from foreign firms. I firmly believe that all of our colleagues want American firms to successfully compete for this business. Today there are hundreds of suppliers of strong encryption in the world marketplace. Strong encryption can be easily downloaded off the Internet. Even if Congress wanted to police or eliminate encryption altogether, I am not sure that is doable.

So, let's deal with reality. Clamping down on the constitutional rights of American citizens, in an attempt to limit the use of a technology, is the wrong solution. The wrong solution. This is especially true with encryption technology because it has so many beneficial purposes. It prevents hackers and espionage agents from stealing valuable information, or worse, from breaking into our own computer networks. It prevents them from disrupting our power supply, our financial markets, and our air traffic control system. This is scary—and precisely why we want this technology to be more available.

Only a balanced solution is acceptable. Ultimately, Congress must empower Americans to protect their own information. Americans should not be forced to only communicate in ways that simply make it more convenient for law enforcement officials. This is not our national tradition. It is not consistent with our heritage. It should not become a new trend.

Mr. President, I would like to establish a framework to resolve this difficult issue. I hope to discuss it with the chairmen and ranking members of the key committees. I especially look forward to working with the chairman of the Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Communications, Senator BURNS. He was the first to identify this issue and try to solve it legislatively. His approach on this issue has always been fair and equitable, attempting to balance industry wants with law enforcement requirements.

I believe there are other possible ideas which could lead to a consensus resolution of the encryption issue. It is my hope that industry and law enforcement can come together to address these issues, not add more complexity and problems. The bill passed by the House Commerce Committee included a provision establishing a National Encryption Technology Center. It

would be funded by in-kind contributions of hardware, software, and technological expertise. The National Encryption Technology Center would help the FBI stay on top of encryption and other emerging computer technologies. This is a big step. This is a big step in the right direction.

It is time to build on that positive news to resolve encryption policy.

Mr. President, there is an op-ed piece which appeared in the Wall Street Journal on Friday, September 26. It is well written and informative, despite the fact that its author is a good friend of mine. Mr. Jim Barksdale is the president and CEO of Netscape Communications and is well-versed in encryption technology. Mr. Barksdale's company does not make encryption products; they license such products from others. They sell Internet and business software and, as Jim has told me many times, his customers require strong encryption features and will buy those products either from us or foreign companies.

Again, let's deal with reality. The credit union manager in Massachusetts, the real estate agent in Mississippi, the father writing an e-mail letter to his daughter attending a California university, each want privacy and security when using the computer. They will buy the best systems available to ensure that privacy and security. And, in just the same way, the banker in Brussels, Belgium, the rancher in Argentina, and the mother writing e-mail to her daughter in a university in Calcutta, India, each of these people also want privacy and security. They also will buy the best systems available to ensure that privacy and security. And they want encryption systems they trust—American systems. That's what this debate is about.

Mr. President, if Congress does not modernize our export controls, we run the real risk of destroying the American encryption industry. And we risk giving a significant and unfair advantage to our foreign business competitors.

THE FMC DID THE RIGHT THING

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I rise to congratulate the Federal Maritime Commission [FMC] for doing the right thing about Japan's ports. This action was not unexpected by the Japanese carriers, but I am sure many were surprised with the FMC's dedication to seeing this through. During the past few days, the Nation watched as a long running dispute between Japan and those countries whose ships call on Japan's ports appears to have been resolved.

Japan's ports are widely known as the most inefficient and expensive in the developed world. Additionally, Japan's port system discriminates against non-Japanese ocean carriers.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. For many years, the United States has attempted to negotiate commonsense changes to this

system with Japan. Japan also faced criticism from the European Union. However, no progress was made until earlier this year when the FMC voted to assess \$100,000 fines against Japanese ocean carriers for each United States port call. It is reasonable for the United States to collect fines from the Japanese shipping lines. Before these fines were to be imposed, the Government of Japan agreed to make the necessary changes. The FMC judiciously gave Japan until August 1997 to work out these changes. When Japan failed to meet this generous deadline, the fines automatically went into effect. By last week, the Japanese ocean carriers had missed the FMC's deadline to pay the first \$5 million in fines. Realizing that Japan would not follow through on its promise to fix its port system unless stronger measures were imposed, the FMC voted last week to deny the same Japanese ocean carriers entry to and exit from United States ports.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, this firm action has had the desired effect.

An agreement between the United States and Japan on the port issue has been reached. The FMC's order will not have to be carried out, but it was vital to ensuring that Japan's discriminatory port practices are ended. International trade only works when trading partners treat each other fairly. Diplomatic solutions only work when both sides live up to their commitments, and this only occurs when nations know there are genuine consequences to inaction.

The FMC's active role in the port dispute ensured that United States ocean carriers will be treated fairly in Japan. I want to personally recognize Harold Creel, the Chairman of the FMC, and FMC Commissioners Ming Hsu, Del Won, and Joe Scroggins for their efforts to resolve the Japanese port dispute in a firm, yet fair, manner.

Clearly, the FMC has both the responsibility and the authority to take the action. And, the Commissioners approached their decision in a thoughtful and measured way.

I also want to thank the other members of the negotiation team, in particular, the Maritime Administration which provided much needed maritime expertise.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I want to add my congratulations to the FMC, the Maritime Administration, and the administration as well. The resulting improvements in Japan's port practices will benefit not only U.S. ocean carriers, but other ocean carriers and the shippers of the world trading through Japan's ports.

Mr. LOTT. I would also note that the authority under which the FMC took these actions, section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, and the independence of the U.S. Government's international shipping oversight agency would be preserved under S. 414, the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1997. Under this bill, the action would be

carried out by the U.S. Transportation Board, an expanded and renamed Surface Transportation Board. To those who expressed concerns that this multimodal board would be unwilling or unable to be an effective regulator of the maritime industry, I tell them to look at the Surface Transportation Board's record of making tough decisions with regard to the mergers of the largest railroads in the United States. When provided with similar maritime expertise, this combined board will certainly have the ability and willingness to protect the interests of the United States in international maritime disputes.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. The Majority Leader is correct. S. 414 does not limit the United States' ability to address similar situations in the future. The U.S. Transportation Board would have the same authority, independence, and I believe the same willingness, to protect America's interests as the FMC.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Monday, October 20, 1997, the Federal debt stood at \$5,418,457,770,302.08. (Five trillion, four hundred eighteen billion, four hundred fifty-seven million, seven hundred seventy thousand, three hundred two dollars and eight cents)

Five years ago, October 20, 1992, the Federal debt stood at \$4,059,070,000,000. (Four trillion, fifty-nine billion, seventy million)

Ten years ago, October 20, 1987, the Federal debt stood at \$2,384,494,000,000. (Two trillion, three hundred eighty-four billion, four hundred ninety-four million)

Fifteen years ago, October 20, 1982, the Federal debt stood at \$1,137,638,000,000. (One trillion, one hundred thirty-seven billion, six hundred thirty-eight million)

Twenty-five years ago, October 20, 1972, the Federal debt stood at \$438,262,000,000 (Four hundred thirty-eight billion, two hundred sixty-two million) which reflects a debt increase of more than \$5 trillion—\$4,980,195,770,302.08 (Four trillion, nine hundred eighty billion, one hundred ninety-five million, seven hundred seventy thousand, three hundred two dollars and eight cents) during the past 25 years.

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION HONORS MARK MONTIGNY

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the American Medical Association recently honored Massachusetts State Senator Mark Montigny of New Bedford with its 1997 Nathan Davis Award. This honor is a well-deserved tribute to Senator Montigny for his outstanding commitment to public service and his leadership in health care.

The award was established by the AMA in 1989 to honor elected and career officials at the Federal, State and