

that tie its hands at the collective bargaining table. Amtrak's labor rules must be the same as the private sector's, just like in other transportation modes. Labor's unwillingness to negotiate makes it appear that severance packages are more important than rail passenger service.

Mayor John Robert Smith, of Meridian, Mississippi, has noted that rail labor's message seems to be that they are more willing to allow Amtrak to go under and sacrifice all 23,000 Amtrak employees to unemployment than to allow collective bargaining in the reform bill. Like me, he is appalled that the rail union leadership, supposedly representing its workers, would abandon them for its own purposes. Equally amazing is the fact that the Amtrak reform language is language that the union leadership itself once drafted, supported, and came in my office to ask me to support. And I did.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. The Majority Leader has summed up this situation exactly. If we really care about our national rail passenger system, the communities that it serves, the employees that work there and the role it plays in our transportation infrastructure, then we need to take up and pass the Amtrak authorization bill that has been reported from the Commerce Committee. If the Senate wants to give Amtrak the tools it needs to run a national system and collectively bargain with the employees, the Senate needs to act now.

The clock is ticking and time is running out. Congress needs to act or there most likely will be a national rail strike, crippling transportation of people and goods across the country. Congress also needs to act on the Amtrak reforms to ensure it receives adequate capital funding and becomes solvent. If Congress doesn't act, there will be no national rail passenger system.

Mr. LOTT. Senator HUTCHISON and I are committed to bring the Amtrak reform bill to the floor, but not against a swell of opposition. It's a very clear cut choice. My colleagues need to decide if they want a national rail system or not.

#### HISPANIC HERITAGE MONTH

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I join with my colleagues in celebrating Hispanic Heritage Month. Hispanic Heritage Month pays a special tribute to a group of Americans that have made important and lasting contributions to this country's political, cultural and intellectual life.

Hispanic Americans are people of diverse background. Their forebears came from Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Central and South America, and Spain—at different times and for different reasons. Nonetheless, they share a common culture and a deeply held belief in the American Dream. They came here to share in the freedom and prosperity that we have achieved as a nation and have added greatly to that richness.

It is true that Hispanic-Americans faced discrimination in this country. In recent years, however, we have made great strides to eliminate legal and societal barriers to their full integration into American life. Since the passage of laws barring employment discrimination, Hispanics have made great advancements economically and, with the passage of the Voting Rights Act, have increased their participation in the political process. There are currently 17 members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus.

Just recently, a great Hispanic Congressional leader, Congressman HENRY B. GONZALEZ, announced his retirement to the great sadness of his colleagues. HENRY GONZALEZ has served as the dean of the Hispanic Caucus and is the former chairman, and now ranking member, of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services.

I proudly worked with him when I served in the House of Representatives and witnessed for myself his hard work and commitment to doing what is right. Dean GONZALEZ has given 36 years of dedicated service to his constituents in Texas, the Hispanic community and the American people. He came to Washington in 1961, after serving in the San Antonio City Council and the Texas State Legislature, and was the first Hispanic Congressman ever elected from the State of Texas. And back in December, 1976, Dean GONZALEZ, with 4 other members of Congress, founded the Congressional Hispanic Caucus.

Dean GONZALEZ has served as a leader and trail blazer for Hispanic-Americans and an inspiration to all Americans. He demonstrated to all of us that, as a nation, we are capable of coming together, of overcoming discrimination, and of celebrating the cultural bounty brought by people of all backgrounds. When he leaves the House later this year, I know that he will be sorely missed by his colleagues in the House of Representatives and by those of us in the Senate who had the good fortune to work with him.

Dean GONZALEZ is just one of many great Hispanic-Americans. I am proud to add my tribute to these Americans and thank them for enriching our social, intellectual and artistic life.

#### THE STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this week the Committee on Foreign Relations began a comprehensive series of six hearings on NATO enlargement. I commend Chairman HELMS for holding these hearings at this busy time. He and I have met at great length to construct the agenda as preparation for the committee's acting expeditiously next year to consider the enlargement amendment to the Washington Treaty.

At the committee's first hearing on October 7, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright outlined the administration's strategic rationale for

enlargement. Mr. President, I ask permission for the text of Secretary Albright's statement be printed in the RECORD. Following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. BIDEN. The second hearing today will feature testimony of distinguished experts who are for and against enlargement. Later in the month the committee will hear examinations of cost and burden-sharing, of the qualifications for membership of the three candidate countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and of the new relationship between NATO and Russia. The final hearing will be reserved for public testimony from individuals and groups with special interest in the NATO enlargement issue.

Through these hearings, the Committee on Foreign Relations hopes to inform not only the entire Senate on this critically important issue, but also the American public.

Mr. President, as my colleagues know, I have spoken many times in some detail on this floor about the issue of NATO enlargement. As the Committee on Foreign Relations launches its series of hearings, I would like briefly to recapitulate why I believe NATO enlargement is in the best interest of the United States.

Europe remains a vital area of interest for the United States for political, strategic, economic, and cultural reasons. A sizable percentage of the world's democracies are in Europe, and the continent remains a major global economic player and partner of the United States. The European Union, with a combined population a third larger than ours, has a combined gross domestic product that exceeds ours.

While the United States has a larger and less balanced trading relationship with Asia than with Europe, we invest far more in Europe. Several new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have highly educated work forces, already boast rapidly expanding economies, and already attract considerable American investment. Moreover, most Americans trace their ethnic and cultural roots to Europe, and millions retain personal ties to it.

Other than North America, no other part of the world can match Europe's combination of political, economic, military, and cultural power. By any geopolitical standard, it would be a catastrophe for U.S. interests if instability would alter the current situation in Europe.

Of course no one believes that the Russian Army is poised to pour through the Fulda Gap in Germany—NATO's horror scenario for 45 years. Rather, the threats to stability in Europe have changed, but they are, if anything, even more real than those of the cold war: ethnic and religious hatred as horrifyingly shown in the hundreds of thousands killed, raped, made homeless, or otherwise brutalized in Bosnia, and the well-organized forces of

international crime, whose tentacles extend from Moscow and Palermo to New York and Los Angeles.

Unfortunately, the history of the 20th century has demonstrated that out of enlightened self-interest the United States must play a leading role in organizing the security of Europe. In two world wars and lately in Bosnia without American leadership the countries of Europe have been unable to resolve their differences peacefully.

Translated into 1997 terms it means that we must lead the Europeans to create a new security architecture to guarantee stability to the areas most vulnerable to disruption, namely Central and Eastern Europe, where newly independent states are striving to create and solidify political democracy and free markets. It is a difficult process, which if not put into a larger framework could spin out of control.

It is in this context that the enlargement of NATO must be seen. During the cold war, NATO provided the security umbrella under which former enemies like France and Germany were able to cooperate and build highly successful free societies.

It was the framework in which former pariahs like Germany, Italy, and Spain could be reintegrated into democratic Europe. And it was NATO that kept the feud between Greece and Turkey from escalating to warfare.

The enlargement of NATO can now serve to move the zone of stability eastward to Central Europe and thereby both prevent ethnic conflicts from escalating and forestall a scramble for new bilateral and multilateral pacts along the lines of the 1930's from occurring.

In fact, it is already happening. In anticipation of NATO membership, several Central and East European countries have recently settled long-standing disputes.

If NATO were not to enlarge, however, the countries between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to protect themselves. The question for today is not, as is often assumed, enlarge NATO or remain the same. The status quo is simply not an option.

Finally, there is the moral argument for enlargement. For 40 years the United States loudly proclaimed its solidarity with the captive nations who were under the heel of communist oppressors. Now that most of them have cast off their shackles, it is our responsibility to live up to our pledges to readmit them into the West through NATO and the European Union when they are fully qualified.

NATO enlargement, of course, like any venture, is not cost-free. Earlier this year the Pentagon issued a study that estimated the cost to the United States to be around \$200 million per year for 10 years. Other estimates by the Congressional Budget Office and by the Rand Corp. have varied considerably, according to risk assumptions. At the July NATO Summit in Madrid, the

North Atlantic Council directed the Alliance to come up with a definitive cost estimate for the NATO ministerial meeting in December.

Whatever the final, authoritative cost estimate turns out to be, we must be certain that our current allies, and our future allies, pay their fair share of the enlargement costs.

Similarly, before we in the Senate vote on whether or not to admit Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO, we must settle what we plan to do in Bosnia after the expiration of the mandate for SFOR in June 1998. That in itself is an immensely complicated topic, for which there is inadequate time to discuss today. After my latest trip to Bosnia at the end of August, I am more convinced than ever that we are making progress and that we must not abandon the international effort to reach a lasting, peaceful, and just solution for that troubled land. But whatever post-SFOR plan we hammer out, it must be done on the basis of sharing the risks and costs with our European allies and with non-NATO contributors to SFOR.

NATO enlargement need not adversely affect our relations with Russia. In fact, we must redouble our peaceful engagement with Russia in the hope that its nascent democracy and free market system will mature sufficiently so that some day it may fully join the Western world. The NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 is a significant step in the right direction.

Enlargement plans have been accompanied by a redefinition of NATO's mission and force posture. The alliance's primary mission remains the same: treating an attack on one member as an attack on all, and responding through the use of armed force if necessary.

NATO's new strategic concept emphasizes rapid and flexible deployment. The three new members, plus other countries like Slovenia and Romania in the near future, will enhance NATO's ability to project power, if necessary, into crisis areas like the Middle East.

In addition, in the current post-cold war situation, missions like peacekeeping, sometimes in cooperation with non-NATO powers, have become possible. The SFOR joint effort in Bosnia with Russia and several other non-NATO countries, which I mentioned earlier, is an excellent example.

NATO enlargement corresponds to America's security requirements in the 21st century. As long as the costs of enlargement are equitably shared among current and future NATO members, and as long as we have agreed upon a fair and coherent plan for Bosnia after SFOR, I believe that my Senate colleagues will vote to ratify NATO enlargement when it comes before us next spring.

## EXHIBIT 1

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 7, 1997

Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: It is with a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come before you to urge support for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO.

Each of us today is playing our part in the long unfolding story of America's modern partnership with Europe. That story began not in Madrid, when the President and his fellow NATO leaders invited these three new democracies to join our Alliance, nor eight years ago when the Berlin Wall fell, but half a century ago when your predecessors and mine dedicated our nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe.

It was then that we broke with the American aversion to European entanglements, an aversion which served us well in our early days, but poorly when we became a global power. It was then that we sealed a peacetime alliance open not only to the nations which had shared our victory in World War II, but to our former adversaries. It was then that this committee unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the original NATO treaty.

The history books will long record that day as among the Senate's finest. On that day, the leaders of this body rose above partisanship and they rose to the challenge of a pivotal moment in the history of the world.

Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition today. I thank you for your decision to hold these hearings early, for the bipartisan manner in which you and Senator Biden are conducting them, and for the serious and substantive way in which you have framed our discussion.

I am honored to be part of what you have rightly called the beginning of the process of advice and consent. And I am hopeful that with your support, and after the full national debate to which these hearings will contribute, the Senate will embrace the addition of new members to NATO. It would be fitting if this renewal of our commitment to security in Europe could come early next year, as Congress celebrates the 50th anniversary of its approval of the Marshall Plan.

As I said, and as you can see, I am very conscious of history today. I hope that you and your colleagues will look back as I have on the deliberations of 1949, for they address so many of the questions I know you have now: How much will a new alliance cost and what are its benefits? Will it bind us to go to war? Will it entangle us in far away quarrels?

We should take a moment to remember what was said then about the alliance we are striving to renew and expand today.

Senator Vandenberg, Chairman Helms' extraordinary predecessor, predicted that NATO would become "the greatest war deterrent in history." He was right. American forces have never had to fire a shot to defend a NATO ally.

This Committee, in its report to the Senate on the NATO treaty, predicted that it would "free the minds of men in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity, and enable them to work and plan with that confidence in the future which is essential to economic recovery and progress." Your predecessors were right. NATO gave our allies time to rebuild their economies. It helped reconcile their ancient animosities. And it made possible an unprecedented era of unity in Western Europe.

President Truman said that the NATO pact "will be a positive, not a negative, influence

for peace, and its influence will be felt not only in the area it specifically covers but throughout the world." And he was right, too. NATO gave hope to democratic forces in West Germany that their country would be welcome and secure in our community if they kept making the right choices. Ultimately, it helped bring the former fascist countries into a prosperous and democratic Europe. And it helped free the entire planet from the icy grip of the Cold War.

Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different world. Our Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom's flag has been unfurled from the Baltics to Bulgaria. The threat of nuclear war has sharply diminished. As I speak to you today, our immediate survival is not at risk.

Indeed, you may ask if the principle of collective defense at NATO's heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and freer Europe. You may ask why, in this time of relative peace, are we so focused on security?

The answer is, we want the peace to last. We want freedom to endure. And we believe there are still potential threats to our security emanating from European soil.

You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I want to answer as plainly as I can.

First, there are the dangers of Europe's past. It is easy to forget this, but for centuries virtually every European nation treated virtually every other as a military threat. That pattern was broken only when NATO was born and only in the half of Europe NATO covered. With NATO, Europe's armies prepared to fight beside their neighbors, not against them; each member's security came to depend on cooperation with others, not competition.

That is one reason why NATO remains essential, even though the Cold War is over. It is also one reason why we need a larger NATO, so that the other half of Europe is finally embedded in the same cooperative structure of military planning and preparation.

A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. Because of conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, Europe has already buried more victims of war since the Berlin Wall fell than in all the years of the Cold War. It is sobering to recall that this violence has its roots in the same problems of shattered states and hatred among ethnic groups that tyrants exploited to start this century's great wars.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider the dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean direct threats against the soil of NATO members that a collective defense pact is designed to meet. Some are visible on Europe's horizon, such as the threat posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons that might have Europe within their range and in their sights. Others may not seem apparent today, in part because the existence of NATO has helped to deter them. But they are not unthinkable.

Within this category lie questions about the future of Russia. We have an interest in seeing Russian democracy endure. We are doing all we can with our Russian partners to see that it does. And we have many reasons to be optimistic. At the same time, one should not dismiss the possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.

We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even 50 years from now. We do know enough from history and human experience to believe that a grave threat, if allowed to arise, would arise. We know that

whatever the future may hold, it will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share our values and our determination to defend them.

We recognize NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of American responsibilities in Europe. It does not bind us to respond to every violent incident by going to war. But it does oblige us to consider an armed attack against one ally an attack against all and to respond with such action as we deem necessary, including the use of force, to restore the security of the North Atlantic area.

As Americans, we take our commitments seriously and we do not extend them lightly. Mr. Chairman, you and I do not agree on everything, but we certainly agree that any major extension of American commitments must serve America's strategic interests.

Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO meets that test.

First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the productive paradox at NATO's heart: By imposing a price on aggression, it deters aggression. By making clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend our allies, it makes it less likely our troops will ever be called upon to do so.

Now, you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate threat of armed attack today. That is true. And I would say that the purpose of NATO enlargement is to keep it that way. Senator Vandenberg said it in 1949: "[NATO] is not built to stop a war after it starts, although its potentialities in this regard are infinite. It is built to stop wars before they start."

It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to prevent conflict in central Europe. There are those who imply it is not. I'm sure you have even heard a few people trot out what I call the "consonant cluster clause," the myth that in times of crisis Americans will make no sacrifice to defend a distant city with an unpronounceable name, that we will protect the freedom of Strasbourg but not Szczecin, Barcelona, but not Brno.

Let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a European power. We have an interest not only in the lands west of the Oder river, but in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the Cold War in part because these nations were held captive. We fought World War II in part because these nations had been invaded.

Now that these nations are free, we want them to succeed and we want them to be safe, whether they are large or small. For if there were a major threat to the security of their region, if we were to wake up one morning to the sight of cities being shelled and borders being overrun, I am certain that we would choose to act, enlargement or no enlargement. Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way to prevent that kind of threat from arising, and thus the need to make that kind of choice.

Mr. Chairman, the second reason why enlargement passes the test of national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are passionately committed to NATO and its principles of shared responsibility. Experience has taught them to believe in a strong American leadership role in Europe. Their forces have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to Bosnia. Just last month, Czech soldiers joined our British allies in securing a police station from heavily armed Bosnian Serb extremists.

Mr. Chairman, I know you have expressed concern that enlargement could dilute NATO by adding too many members and by involv-

ing the alliance in too many missions. Let me assure you that we invited only the strongest candidates to join the Alliance. And nothing about enlargement will change NATO's core mission, which is and will remain the collective defense of NATO soil.

At the same time, it is important to remember that NATO has always served a political function as well. It binds our allies to us just as it binds us to our allies. So when you consider the candidacy of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Mr. Chairman, I ask you to consider this:

When peace is threatened somewhere in the world and we decide it is in our interest to act, here are three nations we have been able to count on to be with us. In the fight against terror and nuclear proliferation, here are three nations we have been able to count on. In our effort to reform the UN, here are three nations we have been able to count on. When we speak out for human rights around the world, here are three nations we will always be able to count on.

Here are three nations that know what it means to lose their freedom and who will do what it takes to defend it. Here are three democracies that are ready to do their dependable part in the common enterprise of our alliance of democracies.

Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring countries have strengthened their democratic institutions. They have made sure that soldiers serve civilians, not the other way around. They have signed 10 major accords that taken together resolve virtually every old ethnic and border dispute in the region, exactly the kind of disputes that might have led to future Bosnias. In fact, the three states we have invited to join NATO have resolved every outstanding dispute of this type.

I have been a student of central European history and I have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and Hungarians building a genuine friendship after centuries of enmity, when I see Poles, Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming joint military units after years of suspicion, when I see Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of mistrust, when I see central Europeans confident enough to improve their political and economic ties with Russia, I know something remarkable is happening.

NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it did—precisely what this Committee predicted it would do—for Europe's west after World War II. It is helping to vanquish old hatreds, to promote integration and to create a secure environment for economic prosperity. This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want our troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social unrest are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than without it.

In short, a larger NATO will prevent conflict, strengthen NATO, and protect the gains of stability and freedom in central and eastern Europe. That is the strategic rationale. But I would be disingenuous if I did not tell you that I see a moral imperative as well. For this is a policy that should appeal to our hearts as well as to our heads, to our sense of what is right as well as to our sense of what is smart.

NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War. America has long stood for the proposition that this Atlantic community should not be artificially divided and that its nations should be free to shape their destiny. We have long argued that the nations of

central and eastern Europe belong to the same democratic family as our allies in western Europe.

We often call them "former communist countries," and that is true in the same sense that America is a "former British colony." Yes, the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians were on the other side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. But we were surely on the same side in the ways that truly count.

As Americans, we should be heartened today that so many of Europe's new democracies wish to join the institutions Americans did so much to build. They are our friends and we should be proud to welcome them home.

We should also think about what would happen if we were to turn them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier. It would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise qualified democracies simply because they were once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact.

Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old democracies forever, but its new democracies never? There is no acceptable, objective answer to that question. Instead, it would probably be said that we blocked the aspirations of our would-be allies because Russia objected. And that, in turn, could cause confidence to crumble in central Europe, leading to a search for security by other means, including costly arms buildups and competition among neighbors.

We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which of these nations that are so clearly important to our security are ready and able to contribute to our security? The answer to that question is before you today, awaiting your affirmation.

I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty voices on both sides of this debate. There are legitimate concerns with which we have grappled along the way, and that I expect you to consider fully as well. Let me address a few.

First, we all want to make sure that the costs of expansion are distributed fairly. Last February, at the behest of Congress and before the Alliance had decided which nations to invite to membership, the Administration made a preliminary estimate of America's share. Now that we have settled on three candidates, we are working with our allies to produce a common estimate by the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council. At this point, the numbers we agree upon as 16 allies are needed prior to any further calculations made in Washington.

I know you are holding separate hearings in which my Pentagon colleagues will go into this question in detail. But I will say this: I am convinced that the cost of expansion is real but affordable. I am certain our prospective allies are willing and able to pay their share, because in the long run it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their forces within the alliance than outside it. As Secretary of State, I will insist that our old allies share this burden fairly. That is what NATO is all about.

I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger NATO will cost far more than we have anticipated. The key fact about our estimate is that it is premised on the current, favorable security environment in Europe. Obviously, if a grave threat were to arise, the cost of enlargement would rise. But then so would the cost of our entire defense budget.

In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is why the main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chair-

man, and in our consultations with our allies, needs to be on defining the level of military capability we want our old and new allies to have in this favorable environment, and then making sure that they commit to that level. We must spend no more than we must, but no less than we need to keep NATO strong.

Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it might damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia. Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is real. But we should see it for what it is: a product of old misperceptions about NATO and old ways of thinking about its former satellites in central Europe. Instead of changing our policies to accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage Russia's more modern aspirations.

This means that we should remain Russia's most steadfast champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining international institutions, opening its markets and participating constructively in world affairs. It means we should welcome Russia's decision to build a close partnership with NATO, as we did in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a threat, we owe it candor to say that is false—and to base our policies on what we know to be true. When they imply that central Europe is special, that its nations still are not free to choose their security arrangements, we owe it to candor to say that times have changed, and that no nation can assert its greatness at the expense of its neighbors. We do no favor to Russian democrats and modernizers to suggest otherwise.

I believe our approach is sound and producing results. Over the past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement, reformers have made remarkable gains in the Russian government. We have agreed to pursue deeper arms reductions. Our troops have built a solid working relationship on the ground in Bosnia. Russia was our full partner at the Summit of the Eight in Denver and it has joined the Paris Club of major international lenders.

What is more, last week in New York we signed documents that should pave the way for the Russian Duma to ratify the START II treaty. While this prospect is still by no means certain, it would become far less so if we gave the Duma any reason to think it could hold up NATO enlargement by holding up START II.

As you know Mr. Chairman, last week, NATO and Russia held the first ministerial meeting of their Permanent Joint Council. This council gives us an invaluable mechanism for building trust between NATO and Russia through dialogue and transparency.

I know that some are concerned NATO's new relationship with Russia will actually go too far. You have asked me for an affirmation, Mr. Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council remains NATO's supreme decision making body. Let me say it clearly: It does and it will. The NATO-Russia Founding Act gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay or block NATO decisions. NATO's allies will always meet to agree on every item on their agenda before meeting with Russia. And the relationship between NATO and Russia will grow in importance only to the extent Russia uses it constructively.

The Founding Act also does not limit NATO's ultimate authority to deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to new and old members. All it does is to restate unilaterally existing NATO policy: that in the current and foreseeable security environment, we have no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor

do we contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces. The only binding limits on conventional forces in Europe will be set as we adapt the CFE treaty, with central European countries and all the other signatories at the table, and we will proceed on the principle of reciprocity.

Another important concern is that enlargement may create a new dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the countries that will not join in the first round. We have taken a range of steps to ensure this does not happen.

President Clinton has pledged that the first new members will not be the last. NATO leaders will consider the next steps in the process of enlargement before the end of the decade. We have strengthened NATO's Partnership for Peace program. We have created a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, through which NATO and its democratic partners throughout Europe will shape the missions we undertake together. We have made it clear that the distinction between the nations NATO invited to join in Madrid and those it did not is based purely on objective factors—unlike the arbitrary line that would divide Europe if NATO stood still.

Among the countries that still aspire to membership, there is enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. Had you seen the crowds that cheered the President in Romania in July, had you been with me when I spoke to the leaders of Lithuania and Slovenia, you would have sensed how eager these nations are to redouble their efforts.

They understand a simple fact: With enlargement, no new democracy is permanently excluded; without enlargement, every new democracy would be permanently excluded. The most important thing the Senate can do to reassure them now is to get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission of the first three candidates.

Mr. Chairman, a final concern I wish to address has to do with Bosnia.

Some have suggested that our debate on NATO enlargement simply cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in that troubled country. I agree with them. Both enlargement and our mission in Bosnia are aimed at building a stable undivided Europe. Both involve NATO and its new partners to the east.

It was our experience in Bosnia that proved the fundamental premise of our enlargement strategy: there are still threats to peace and security in Europe that only NATO can meet. It was in Bosnia that our prospective allies proved they are ready to take responsibility for the security of others. It was in Bosnia that we proved NATO and Russian troops can work together.

We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve all its goals, for that ultimately depends on the choices the Bosnian people will make. But we can say that whatever may happen, NATO's part in achieving the military goals of our mission has been a resounding success. Whatever may happen, our interest in a larger, stronger NATO will endure long after the last foreign soldier has left Bosnia.

We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful instrument we have for building effective military coalitions such as SFOR. At the same time, Bosnia does not by itself define the future of a larger NATO. NATO's fundamental purpose is collective defense against aggression. Its most important aim, if I can paraphrase Arthur Vandenberg, is to prevent wars before they start so it does not have to keep the peace after they stop.

These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to address today; I know you have many more questions and I look forward to answering them all.

This discussion is just beginning. I am glad that it will also involve other committees of the Senate, the NATO Observers' Group and the House of Representatives. Most important, I am glad it will involve the people of the United States. For the commitment a larger NATO entails will only be meaningful if the American people understand and accept it.

When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I trust they will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr. Chairman. And on that day, we will be standing on the shoulders of many.

We will be thankful to all those who prosecuted the Cold War, to all those on both sides of the Iron Curtain who believed that the goal of containment was to bring about the day when the enlargement of our democratic community would be possible.

We will be grateful to all those who championed the idea of a larger NATO—not just President Clinton, or President Havel, or President Walesa, but members of Congress from both parties who voted for resolutions urging the admission of these three nations. We will owe a debt to the Republican members who made NATO enlargement part of their Contract with America.

Today, all of our allies and future allies are watching you for one simple reason. The American Constitution is unique in the power it grants to the legislative branch over foreign policy, especially over treaties. In this matter, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, you and the American people you represent are truly in the driver's seat.

That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe and telling our allies: "This is what we want to do, but ultimately, it will be up to our Senate and our people to decide." I say that with pride because it tells them something about America's faith in the democratic process.

But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence as well. I believe we will stand together, Mr. Chairman, when the time comes for the Senate to decide, because I know that the policy we ask you to embrace is a policy that the Administration and Congress shaped together, and because I am certain that it advances the fundamental interests of the United States.

Thank you very much.

#### CONGRATULATIONS TO KENTUCKY FORD AND TOYOTA WORKERS

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I want to take just a moment today to talk about some hard working Kentuckians. Earlier this month marked the close of the 1997 year for car models. With that closing came the news that the Toyota Camry was the best-selling car in the United States and that Ford's F-Series trucks are the number one selling trucks in the nation for the 16th year in a row. Also at the top were the Ford Explorer as the number one sports utility vehicle and the Ranger as the number one compact pickup.

I'm proud to say that the number one car, truck and sports utility vehicle all have "made in Kentucky" stamped inside. The Camry is built in Georgetown and two of the Ford trucks—the F-250 and the F-350—along with both the Ranger and the Explorer, are all made in Louisville. About 80 percent of the Camrys sold in the nation come from Kentucky, while the Kentucky-made Ford trucks account for about 26 percent of the F-Series sales.

Behind those impressive sales figures are thousands of hard-working Kentuckians committed to doing the best job possible.

Their hard work not only put Toyota and Ford at the top of the charts, but their local communities and the state come out winners as well. A strong company with productive workers is a boost to the local economy and a successful plant is a powerful recruitment tool for the state.

Mr. President, number one sales mean a number one production team. I know I speak for my fellow Kentuckians when I say we're awfully proud of all the hard work that put the Toyota and Ford vehicles at the top.

Keep up the good work and know that you've made all Kentuckians proud.

#### MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Williams, one of his secretaries.

##### EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in execution session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

#### MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE

At 1:02 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Mr. Hays, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2169) making appropriations for the Department of Transportation and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1998, and for other purposes.

At 2:34 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Ms. Goetz, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following bill, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 901. An act to preserve the sovereignty of the United States over public lands and acquired lands owned by the United States, and to preserve State sovereignty and private property rights in non-Federal lands surrounding those public lands and acquired lands.

At 6:19 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Ms. Goetz, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following bill, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 2607. An act making appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of said District for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1998, and for other purposes.

#### MEASURES REFERRED

The following bill was read the first and second times by unanimous consent and referred as indicated:

H.R. 901. An act to preserve the sovereignty of the United States over public lands and acquired lands owned by the United States, and to preserve State sovereignty and private property rights in non-Federal lands surrounding those public lands and acquired lands; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

The Committee on Veterans' Affairs was discharged from further consideration of the following measure which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. 813. A bill to amend chapter 91 of title 18, United States Code to provide criminal penalties for theft and willful vandalism at national cemeteries.

#### MEASURES PLACED ON THE CALENDAR

The following measures were discharged from the Committee on Governmental Affairs and ordered placed on the calendar:

H.R. 1057. An act to designate the building in Indianapolis, Indiana, which houses the operations of the Circle City Station Post Office as the "Andrew Jacobs, Jr. Post Office Building."

H.R. 1058. An act to designate the facility of the United States Postal Service under construction at 150 West Margaret Drive in Terre Haute, Indiana, as the "John T. Myers Post Office Building."

The following measure was read the first and second times by unanimous consent and placed on the calendar:

H.R. 2607. An act making appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of said District for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1998, and for other purposes.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEE

The following report of committee was submitted:

By Mr. STEVENS, from the Committee on Appropriations:

Special Report entitled "Further Revised Allocation To Subcommittees of Budget Totals from the Concurrent Resolution for Fiscal Year 1998" (Rept. No. 105-104).

By Mr. ROTH, from the Committee on Finance, without amendment:

S. 1278. An original bill to extend preferential treatment to certain products imported from Caribbean Basin countries (Rept. No. 105-105).

By Mr. MURKOWSKI, from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute:

S. 660. A bill to provide for the continuation of higher education through the conveyance of certain public lands in the State of Alaska to the University of Alaska, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 105-106).

By Mr. THOMPSON, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, with amendments and an amendment to the title:

S. 207. A bill to review, reform, and terminate unnecessary and inequitable Federal subsidies (Rept. No. 105-107).

By Mr. HATCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute: