

first time since we reformed campaign financing 23 years ago that there's been allegations of foreign involvement in American political campaigns."

Clearly, this Member is making Guam out to be a foreign contributor instead of the active American community that we are. I wonder what the people of his home State would have thought if that Member had spoken of allegations made about Cuba, Indonesia and even Arizona.

It is important to make this distinction between foreign contributions and American contributions in the context of these discussions because it seems that it rubs Guam in a negative way in both directions.

To the extent that the people of Guam cannot vote for President of the United States, the one way that perhaps they can provide evidence of their support for the candidacy of an individual running for President is to make a campaign donation. And now that very campaign donation has many doubts cast upon it, and its utility has been besmirched and run through the media mud.

These reports have also failed to point out that the President committed to appointing a special White House representative and moving forward with the commonwealth negotiations during a meeting that I participated in in 1993, and in which I made a request for the President and in which he agreed that he would appoint a special negotiator. This was well before any campaign contributions were made. To link this process to political contributions delegitimizes the very legitimate efforts of the people of Guam to attain a fuller measure of political dignity through a commonwealth.

The article printed in the Washington Post last week alleged a quid pro quo policy shift based on campaign contributions from the people of Guam. The quid pro quo alleged by the article simply has not occurred.

While there have been serious discussions with the administration since 1993, about Guam's quest for commonwealth, to date there has been no specific policy shift. What has changed is the context in which our desires for the local control of immigration have been portrayed. This distortion has been suggested by members of the Federal bureaucracy whom we from Guam are very familiar with because we have negotiated rather unsuccessfully with them over the years.

It is also important to note that, when we look at it in terms of from Guam, we are wondering how we are portrayed in the national media. I heard in the radio this morning a reporter for one of the national magazines making again the claim, and this has been repeated in a number of media interviews, that our policy toward Guam had shifted as a result of campaign negotiations.

It is the extension of the meaning of the word "our" and the portrayal of the people of Guam as being foreign,

out there. I doubt if our policy toward Arizona or our policy toward Montana would be portrayed in that way because the pronoun our is used in that context in the terms of foreign policy. It seems that certainly to the people of Guam that for military purposes we are treated very domestically. But apparently for fundraising purposes, we are quite foreign.

The type of immigration control that Guam desires is not unusual in the context of territorial relations. In the past the National Government has designated territorial leaders to issue passports and administer other functions normally reserved for Federal agencies, and these are parts of the organic acts or the organizing acts for many territories.

Today two territories control immigration locally, American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas. Our desire for immigration control is also consistent, we believe, with the national trend toward the shift of power from the National Government to local government. We on Guam strongly support and even accept and support existing U.S. statutes with respect to fair labor standards, the protection of workers rights, safety and health, and the U.S. minimum wage system. They have become inherent in the way we operate daily in our offices, in our businesses, in our commercial enterprises on Guam. What we seek is economic relief through the ability to procure workers on a temporary basis while continuing to administer these standards ourselves and not their abandonment, as some would suggest.

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We also want to rectify the negative social impact caused by existing Federal immigration law. Guam proposes a standard-driven process whereby the government of Guam will earn the gradual assumption of control congruent with its direct administration of these standards. This has been the tenets of the process of negotiation that we have had with the administration, not the kind of farfetched portrayal that has been made in the media.

What allegedly goes on in other areas is not the desire of the people of Guam. We are not only mindful of the accusation of labor abuses elsewhere in the Pacific region, we too are greatly concerned about them. What the leaders of Guam hear most is not the sound of money changing hands, but the cries and the aspirations of the people about serious policy concerns.

Guam contributes enormously to the strength of our country and Asia and we deserve to be heard on the merits of our arguments. The extension of democracy should have no price.

America's rationale for a strong defense is not only to provide security but to provide the basis to increase the democratization of the Asian Pacific region. If the Federal Government is not willing to deal with Guam's concerns, this rationale is made empty and

degraded. If the United States is to increase and stand for democracy in Asia, it must start at home and even when that home is some 9,000 miles away from Washington.

The call of the people of Guam is a call to open-mindedness. We call on the administration to continue the negotiations to their final conclusion and we ask this Congress to give the people of Guam a fair hearing. We not only desire it, we deserve it, and for the past 100 years, in reality, this is all that we have been asking for.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT ON SOCIAL SECURITY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES AND GOVERNMENT OF UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. 105-47)

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and ordered to be printed:

*To the Congress of the United States:*

Pursuant to section 233(e)(1) of the Social Security Act, as amended by the Social Security Amendments of 1977 (Public Law 95-216, 42 U.S.C. 433(e)(1)), I transmit herewith the Supplementary Agreement Amending the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Social Security (the Supplementary Agreement), which consists of two separate instruments: a principal agreement and an administrative arrangement. The Supplementary Agreement, signed at London on June 6, 1996, is intended to modify certain provisions of the original United States-United Kingdom Social Security Agreement signed at London February 13, 1984.

The United States-United Kingdom Social Security Agreement is similar in objective to the social security agreements with Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Such bilateral agreements provide for limited coordination between the U.S. and foreign social security systems to eliminate dual social security coverage and taxation, and to help prevent the loss of benefit protection that can occur when workers divide their careers between two countries.

The Supplementary Agreement, which would amend the 1984 Agreement to update and clarify several of its provisions, is necessitated by changes that have occurred in U.S. and English law in recent years. Among other things, the Supplementary Agreement removes certain restrictions in the original agreement concerning payment of

UK disability benefits to residents of the United States. The Supplementary Agreement will also make a number of minor revisions in the Agreement to take account of other changes in U.S. and English law that have occurred in recent years.

The United States-United Kingdom Social Security Agreement, as amended, would continue to contain all provisions mandated by section 233 and other provisions that I deem appropriate to carry out the provisions of section 233, pursuant to section 233(c)(4) of the Act.

I also transmit for the information of the Congress a report prepared by the Social Security Administration explaining the key points of the Supplementary Agreement, along with a paragraph-by-paragraph explanation of the effect of the amendments on the principal agreement and the related administrative arrangement. Annexed to this report is the report required by section 233(e)(1) of the Act on the effect of the Agreement, as amended, on income and expenditures of the U.S. Social Security program and the number of individuals affected by the amended Agreement. The Department of State and the Social Security Administration have recommended the Supplementary Agreement and related documents to me.

I commend the United States-United Kingdom Social Security Agreement and related documents.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 25, 1997.

#### 1997 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Agriculture, the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, the Committee on Commerce, the Committee on Education and the Workforce, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, the Committee on International Relations, the Committee on National Security, the Committee on Resources, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on Veterans' Affairs and the Committee on Ways and Means:

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I am pleased to transmit the *1997 National Drug Control Strategy* to the Congress. This strategy renews our bipartisan commitment to reducing drug abuse and its destructive consequences. It reflects the combined and coordinated Federal effort that is directed by National Drug Control Policy Director Barry McCaffrey and includes every department and over 50 agencies. It enlists all State and local leaders from

across the country who must share in the responsibility to protect our children and all citizens from the scourge of illegal drugs.

In the *1996 National Drug Control Strategy*, we set forth the basis of a coherent, rational, long-term national effort to reduce illicit drug use and its consequences. Building upon that framework, the *1997 National Drug Control Strategy* adopts a 10-year national drug-control strategy that includes quantifiable measures of effectiveness. The use of a long-term strategy, with annual reports to the Congress and consistent outreach to the American people on our progress, will allow us to execute a dynamic, comprehensive plan for the Nation and will help us to achieve our goals.

We know from the past decade of Federal drug control efforts that progress in achieving our goals will not occur overnight. But our success in reducing casual drug use over the last decade demonstrates that drug abuse is not an incurable social ill. Thanks to the bipartisan efforts of the Congress and the past three administrations, combined with broad-based efforts of citizens and communities throughout the United States, we have made tremendous progress since the 1970's in reducing drug use.

Nonetheless, we are deeply concerned about the rising trend of drug use by young Americans. While overall use of drugs in the United States has fallen dramatically—by half in 15 years—adolescent drug abuse continues to rise. That is why the number one goal of our strategy is to motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse.

Our strategy contains programs that will help youth to recognize the terrible risks associated with the use of illegal substances. The cornerstone of this effort will be our national media campaign that will target our youth with a consistent anti-drug message. But government cannot do this job alone. We challenge the national media and entertainment industry to join us—by renouncing the glamorization of drug abuse and realistically portraying its consequences.

All Americans must accept responsibility to teach young people that drugs are wrong, drugs are illegal, and drugs are deadly. We must renew our commitment to the drug prevention strategies that deter first-time drug use and halt the progression from alcohol and tobacco use to illicit drugs.

While we continue to teach our children the dangers of drugs, we must also increase the safety of our citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence. At the beginning of my Administration, we set out to change this country's approach to crime by putting more police officers on our streets, taking guns out of the hands of criminals and juveniles, and breaking the back of violent street gangs. We are making a difference. For the fifth year in a row serious crime in

this country has declined. This is the longest period of decline in over 25 years. But our work is far from done and we must continue to move in the right direction.

More than half of all individuals brought into the Nation's criminal justice systems have substance abuse problems. Unless we also break the cycle of drugs and violence, criminal addicts will end up back on the street, committing more crimes, and back in the criminal justice system, still hooked on drugs. The criminal justice system should reduce drug demand—not prolong or tolerate it. Our strategy implements testing and sanctions through coerced abstinence as a way to reduce the level of drug use in the population of offenders under criminal justice supervision, and thereby reduce the level of other criminal behavior.

Our strategy supports the expansion of drug-free workplaces, which have proven so successful and we will continue to seek more effective, efficient, and accessible drug treatment to ensure that we are responsive to emerging drug-abuse trends.

We must continue to shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat. By devoting more resources to protecting the Southwest border than ever before, we are increasing drug seizures, stopping drug smugglers, and disrupting major drug trafficking operations. We must continue our interdiction efforts, which have greatly disrupted the trafficking patterns of cocaine smugglers and have blocked the free flow of cocaine through the western Caribbean into Florida and the Southeast.

Our comprehensive effort to reduce the drug flow cannot be limited to seizing drugs as they enter the United States. We must persist in our efforts to break foreign and domestic sources of supply. We know that by working with source and transit nations, we can greatly reduce foreign supply. International criminal narcotics organizations are a threat to our national security. But if we target these networks, we can dismantle them—as we did the Cali Cartel.

We will continue to oppose all calls for the legalization of illicit drugs. Our vigilance is needed now more than ever. We will continue to ensure that all Americans have access to safe and effective medicine. However, the current drug legalization movement sends the wrong message to our children. It undermines the concerted efforts of parents, educators, businesses, elected leaders, community groups, and others to achieve a healthy, drug-free society.

I am confident that the national challenge of drug abuse can be met by extending our strategic vision into the future, educating citizens, treating addiction, and seizing the initiative in dealing with criminals who traffic not only in illegal drugs but in human misery and lost lives.

Every year drug abuse kills 14,000 Americans and costs taxpayers nearly