

NOT VOTING—5

Bass	Schiff	Yates
Edwards	Towns	

□ 1851

Mr. BOB SMITH of Oregon, Mr. BOB SCHAFFER of Colorado, and Mr. GILMAN changed their vote from "aye" to "no."

Mr. MANTON and Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas changed their vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Speaker, I have a brief statement to make about a matter in the bill; and then I believe the chairman will be asking unanimous consent to deal with the program for the rest of the evening. I just wanted Members to be alerted to that. I will be brief.

I just want to talk for a minute about something that is referenced in our report concerning the nonacoustic submarine warfare research program that is conducted by an office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for intelligence. It is generally referred to by the acronym ASAP, the Advanced Sensor Application Program.

It was created by Congress, and we have always insisted that it be managed independently of the Navy. We have recently learned that there is an effort underway by the Navy and elements within OSD to transfer this program to Navy management, in direct contravention of years of consistent guidance from Congress.

This came too late to be incorporated into our bill, but I want to make Members aware of it. There is guidance regarding this program in our report. Most particularly, this language was drafted to repeat the congressional intent, and I quote, that "we have repeatedly addressed the need to maintain two separate independent but coordinated nonacoustic submarine warfare programs within the Department of Defense." And it goes on to state that, "ASAP is expected to continue investigating advanced technology in nonacoustical anti-submarine warfare."

Mr. Speaker, in my view, this is very important and precludes the Department from transferring this program to the Navy. I think that is the correct course. We have a great deal riding on maintaining the small insurance program in our nonacoustical anti-submarine warfare research programs.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. MCINNIS], having assumed the chair, Mr. THORNBERRY, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill, (H.R. 1775), to authorize

appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

PROVIDING FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1775, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to make a unanimous consent request which I think will be of great interest to all Members, concerning what we expect to be the events of the next hour and a half or so.

I ask unanimous consent that during further consideration of H.R. 1775, pursuant to House Resolution 179, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may, (1) postpone until a time during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any amendment; and (2) reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for electronic voting on any postponed question that follows another electronic vote without intervening business, provided that the time for electronic voting on the first in any series of questions shall be a minimum of 15 minutes.

I further would like to explain my unanimous consent request, Mr. Chairman, by saying that my understanding and part of the unanimous consent request is that the remaining amendments, which I will outline, on H.R. 1775, my understanding, the Frank amendment and all amendments thereto would be considered for a total of 30 minutes, that would be 15 minutes a side; that the Waters amendment that has to do with the Los Angeles drug problem be limited to 60 minutes, that would be 30 minutes a side, and all amendments thereto, if that amendment is in fact in order, which I am not certain about at this time; and that the Waters Amendment No. 2 and all amendments thereto, which has to do with the Gulf war chemical warfare amendment, be limited to 60 minutes, 30 minutes a side.

That would, by my judgment, wrap up all of the amendments that we have provided, then to get back to the normal motions to recommit and closing out the bill in the normal way. I believe that if there is no opposition to our unanimous consent request, that would ensure Members until approximately 8:30, probably thereafter, before we would have the rolled votes; and that is my unanimous consent request.

I would be very happy to yield if there is a question.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, is it my understanding that the chairman on the second amendment might have a substitute amendment?

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, if the gentleman is referring to the Waters second amendment, which is the one on the Gulf war chemical warfare problem, the gentleman is correct. There is a substitute amendment that will be offered and that, indeed, could extend the time out.

Mr. DICKS. Further reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, do we understand that we would roll the votes and we would have a 15-minute vote followed by two 5-minute votes if there were 3 votes requested? Is that the understanding?

Mr. GOSS. If the gentleman would yield further, my understanding is that the first vote in the series would have to be a 15-minute vote and all subsequent votes would be 5 minutes. It is hard for me to say how many there will be because there is a germaneness question on one of these; and my substitute I would not think would take very long.

I am told that there is confusion about whether my substitute is included in the 60 minutes that is set aside for Waters 2.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I thought it was 60 minutes with all amendments thereto.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would continue to yield, that is my understanding. I want to make sure that that is the understanding of the gentleman from California (Ms. Waters) also. In that case, there is no misunderstanding.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would clarify that the Gulf war amendment is amendment No. 6 by the gentleman from California [Ms. WATERS].

Mr. GOSS. I am sure the Speaker is correct on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

□ 1900

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MCINNIS). Pursuant to House Resolution 179 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 1775.

□ 1900

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 1775) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S.

Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. THORNBERRY in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, amendment No. 2 offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CONYERS] had been disposed of.

Pursuant to the order of the House of today, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to not less than 5 minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device without intervening business, provided that the time for voting by electronic device on the first in any series of questions shall not be less than 15 minutes.

AMENDMENT NO. 3 OFFERED BY MR. FRANK OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to offer an amendment that was printed in the RECORD. I ask unanimous consent because I, relying on advice I was given earlier, thought that we were going to have amendments in order at any time. Therefore, I missed the specific time. I ask unanimous consent to offer an amendment which is covered by the time agreement articulated by the gentleman from Florida.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to amending title I of the bill at this point?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts:

Page 6, after line 24, insert the following new section:

SEC. 105. REDUCTION IN FISCAL YEAR 1998 INTELLIGENCE BUDGET.

(a) REDUCTION.—The amount obligated for activities for which funds are authorized to be appropriated by this Act (including the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a)) may not exceed—

(1) the amount that the bill H.R. 1775, as reported in the House of Representatives in the 105th Congress, authorizes for such activities for fiscal year 1998, reduced by

(2) the amount equal to 0.7 percent of such authorization.

(b) EXCEPTION.—The amounts appropriated pursuant to section 201 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund may not be reduced by reason of subsection (a).

(c) TRANSFER AND REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY.—(1) The President, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, may apply the limitation required by subsection (a) by transferring amounts among accounts or reprogramming amounts within an account, as specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

(2) Before carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall submit a notification to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, which notification shall include the reasons for each proposed transfer or reprogramming.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] and a Member opposed, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS], will each control 15 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I thank the chairman and ranking member for allowing me to offer this amendment, although because of the misinformation I missed the time.

We had a long debate about cutting this. We now have a shorter one because we have got a time agreement. The amendment I offer would reduce the authorization by 0.7 percent, seven-tenths of 1 percent. I cannot tell the Members how much that is in dollars because there might be a spy that knows algebra and if a spy knew algebra he could take 0.7, he could multiply, he could do some other things and he would know the total. I certainly would not want to violate the law by indicating the total. So in deference to the algebraic literate Iranians who may be lurking, I will tell any Member who comes to me privately what the dollar amount is. Let me say it is significant. Seven-tenths of 1 percent does not look like a lot, but we are not dealing here with the NEA or the CPB or low-income fuel assistance. We are here dealing with national security, which means it is serious money. So I will be glad to tell people how much we are talking about. I cannot tell it publicly because they are listening. What I am proposing to do is to reduce this to the amount the President requested.

We have had conversations about how the amount was reduced. Ten years ago, we faced a heavily nuclear armed Soviet Union. Fortunately, we no longer have that serious problem. Indeed, the greatest intelligence problem in Europe in the months and years ahead may be to keep track of just how many countries have joined NATO. We certainly have had a substantial reduction in the threat, and we have not had a remotely commensurate reduction in the spending.

I happen to believe that the administration has given in and asked for too much in the national security area, but I accept the judgment of the House, we are not going to make any substantial reduction of the sort I voted for. But I

do not understand how we could vote to raise what the President has requested for this item. Because, remember, we are in the zero sum game situation of the budget deal, and every \$10 or \$100 or \$200 million by which we raise what the President has asked for in this account, we must reduce somewhere else. We must reduce elsewhere in defense or we must reduce in transportation. Members here almost voted to increase transportation. So the question before us is, shall we at this point increase by a significant albeit unstatable sum what the President has asked for for intelligence, knowing that we do this at the cost of other important items?

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. YOUNG], the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. The proponent of the amendment is suggesting it is a small amount, it is only 0.7 percent, but what the gentleman assumes with this amendment is the members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence did not pay attention to what was being done when this bill was being marked up. The truth of the matter is that under the chairmanship of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS] and the leadership of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS], the ranking minority member, the members of this committee, and the staff looked at every item in this bill and looked at it closely to see where we needed to add or to see where we could save a few dollars to try to come in with as low a number as possible. I think we did a pretty good job. My job as chairman of the appropriations Subcommittee on National Security, the chairman's responsibility, and all the Members of this Congress, our responsibility to our Nation, to the people that we represent, is to keep the Nation secure, and that requires a very effective intelligence community to establish worldwide information that we need. And who needs it? Not only do people at the Pentagon, not only the people at the CIA but the soldiers in the field need it, the people that we send to battle need intelligence. Would it not be a shame to send somebody into combat and not provide them the necessary intelligence?

That is what we are trying to do, is to have an effective intelligence operation, to guarantee a commitment that I and many of my colleagues have made over the years that we are not going to be willing to send an American into a hostile situation unless we know we have done the best to provide him with the best training, with the best equipment, the best technology and the best intelligence, and knowledge of the situation. That is what we

are doing here today. We are trying to guarantee that our soldiers and those responsible for our Nation's security have the intelligence, the knowledge that they need. We have done the very best we could to get as much for the money. I would say that the committee has done a good job, and I compliment the leadership of the committee. I would hope that the Members of the House would be willing to vote a strong no on this amendment as they did on the Sanders amendment earlier this evening.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes. I understand that the chairman, a hard-working diligent chairman of an appropriations subcommittee would argue that we never should change what his committee does. I understand that. I do not think, however, that we should treat every amendment to an appropriations or an authorization bill as a vote of confidence.

I have great confidence in the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from Washington, but the argument of the gentleman from Florida is that once the committee has done the work, in fact, I do not know why we are here, let us just ratify what the committees do. He argues that my amendment would endanger the troops. Apparently General Shalikhvili did not think so. Secretary Cohen did not think so. The Director of the CIA did not think so, assuming we had one at the time. You are never sure over there.

The fact is that I am proposing what the administration asks for. As much as I agree that the committee did its work, I am unprepared to conclude that the administration and the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense and all the others did not do their work. So we are not talking here about blind guesses. We are talking about choosing between the administration's figure and this figure.

Second, it is very clear that we could cut 0.7 percent without in any way endangering military intelligence. The intelligence agencies, the CIA in particular, went on a little job hunt after the Soviet Union collapsed. They were a little underemployed, I think. They have now become the source of economic intelligence. I believe we do better with the free market in terms of economic intelligence.

This amendment says the President will reduce after reporting to the committees, and I want to make one statement that I promised betrays no national security. We can cut 0.7 percent of this without in any way endangering military intelligence, tactical, strategic battlefield, global, et cetera. The CIA does a number of other things. It does some better than other intelligence agencies do.

The President and the national security advisers, I believe, cannot be accused of endangering the troops, and that is what this amendment would carry out.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on National Security.

(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPENCE. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1775 specifically supports future military needs in terms of planning, operations, and force protection. Part of this support includes making sure that this Nation understands the nature of the threat that we face. For tomorrow's forces as well as the population at large, our major concern is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The intelligence community plays a vital role in detecting and monitoring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Numerous intelligence sources, including imagery, signals and human intelligence, provide vital information to policymakers and military commanders who must determine ways to deter, prevent, halt or seize the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies.

A recently released CIA report on foreign countries' acquisition of technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction highlights the national security threat posed by the spread of such weapons of mass destruction and technology. This report reveals the following, and I would like to take it one at a time.

Iran aggressively continues to acquire all types of weapons of mass destruction, technology and advanced conventional weapons. China and Russia have been primary sources for missile-related goods, while China and India supply the bulk of Iran's chemical weapons equipment.

During the last half of 1996, China was the most significant supplier of weapons of mass destruction related goods and technology to foreign countries, especially to Iran and Pakistan. China provided a tremendous variety of assistance to both Iran's and Pakistan's ballistic missile programs and to their nuclear programs.

In the last half of 1996, Russia supplied a variety of ballistic missile-related goods to foreign countries, especially to Iran. Russia also was an important source for nuclear programs in Iran and to a lesser extent India and Pakistan.

The intelligence community must focus a great deal of effort on monitoring such activities. The fiscal year 1998 intelligence authorization bill will help the intelligence community in its nonproliferation efforts by encouraging investments in new technologies and encouraging the community to work together as a more flexible corporate whole.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it is prudent to make indiscriminate cuts to intelligence programs that the

oversight committees have carefully reviewed and recommended to this body.

□ 1915

Consequently I oppose the gentleman's amendment, and I encourage my colleagues to vote "no" as well.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. PELOSI], a current member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I was afraid the gentleman from Massachusetts was announcing my resignation from the committee without my knowledge. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me, and, yes, I do rise as a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in support of the gentleman's amendment. I think it is a commonsense amendment that is well-thought-out and worthy of the support of our colleagues.

As a member of the committee I with great reluctance voted against the Sanders amendment, which I think deserved this House's attention because it was a big cut, an across-the-board cut, not giving the discretion to the director or to the community to designate where that cut would come from. That was a 10-percent cut; this is a 0.7-percent cut, less than 1 percent.

Certainly, while every other aspect of this budget is subjected to the harsh scrutiny of fiscal responsibility, certainly there is 0.7 percent in the intelligence budget that can be cut, and that will be done, according to this amendment, by the intelligence community, by the director reporting to the committee and, of course, with the approval of the President of the United States, the No. 1 consumer of intelligence in our country, and this figure, the 0.7 percent reduction in the budget, represents the President's request.

Mr. Chairman, certainly we want the President to have all of the intelligence he needs to make the important and crucial decisions for our country, whether they relate to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or issues relating to our own military and their activities. So by giving the discretion to the Director of Central Intelligence, our colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] says that this cut can be nonmilitary. Certainly there is 0.7 percent in nonmilitary spending, answering the challenge that one of our other colleagues made that this will hurt our troops in the field. I do not think that General Shalikhvili had that in mind when he supported the administration's request for this figure which I cannot mention, but that it is a 0.7 percent reduction.

As some of my colleagues have mentioned, we need information. Intelligence is information, but it is not raw data. It is information that is gathered and then has analysis performed upon it, and then when it is intelligence it is

presented to its consumers, which are the military and policy makers in our country. And as I have said, our commander in chief, our President of the United States, is the biggest consumer of this intelligence information and the most important one. So why would the President be asking for an intelligence budget that was less than he needed?

I supported the Conyers amendment earlier to disclose the aggregate figure of the intelligence budget because I thought, I believed, that the intelligence community should make that figure known to the American people so that it can be accountable for that figure, only the aggregate figure. While every other, as I say, item in this budget has to answer and be accountable to the American people, why does not the intelligence community have to do that as well? Is it because it cannot, in order to resist a small cut of less than 1 percent, if the full figure were divulged, it would have to justify why it could not absorb a 0.7 percent decrease.

I think today we are making some mistakes here. We should be accountable to the American people by disclosing the aggregate figure. We rejected that. But certainly this body should be able to support the administration's request, the request of the leading consumer of intelligence in this country, the President of the United States, for his budget number, and I urge my colleagues to support the Frank amendment.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], a former member of the committee, a very valuable member of the House Committee on International Relations and the chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly Delegation of this body.

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the Frank amendment. This is a case of data-free analysis. It is not based on an assessment of the work of the committee or the needs of the intelligence community. Now admittedly it is difficult for Members to make that kind of an assessment, but we give a special responsibility and privilege to Members of this House to serve 6, now 8 years on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to make the tough decisions, to make an assessment about what is appropriate. And we rotate them off the committee so they cannot become co-opted, so they are objective. Also I would point out that this is the recommendation of the intelligence authorization committee by unanimous vote.

Now some supporters of cuts in intelligence funding say that since the end of the cold war there is no longer the national security threat. Actually there is, but it is more diverse. The one that we face today is more complicated. Today's problems include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction, instability, and the foreign intelligence threat which has not gone away.

Now in May of this year I had the privilege of leading a North Atlantic Assembly delegation to the Aviano NATO base in Italy, and I saw some dramatic improvements we are making which are going to help our tactical leaders on any future battlefield. There have been big changes since the Persian Gulf war. If we ever have to face combat again, in the Balkans or wherever, the kind of intelligence changes we are spending our money on now are going to be making a big, big difference on the safety and success of our troops and other military, naval, and air force personnel.

When I was on the committee I focused during the last 3 or 4 years on high-technology issues, and I would tell my colleagues that our intelligence expenditures in that area protects and serves well our military and our intelligence community. We must protect against the espionage or theft of advanced technologies that represent huge investments of our defense dollars. The files of the Intelligence Committee are replete with stories of how the intelligence community saved tens of millions of dollars for the defense acquisition community by protecting against our technological lead in military and intelligence matters.

I would also say that we cannot talk much about the security threats that we have solved, and about the terrorism threats that we have met. But, for example, we can talk about Ramsi Youssef, who was involved in the World Trade Center bombing. Without the intervention of the Intelligence Committee he successfully would have simultaneously bombed a number of planes crossing the Pacific. We were able to intervene there because of our intelligence capability to stop that threat and save not just hundreds of lives but probably thousands of lives.

So the intelligence protects against the intelligence theft of valuable proprietary investments. The committee has repeatedly encouraged us to adequately fund this area.

Let me say that what committee assessment has shown in budgetary and programmatic shortfalls. Clearly in the current budget environment the President of the committee cannot address all of the needs. What this budget represents is a good-faith effort by the Members we have given the responsibility for this whole House of Representatives to make an assessment about the kind of increases or modest adjustments in our intelligence budget meets the most critical needs. If the Frank amendment passes, funding for some modernization, for training and improved intelligence collection, and especially analysis, will be sacrificed. We are not going to lose it all for we are making progress, but there are dramatic improvements that can be made without this amount of additional money that the committee has recommended.

I urge my colleagues to support the recommendations of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously approved by this authorizing committee and approve them.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.

The argument for committee infallibility continues to lack any persuasive effect. The gentleman said I am offering an amendment without analysis. I am offering the President's budget. I very much have to disagree that the President and the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs did no analysis. That simply is not worthy of consideration. The argument is that our committee, which we designated, is infallible, and the administration and all of the people involved in national security did no informational work here at all.

The gentleman mentioned that we need to protect private investment. Well, I would disagree that that is an absolute national security priority. I just voted in committee for the Export-Import Bank, to protect it, but the argument that we have got to in a secret budget fund economists and others to analyze economics and that once the committee has put its imprimatur on the figure it is unchallengeable is simply not sensible.

I do think we have a right to say given the priorities, given priorities in the environment and law enforcement on the streets and other things, all of which are hurting in this budget, we would rather not put an extra x hundred million dollars into economic analysis by the intelligence people. We may tell people that they can do their own security checking when they are investing. And no, I do not equate terrorism with economic investment, and I insist that the 0.7 percent can come out of areas that have zero, zero to do with physical security, zero to do with the military, zero to do with proliferation. They clearly are doing much more than 0.7 percent in a whole lot of other areas.

But I simply have to reject this notion that what the committee did must be accepted and we dismiss as somehow totally improvident and endangering our troops what the administration proposed.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished ranking member himself, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS].

Mr. DICKS. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding this time to me, and without fear of disclosure here my good friend from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK], and he and I voted together on disclosing the overall number, but he asked me a very important question. He asked me how much the intelligence budget has been cut in nominal terms and figuring inflation.

Now this does not violate any intelligence prohibitions. I want to tell my colleagues that between 1992 and 1997

in nominal terms the cut is 13.4 percent. In real terms, considering a 2-percent inflation rate, which is very, very low, the cut has been 21.4 percent. So I would point out to our colleagues we have cut this budget. We have also cut defense by about 40 percent.

Now I still believe that intelligence is a force multiplier. By being able to use these national technical means, being able to use UAV's, by getting this information to our commanders, we can save American lives, and I believe that we carefully went through this budget. We added some money, we cut some money, and Mr. YOUNG is here. We did the same thing over the last 2 days in the Appropriations Subcommittee on National Security. So we do not always agree with everything the President does. We see some areas, for example, in analysis where we think more needs to be done. We added money for that.

So I would urge the committee to stay with the recommendations of our bipartisan Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Fifteen members voted for this, and I think that the right thing to do is to stay with that recommendation, I would stress again when you consider inflation, we've cut this budget by 21.4 percent since 1992.

□ 1930

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] is recognized for 4 minutes.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington for his candor. He just said the committee, the infallible, highly respected committee, added money in analysis. So that means we can cut their additions without affecting technical means, without affecting battlefield intelligence. So we are fighting now over the sanctity of the economic and political analysis.

I submit to those of us who have seen this that we are not here endangering anybody's security. We are talking about the extent to which we get political judgments made and economic judgments made. That is what is at issue.

The gentleman said that the amount has been cut in nominal terms, in dollars, 13 percent. He also used a 21 percent real figure, but I have to tell the gentleman, as he knows, his Republican colleagues with whom he is allied on this measure do not accept that. We have people who say, none of this inflation stuff, a cut is a cut. So the argument that we cut by not meeting inflation, he should understand, is repudiated by the honest gentlemen on the other side.

They would certainly never claim that we give an inflation factor for defense and not for Medicare. These are people who repudiate the notion that we fail to keep Medicare up with inflation, you are cutting it, and the gen-

tleman would not want to get them in trouble by arguing contrariwise here.

So then the question is, is it outrageous that we reduce in dollars 13 percent from 1992? The 1992 budget formulated in 1991 was still formulated at a time that was the height of the cold war. The Soviet Union was crumbling. We were not sure of that then.

I agree that terrorism is a problem, but terrorism is not a new problem. There was terrorism in 1982. There was terrorism in 1989; the bombing in Lebanon; terrible things have happened. Terrorism is not a new problem. Nuclear proliferation is not a new problem. India and Pakistan did not get their nuclear weapons a week ago. All those things were there, and we had the heavily armed Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. So I would submit that there has been a reduction in the physical threat the United States faces of greater than 13 percent.

I think the capacity of our enemies, particularly the Soviet Union, to damage us has been more than 13 percent. I think when the Warsaw Pact nations switched sides, when Poland, and Hungary, and the Czech Republic go from being our enemies, as we consider them to be in 1980's and early 1990's to being on our side, that is more than a 13 percent reduction in the real threat.

We have a difficult budget situation. We will be underfunding by most measures COPS on the streets. Yes, there are dangers to Americans, but there are dangers to most Americans more immediately, unfortunately, in their own communities from a handful of criminals who terrorize them. We have provided in the past the Federal money to help that. That competes with this.

Money for transportation safety competes with this. Money to clean up the environment, to undo Superfund, competes with this. Money to help poor elderly people heat their homes competes with this.

The question is not in the abstract, is it a good idea to have an extra couple of hundred million, \$300 million, whatever, \$150 million, I have to disguise it, million. The question is, do we increase the analysis capacity, the economic analysis capacity of the intelligence community over the recommendation of the administration, and take that money from other programs?

If Members vote against this amendment and they vote to give the intelligence community this extra analysis money, I hope Members will be good enough to make that clear when people come to them and say, I would like more money for NIH, more money for cancer research, for COPS on the streets. When Members say to them, I am sorry, I agree but I cannot afford it, have the grace to tell them that one of the reasons we cannot afford it is that we gave this money to the intelligence community over and above what was asked for, because that is what is at issue.

We are talking about a zero sum game. If Members vote to give more

than was asked to the intelligence community, more than was asked by the enemies community and the President and his national security advisors, explain to people what we are taking that away from.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the distinguished ranking member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS].

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would want to maybe say to my friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK], is that if we take the money away from the intelligence community, that money is not going to go to NIH, it is not going to go to Medicare or Medicaid. It is going to go to defense spending. That is where it is going to go. It is going to go to somewhere else in the defense budget, because under the 602(b), the defense budget is there. We do not take money from it and move it somewhere else. It is going to be either intelligence or something else in defense. We think that this is the right balance between the two.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment assumes that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence just simply plussed up the program funding without regard to the merits of the program, without due deliberation, and simply because we wanted to increase the numbers. That is not true. If we cut 0.7 percent, we do not get the President's budget. We added, we cut, we changed programs, we did all kinds of things. We are not at the President's budget. We are not at the President's program. There may be a number that is similar but we do not have a program that is similar.

We have a program that provides more security for Americans, American interests, whether they are here or abroad, than the President's program does because this House and our Founding Fathers in their divine wisdom created balance of power, oversight, and our opportunity to check and balance with each other. We have a better product as a result of this.

I am proud of our product and I think it is better than what I believe is not thoughtless, a well-intentioned, but an amendment that does come out without sufficient thought to what happens, because a disproportionate share of the gentleman's amendment will fall to important parts of the program; because we have to spend a very large part for architecture, which everybody knows. And 0.7 percent of architecture means one thing, and 0.7 percent of something else which is very small but vital means something else. I do not want to get in that position.

I think we have been extremely thoughtful, and I think that as the gentleman understands the classified documents that we have worked with, as well as the nonclassified, and goes through them all, he would have to come to the same conclusion.

Mr. Chairman, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence looked at all the programs we went into. I tried to explain that across-the-board cuts like this do not get into the kind of cost-benefit assessment we did on a program-by-program basis, which is what we do and what we certainly did, and the record will show.

I think to be totally honest, when we go across the board in a cut like this, basically, to be honest, I think an approach that goes to a 0.7-percent reduction gets us to a lack of critical examination and intellectual rigor. It just simply is a number, like 10 percent, 5 percent, 50 percent, or any other percent, it is a number. It is not an intellectual cost-benefit program by program, which is what we have done.

I think that the gentleman's amendment puts the authorization at the level of the President's request but it does not get the President's program, as I said. I want to congratulate the President because I think he made a pretty good effort. But I think we have done a value-added approach, which is what our job is, value-added, next branch of government. We did it.

Mr. Chairman, the other thing I have to say is that unanimously on the committee every Republican and every Democrat saw areas where funding was clearly inadequate for intelligence needs. We are short on some programs that I worry about. I think the ranking member would say the same.

We could have done much more. We would love to have done much more. The gentleman mentioned a 13-percent reduction. Boy, I would hate to be one of the casualties in that 13-percent area that I had to go to the parents and say, gee, we just picked a number and we reduced it, and unfortunately you were in the target zone; oh, gee, that is too bad. The fact of the matter is we could have done better. The fact of the matter is we did do better. Where we did better was in our bill.

Mr. Chairman, I think that it is fair to say that for the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS] and myself, that we have made painful decisions to forego funding for some very important intelligence activities, but we both agree that we do not have all that we would like to have. I think we are down at the point now where my conscience says, any more and we are in deep trouble.

I have talked about the disproportionate problem because we do have fixed infrastructure, fixed overhead, as the gentleman well knows. We cannot accept reductions in our efforts to detect weapons proliferators, I am sure the gentleman would agree, locate terrorists, I am sure the gentleman would agree, determine nefarious activities from rogue states, and on and on. We just cannot give up anymore.

The CHAIRMAN. All time on this amendment has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the previous order of the House, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] will be postponed.

The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. DICKS. I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, does that mean that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] has to re-request a recorded vote when we go back to vote on this at a later point?

The CHAIRMAN. The request for a recorded vote will be the pending business.

Mr. DICKS. I thank the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?

AMENDMENT NO. 6 OFFERED BY MS. WATERS

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 6.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. WATERS:

Page 10, after line 15, insert the following new section:

SEC. 306. STUDY OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR.

Not later than August 15, 1999, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct, and submit to Congress in both a classified and declassified form, a study concerning Central Intelligence Agency involvement (or knowledge thereof) of the use of chemical weapons by enemy forces against Armed Forces of the United States during the Persian Gulf War. Such study shall determine—

- (1) Whether there is any complicity of Central Intelligence Agency agents, employees, or assets in the use of chemical weapons;
- (2) whether there is any use of appropriated funds for such purposes; and
- (3) the extent of involvement of other elements of the Intelligence Community of the United States or foreign intelligence agencies in the use of such weapons.

Ms. WATERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from California?

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from California?

Mr. GOSS. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I want to be clear which amendment we are on, Mr. Chairman. I do not have the same numbering system. There are two amendments.

Ms. WATERS. If the gentleman will yield, it is amendment No. 6.

Mr. GOSS. The subject of this amendment is chemical weapons, chemical weapons in the Gulf?

Ms. WATERS. A study of the Central Intelligence Agency involved in the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf war.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from California?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Under a previous order of the House, the time will be allotted, 30 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS], and 30 minutes to a Member opposed to the amendment.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS].

Ms. WATERS. I yield myself such time as I may consume, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment to establish a study of the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA. This study is designed to explore the involvement and the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf war. Specifically, this amendment requires the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct a study and submit to Congress in both a classified and declassified form a report of its findings.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to expand a little bit on why I would want such a study. In order to do that, I would like to read information from the New York Times, May 6, 1997, the Tuesday late edition. It starts with the information concerning George J. Tenet, the fifth nominee for director of Central Intelligence in the last 4 years.

It states that he would be questioned by a Senate committee on that Tuesday, and the betting is, they said, that his nomination will be quickly approved by the panel and then promptly confirmed by the full Senate. The article goes on to explain what has been happening in trying to keep directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the turnover and the turmoil that this agency has been experiencing.

Mr. Chairman, they say, "This turmoil at the top of American intelligence has no parallel except in the Watergate era, when five men served in rapid succession as director of Central Intelligence from 1972 to 1977, years when the agency was devastated by a disclosure of its Cold War history of assassination plots, coups, and dirty tricks."

What is important about this article, however, is that it identifies much of the turmoil, much of the criticism, much of the faux pas, much of the problems that this agency has been experiencing. But this amendment today centers on what happened in Iraq. It talks about secret operations were exposed in Iraq, France, Japan, India, and Italy, but then it really targets in on the agency, the fact that the agency sat on evidence that chemical weapons had been present at the Iraq munitions dump blown up soon after the Persian Gulf war.

Members have heard references to this today, when they talk about the

20,000 soldiers that were exposed to sarin gas. Mr. Chairman, this is unacceptable. As Members know, I served on the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. I learned a lot in the period of time that I served on that committee.

□ 1945

I gained deep respect for the sacrifices that are made by families and members in our armed services. I also witnessed a lot of other things having served on that committee.

These loyal individuals who gave of themselves, most of whom were very proud to serve their country, many of them belonging to families where they had other family members who had served their country, had died serving their country in previous wars, many of them now ailing and sick and disabled, many of them fighting day and in and day out because they cannot get their claims adjudicated with their own government. I learned deep respect for the veterans of this country, having served, watched them come to the Congress of the United States oftentimes asking for assistance and not getting that assistance, many of them not being taken care of properly in the veterans hospitals around the Nation, but they continued to be very loyal, very committed, very patriotic.

And I learned something else: Members of this House could wax eloquently about their support of the Members who had served, our veterans, members of the armed services. They could say over and over again how much respect they had for them, how much they honored and cherished them and how we should do everything in our power to make their lives comfortable once they had served. But it is very interesting, when we look at what the Central Intelligence Agency did to them in Iraq, how they had information about the chemicals that were stored there and they did not share this information, they did not tell them they were at risk and they exposed these 20,000 individuals.

How can we be comfortable with this agency that has been identified over and over today as an agency with serious problems, with serious trouble, an agency that is too closely associated with trafficking in drugs, an agency that has relationships with some of the worst people in the world, murderers, drug dealers, terrorists, an agency that has broken down where we have members who are there to protect and serve, who are selling us out, identified in a most prominent way in all of the news media of this country? Knowing all of this we do not want to in any way touch them.

Why are we so afraid of the CIA? Why are we as public policymakers not willing to pull them in? Why are we not ready to rap their wrists?

I have heard Members on this floor talk about all of the agencies that have failed and how they want to cut them. I have heard many times about the poverty programs and how they have

not worked and how they have been fraught with problems and troubles. Well, we have an agency that is embarrassing us, an agency where our allies are telling us, get them out of their country, an agency that has committed just about every ill and every sin that any intelligence group could commit. Do we want to cut them back a little bit? Five percent? No, we do not want to do that. Do we want to share information about the budget? Do we want to shine the spotlight on this agency in any way? No, we do not want to do that.

In this post-cold-war era, we are satisfied to continue to let them run rampant. But I do not think we ought to do that. I think if we do nothing else, if we do not care about the children and communities that are the victims of drugs having been brought into this country where we have identified CIA involvement, which will be in my next amendment, if we do not care about the terrorists, who we claim to want to get rid of in the world, being associated with our own intelligence community, if we do not care about the fact that the breakdown in the agency is causing too much strife and dissemination of information, do we not care enough about the veterans to send a message to them to say to them, yes, the CIA was wrong; no, you should not have been put at risk; no, they should not have withheld this information; yes, they should be punished for having done so; yes, we should do everything that we can to make sure it does not happen again?

This is not about a movie. This is not something somebody made up. This is not gossip or speculation. This is fact. The fact of the matter is 20,000 soldiers exposed to sarin gas, information withheld, information that the CIA simply could say, oh, yes, we forgot to tell you; yes, we apologize; no, we should not have done it. That is not enough. Thirty billion dollars being spent on an intelligence community, no real oversight, no real transparency, no real understanding by the public policymakers who come to this floor year in and year out and simply give their vote to the intelligence community, not knowing how it is spent and what they are doing.

I think it is about time we live up to the responsibilities that have been bestowed upon us as public policymakers. It is about time that we say, no agency is so big and so bad that it threatens us in ways that cause us not to be good public policymakers.

Yes, there is a need for intelligence. I am not naive. I do understand that we need intelligence. But I am saying to my colleagues, the CIA does not deserve our support. I am saying to my colleagues, on the Senate side, Senator MOYNIHAN has said, strike them from the budget. Get rid of them. Over here, a modest amount tried, just cut them by 5 percent. And we sit and hold our hands and get up and make excuses about why we cannot control the CIA,

why we do not have a right to do the oversight that we must do, why they are different from every other agency that we deal with, why we do not want to know, why we want to keep our heads in the sand.

It is not right. We can do better than this. So I offer this amendment. It is a very modest amendment. This amendment would simply, again, establish a study of the Central Intelligence Agency and their involvement in the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf war. This is a limit to design, to do that, and I would like to send a message to the veterans that we all honor and cherish, the ones that we love so much because of the sacrifices that they have made, the ones who may die from this exposure, the ones whose families may never be satisfied that their health needs will be taken care of. I would like us to send a message here this evening, if we have got the guts to do it, I would like for us to send a message that we care. And not only do we care, we are going to do something about it. It is time to get rid of the rhetoric and step up to the plate and put our actions where our mouths are in terms of loving the veterans and the soldiers that have given to us and do this modest, very modest amendment that would shed some light on what happened in the Persian Gulf War; why did it happen and how do we prevent it from ever happening again?

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. GOSS TO THE AMENDMENT NO. 6 OFFERED BY MS. WATERS

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Goss to the amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Waters:

Strike all after "Sec. 306." and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"REVIEW OF THE PRESENCE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF THEATER

"The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct a review to determine what knowledge the Central Intelligence Agency had about the presence or use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf Theater during the course of the Persian Gulf War. The Inspector General shall submit a report of his findings to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, no later than August 15, 1998 in both classified and unclassified form. The unclassified form shall also be made available to the public."

The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is not separately debatable. Pursuant to the previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I originally rose in opposition to the Waters amendment, but now I am rising in support of my substitute amendment.

I think it is very important that we understand here that this is not a new subject and that there are unclassified documents available to the public on

Khamisiyah and what happened there. One is entitled *Khamisiyah Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence of 9 April 1997*. And the second, more to the point, is *CIA Supports the U.S. Military During the Persian Gulf War of 16 June 1997*, which deals very directly with the subject at hand. These are available for all Members and the public at large, any veterans or soldiers or military civilians or anybody who would be interested. It is a very important subject. I quite agree with that.

The gentlewoman has pointed to her love of veterans and soldiers, and I certainly admire that and I will also say that I agree with it. I have a great many veterans in my district. We have a very large veterans population, seems to grow larger every day, which is not surprising given the wonderful area where I live in southwest Florida.

I think it is very important, however, that we understand that this is not an issue that has been ignored. I would like very much, therefore, to explain a little bit further what my substitute amendment will do in addition to these reports that are already out.

The gentlewoman is seeking an IG report and we have designed an approach that would bring about a result, I think, while avoiding some of the pitfalls I see in going with the gentlewoman's original amendment.

The Intelligence Committee is obviously very concerned about the issue of chemical weapons exposure during the gulf war or any other time, and we have been closely monitoring the DCI efforts to examine this subject fully. Again, the committee was very pleased to see the April release of the unclassified report from the DCI, that would be director of the Central Intelligence Agency, related to the events at the Khamisiyah storage facility where Iraqi, and I underscore, Iraqi chemical weapons were stored and were subsequently destroyed by U.S. troops. And in that process it is apparent that some have suffered exposure to chemical weapons.

The question has to be asked. What happened? What went wrong? We tried to find out. Since this is the first I have heard from the gentlewoman on this subject but not the first I have heard on the subject, I am going to encourage her to read these reports. And I will make them available if she has not already.

From the report we know that there was a breakdown in analysis and communications between the intelligence community and the Department of Defense related to the knowledge of chemical weapons storage at this particular facility. There was a ground location problem involved and how it was referred to.

We also know that steps are already being taken by both the intelligence community and the defense to make sure that this does not happen again. Again it is addressed in these reports.

Our committee remains very vigilant about monitoring the progress of that

effort and other efforts because we know the catastrophic consequences of mishandling or not knowing the maximum amount about chemical warfare and all its ramifications. The Waters amendment implies that the CIA or CIA employees were complicit, and I think that word was used in her amendment, in the use of chemical weapons against U.S. troops. That is an accusation that obviously disturbs me and any American very greatly and warrants immediate consideration.

The facts that I know are that intelligence and defense were never closer in their working relationship even though there were opportunities for things to go wrong as there are in any hostile combat situation or any peacetime situation, as we know. But former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, is I think, a man well regarded and certainly was well regarded in accomplishments of his duties in these events stated, and I quote: No combat commander has ever had as full or complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm was a success story.

I am not making that up. That is not a newspaper story. That is something that Colin Powell said.

Mr. Chairman, I note that there are many, many studies that have been or are being conducted, several under the watchful eye of the Presidential Commission on Gulf War Illness. This is entirely appropriate. This committee will continue its oversight responsibilities and continue to look at activities related to this issue that belong in the area of the intelligence community, as I have said we are doing, as witnessed by these reports.

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I have said in my substitute that the gentlewoman's amendment calls on the CIA's Inspector General to conduct a review to determine what knowledge the Central Intelligence Agency had about the presence or the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf theater during the course of the gulf war. This report would be submitted to the intelligence committees of the Congress, that would be both committees, no later than August 15, 1998 in both classified and unclassified form. And, frankly, I think it will happen much sooner because much of the work has already been done.

I believe the substitute will reach the goal the gentlewoman seems to have, the goal of getting as much information as possible about what we knew of the presence or use of chemical weapons during the gulf war without prejudging the outcome or implying complicity on the part of the men and women who work so hard on behalf of our national security.

I want to point that out. People are watching this debate. We are on C-SPAN. I know that it is for the benefit of the Members, but inevitably there are other observers who watch what

goes on here, including the men and women of our intelligence community. I am sure that they feel a little bit let down when somebody implies that they may have been using or complicit in chemical warfare against American troops overseas.

I have trouble with that. I hope they do not believe that that is the feeling of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence because it is clearly not. I believe very strongly in oversight, the need for good discipline, a piercing look at what we are doing, calling it when we see it when there is a problem, not shrinking from that, but I certainly do not think we want to denigrate the men and women who are working so hard for our national security if it is not warranted. And in my case I have not seen any facts whatsoever to warrant it.

I hope the gentlewoman will support our approach, which is offered for our mutual interest of getting at the truth. And that is what we seek, the truth. I will urge my colleagues to support the substitute to the Waters amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

First, I would like to deal with the way in which the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS] characterized the inquiry that I am seeking. I asked that a study be done to make determinations. I did not come to any conclusions about the involvement of the CIA. The idea of asking for the study is to make certain determinations, and I think that should be clear.

Further, allow me to share with the Members of this House that I believe that the gentleman from Florida and I are saying the same thing. It needs to be looked at. I brought this to the floor today because I intended very much to create a platform for a discussion about this issue. I am extremely concerned, even though the gentleman from Florida believes that I should know that some studying has been done, that just as I do not know other Members of this House do not know, the public does not know, and that we are left with the accounts that we have learned about. We have heard the CIA say, yes, we had the information and, yes, we should have revealed it. That much we know.

I think the gentleman from Florida and I and other Members of this House want to shed some light on this. We want more information. We want to be able to share with the American public everything that we know about what happened, and we want to be in a position to use whatever power we have to make sure it never happens again.

So I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that I am joined and embraced, by way of this substitute amendment, because while it may be structured a little bit differently, I am pleased that it would get the information a little bit sooner than the way that I had structured the amendment. Either way, whether it is 1

year from now or 2 years from now, and for some reason it falls on my birthday, August 15, that is all right with me.

So let me just say that I think that having brought it here, it served a purpose. It got me what I wanted. It forced the discussion. It created the debate about something that never should be in the dark, and it got my colleagues on the other side of the aisle joining with me to have a study so that we can reveal everything that we know. And with that, that is all I ask. I am pleased to accept the substitute and I thank the gentleman from Florida for recognizing that it needed to be done.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to rise in support of the substitute, and I appreciate the efforts of the gentleman from Los Angeles, who has been very interested in this subject. I think the language drafted by the chairman gets to what we all want to get to.

Let me just say that when this happened, I had some serious reservations about the studies that were done by the Defense Department, the work that was done by the CIA on this. I asked Mr. Deutch, when he was still the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to have the Inspector General start a study.

So the chairman is right, the Inspector General has already engaged in this, and particularly about the destruction of chemical weapons at a storage site in Khamisiyah. I also asked them to look at the whole question of what did the CIA know, when did it know it, and what did it say to the Department of Defense and to the Army and to the other units that were there about their knowledge about what was stored at these various sites.

This is one of those situations where knowledge may not have been shared in a timely way, and there was destruction of some of these weapons, and I am not sure we still, even to this day, know exactly what all those weapons were. I am worried that this goes beyond just chemical weapons; that we may have had biological or other infectious agents that were released on our own people. And whether it was done by the Iraqis or it was done in our destroying these weapons, there are a lot of unanswered questions.

I think one of the big problems here is the Department of Defense did such a lousy job of investigating this thing initially that it created suspicion everywhere. We had all these veterans coming home with these various symptoms and it just did not add up, and the Department's continued denial after denial after denial, and then finally having to say, oh yes, we may have made a big mistake here and there may have been something that actually happened, is one of the reasons why there is such suspicion, not only on the part of Members of Congress but on the

part of the American people, about what actually happened over there.

That is why I insisted with Mr. Deutch that the Inspector General, Fred Hintz, out at the CIA, would do the investigation. I did not want the CIA, in essence, investigating itself. I wanted the independent Inspector General of the CIA tasked for this.

So I think what this study does is expand upon that, and I think it does get the information that my colleague wants sooner by making the date August. I am certainly glad it is on her birthday. I hope the report is something that she will find joyous. And hopefully this is not a report we will all be embarrassed about, and I hope it is not.

The bottom line here is I think the chairman has crafted a good compromise. I would like to see us accept it and then move on to the next amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MCCOLLUM].

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to rise first of all to support the substitute amendment. I think what the chairman of the committee has offered is a perfectly logical proposal, and that is that the Inspector General report, after a review, what knowledge the Central Intelligence Agency had about the presence of the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf theater during the course of the war over there.

I am, however, very disturbed by the language that was in the underlying amendment, and I do want to point this out. I think it needs to be reiterated. There is not a shred of evidence that I know of, anywhere in my tenure in looking at this matter, and I have been involved as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence looking into this matter for some time now, that would support the idea that we need a study, which the language of this original underlying amendment said, a study concerning the Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in the use of chemical weapons by enemy forces against armed forces of the United States during the Persian Gulf War.

The insinuation or the implication, not that they knew something about the chemical weapons or that they had some knowledge in the efforts that were going on over there to destroy those weapons, but that they, the CIA, was involved in some way supporting the use of those weapons, involved in the use of those weapons by our enemies, by our enemies, is outrageous in my opinion. And I do not appreciate the underlying premise here.

So I think the substitute is terribly important, and I am appreciative of the fact the gentleman is willing to accept the substitute because, as I said, there is no shred of evidence whatso-

ever anywhere that our intelligence community in any way aided or abetted the enemy, which the implication, whether she intended it or not, is there in the underlying amendment.

So I am very supportive of this substitute, I urge its adoption, and I wanted the RECORD to be very clear that our men and women, as far as I can determine, as long as the eye can see, operating for our intelligence community, have been honorable supporters of the American cause and patriots. Whether we agree with everything they do or do not do, certainly they have not been working for the enemy.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of how much time I have remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Ms. WATERS] has 10½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS] has 21 minutes remaining.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, because I think it is important to point out that not only did I accept the gentleman from Florida's substitute amendment, but I also offered, prior to that acceptance, an explanation of the wording that the other gentleman from Florida [Mr. MCCOLLUM] now is trying to latch on to in order to in some way imply that I made accusations unfairly.

If I had not accepted the substitute, perhaps he could do that kind of spinning. But the fact that I accepted the substitute explains very clearly, and in a way that cannot be misunderstood, what I am doing and why I am doing it, and that I congratulated them for embracing me, I think, does away with that kind of specious argument.

Certainly it is honorable for Members of this House, elected by the people, to come to this floor and raise the questions, no matter how hard they are, no matter how unpopular they are, no matter how difficult they are. And oftentimes when that is done, it is misunderstood by people who do not have the guts or the nerve to do that themselves. And sometimes it is embarrassing to take this floor and kind of push and nudge people into doing what they should be doing anyway. I understand that. But there comes a time when we need to do that.

I chose this moment, at this time, on this legislation to make an issue of what had happened in the Persian Gulf. I chose at this time, at this moment to point out that 20,000 of our soldiers were at risk. No matter whether it was intended or not, it happened. I chose at this time to demand more information, to share with the public, to demand an investigation so that we could have in writing something that people could pick up and read and know where we are going and what we are doing. I chose to do that because I think that is my responsibility and I do feel strongly about this.

So we can spin it any way we want, we can define it any way we want, but

I know what I have said and I know what I am doing and I am pleased that the gentleman has joined with me to do it, no matter how much he may not have liked the fact that I brought it, no matter how much the gentleman may not have liked the fact that I raised the kinds of questions that are oftentimes embarrassing. None of us like to think that we invest so much in our intelligence community to have those kinds of terrible costly mistakes.

Having said all of that, Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is we move forward with the substitute amendment that I have embraced. And, hopefully, this is a bipartisan concern, a bipartisan effort to do the right thing, to focus the attention on what happened there, get the answers that we can get and then move to make sure that it does not happen again.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

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Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I think that we ought to accept what the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] has said here. She is willing to accept this compromise. I would like to see this be a bipartisan study supported on both sides of the aisle, and I would urge that we all yield back our time and have a vote and move forward.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to yield back. We have no further speakers on this subject at this time, and as long as we understand that this satisfies the full unanimous-consent request we had for the 30 minutes on either side and includes my substitute amendment, and that is the issue we will be voting on first, we are prepared to yield back.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to yield back my time. I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS] for joining with me in this very special and important effort.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS] to the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS].

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS], as amended.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?

AMENDMENT NO. 7 OFFERED BY MS. WATERS

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 7.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment No. 7 offered by Ms. WATERS:

Page 10, after line 15, insert the following new section:

SEC. 306. CLANDESTINE DRUG STUDY COMMISSION.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a commission to be known as the "Clandestine Drug Study Commission" (in this section referred to as the "Commission").

(b) DUTIES.—The Commission shall—

(1) secure the expeditious disclosure of public records relevant to the smuggling and distribution of illegal drugs into and within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency or others on their behalf or associated with the Central Intelligence Agency;

(2) report on the steps necessary to eradicate any Central Intelligence Agency involvement with drugs or those identified by Federal law enforcement agencies as drug smugglers; and

(3) recommend appropriate criminal sanctions for the involvement of Central Intelligence Agency employees involved in drug trafficking or the failure of such employees to report their superiors (or other appropriate supervisory officials) knowledge of drug smuggling into or within the United States.

(c) MEMBERSHIP.—The Commission shall be comprised of nine members appointed by the Attorney General of the United States for the life of the Commission. Members shall obtain a security clearance as a condition of appointment. Members may not be current or former officers or employees of the United States.

(d) COMPENSATION.—Members of the Commission shall serve without pay but shall each be entitled to receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United States Code.

(e) QUORUM.—A majority of the Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum.

(f) CHAIRPERSON; VICE CHAIRPERSON.—The Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Commission shall be elected by the members of the Commission.

(g) OBTAINING OFFICIAL DATA.—The Commission may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States information necessary to enable it to carry out this section. Upon request of the Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of the Commission, the head of that department or agency shall furnish that information to the Commission.

(h) SUBPOENA POWER.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence relating to any matter which the Commission is empowered to investigate by this section. The attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence may be required from any place within the United States at any designated place of hearing within the United States.

(2) FAILURE TO OBEY A SUBPOENA.—If a person refuses to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1), the Commission may apply to a United States district court for an order requiring that person to appear before the Commission to give testimony, produce evidence, or both, relating to the matter under investigation. The application may be made within the judicial district where the hearing is conducted or where that person is found, resides, or transacts business. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as civil contempt.

(3) SERVICE OF SUBPOENAS.—The subpoenas of the Commission shall be served in the manner provided for subpoenas issued by a United States district court under the Federal Rules of Civil procedure for the United States district courts.

(4) SERVICE OF PROCESS.—All process of any court to which application is to be made under paragraph (2) may be served in the judicial district in which the person required to be served resides or may be found.

(i) IMMUNITY.—The Commission is an agency of the United States for the purpose of part V of title 18, United States Code (relating to immunity of witnesses). Except as provided in this subsection, a person may not be excused from testifying or from producing evidence pursuant to a subpoena on the ground that the testimony or evidence required by the subpoena may tend to incriminate or subject that person to criminal prosecution. A person, after having claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, may not be criminally prosecuted by reason of any transaction, matter, or thing which that person is compelled to testify about or produce evidence relating to, except that the person may be prosecuted for perjury committed during the testimony or made in the evidence.

(j) CONTRACT AUTHORITY.—The Commission may enter into and perform such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and other transactions as may be necessary in the conduct of the functions of the Commission with any public agency or with any person.

(k) REPORT.—The Commission shall transmit a report to the President, Attorney General of the United States, and the Congress not later than three years after the date of the enactment of this Act. The report shall contain a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission, together with its recommendations for such legislation and administrative actions as the Commission considers appropriate.

(l) TERMINATION.—The Commission shall terminate on upon the submission of report pursuant to subsection (k).

(m) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$750,000 to carry out this section.

Ms. WATERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. MCCOLLUM] reserves a point of order against the amendment.

Under the previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] will be recognized for 30 minutes in support of her amendment and a Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS].

MODIFICATION TO AMENDMENT NO. 7 OFFERED BY MS. WATERS

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to modify the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.

The Clerk read as follows:

Modification to amendment No. 7 offered by Ms. WATERS of California:

In subsection (h), strike paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), and strike "(1) IN GENERAL.—"

Strike subsection (i) and redesignate subsections (j), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (i), (j), (k), and (l), respectively.

In subsection (k) (as so redesignated), strike "subsection (k)" and insert "subsection (j)".

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from California?

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I would like to know from the gentlewoman, if she can explain, is the modification designed to correct the germaneness problem with the underlying amendment?

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MCCOLLUM. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.

Ms. WATERS. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. I was advised that any reference to "immunity" would not be appropriate in this legislation, and it is designed to delete all references to "immunity" in this amendment.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. And is it further my understanding from the gentlewoman, if I might continue the reservation, that the agreement would be that she would have the 1-hour time limit that we have agreed upon to apply to this? I believe that is the Chair's understanding of this, regardless of the modification, is that not correct, 30 minutes to a side? Or is it 15 to a side? What is the time limit, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would inform the gentleman that under the previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] is entitled to 30 minutes and a Member opposed thereto is entitled to 30 minutes.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. And that would be applicable, Mr. Chairman, to this modification if the unanimous consent is agreed to?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS]?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is modified.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida withdraws his point of order.

The gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment to establish a clandestine drug study commission. This commission would be composed of nine members appointed by the U.S. Attorney General and would be required to report on the following:

Report on the steps necessary to eradicate any CIA involvement with drugs or those identified by Federal law enforcement agencies as drug smugglers.

No. 2, secure disclosure or the gathering of Government public records rel-

evant to the smuggling and distribution of illegal drugs into and within the United States by the CIA or others on their behalf or associated with the CIA.

In addition, my amendment would authorize funds to be appropriated in the amount of \$750,000.

Mr. Chairman and Members, I am sure there are those both within this House and within the sound of my voice who would wonder why would we need such an amendment, why would I take this floor and talk about taking steps to make sure that the CIA is not involved in drugs or drug smuggling.

Mr. Chairman, I do this because over the past year I have learned more than I have ever wanted to know about the CIA and drugs. How did it get started? It got started with a revelation about drug smuggling and drug trafficking that ended up in South Central Los Angeles back in the 1980's.

Oh, there has been a lot of controversy about the report. Many are aware that the San Jose Mercury News revealed that there was a drug ring and the basic points of that report remain uncontested. There are some points in the report that are contested. For example, the report said that as a result of the drug trafficking, millions of dollars were funneled to the Contras from the sale of drugs, crack cocaine in particular.

The exception that was taken to that identification simply was an exception that said instead of saying millions of dollars, they should have said they estimated there were millions of dollars. I can accept that. I maintain there should not have been \$1 from the sale of drugs to support the Contras.

But this revelation got me involved, and I have spent a lot of time looking at the CIA and the allegations of their involvement in drug trafficking in south central Los Angeles. It has taken me to many places, all the way to Nicaragua, where I have gone up to a place called Grenada and interviewed a prisoner who is well known to have been connected with the Cali cartel and sold drugs both for the Sandanistas and the Contras.

Since my visit there, I made it known to the Inspector General, who is involved in an investigation, and the Inspector General further has sought out information from this individual. Even members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence fold followed me to Nicaragua and interviewed the same person that had been revealed to me.

But that is just a small part of the information that has come to me. As a result of my involvement, a lot of things have happened. The sheriff's department of the county of Los Angeles filed an extensive report about many of the allegations. The investigations continue.

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is involved. The Inspector General of the CIA, the Inspector General of the Justice Depart-

ment, they are still doing interviews, and I do not know what is going to happen. Hopefully there will be a report. Hopefully there will be hearings. But I have learned enough to know that the CIA has come too close, rubbed shoulders with, and been involved in some ways that should make us all uncomfortable, with drug dealers.

Mr. Chairman, I have been involved for a long time and taken a closer look at the Central Intelligence Agency and these allegations that CIA operatives or assets have been involved in or had knowledge of drug trafficking in the United States. I mention South Central Los Angeles, but one need look no further than the current newspaper to find there are recent occasions of CIA involvement with drugs.

Let us look at Venezuela. Earlier this year, there was a general named Gen. Ramon Guillen Davila, Venezuela's former drug czar, who was indicted by Federal prosecutors in Miami for smuggling cocaine into the United States.

And according to the New York Times, uncontested by the CIA, this article that appeared as early as November 1993, they talked about the CIA and its so-called antidrug program in Venezuela and guess what? They concluded, and it is documented, that our CIA shipped a ton of nearly pure cocaine into the United States in 1990. That is a fact, uncontested.

When you unravel this story, you find that the CIA concocted some scheme to talk about the only way it could apprehend drug dealers was to get involved in shipping this cocaine and selling this cocaine. They went to the DEA to get their permission to do it, and the DEA turned them down flat and said they would not be involved in this scheme in any shape, form, or fashion.

But the CIA defied the DEA and they shipped this pure cocaine into the United States in 1990, and they have since acknowledged that they defied the laws of this government and allowed the drugs to be sold on the streets of the United States of America. I challenge anybody to tell me that it did not happen, because it is documented.

Now let me tell you what unnerves me about this. We spend a lot of money in this House, we spend a lot of money in this Government to apprehend drug dealers, to try to get rid of drug trafficking. We spend a lot of money on drug education and prevention. We even spend money on alternative crop development in countries that we want to get out of the business of raising the coca leaf. We spend billions of the taxpayers' dollars.

Knowing this and being involved in this struggle, it really unnerves me to find out that my own CIA brought cocaine into the United States and allowed it to get on the streets and be sold. Do you know what that means? We are representing communities

where drugs are devastating our communities. People are becoming addicted. Oh, and it is not simply in inner cities, it is in rural communities, it is in suburbia, it is everything, everywhere. It is swallowing us up.

I do not know what kind of cockamamie scheme they could have cooked up to talk about this would help them to apprehend drug dealers by allowing drugs to be sold on the streets of the United States of America. How many more people became addicted? How many more people got involved in crime? How many more people became a part of the destruction that we all hate so much? I do not like it and I am not going to get off this business about who they are and what they do and their involvement with drugs until this body has the guts and the nerves to do something about it.

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The joint CIA/Venezuela force was headed by General Davila and the ranking CIA officer, I am going to call the names, was Mark McFarlin, who worked with the antiguerrilla forces in El Salvador in the 1980's. Not one CIA official has ever been indicted or prosecuted for this abuse of authority. I will give it to my colleagues again. General Davila and Mark McFarlin. Look it up.

What happened? Why can we not ask the questions? Why are we not outraged that these drugs found their way into our cities?

Let me go a little bit further and talk about this alignment, this association, the CIA being involved, coming too close to people who traffic in drugs. In a March 8, 1997, Los Angeles Times article, it was reported that Lt. Col. Michel Francois, one of the CIA's Haitian agents, and I defy anybody to tell me he was not, a former army officer and a key leader in the military regime that ran Haiti between 1991 and 1994, he was indicted in Miami and charged with smuggling 33 tons of cocaine into the United States. The article detailed that Francois met face to face with the leaders of three Colombian cartels to arrange for drug shipments to pass through Haiti via a private airstrip that he helped to build and protect. The CIA was right there in Haiti while he was building this airstrip. He was trained by the CIA. Francois is the CIA's boy.

Lieutenant Colonel Francois was trained by the U.S. Army in military command training for foreign officers in Georgia. He was a senior member of the Service Intelligence Agency, a Haitian intelligence organization founded with the help of the CIA in 1986.

After the 1991 coup put Francois in power, the cocaine seizures in Haiti just plummeted to near zero. He could do whatever he wanted to do. He built a strip. He met with the cartels. All of this is in DEA reports. U.S. prosecutors have requested the extradition of Francois from Honduras, where he has been living under a grant of political asy-

lum. When I tell my colleagues our own CIA is documented as having brought cocaine in, in the Venezuelan fiasco, and when I tell my colleagues that Francois is a creation of the CIA and that the apprehension of drugs and drug smuggling and trafficking went down once he took charge, I am accusing the CIA of being too close, of being too involved, for turning its head.

Mr. Chairman, let me just wrap up my comments by saying I have pointed out today on several occasions some of the problems with the Central Intelligence Agency. I have pointed out the fact that some of our allies and our friends around the world have been sending us this quiet but stern message. They are asking us to leave. I have talked about something that none of us are proud of, the fact that there is a breakdown in this agency and we have people that we pay to protect and serve literally endangering us all with the selling of information. I have pointed out that not only do we have all of this occurring, but that our own soldiers were put at risk because something is wrong in this CIA. I am disturbed that we could not get much support in trying to slap them on the wrist, cut the budget just a little bit, but I am convinced that the American people will join us in the struggle because this is a struggle and a battle that we are going to have to wage for a long time.

I am not accusing the Members who have taken this floor in efforts to protect the CIA. I understand. There are responsible Members of this House who really believe, despite the problems of the CIA, everything should be done to protect them, to make sure they have all the money they need to operate with, that somehow if we question them, we are going to put at risk their ability to gather the intelligence information we need.

We need to redefine the role of the CIA in this post-cold-war era. Who are they and what do they do? Someone pointed out to me today that in every aspect of our society, with the new technology we have been able to reduce personnel, we have been able to put in systems and processes to better manage information, we have been able to reduce cost, and many on the opposite side of the aisle have made these arguments time and time again as they have gone about cutting and redesigning and privatizing and all of those things that we hear about on the floor.

Why is it the CIA escapes any of this? Why has the new technology not caught up with the CIA? Why can we not shine the light in ways that we understand, where the money is going? Why can we not redesign the ways in which we relate to them and still respect some of the secrecy and privacy that is needed?

I say to my colleagues, today I have been afforded the opportunity to take this floor and talk about this issue in the hopes that we can focus, we can really put this on our radar screen and

begin to raise questions and get the American public involved in raising questions. I hope that this debate will allow that.

I am under no illusions about everything that I want being embraced by the protectors of the CIA, right or wrong. But I know one thing: This platform that is afforded to me by the voters on this floor of Congress is an important tool to be used to create a discussion. I see my responsibility to create discussions that maybe others will not. I am not afraid of the CIA, I am not going to run from the CIA, I am not going to tuck my tail and duck my head and talk about their untouchables. This day we unveiled some of the problems, along with other Members who have taken this floor.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentlewoman's amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. DIXON].

Mr. DIXON. I thank the chairman of the committee for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to the Waters amendment, reluctant for several reasons. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] is the chairman of our Congressional Black Caucus. She represents a community that I represent, Los Angeles County, cities in that community, but probably most importantly because I think we, both of us, as well as most Members of this House, are seeking accurate and truthful information as it relates to the CIA involvement in crack cocaine in Los Angeles, or any other community of this country, and any involvement it has had with members or assets of the community in either aiding or abetting or having knowledge of the CIA involvement in the distribution of drugs.

The reason I rise in opposition to it, this commission that is being offered here as an amendment suggests that the process that we have here is either not operating in good faith or is broken. As most of the Members know, the inspector generals of the CIA and the Justice Department are investigating this matter at this point in time. Both gentlemen have reputations for not only being independent but calling it like it is, and I doubt if anyone here feels that if they find some wrongdoing or some culpability on the part of the CIA that in fact they will not include it in their reports.

It has been my experience as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that no member of that committee is an apologist or tries to represent the interests of the CIA, but as the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] does, represents the

interests of the citizens of this country. And so I stand here not as an apologist for the CIA, but with the same goal that the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] has, to get to the facts in this matter.

Mr. Chairman, we all know that facts that are suggested or alluded to in newspaper articles, there may be some truth to them, they may be entirely true, or they may be entirely untrue. But I think it is the responsibility of the House and the inspector generals to take the first cut at sorting out those facts.

The gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] is right, that other than the publisher of the San Jose Mercury, no one has contested the points made in the article. No one has contested those points at this point in time because factually no one knows exactly what has occurred. This committee is about verifying facts in that report. I daresay we would be derelict if we came to the House on a bit-by-bit basis to either sanction what was in the article or criticize it, the point being that the investigations, if they are to go forward, will come to some conclusions about the validity of the arguments and the points made in the article.

As it relates to the CIA and drug trafficking, I can say that I think the CIA has made some terrible blunders in the past. I do not think that there is anyone here that would deny that. But the issue before us is whether or not they were either involved in trafficking by aiding and abetting, or knew of, had knowledge of, drug traffickers.

The reports that I have read thus far do not lead me to that conclusion at this point in time. Let me say that again: The reports that I have read thus far do not lead me to that conclusion at this point in time.

I have read the newspaper articles, I have read other materials and interviewed people, and at some point in time I may be joining the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] on this floor asking for some type of public commission. But now is not the time, I suggest to the members of this committee. Now is the time to let the structure of the Justice Department, the CIA inspector general and the House to move forward in an objective evaluation.

I am not naive enough to think whatever this committee finds and whatever the Inspector Generals find, that in fact there will be a consensus opinion. And if there is not a consensus opinion and there is fault to be found with either a lack of thoroughness or professionalism or even covering up, that would be the time to move forward with some commission. I have reservations about the composition of the commission and some of the structure, but I am sure that the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] and I at the appropriate time could work that out.

For example, there is a prohibition in here that any employee of the U.S.

Government, past or present, could not be a member of that commission. I think that there are many people who have been employed by the U.S. Government who have expertise and abilities that could appropriately serve on the commission, and I would feel it is certainly insulting to say that anyone who has ever worked for Government could not be objective in this issue.

As it relates to the issue of people who have been assets of the CIA, whether they be in Venezuela or Haiti, there is no doubt that some of the assets should never have been employed by the CIA. There is no doubt that some of them have been involved in drug trafficking. But that is like saying some Member of Congress being arrested for drugs, that the Congress of the United States is responsible for it.

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Let us sort through the facts without emotion. Then let people come forward and criticize the report, scrub it, examine it, and then at that point in time I may be joining the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] on some outside citizens panel to review that material and to carry the investigation forward, but now is not the time.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time I have remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] has 12½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS] has 16 minutes remaining.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I hold the gentleman from California [Mr. DIXON] in the highest esteem and respect, and I have worked with him, and we do share this area of Los Angeles where the drug trafficking took place, where the CIA is alleged to have been deeply involved in trafficking in drugs and the profits of which, some of them, went to fund the contras, the contras having been created by the CIA. That was their body, and the FDN, the army of the contras, was a creation of the CIA's.

And I am working to get to the bottom of this, but my commission that I am asking for is not only about that. This is more generic, and it encompasses the question of drug trafficking, period, by the CIA.

And I would like to raise a question of the gentleman from California [Mr. DIXON] so that I can help make a determination about his representations regarding the investigations that are going on and the possibility that he may join me, depending on what he has discovered or they discovered as a result of the House intelligence investigation.

Has the gentleman's committee investigated the Venezuelan dope dealing of the CIA where I have in no uncertain terms identified on the floor of Con-

gress the fact that they were responsible for tons of cocaine coming into the United States that got sold on the streets of America? Has the gentleman done anything about that? Has he looked at that?

Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, yes, there has been testimony before the committee. There has not been a thorough investigation, but there has been testimony before the committee by the CIA.

The CIA, as I recall their testimony, one, denied that they ever approved it because they recognized that in fact it would be hard to trace once it got into the United States and also DEA rejected it.

It is true that this man was an operative in form at some point in time with the CIA, but they deny ever having approved or sanctioned this activity, and this activity, according to them, was taken on independently by the general.

Ms. WATERS. May I ask of the gentleman whether or not there has been any report on it, and since this exposure was given to this in the New York Times, we have not seen a response of any kind, we have not seen the work of the gentleman's committee answering this in any way.

Mr. Chairman, we cannot have the New York Times or any other newspaper documenting and court records documenting trafficking in cocaine by the CIA and CIA operatives, and we just sit mum and not tell the American public anything.

So is there a report on this in any way? If there is no report, would the gentleman be willing to issue some kind of report between him and the chairman? Could the gentleman from California make some representation about what he will be willing to do, given we know this information about drug trafficking by the CIA?

Mr. DIXON. Yes. The staff informs me that in fact there has been a report to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by the inspector general, and I am sure with certain permission that the gentlewoman from California could review that report. But I will indicate to her since she has raised it and created the inference that the CIA was involved, I feel duty obligated to go forward and look at this once again.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, yes, let me be clear about this one, and I do not go this far even in the South L.A. one. I am accusing the CIA on this one based on the information that I have of having been responsible for tons of cocaine coming into the United States that got sold on the streets of America. That is an accusation that I am making clear, simple, and without any reservations.

So what I am saying to the gentleman:

It is not enough for me to see the report. What can we do to share this information with the American public? Is

there anything that can be done to shed some light on this?

Mr. DIXON. If the gentlewoman will continue to yield, first of all I think that it would be good for her to read the report.

Ms. WATERS. I will do that.

Mr. DIXON. So that the CIA's perspective on this is there, and perhaps the committee chairman or others, since this issue has been raised that the report can be scrubbed and that some materials could be released; but I do think, Mr. Chairman, that we have a responsibility with the charge made just on the floor that the CIA was responsible for the Venezuelan drug transaction, to either refute or make some statement about this based upon an investigation in the materials that we have already collected. I think that is a very serious allegation.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield to me?

Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. GOSS. As far as I am concerned, if the gentlewoman has some new information that is additional or supplemental or complementary to any of the previous work that has been done on this, that she would bring it to the committee's attention, that we will obviously attend to it forthwith. My understanding is that there has been some work done on this; I do not know the exact status, because we are dealing with somewhat of a new subject that is just a little bit off the record here of what I thought we were talking about, but I am certainly willing, as we have been all along the way on this, with the gentlewoman, with the gentleman from California [Mr. DIXON], and as seen with the gentleman from California [Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD] earlier in our colloquy.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to be snowed, I do not want to be patronized, I do not want to be talked to in that way. I have asked. I have made an accusation on the floor of Congress about the CIA and the Venezuelan drug deal, and I am asking the gentleman based on the information that he has, is there any way that he can shed some light or share this information with the American public?

I want to know.

Mr. GOSS. If the gentlewoman will continue to yield, the gentlewoman is referring, I think, to events that transpired before I was privileged to be on this committee, and that is why, since I had no forewarning that that was going to be a subject today, I am simply not prepared to give her any specific information.

I am certainly welcome to assure that we will attend to her request to see if there is anything into it, as we would with any Member who brings forward that type of a serious allegation.

Ms. WATERS. Could the gentleman be a little bit clearer about what it is he is committing to? The gentleman said he would attend to it. Could the

gentleman tell me how he can satisfy the concerns that I have raised, and I am not being facetious at this point, but I have made a specific charge, and I am asking the gentleman, even though he was not the Chair, the records did not leave with the last Chair; I want to know what can the gentleman do to shed some light on this information?

Mr. DIXON. If the gentlewoman will yield and if I could suggest to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS], one, that a lot of this evidentiary material will come out in the trial. As I understand, he is on trial in Florida. Second, I do think, Mr. Chairman, we have an obligation to go back and look at the inspector general's report, and, as I recall it, it did not in any way involve the CIA and the transportation or distribution of the drugs that the gentleman is being charged with.

But this is a very serious accusation that the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] is making, and I want to emphasize it. She is alleging that the CIA was involved with the Venezuelan general in bringing drugs into the country. I assume that means either aiding, abetting, or being a sponsor of those drugs.

Ms. WATERS. That is right.

Mr. DIXON. And I think that we have a responsibility to, once again, go back and look at this case, notwithstanding the prosecution that is going on in Florida and notwithstanding what the inspector general has said.

Ms. WATERS. And also would the gentleman add to this discussion whether or not the former drug czar who worked with the CIA is going to be extradited for this case? Is there an extradition problem?

Mr. GOSS. If the gentlewoman will yield to me, I presume these questions are being directed to me.

Ms. WATERS. The gentleman from Florida or anybody else who can answer that.

Mr. GOSS. Let me clearly tell the gentlewoman that I have tremendous respect for the gentleman from California [Mr. DIXON], and I think Mr. DIXON has said exactly the right thing.

The specific facts that the gentlewoman is basing her allegation on, I would like to know what they are. I will then deal with those facts, and I will advise the gentlewoman of relevant information, and the gentleman from California [Mr. DIXON] will be part of that process, as he has been, because he has been doing stellar service for our committee on this matter in Los Angeles because it is clearly part of his representation.

Ms. WATERS. The gentleman from California [Mr. DIXON] said that he felt a responsibility to answer my charge. What the gentleman from Florida is saying is if I can bring him more information—

Mr. GOSS. No, I am saying, if the gentlewoman will continue to yield, I will be very happy to join Mr. DIXON in responding as exactly as he has done.

But it would be helpful to me to know all of the details of what the gentlewoman knows.

I take very seriously, living in Florida, which is not unlike the problem in California, of drug smuggling and the impact we see on our streets. We have a problem. We are not insensitive to this, I assure my colleague, and I assure her that there are unfolding events every minute in the war on drugs, every minute, and the intelligence part of that we are attending to. We are committing dollars, and we hope we have the gentlewoman's support for our budget for those dollars.

Ms. WATERS. Oh, no. I have been to every budget committee, every appropriations committee where there are appropriations for drugs to talk about the Black Caucus' No. 1 priority of eradicating drugs in this Nation. It is not only our No. 1 priority, we have come, we have testified before the committees, we have supported the drug czar, we have supported the President's budget, we have even asked for more money, and we have come up with ways by which to work closer with the drug czar on this issue.

So we are serious about this, but let me just say this:

Given my friend and my colleague's representations, along with the gentleman from Florida, about feeling a responsibility to respond to the very serious accusation that I have made here today, I accept that as not only a representation for himself, but for him and others, and the committee; and even though we are clear that my bringing forth new information is not a condition for his moving forward, if I have or can locate new information, I will be happy to work with the gentleman on it. But I do expect that this commitment on the House of the floor that has been made about shedding light per the gentleman from California [Mr. DIXON] and supported by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS] is something that we can rely on.

So let me just say this:

My colleague whom I have worked with not just since I came to Congress 6 years ago, but about 30 years now, having served with him in the State of California in the assembly and prior to that when I managed campaigns and all of that, I accept—

The CHAIRMAN. All time of the gentlewoman from California [Ms. WATERS] has expired.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to yield 1 more minute to the gentlewoman from California to wrap up.

Ms. WATERS. I thought when the gentleman heard the word "accept" he would be generous, and I thank him very much.

I accept his representations that these investigations are going on now, and I know that. And I do think that perhaps it is a little premature, and maybe that is something we will do after if, in fact, we do not believe that the information is credible, the work

has been good, or we learn more about it.

□ 2100

I do think that that would be the correct order of things. Today provided us with the opportunity to shed more light, to get something moving. I accept that he rejects, he does not accept, my amendment. He believes the commission is premature. He will work with me. I will work with the gentleman, I will work with the other gentlemen, and everyone else.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from California?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III of the bill?

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

The text of the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows:

TITLE IV—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 401. MULTIYEAR LEASING AUTHORITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (a) through (f) as paragraphs (1) through (6), respectively;

(2) by inserting “(a)” after “SEC. 5.”;

(3) by striking “and” at the end of paragraph (5), as so redesignated;

(4) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6), as so redesignated, and inserting “; and”;

(5) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph:

“(7) Notwithstanding section 1341(a)(1) of title 31, United States Code, enter into multiyear leases for up to 15 years that are not otherwise authorized pursuant to section 8 of this Act.”;

and

(6) by inserting at the end the following new subsection:

“(b)(1) The authority to enter into a multiyear lease under subsection (a)(7) shall be subject to appropriations provided in advance for (A) the entire lease, or (B) the first 12 months of the lease and the Government’s estimated termination liability.

“(2) In the case of any such lease entered into under clause (B) of paragraph (1)—

“(A) such lease shall include a clause that provides that the contract shall be terminated if budget authority (as defined by section 3(2) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(2))) is not provided specifically for that project in an appropriations Act in advance of an obligation of funds in respect thereto;

“(B) notwithstanding section 1552 of title 31, United States Code, amounts obligated for paying termination costs in respect of such lease shall remain available until the costs associated with termination of such lease are paid;

“(C) funds available for termination liability shall remain available to satisfy rental obligations in respect of such lease in subsequent fiscal years in the event such lease is not terminated early, but only to the extent those funds are in excess of the amount of termination liability in that subsequent year; and

“(D) annual funds made available in any fiscal year may be used to make payments on such lease for a maximum of 12 months beginning any time during the fiscal year.”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) applies with respect to multiyear leases entered into pursuant to section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended by subsection (a), on or after October 1, 1997.

SEC. 402. CIA CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM

“SEC. 21. (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Director may—

“(1) establish a program to provide the central services described in subsection (b)(2); and

“(2) make transfers to and expenditures from the working capital fund established under subsection (b)(1).

“(b) ESTABLISHMENT AND PURPOSES OF CENTRAL SERVICES WORKING CAPITAL FUND.—(1) There is established a central services working capital fund. The Fund shall be available until expended for the purposes described in paragraph (2), subject to subsection (j).

“(2) The purposes of the Fund are to pay for equipment, salaries, maintenance, operation and other expenses for such services as the Director, subject to paragraph (3), determines to be central services that are appropriate and advantageous to provide to the Agency or to other Federal agencies on a reimbursable basis.

“(3) The determination and provision of central services by the Director of Central Intelligence under paragraph (2) shall be subject to the prior approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

“(c) ASSETS IN FUND.—The Fund shall consist of money and assets, as follows:

“(1) Amounts appropriated to the Fund for its initial monetary capitalization.

“(2) Appropriations available to the Agency under law for the purpose of supplementing the Fund.

“(3) Such inventories, equipment, and other assets, including inventories and equipment on order, pertaining to the services to be carried on by the central services program.

“(4) Such other funds as the Director is authorized to transfer to the Fund.

“(d) LIMITATIONS.—(1) The total value of orders for services described in subsection (b)(2) from the central services program at any time shall not exceed an annual amount approved in advance by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

“(2) No goods or services may be provided to any non-Federal entity by the central services program.

“(e) REIMBURSEMENTS TO FUND.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Fund shall be—

“(1) reimbursed, or credited with advance payments, from applicable appropriations and funds of the Agency, other Intelligence Community agencies, or other Federal agencies, for the central services performed by the central services program, at rates that will recover the full cost of operations paid for from the Fund, including accrual of annual leave, workers’ compensation, depreciation of capitalized plant and equipment, and amortization of automated data processing software; and

“(2) if applicable credited with the receipts from sale or exchange of property, including any real property, or in payment for loss or damage to property, held by the central services program as assets of the Fund.

“(f) RETENTION OF PORTION OF FUND INCOME.—(1) The Director may impose a fee for central services provided from the Fund. The fee for any item or service provided under the central services program may not exceed four percent of the cost of such item or service.

“(2) As needed for the continued self-sustaining operation of the Fund, an amount not to exceed four percent of the net receipts of the Fund in fiscal year 1998 and each fiscal year thereafter may be retained, subject to subsection (j), for the acquisition of capital equipment and for the improvement and implementation of the Agency’s information management systems (including financial management, payroll, and personnel information systems). Any proposed use of the retained income in fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000, shall only be made with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and after notification to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

“(3) Not later than 30 days after the close of each fiscal year, amounts in excess of the amount retained under paragraph (2) shall be transferred to the United States Treasury.

“(g) AUDIT.—(1) The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct and complete an audit of the Fund within three months after the close of each fiscal year. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall determine the form and content of the audit, which shall include at least an itemized accounting of the central services provided, the cost of each service, the total receipts received, the agencies or departments serviced, and the amount returned to the United States Treasury.

“(2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of the audit, the Inspector General shall submit a copy of the audit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

“(h) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section—

“(1) the term ‘central services program’ means the program established under subsection (a); and

“(2) the term ‘Fund’ means the central services working capital fund established under subsection (b)(1).

“(i) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Fund \$5,000,000 for the purposes specified in subsection (b)(2).

“(j) TERMINATION.—(1) The Fund shall terminate on March 31, 2000, unless otherwise reauthorized by an Act of Congress prior to that date.

“(2) Subject to paragraph (1) and after providing notice to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget—

“(A) may terminate the central services program and the Fund at any time; and

“(B) upon any such termination, shall provide for dispositions of personnel, assets, liabilities, grants, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made available in connection with such Fund, as may be necessary.”.

SEC. 403. PROTECTION OF CIA FACILITIES.

Subsection (a) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)) is amended—

(1) by inserting “(1)” after “(a)”;

(2) by striking “powers only within Agency installations,” and all that follows through the end, and inserting the following: “powers—

“(A) within the Agency Headquarters Compound and the property controlled and occupied by the Federal Highway Administration located immediately adjacent to such Compound and in the streets, sidewalks, and the open

areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary of such Compound and property and extending outward 500 feet; and

“(B) within any other Agency installation and in the streets, sidewalks, and open areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary of any such installation and extending outward 500 feet.”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

“(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers under paragraph (1) shall be limited to those circumstances where such personnel can identify specific and articulable facts giving such personnel reason to believe that their performance of such functions and exercise of such powers is reasonable to protect against physical attack or threats of attack upon the Agency installations, property, or employees.

“(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude, or limit in any way, the authority of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency or of any other Federal police or Federal protective service.

“(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel shall be the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director and shall only be applicable to the areas referred to in paragraph (1).

“(5) On December 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the Director shall submit a report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that describes in detail the exercise of the authority granted by this subsection, and the underlying facts supporting the exercise of such authority, during the preceding fiscal year. The Director shall make such report available to the Inspector General of the Agency.”.

TITLE V—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 501. AUTHORITY TO AWARD ACADEMIC DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN INTELLIGENCE.

(a) AUTHORITY FOR NEW BACHELOR'S DEGREE.—Section 2161 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

“§2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic degrees

“Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the president of the Joint Military Intelligence College may, upon recommendation by the faculty of the college, confer upon a graduate of the college who has fulfilled the requirements for the degree the following:

“(1) The degree of Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI).

“(2) The degree of Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI).”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The item relating to that section in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 108 of such title is amended to read as follows:

“2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic degrees.”.

SEC. 502. UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NAME, INITIALS, OR SEAL OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

(a) EXTENSION, REORGANIZATION, AND CONSOLIDATION OF AUTHORITIES.—Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“§425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name, initials, or seal: specified intelligence agencies

“(a) PROHIBITION.—Except with the written permission of the Secretary of Defense, no person may knowingly use, in connection with any merchandise, retail product, impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Secretary of Defense, any of the following (or any colorable imitation thereof):

“(1) The words ‘Defense Intelligence Agency’, the initials ‘DIA’, or the seal of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

“(2) The words ‘National Reconnaissance Office’, the initials ‘NRO’, or the seal of the National Reconnaissance Office.

“(3) The words ‘National Imagery and Mapping Agency’, the initials ‘NIMA’, or the seal of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

“(4) The words ‘Defense Mapping Agency’, the initials ‘DMA’, or the seal of the Defense Mapping Agency.”.

(b) TRANSFER OF ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY.—Subsection (b) of section 202 of title 10, United States Code, is transferred to the end of section 425 of such title, as added by subsection (a), and is amended by inserting “AUTHORITY TO ENJOIN VIOLATIONS.—” after “(b)”.

(c) REPEAL OF REORGANIZED PROVISIONS.—Sections 202 and 445 of title 10, United States Code, are repealed.

(d) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.—

(1) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter II of chapter 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out the item relating to section 202.

(2) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out the items relating to sections 424 and 425 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

“424. Disclosure of organizational and personnel information: exemption for Defense Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

“425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name, initials, or seal: specified intelligence agencies.”.

(3) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out the item relating to section 445.

SEC. 503. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR ENHANCEMENT OF CAPABILITIES OF CERTAIN ARMY FACILITIES.

Effective October 1, 1997, section 506(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-93; 109 Stat. 974) is amended by striking out “fiscal years 1996 and 1997” and inserting in lieu thereof “fiscal years 1998 and 1999”.

TITLE VI—MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNITY PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS

SEC. 601. COORDINATION OF ARMED FORCES INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAMS.

(a) PROGRAM EXECUTION COORDINATION.—The Secretary of a military department or the head of a defense agency may not obligate or expend funds for any information security program of that military department without the concurrence of the Director of the National Security Agency.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section takes effect on October 1, 1997.

SEC. 602. AUTHORITY OF EXECUTIVE AGENT OF INTEGRATED BROADCAST SERVICE.

All amounts appropriated for any fiscal year for intelligence information data broadcast systems may be obligated or expended by an intelligence element of the Department of Defense only with the concurrence of the official in the Department of Defense designated as the executive agent of the Integrated Broadcast Service.

SEC. 603. PREDATOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE.

(a) TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS.—Effective October 1, 1997, the functions described in subsection (b) with respect to the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle are transferred to the Secretary of the Air Force.

(b) FUNCTIONS TO BE TRANSFERRED.—Subsection (a) applies to those functions performed as of June 1, 1997, by the organization within the Department of Defense known as the Unmanned Aerial Joint Program Office with respect to the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

(c) TRANSFER OF FUNDS.—Effective October 1, 1997, all unexpended funds appropriated for the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle that are within the Defense-Wide Program Element number 0305205D are transferred to Air Force Program Element number 0305154F.

SEC. 604. U-2 SENSOR PROGRAM.

(a) REQUIREMENT FOR MINIMUM NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT.—The Secretary of Defense shall ensure—

(1) that not less than 11 U-2 reconnaissance aircraft are equipped with RAS-1 sensor suites; and

(2) that each such aircraft that is so equipped is maintained in a manner necessary to counter available threat technologies until the aircraft is retired or until a successor sensor suite is developed and fielded.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (a) takes effect on October 1, 1997.

SEC. 605. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION BOOKS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The congressional budget justification books for any element of the intelligence community submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the President for any fiscal year shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(1) For each program for which appropriations are requested for that element of the intelligence community in that budget—

(A) specification of the program, including the program element number for the program;

(B) the specific dollar amount requested for the program;

(C) the appropriation account within which funding for the program is placed;

(D) the budget line item that applies to the program;

(E) specification of whether the program is a research and development program or otherwise involves research and development;

(F) identification of the total cost for the program; and

(G) information relating to all direct and associated costs in each appropriations account for the program.

(2) A detailed accounting of all reprogramming or reallocation actions and the status of those actions at the time of submission of those materials.

(3) Information relating to any unallocated cuts or taxes.

(b) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section: (1) The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a).

(2) The term “congressional budget justification books” means the budget justification materials submitted to Congress for any fiscal year in support of the budget for that fiscal year for any element of the intelligence community (as contained in the budget of the President submitted to Congress for that fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code).

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to fiscal year 1999.

SEC. 606. COORDINATION OF AIR FORCE JOINT SIGINT PROGRAM OFFICE ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.

(a) CONTRACTS.—The Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office, may not modify, amend, or alter a JSAF program contract without coordinating with the Secretary of any other military department that would be affected by the modification, amendment, alteration.

(b) NEW DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING OPERATIONAL MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.—(1) The Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office, may not enter into a contract described in paragraph (2) without coordinating with the Secretary of the military department concerned.

(2) Paragraph (1) applies to a contract for development relating to a JSAF program that may

directly affect the operational requirements of one of the Armed Forces (other than the Air Force) for the satisfaction of intelligence requirements.

(c) **JSAF PROGRAM DEFINED.**—For purposes of this section, the term “JSAF program” means a program within the Joint Signals Intelligence Avionics Family of programs administered by the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office.

(d) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—This section takes effect on October 1, 1997.

SEC. 607. DISCONTINUATION OF THE DEFENSE SPACE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM.

Not later than October 1, 1999, the Secretary of Defense shall—

(1) discontinue the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (a program within the Joint Military Intelligence Program); and

(2) close the organization within the Department of Defense known as the Defense Space Program Office (the management office for that program).

SEC. 608. TERMINATION OF DEFENSE AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

(a) **TERMINATION OF OFFICE.**—The organization within the Department of Defense known as the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office is terminated. No funds available for the Department of Defense may be used for the operation of that Office after the date specified in subsection (d).

(b) **TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS.**—(1) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), the Secretary of Defense shall transfer to the Defense Intelligence Agency those functions performed on the day before the date of the enactment this Act by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office that are specified in paragraph (2).

(2) The functions transferred by the Secretary to the Defense Intelligence Agency under paragraph (1) shall include functions of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office relating to its responsibilities for management oversight and coordination of defense airborne reconnaissance capabilities (other than any responsibilities for acquisition of systems).

(3) The Secretary shall determine which specific functions are appropriate for transfer under paragraph (1). In making that determination, the Secretary shall ensure that responsibility for individual airborne reconnaissance programs with respect to program management, for research, development, test, and evaluation, for acquisition, and for operations and related line management remain with the respective Secretaries of the military departments.

(4) Any function transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency under this subsection is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

(c) **REPORT.**—(1) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the committees named in paragraph (2) a report containing the Secretary’s plan for terminating the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office and transferring the functions of that office.

(2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives.

(d) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—Subsection (a) shall take effect at the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute?

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of today, proceed-

ings will now resume on the amendment on which further proceedings were postponed: amendment No. 3 offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts Mr. FRANK].

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FRANK OF MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote.

The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The Clerk designated the amendment.

RECORDED VOTE

The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 182, noes 238, not voting 14, as follows:

[Roll No. 255]
AYES—182

Abercrombie	Goode	Obey
Ackerman	Goodlatte	Olver
Allen	Gordon	Owens
Baldacci	Green	Pallone
Barcia	Gutierrez	Pascrell
Barrett (WI)	Hall (OH)	Pastor
Becerra	Hall (TX)	Paul
Bentsen	Hamilton	Payne
Berry	Hastings (FL)	Pelosi
Blagojevich	Hefner	Peterson (MN)
Blumenauer	Hilliard	Petri
Bonior	Hinchev	Pomeroy
Borski	Hooley	Porter
Boswell	Jackson (IL)	Poshard
Boucher	Jackson-Lee	Price (NC)
Boyd	(TX)	Ramstad
Brown (CA)	Jefferson	Rangel
Brown (FL)	Johnson (WI)	Riggs
Brown (OH)	Johnson, E. B.	Rivers
Camp	Kanjorski	Rodriguez
Campbell	Kennedy (MA)	Roemer
Capps	Kennedy (RI)	Rohrabacher
Carson	Kennelly	Rothman
Chabot	Kildee	Roukema
Clay	Kilpatrick	Roybal-Allard
Clayton	Kind (WI)	Royce
Clyburn	Kleczka	Rush
Condit	Klug	Sabo
Conyers	Kucinich	Sanchez
Costello	LaFalce	Sanders
Coyne	Lampson	Sanford
Cummings	Lantos	Sawyer
Danner	Largent	Schumer
Davis (FL)	Leach	Sensenbrenner
Davis (IL)	Levin	Serrano
DeFazio	Lewis (GA)	Shays
DeGette	Lofgren	Skaggs
Delahunt	Lowey	Snyder
DeLauro	Luther	Spratt
Dellums	Maloney (CT)	Stabenow
Dingell	Maloney (NY)	Stark
Doggett	Markey	Stenholm
Dooley	Matsui	Stokes
Doyle	McCarthy (MO)	Strickland
Duncan	McCarthy (NY)	Stupak
Engel	McDermott	Tanner
Ensign	McGovern	Tauscher
Eshoo	McKinney	Thompson
Etheridge	Meehan	Thurman
Evans	Meek	Tierney
Farr	Menendez	Torres
Fazio	Millender-	Traficant
Filner	McDonald	Upton
Flake	Miller (CA)	Velazquez
Foglietta	Minge	Vento
Ford	Mink	Waters
Fox	Moakley	Watt (NC)
Frank (MA)	Moran (VA)	Waxman
Furse	Morella	Weygand
Gejdenson	Nadler	Woolsey
Gephardt	Neal	
Gonzalez	Oberstar	

Aderholt	Gillmor	NOES—238
Andrews	Gilman	Noes
Archer	Goodling	Ortiz
Armey	Goss	Packard
Bachus	Graham	Pappas
Baesler	Granger	Parker
Baker	Greenwood	Paxon
Ballenger	Gutknecht	Pease
Barr	Hansen	Peterson (PA)
Barrett (NE)	Harman	Pickering
Bartlett	Hastert	Pickett
Barton	Hastings (WA)	Pitts
Bass	Hayworth	Pombo
Bateman	Hefley	Portman
Bereuter	Herger	Pryce (OH)
Bilbray	Hill	Quinn
Bilirakis	Hilleary	Radanovich
Bishop	Hinojosa	Rahall
Bliley	Hobson	Redmond
Blunt	Hoekstra	Regula
Boehlert	Holden	Riley
Boehner	Horn	Rogan
Bonilla	Hostettler	Rogers
Bono	Houghton	Ros-Lehtinen
Brady	Hoyer	Ryan
Bryant	Hulshof	Salmon
Bunning	Hunter	Sandlin
Burr	Hutchinson	Saxton
Burton	Hyde	Scarborough
Buyer	Inglis	Schaefer, Dan
Callahan	Istook	Schaffer, Bob
Calvert	Jenkins	Scott
Canady	John	Sessions
Cannon	Johnson (CT)	Shadegg
Cardin	Jones	Shaw
Castle	Kaptur	Sherman
Chambliss	Kasich	Shimkus
Chenoweth	Kelly	Shuster
Christensen	Kim	Siskisky
Clement	King (NY)	Skeen
Coble	Kingston	Skelton
Coburn	Klink	Smith (MI)
Combust	Knollenberg	Smith (NJ)
Cook	Kolbe	Smith (OR)
Cooksey	LaHood	Smith (TX)
Cox	Latham	Smith, Adam
Cramer	LaTourette	Smith, Linda
Crane	Lazio	Snowbarger
Crapo	Lewis (CA)	Solomon
Cubin	Lewis (KY)	Souder
Cunningham	Linder	Spence
Davis (VA)	Lipinski	Stearns
Deal	Livingston	Stump
DeLay	LoBiondo	Sununu
Deutsch	Lucas	Talent
Diaz-Balart	Manzullo	Tauzin
Dickey	Martinez	Taylor (MS)
Dicks	Mascara	Taylor (NC)
Dixon	McCollum	Thomas
Doolittle	McCreery	Thornberry
Dreier	McHale	Thune
Dunn	McHugh	Tiahrt
Ehlers	McInnis	Turner
Ehrlich	McIntosh	Visclosky
Emerson	McIntyre	Walsh
English	McKeon	Wamp
Everett	McNulty	Watkins
Ewing	Metcalf	Watts (OK)
Fawell	Mica	Weldon (FL)
Foley	Miller (FL)	Weldon (PA)
Forbes	Molinari	Weller
Fowler	Mollohan	White
Franks (NJ)	Moran (KS)	Whitfield
Frelinghuysen	Murtha	Wicker
Frost	Myrick	Wise
Galleghy	Nethercutt	Wolf
Ganske	Neumann	Wynn
Gekas	Ney	Young (AK)
Gibbons	Northup	Young (FL)
Gilchrest	Norwood	

NOT VOTING—14

Berman	Manton	Slaughter
Collins	McDade	Towns
Edwards	Oxley	Wexler
Fattah	Reyes	Yates
Johnson, Sam	Schiff	

□ 2120

The Clerk announced the following pair:

On this vote:

Mr. Yates for, with Mr. McDade against.

Messrs. FOLEY, WATTS of Oklahoma, and STEARNS changed their vote from “aye” to “no.”

Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas, and Messrs. PAUL, SPRATT, JEFFERSON, HALL of Texas, and STENHOLM changed their vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The CHAIRMAN. There being no further amendments to the bill, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.

The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD) having assumed the chair, Mr. THORNBERRY, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1775) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 179, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

AUTHORIZING THE CLERK TO MAKE CORRECTIONS IN ENGROSSMENT OF H.R. 1775, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in the engrossment of the bill, H.R. 1775, the Clerk be authorized to make such technical and conforming changes as may be necessary to correct such things as spelling, punctuation, cross-referencing and section numbering.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to

revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 1775, the bill just considered and passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

A TALE OF TWO WOMEN

(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to share with my colleagues a letter I received from a constituent of mine from Sparks, NV. This letter tells a story of two women. The first, and author of this letter, works 60 hours or more a week in hopes of saving enough money to get married and have children. The second woman, her cousin, has three children and has been receiving welfare for 13 years. The closing paragraph of her letter sums up the state of things better than I have ever heard. She writes, "Yes, the liberals take good care of people like my cousin who were smarter than I by deciding to have children, not get married and not go to work so that the Federal Government would take care of her and her children. I was the stupid one, who worked hard and waited to get married before having children. Now my taxes and hard work help pay for my cousin to enjoy her life."

The Republican tax reduction will help restore common sense and accountability to the process and lift the burden off the shoulders of the hard-working, tax-paying men and women of America.

JULY 1, 1997.

Congressman JIM GIBBONS,
Reno, NV.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN GIBBONS: I thought you might enjoy reading about how Clinton and the liberals have proved they are pro family. This is a tale of two women.

One is 37 years old and has worked since she was 14 years old busing tables at a Holiday Inn. The other woman is 30 and has never had a regular job in her life but she has received welfare assistance since she was 17.

The 37 year old recently got married for the first time, became a first time home buyer and has no children. The 30 year old has never been married, lives with her current boyfriend and has three children.

The 37 year old owns a car that is 10 years old and only seats two people. Her husband has a 9 year old pick up truck which also only seats two. They would like to purchase a moderately priced used four door car to carry children that they plan to have. The 30 year old recently bought a new Toyota Camry.

The 37 year old and her husband now pay more taxes since they got married and the 30 year old pays no taxes.

When the 30 year old and her husband have children they will not qualify for the proposed \$500 tax credit per child because they make a little more than \$75,000 per year on a combined income and are considered rich. The 30 year old will receive a \$500 per child tax credit even though she does not pay taxes.

The 37 year old recently took a second job at \$6.75/hour and her husband works as much overtime as he can to help pay off debt associated with buying the new house so she can afford a new car and have children. The 37 year old woman works 60+ hours a week and sees her husband 1 day a week and in passing during the rest of the week. The 30 year old has lots of free time, as her mother and sisters take turns baby-sitting the three children, while she goes out with her friends and spends time with her boyfriend.

When the 30 year old loses her welfare, she plans to take a job but her child care will be paid for by the government. The 37 year old will have to quit her job to take care of children, when she has them, because child care will eat up most of her salary so she has decided it would be better to stay home.

The 37 year old is myself and the 30 year old is my cousin who had her first child at 17 because her older sister had a child and received more attention.

I make \$28,500 per year as a marketing coordinator for an engineering firm. I have worked hard all my adult life and put myself through college. My husband's base salary is about \$36,000 per year as a postal worker (for 16 years) but he works a lot of overtime and averages about \$47,000 per year. We bring home about \$48,000 per year. We both have some money withheld for retirement. When we did our taxes last year we discovered that we are considered to be wealthy (because of our combined incomes) and should therefore pay more taxes.

We were penalized for working hard and getting married.

Now we find that we cannot afford to have children. If we have children, I will probably have to quit my job to take care of them because day care would cost about \$7,800 per year for one child and I don't have relatives nearby who could care for them and I don't qualify for assistance by the federal government to help pay for day care.

But I guess quitting my job would be okay because I would then qualify for the \$500 per child tax credit because our family income would be under \$75,000 per year. Of course we wouldn't have a car that we would all fit in. But at least the child would be safe in the front seat of both vehicles since they don't have air bags.

My husband would have to give up his 401K because we would need that extra income too. But that would be okay since we will now have the federal government to take care of us when we get old.

So now, we will be penalized for having children.

Yes, Clinton and his liberals take good care of people like my cousin who was smarter than I by deciding to have children, not get married and not work so the federal government would take care of her and her children.

I was the stupid one, who worked hard and waited to get married before having children.

Now my taxes and hard work help pay for my cousin to enjoy her life.

Yes, Clinton is pro family.

Sincerely,

SHELLEY READ,
Sparks, Nevada.

□ 2130

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.