

Pombo	Sessions	Visclosky
Poshard	Stark	Waters
Ramstad	Stupak	Watt (NC)
Redmond	Sununu	Watts (OK)
Rush	Taylor (MS)	Weller
Sabo	Thompson	Wicker
Schaffer, Bob	Velazquez	

NOT VOTING—6

Bass	Leach	Strickland
Cox	Schiff	Yates

□ 1559

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

So the Journal was approved.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD). Pursuant to House Resolution 169 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 1119.

□ 1600

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 1119) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for other purposes, with Mr. YOUNG of Florida in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Monday, June 23, 1997, the amendments en bloc offered by the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] had been disposed of.

It is now in order to debate the subject matter of United States forces in Bosnia.

The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] and the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE].

(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, today Congress will cast its first significant votes on our United States policy in Bosnia since the President extended deployment of our United States ground troops to that war-torn land last winter.

Today's votes will not be an expression of support for the mission, although our troops are doing well and we surely all support them. Nor will today's votes express the sense of the House or sense of the Congress. Rather, today's votes will call for the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from a peacekeeping operation of growing expense and seemingly unending duration.

Our Armed Forces have done all that they can to help bring peace to Bosnia and in the Balkans. With consummate professionalism under trying circumstances, our troops and NATO troops have enforced the military provisions of the Dayton peace agreement. As a result of their efforts, the military tasks required by the Dayton accord, the separation of the warring parties, the collection and destruction of heavy weapons, and the transfer of territories have all been completed.

But the remaining tasks, the civilian, humanitarian and political reconstruction of Bosnia, are beyond the capabilities of our troops, unless we are prepared to remain in Bosnia for decades. In recent months, our military commanders have added tanks to the stabilization force in Bosnia and have made plans to postpone the transition to the smaller, lighter deterrent force that was supposed to take over when the United States ground mission ended in fiscal year 1998.

Just last month, a top NATO commander told the New York Times, and I quote: "It would be a mistake to say that there is peace in Bosnia. We have only the absence of war. We gave the civilian officials the time and the space it carry out the Dayton agreement, but they failed. Nothing has been accomplished."

This is a startling and frank admission. But we have not failed for want of effort. Since the United States military involvement in Bosnia and the Balkans began with the imposition of Operation Sharp Guard blockade back in 1992, more than 100,000 American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines have seen duty in that theater of operations. That is the largest deployments of our forces since the Gulf War.

Not only have we deployed tens of thousands of troops, we have spent a lot of money in doing it. By the end of the year, fiscal year 1998, the Department of Defense will have spent at least \$7.3 billion on Bosnia and supporting operations. That is \$7.3 billion over and above normal operating and personnel budgets. And \$7.3 billion that has been and will continue to be diverted from already underfunded modernization, quality of life, readiness and training programs.

I suspect, of course, that the true costs of our Bosnian involvement have been much larger. And based upon the highly optimistic political and operational assumptions that underlie the President's budget request for fiscal year 1998 in Bosnia, the cost will continue to rise dramatically.

By any measure, Bosnia is too large an issue for our United States foreign policy to be decided exclusively by Presidential fiat. This would be true even if the administration's Bosnia policy were not marked with broken promises about the duration the mission, its scope, and its cost.

The administration has lost the confidence of the American people when it comes to Bosnia. Nearly 2 years ago

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, said that he could not, and I quote, "imagine circumstances changing in such a way that we would remain in Bosnia."

More than 1 year. Just 2 months ago, Secretary of Defense Cohen stated, and I quote, "It is very clear that by June of 1998 we will be on our way out." I hope both of these gentlemen's statements have taken especially into account the administration's proclivity to say one thing one day and change its tune the next day.

And the President is at it again. When he announced extension of the Bosnia mission following last November's elections, he said that he would propose to our NATO allies that by June of 1998 the work would be done and the forces would be able to be withdrawn.

Yet last month, the President began to reverse himself again, as anticipated, when he said, and I quote: "We just can't sort of hang around and then disappear in a year. . . I want to stop talking about what date we're leaving on."

The time is long overdue for Congress to express its will on behalf of the American people. It is important that the Clinton administration be held accountable for the Nation's foreign policy and in this case for Bosnia policy, a policy initiated without the consent or even support of Congress and predicated on the early withdrawal of United States ground troops. In my opinion, the sooner our ground troops are withdrawn, the better.

But the withdrawal of our ground troops from Bosnia need not and should not mean the end of NATO operations in and around Bosnia. The United States has an obligation to support alliance operations. But I believe that our support should be focused on providing those capabilities which we alone possess or can best provide, things such as logistics support over large areas in long distances, intelligence, communication and a list of all kinds.

No one should characterize our U.S. contributions as undermining the alliance, for these contributions will continue to involve thousands of troops at a cost to our taxpayers of billions of dollars. I am not suggesting that the Nation revert to isolationism; rather, a more practical and proper sharing of responsibilities and burdens of what appears to be a long-term NATO peacekeeping operation.

I do not disagree with the approach that our allies call "in together, out together" when it comes to NATO operations in Bosnia. But unless we can take a more nuanced approach to that policy, one that allows the United States to participate without performing each and every task, our allies will simply continue to hold us hostage.

If the withdrawal of our ground troops from Bosnia is followed by the collapse of the NATO mission, as the administration asserts will occur, then

the alliance will have proven itself far more fragile than anyone anticipated, perhaps too fragile for the stresses of post-Cold War missions and certainly too fragile for NATO expansion.

I urge my colleagues to study both amendments very closely. More fundamentally, I urge all Members to vote in favor of withdrawing our ground troops from a Bosnia mission with no end in sight.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON].

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to both the Hilleary and the Buyer-Skelton amendments. The primary difference between the two amendments, as I understand it, is the date of withdrawal. The concept is the same, but so are the defects.

Both amendments I think are unwise, for several reasons. First all, these amendments pose a risk to the United States troops in Bosnia. That is not my judgment. We should pay attention to the military commanders and to the Secretary of Defense. They have said that if we have a statutorily mandated requirement of redeployment, then that will jeopardize the safety of our personnel. Why would anybody in this Chamber want to jeopardize the safety of our troops by mandated date of withdrawal?

Second, these amendments threaten the Bosnia peace process. When United States troops leave Bosnia, our allies are sure to go. They have said that loud and clear. If NATO-led peacekeepers leave too soon, Bosnia will likely return to chaos and to war. That is precisely what Bosnian President Izetbegovic says and thinks.

These amendments send the opponents of the peace process the message they want to hear: Just wait; the U.S. troops are going to go. And we are going to be playing into the hands of the hardliners and the warmongers. Whether we like it or not, we are the key to stability in Bosnia. We are the central player. We are the leader. If we mandate a date certain for withdrawal, we help the opponents of peace and we make it more difficult to fulfill the promise of the Dayton accords.

□ 1615

We cannot build stability in Europe by simply walking away from U.S. commitments.

Third, these amendments threaten the cohesion of NATO. The peace process in Bosnia has always been about more things than just Bosnia. It is also about the future of NATO and the stability of Europe.

The NATO-led operation in Bosnia is the largest, most complex military mission that NATO has ever under-

taken. Our allies have looked to us for leadership and we have supplied it. Both of these amendments tell the President to withdraw U.S. troops by a fixed date, without prior consultation, without agreement. The message is, we are pulling out. It does not matter what our NATO allies think. We are leaving, no matter what.

If we act unilaterally in Bosnia, it undercuts United States leadership in NATO. This is the very moment of the most momentous change in NATO, enlargement, and we are saying by these amendments, NATO be damned, we are leaving when we want to without consulting them. What kind of an alliance partnership is that?

Fourth, these amendments shut out the options and deny the President flexibility. That is obvious. It does not need to be elaborated on.

Instead of locking ourselves in by passing either amendment, let us keep the options open. There are many ways that can be done. I do not have time to go into that.

And, fifth, these amendments undermine the credibility of U.S. leadership because they cast a serious doubt on our ability to keep our commitments. We made a political commitment to the parties in Dayton that we would try to help them form a unified, decentralized Bosnia. We have lived up to that commitment. We have spent about \$6 billion or \$7 billion, and brave Americans have risked their lives. So far, let it be noted, not one American soldier has been killed by hostile fire.

We knew that peace in Bosnia would not come easy. What does it say about American steadfastness, American reliability, American credibility if we mandate a pullout before the job is done? Congress should not, I think, force the President's hand.

I understand the President considers a legislatively mandated withdrawal date from Bosnia a veto item. No one in this Chamber can predict today what the circumstances in Bosnia will be on a date in the future. That being the case, it is folly to require American forces to be out of there by a date certain.

I urge my colleagues to vote against both of these amendments.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. HEFLEY].

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I do not recall the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] when the President set a date certain when we went into Bosnia that we would be out by November of 1996 saying, "Mr. President, that is folly for you to set that date." We all accepted that date. The President assured me we would be out by that date. That was our commitment. We would be there until November and get the shooting stopped, get the killing stopped, and then we would come out.

We also had a commitment to spend \$1.2 billion at that time. I want to refer my colleagues to this chart here. By 1998, we will be at \$7.3 billion. So do

not talk to me about us backing down on our commitments. We have kept our commitments.

Recently, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, it was quite clear to me that all of our allies sitting out there at the assembly were convinced that we were there for the duration; that we were going to be there forever, if necessary; that we were going to have another Korea, if necessary. Fifty years later, we might still be in Bosnia as we are still in Korea.

I told them then as I tell Members now, so far as I am concerned, we are bringing our troops home from Bosnia, and we need to set a date certain to do that so that we can do it in an orderly kind of fashion, so it is not precipitous, so that our European allies know that this is what is going to be done, so that they can make preparations.

Most of us felt this is primarily a European problem, but we wanted to be helpful. We still want to be helpful. As the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE], the chairman, enumerated, and I will not go over it, there are many things we can continue to do without having our ground troops on the ground in Bosnia. My colleagues can decide what is the right date, whether the date is December, whether the date is next June, but we need to set a date certain and say at that date our troops are out of there and we are bringing them home.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KUCINICH].

(Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, Branjevo Farm in eastern Bosnia was an ordinary livestock farm. Then, in the course of war, this ordinary place became extraordinary. The banality of evil reared its ugly head in July 1995 when more than 1,000 Muslims were bused to the farm, shot in groups of 10, and then bulldozed over. Months later when then U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright visited the mass grave, as she walked along this mass grave area, the bones crunched underneath her feet.

This chart, Mr. Chairman, of the mass burial at Branjevo Farm in the Donje Pilica area in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows Members the general area of the farm where livestock was raised and the area where the bodies were put into a pit and then covered over. Some of my colleagues have seen photos of that in the papers.

Today the ghosts of Branjevo and the ghosts of Srebrenica and other places soar and drop over our consciousness and they challenge our sensibilities and they ask us, where we were when, did we take a stand, did we speak out, did we come forward to say no more killing, do we say no more killing today? Do we say the United States will continue to share the burdens of keeping the peace in the world as the most powerful Nation in the world, stepping up to our responsibility?

Let us remember why we sent troops to Bosnia in the first place. Exactly 50 years after the Nazis and their atrocities, another genocide occurred in Europe as a result of nationalism, racial and religious hatred, and the obsession to create ethnically pure states. The international community stood silently by as more than 2 million people were displaced and more than 200,000 human beings were killed, and horrendous acts of torture, systematic rape, and similar expressions of barbarity ensued. There is universal consensus that to protect human beings against gross violations of their basic human rights is no longer considered interfering with the internal affairs of the state. It is no longer a European problem, it is a world problem, it is a world responsibility and as the most powerful Nation in the world it is also our responsibility.

If incidents like these can continue, albeit on a drastically reduced scale, where for example in Mostar recently, a 70-year-old woman's door was kicked in, she was torn from her bed, killed, wrapped in sheets and dumped in a field along the highway. Within days, a soldier and his family moved into her apartment. No charges filed. No arrests made.

If incidents like these can continue, what will happen if we pull out of an area? What will happen to the peace? What will happen to our troops? What will happen to the survivors of genocide? The ghosts of Branjevo are watching. The ghosts of Srebrenica are watching.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER] who is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and the author of one of the amendments today.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, on October 30, 1995, the House overwhelmingly passed House Resolution 247, a non-binding resolution which urged the President to obtain prior authorization for any deployment of United States forces to Bosnia and that the Dayton peace agreement should not be predicated on United States ground troops but really focus on the parties so that they can discuss about the real reasons they are killing each other.

On November 21, 1995, the House passed H.R. 2606 offered by the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. HEFLEY] which would deny funds for the Bosnian mission unless specifically appropriated by Congress. The bill passed 243 to 171, but the measure failed in the U.S. Senate.

Finally on December 13, 1995, the House passed the Buyer-Skelton measure which reiterated the body's opposition to the deployment of ground troops. At that time the President indicated that the Bosnian deployment would last about 1 year. On September 15, 1996, the Committee on National Security heard testimony from former Assistant Secretary of Defense John White who stated, "IFOR will complete

the withdrawal of all troops in the weeks immediately after December 20, 1996 on a schedule set by the NATO commanders."

As we now know, immediately following the Presidential election, the President extended the mission in Bosnia until June of 1998 and renamed from IFOR to SFOR which stands for sustainment force.

On November 22, 1996, I attended a hearing of the Committee on International Relations. At that hearing the administration officials testified concerning the lack of progress in the civilian reconstruction efforts that have been experienced since the Dayton accords were signed. IFOR and now SFOR has accomplished the military mission of ceasing hostilities in the region. However, a May 1997 GAO report indicates that "while the task of implementing the civil aspects of the Dayton agreement has begun, transition to an effective multi-ethnic government has not occurred."

The report goes on to say that Bosnia remains politically and ethnically divided. The limited progress to date has been due principally to the failure of the political leaders of Bosnia's three major ethnic groups to embrace political and social reconstruction and to fulfill their obligations under the Dayton agreements.

IFOR and SFOR has accomplished their mission, but the civilian leadership of the region and the international community in general have failed to make sufficient progress on reconstruction and reconciliation. The time is near for the United States to withdraw its ground forces from the region. Likewise, the time has come for the European nations to meet the challenge of rebuilding the Balkans.

We in Congress have a dual responsibility. We must ensure the support of the peace process with the military forces and what I envision we will discuss here this afternoon is the over-the-horizon case. We want to work with our European allies to do exactly that.

Mr. Chairman, I want to share with all my colleagues that I believe some of the problems that we are facing today in fact was inked in the Dayton accords. When the Dayton accords were signed, we came in and we just separated the parties. Rather than focusing on some of the problems, we said, "Well, we'll delay them, we'll deal with them later." The parties right now are hunkered down and they are in the posture of deny and delay. That is why the Dayton accords has set forth a problem that we are facing today. When it is ill-conceived, improperly defined, and highly dangerous, it leads to the open commitment of ground troops.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA].

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, as most Members know, I have been involved in this issue for the entire

length of time that the United States became aware of what was going on in Bosnia, and I realize there is an amazing difference between all of us about when troops should have been deployed and when they should not. I can remember vividly the debate on the floor of the House after the Dayton accord. There were predictions there would be American troops brought back in body bags. There were predictions that there would be a disastrous deployment for U.S. forces. When it started out, it looked like that was going to happen. President Clinton, against a lot of advice, made one of the most courageous decisions of his Presidency. He worked out an agreement, he put U.S. forces in conjunction with other forces under NATO on the ground.

I am not one that believes that U.S. forces could have stopped this fighting before an agreement. I believe we had to have an agreement. But the truth has been that everything that has happened since the agreement has been positive. We have not lost one single American soldier from hostile fire. We have not had one person come back in a body bag from hostile fire. What happened before was just unmitigated killing by both sides. They hated each other. Once the accord was done, they were worn out, they decided that the territory was settled by the war itself and they are trying to reassimilate themselves.

□ 1630

The last time I was there, more agriculture than we had ever seen before, unemployment was down 50 percent in Sarajevo. Employment is coming back. People are starting to renew their lives.

The day that I went in, one of the last times I went in, the Dayton Accord was just signed, and it was a quiet night, and I stayed in the hotel there because we could not get out of Sarajevo before dark. They said, well, only 4000 rounds were fired. Now that was the day before the Dayton Accord. Since that time there has not been any rounds fired, there has been nobody killed. It is almost as if some Members or some people wish something would happen.

And I know that I am not suggesting that anybody has that motive. I know that all of us are trying to protect American forces. The thing that worries me: If we put into place either of these amendments that we say firmly under the law we take away the flexibility of the President of the United States.

And we cannot argue with the results of what the President has done; the President has been successful. One of the reasons is because of the tremendous work of the troops. We have given the troops the responsibility to carry out their mission, we have not interfered. We do not want to interfere in this. Do they understand what they are doing? Do they appreciate what they are doing?

I went to an outpost, one of the foremost outposts in Bosnia, and I went into what they called the slaughter house, and they showed me a room where nothing but bodies was in when they first went in there. There had been a mass killing in that particular room. They had cleaned it up, they put whitewash on the walls, but they left one small bloody hand print on that porous wall, and they took every single soldier that came to that outpost to see that small bloody hand print because they wanted the soldiers to know why they were there.

I believe that the Europeans should be able to handle this themselves. I said it for 4 or 5 years while the fighting was going on. But they begged us to take a leadership position.

Nobody else has logistics capability, the administrative capability or the leadership and experience capability the United States has, and our military has done a marvelous job. I think we make a substantial mistake if we put any kind of a time limitation in law.

There is nobody wants to get them out more than I do. Nobody believes that the June date should be adhered to more than I do. I just do not believe we should put an arbitrary time limit, and I would request that the Members think very seriously, whatever motive we have, think very seriously about putting in law a time limitation, and I would ask the Members to vote against this time limitation.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. HILLEARY].

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, we have all heard about how difficult it is for Congress to get clear answers from the administration on the current situation or exit strategy in Bosnia. Congress needs to regain control of this situation. The compromise substitute amendment I am offering, the Hilleary-Condit-Kasich-Jones-Frank amendment, would accomplish three major objectives:

It commits the United States to leave Bosnia by December 31, 1997, unless the President requests and Congress approves a 180-day extension. Should that happen, and I find it likely that it would, frankly, the date for the final withdrawal of all U.S. Armed Forces would be June 30, 1998. It also prohibits DOD spending for law enforcement and related activities by U.S. troops. This averts the mission creep that caused heavy casualties against United States soldiers in Somalia. It also prepares the Europeans to assume the mission. Rather than accept the self-fulfilling prophecy that the Europeans cannot do the mission, the legislation will require the executive branch to report on steps being taken to restore the Europeans to their appropriate role, deficiencies in our allies' capabilities and steps being taken to remedy those deficiencies.

It is way past time, Mr. Chairman, for Congress to get a handle on this spending and to protect the men and

women in the military who signed up to defend our national security, not police the world. Let us bring our troops home from Bosnia. I urge all my colleagues to vote for the Hilleary-Condit-Kasich-Jones-Frank bipartisan compromise amendment later this afternoon.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, let us slow it down and think about what it is we are doing. There are 2 amendments before the body that call for a date certain of withdrawing Americans troops. The previous speaker in the well said we should not be the police officer to the world. I agree. Let us talk about where we are.

We are in a period that is so unique we have not come up with a name for it. We simply call it the post cold war era. But it is an era that is defined by change and difference and transition, and, as I have said on more than one occasion, both challenge and opportunity. In this period America has just begun to internalize and learn about, accept, play the role of peacekeeper, peacemaker, peace enforcer. This has not been part of the American lexicon: peacekeeping, peacemaking. This is all new to us. We are learning and evolving.

The first practical reality of setting a date, I would challenge anyone here: Does the human condition lend itself to a date certain? Does it?

What was happening that caused us to be in Bosnia in the first place?

I want to remind my colleagues 250,000 people were killed, 13,000 of them children, women raped, beaten and brutalized, and I said, Mr. Chairman, to many of my colleagues who did not want America to play the role of peacekeeper in Bosnia because it, A, was not in our national security interests, and I went back and looked at the record of the discussion and debate when 6 million Jews were being killed in the context of Nazi Germany. People were saying, "There is nothing we should do; it's not in our national security interests."

But Members who were on the floor in the context of this debate said, "If I were there during that period of time, I would have stood up and challenged the murder of 6 million people."

Well, do my colleagues know what that did? That let me know where my colleagues' moral compass is. If 6 million people die, one could be morally outraged. So now we are dickering at what the bottom line is: Five million? Three million? Two million? Can we get outraged morally because 250,000 people died and we are the major, the one, superpower standing?

So some of us said, yes, we have a moral obligation, that that is in our national interest to stop the killing and the maiming. At what point do human beings move beyond the folly of murdering and killing each other as a way of solving problems? At what point do we move beyond that bizarre and

barbaric way of solving human problems as a civilized society?

So we said yes, peacekeeping. But remember we did not walk in. What happened? The parties to the killing and the maiming came to this country, in Dayton, Ohio, sat down around a table for days, and they worked out a peace agreement. Maybe not perfect; who am I to know? But these are people who were killing each other, maiming each other, murdering and raping each other, and they went to the table and they hammered out a peace agreement.

And then they came to us as the great superpower committed to compassion, human rights, justice and peace and all the things we write down, and they said, "Look. Here is a peace agreement. It's not perfect, but we hammered it out in your country on your soil. But we don't quite still trust each other. This is because they killed my parents, I killed theirs; they killed my children, I killed theirs; we killed each others' neighbors. And so for a while we do not quite trust each other. So will you and other nations in the world help us to make the peace real? Be peacemakers? Peacekeepers? Keep us apart for a while? Let us begin to build the necessary conditions that would allow a warm peace, a real peace."

As my colleagues know, as someone much more eloquent than this gentleman once said, the fascinating thing about peace is we do not have to make peace with our friends, we make peace with our enemies, and peace is hard because it is about making peace with somebody that killed and maimed people, and killed and maimed their children, their parents, their friends, their relatives, their neighbors. So we need some help.

So we stood up for this country, but if I remember the circumstances, my colleagues, this body did not. This body went on record, as one of my colleagues pointed out, saying that the President should come to the Congress for prior approval. As my colleagues know, I believe in that. I am a man of peace. I believe in peace. But I am a hawk when it comes to preserving Congress' prerogatives on the issue of the deployment of our troops.

I sued President Bush when he thought he could go to the Persian Gulf and violate the rights of the Congress to declare and to make war, rendering impotent 500,000 people that I represent. And thank God that Members joined with us and a decision was made, not in the court, but a ruling that made the President say maybe on sober reflection I ought to come to the Congress. Even the most incredible pundits in America said this was Congress' greatest moment when it stood up and debated whether we should or should not go. We did not do this on Bosnia; we let the President go, we passed the thing, a piece of paper that said we support the troops.

I believe that this is the wrong debate, it ought to be Congress militant

about congressional powers when it comes to the deployment of troops, but we ought to be there on the front end, have heart, have courage, stand up and say, yes, they ought to go; no, they should not go. But do not wait until they are there and then say date certain, withdrawal. That is on the tail-end of the discussion. Where is the courage in all of that?

I join my colleagues in standing here saying, "Mr. President, whenever you're going to put troops out there in harm's way, you come to us. Article I, Section 8, the Constitution, gives us that right," and if that is not clear in the context of the post-cold war world, then let us pick up the War Powers Act, which I think is an impotent and incompetent instrument to guide us through the post-cold war era. Let us rewrite it so that it speaks to the reality of the world that we presently live in.

But this is not the way, at the end to pick out a date, to say we have got to withdraw. We did not have the courage to step up to it in the first place; that is where Congress should assert itself; that is the correct debate.

Now, Mr. Chairman, there are practical realities. This is not just a struggle between the President and the Congress. There are practical realities to our withdrawal. I cite one.

The Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that many of us talk about, we want to speak about the troops. This is our highest-ranking military person who wrote with respect to date certain the following, and I quote in part from a letter, a joint letter, dated May of this year:

"We remain committed to a June 1998 withdrawal date. However we strongly oppose statutorily mandating withdrawal of United States forces from the NATO-led stabilization force by that date or indeed any specific date."

I go further. "A fixed withdrawal date will restrict U.S. commanders' flexibility, encourage our opponents, opponents meaning people who oppose the peace process who want to pursue violence and undermine the important psychological advantage U.S. troops enjoy. Our forces must be able to proceed with the minimum of risk to U.S. personnel. Legislating their redeployment schedule would completely change the dynamics on the ground and could undercut troop safety."

Now we are in the wrong part of the debate; my colleagues want to micromanage the discussion, did not have the heart to step up to it in the first place and say they should go or they should not go. So now we want to take political shots.

I walked in the door, heard people saying that our foreign policy ought to be nonpartisan. Our foreign policy ought to be bipartisan. We fight here, but when we leave these shores, we join hand and we have a bipartisan foreign policy.

What is this? What is this? Our own military people are saying, "You are

micromanaging, you are putting troops in harm's way"; these are our own military saying this.

□ 1645

We should debate it up front, go or do not go, but do not leave the micromanaging to the wrong side of the debate.

I would conclude with this. We went there on moral grounds, we went there to save human life. I thought that was a dignified, courageous and lofty thing to do. Now that we are there, they are going to go out in June of next year; I did not agree, the gentleman from Colorado said anybody who says we should not have a date certain, I did, because I knew that we were learning about peacekeeping. And that date certain may play a political game, but it does not deal with the reality. If one is about peace, one is about peace. If it takes 1 month, 1 year, 18 months, 2 years, we do it if we are committed to peace. Or if we are just committed to do a little political dance, then we walk away whenever we choose to walk away but not because we are committed to these ideals.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 20 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to try to see if we cannot put this whole thing in perspective, with all of the rhetoric on both sides of the issue here today in debating this question. The President of the United States set this date himself for withdrawal in the Dayton accords. Both of these amendments propose to give that same date as the date for withdrawal. One gives a different plan for getting up to the date.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. JONES].

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, United States troops in Bosnia have been forgotten. Clearly the saying, out of sight, out of mind, applies to our men and women in Bosnia. While many Americans were opposed to deploying U.S. troops to Bosnia, we found some comfort in knowing that our troops were to come home at the end of 1 year.

Well, Mr. Chairman, as we know, the President has broken his promise time and again and still will not commit to a withdrawal date. Enough is enough.

I am a supporter of national defense, and I believe our men and women in Bosnia are doing an extraordinary job under tough circumstances; but I am troubled by an operation with no congressional authorization, no congressional consultation. In fact, our only function is to pay the bill. It is time for Congress to play a role and support the Hilleary amendment to ensure the safe and orderly withdrawal of United States troops from Bosnia.

America has done its duty. Let us bring our troops home.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.

I would simply yield myself 30 seconds to say that this is a debate that takes us beyond rhetoric, and I think to use the term rhetoric is not advis-

able in the context of this debate. We are talking about life and death here, and to demean anyone's comments as rhetoric I think does not bode well.

We are intelligent people here. Let us lift the level of the discussion and the debate. I am not prepared to challenge anyone on rhetorical grounds here. I am prepared to challenge any Member of Congress on substantive grounds, and I would hope that my distinguished colleague on the other side of the aisle would move beyond using the term rhetoric. It is demeaning and it is inappropriate in the context of the debate that ought to take us to a much higher level.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. METCALF].

Mr. METCALF. Mr. Chairman, I opposed sending the troops to Bosnia. There was no critical U.S. interest involved, or, if there was, it escaped the notice of the President. He was never able to state it clearly.

I said over a year ago, it is easy to send troops in but very difficult to accomplish stability and exit in a safe, honorable, and timely way.

The President promised the troops out by December 1996. Now he says June 30, 1998. Why should this Congress not set a date certain and hold him to it? I support bringing the troops home December 1997, that is the Hilleary amendment. If that fails, then I think we should set an absolute deadline of June 1998.

Congress must not continue to acquiesce to the President and allow him to leave our troops in Bosnia indefinitely. Both amendments give the President and our allies ample flexibility and notice that U.S. troops will be withdrawn.

I urge every one of my colleagues to support the Hilleary amendment, of which I am a cosponsor; and if that is unsuccessful, support the Buyer amendment.

There are many good reasons, but the cost alone, \$7 billion already, demands that Congress do its duty, support the troops by bringing them home by a date certain.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. ENGEL], my distinguished colleague.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding me this time.

I want to just say that I think that we ought not to tie the President's hands, and we ought not to say that beyond a certain date certain our troops ought to go home.

The people, our colleagues who are now saying that we ought to set a fixed date, are the same people who predicted dire disaster and dire consequences if the President sent troops to Bosnia. That has not happened. In fact, we can be proud of what our American troops have done in Bosnia. We have saved thousands upon thousands upon thousands of lives.

Until the United States got involved, people were killing each other, men,

women, children; there was no end to the carnage. Since the United States has been there, we have helped bring peace to the region. It was only when the United States got involved that peace came. When our European allies were doing it, peace did not come; it was elusive. It was only when the United States got involved that we put an end to the carnage.

I am proud of the role that we play. The United States is the leader of the free world, and sometimes we have to act like leaders of the free world. It does not mean that we need to be the policeman of the world or we need to rush to every incident in the world, but here, in Bosnia, it became crystal clear that, without United States help and intervention, the carnage was not going to end.

So my colleagues who are now saying, let us get out, let us pull people out, are the ones that did not want us to go there in the first place. They said that there would be many, many American casualties; they said that it would be a disaster; they said that we would not be able to do the job. We have proven them wrong. It has not been a disaster. Thankfully, there have not been tremendous amounts of American casualties, virtually no American casualties.

I went to Bosnia last year with then-Secretary of Defense Bill Perry; I saw firsthand how our troops were doing. I saw firsthand the precautions that were being taken to ensure the safety of American troops. I was proud to walk with our soldiers. I was proud to see the role we were playing and the job we were doing.

The naysayers said it could not happen. They were wrong. Let us leave it the way it is. The President has done a very good job. He is not going to let our troops stay 1 day more than they have to stay. He is thinning down the amount of troops that will be there. He is saying that we intend to get out by June 1998. But we cannot foresee the consequences of what might happen down the road.

Do we need to set a date certain to send a message to the parties there that we are definitely getting out come hell or high water? No. We cannot do that, and we should not do that, and it would be imprudent to do that.

I have letters here that I am sure my colleagues got from General Shalikashvili, from Secretary of Defense Cohen, from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and they all say the same thing: Do not tie our hands. We are thinning out the troops. There are going to be less American troops. Our allies in Europe are going to be playing a major role. This is not the time to do it.

I am proud of the role that the United States has played. Let us not tie the President's hands.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. BRYANT].

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time on this very serious debate.

First of all, let me say that I join in all of my colleagues in this House in support of our troops, the 8,000-plus soldiers in Bosnia and for the outstanding job they are doing. We are hearing testimony to that today of the record they have there and the job they are doing, and again, without war-related casualties. That is great.

I think, though, that when many of us considered this debate in the beginning, we had great hesitancy and philosophical differences in sending our soldiers over there when we felt that America's national interests were not at stake. Many of us continue to have those doubts, but yet, we received some comfort when we made that vote and when ultimately our soldiers were sent over there that there would be deadlines. There would actually be goals to be accomplished with our troops over there, putting their lives and limbs at issue. But yet, we seem to be going down that path of open-endedness. We do not see that goal, that end in sight any longer.

We resist the idea that our soldiers ought not have that, especially when we are carrying the heavy weight there. We are carrying the water over there. At a time when we are having to downsize our military forces, our national defense; at a time when we are having to go back in and work on salvaging the morale of our soldiers and we have soldiers in some cases that are being paid so little they are on food stamps, and when they are training in this country, the training for the job they are supposed to be doing, not just being a policeman in Bosnia, but they are actually trained to do other jobs in case we have to defend ourselves. That is suffering. The equipment that we give these soldiers, we have to pay for that.

When we are having to divert money from those types of good things to support a police-keeping effort that seems to be endless in Bosnia, many of us have great concerns there. We believe it is the right thing to do at this point. We do not want to tie hands, but we want a definite date certain for our soldiers and our taxpayers.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Hampshire [Mr. BASS].

Mr. BASS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER] and the amendment offered by the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. HILLEARY] concerning the need to set a schedule to get our troops out of Bosnia by a date certain. I just want to say that this position in no way diminishes my outrage at the alleged atrocities that have been committed in this region, as was so eloquently described by my colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], and it in no way diminishes my concern and commitment to ensure that our troops re-

main safe and secure as they defend our interests over in that area.

But let me just point out that the United States has never been able to successfully mediate civil wars around the world. I would only point out, for example, what happened to us in Bosnia, what happened to us in Lebanon and, as we all know, what happened to us in Vietnam. We are good at stopping incursions and defending countries and then leaving, but we are not good at mediating civil wars, and that is precisely what is going on in the Balkan region.

I know the President wants to get us out of Bosnia in a reasonable period of time, but it just is not going to be possible without the help and support of Congress. Now, the Buyer amendment gets us out in the middle of next year, which is when the President now says he is going to get us out of the area. The Hilleary amendment calls for a date certain at the end of this year with a congressional resolution thereafter. This will get us out of a situation that is costing us anywhere from \$5 million to \$10 million a day. We can work together with the President to end this incursion and do so in an orderly and successful fashion.

So I support both the Buyer amendment and the Hilleary amendment. I think that it is time for Congress to step forward and definitively provide an exit strategy for our troop involvement in the Balkan region.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH], the chairman of the Committee on the Budget.

□ 1700

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I was in the Congress the weekend when the bombing of our barracks in Beirut took place. It was a sobering event for all the American people. I think it was during that period that we began to determine that we needed a good set of rules that the country could follow when it came to putting our people in harm's way.

Soon after the tragedy in Beirut, then-Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger came out with more or less a set of rules that would guide the United States as they intervened around the world: Is there an achievable goal; is there an exit strategy; does it have public support; and is it in the direct, vital national interest of the United States? One thing he did not ask is what is the role of our allies. But in the post-cold war period, it is absolutely essential that we ask, what is the role of our allies?

First of all, in regard to Bosnia, is there an achievable goal? Let me maintain that I do not believe there is. In fact, when we study the region of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is pretty clear that pre-19th century, the parties had engaged in warfare. The region has not been stable since before the 19th century. Pre-19th century all the way up to the end of the 20th century has indicated that the parties in that region

have not been able to create a stable environment. In fact, it was only under the brutal iron fist of President Tito that the parties were able to remain in some kind of a stable relationship.

I am uncertain as to whether there is a stable goal of being able to provide some kind of a Democratic environment in this region. But nevertheless, the United States intervened and separated the warring parties and stopped the slaughter that was going on, so the United States has done its job, the job it set out to do, to separate the warring parties. Many of us had a lot of questions about whether that was right at the time, but nevertheless, we went, we did our job. Now what remains to keep the peace is for our allies who we have protected for 50 years to continue to patrol the streets of Sarajevo and Bosnia.

If we worked with our allies for the last 50 years to put them in a position to be able to stop the advance of Soviet tanks across the Fulda Gap in a major armored invasion, is it not likely that our European allies would be able to patrol the streets of Sarajevo and keep the peace? I say yes. But I say they will not do it until we make sure that they are in the place of being forced to do it.

Of course they want us to do their job. The fact is, this is a vote on telling our allies to step up to the plate and do what they were intended to do, what we trained them to do over the course of the last 50 years.

Is it in the direct national interest? I have not heard that case made. I have not heard that case made by the administration, I have not heard that case made by any of our defense intellectuals as to how the United States being in Sarajevo today is in the direct national interest of the United States.

We want the President to have that opportunity. Under the Hilleary amendment he would be forced to make the case as to why we should be there. He should do it, he must do it, the same way George Bush made the case. As we got ready to go to war against Saddam Hussein, Secretary Baker called me at home and said, what is your view as to whether we should have a vote in the Congress? I said absolutely, we must have the vote. So if it is in the direct national interest, let us have the President lay it out and let us vote on it.

Now, what about the question of allies? I think they can do the job, Mr. Chairman. The United States under the Hilleary amendment is prepared to offer the logistical and technical support they need in order to do the job, for them to be able to accomplish their objective in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mr. Chairman, let me suggest I worry about our troops. I worry about the military being sent into a mission that is not well-defined, that I question is achievable, that is fuzzy.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER].

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] for yielding time to me.

I understand the frustration the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] had in trying to explain his position in 5 minutes. All of us are constrained by time, but we ought to be constrained by good judgment on this issue as well.

Yes, there was an issue as to whether or not we ought to deploy troops in Bosnia. There was concern. The President brought together at Dayton a new paradigm, if you will, to borrow from the Bush administration, and that paradigm was that we were going to be peacekeepers and peacemakers. We obviously have the ability to make war, but we were going to use our might to, yes, as Chairman KASICH has indicated, separate the parties, bring genocide to a close, and to, yes, put at risk some of our people.

We did so in the context of large force so our people would be protected. That, in my opinion, made sense. I believe, Mr. Chairman, however, that it would not make sense at this point in time to set dates certain. Many Members in this body have talked to General Joulwan and other leaders of our military in NATO and in our own forces.

They do not believe, as I think perhaps the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA] have already stated, that a date certain is in the best interests of the United States, of the date on peace accords, or the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or, in fact, the *Srpska Republic*.

I would urge my colleagues to continue to express their desires that we, as the President wants to do, extricate ourselves in a timely fashion, but let us not set a date certain so that we will in fact freeze in place the opponents of a Democratic, peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Balkans and simply try to outwait the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I again I thank the ranking member, the chairman in exile, for yielding me the time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, if you believe in one of the notions that one of my colleagues asserted, that people cannot move to peace because for years they have been killing each other, then we would still believe in the divine right of kings and the right of people to buy and sell other human beings as chattel. We have moved beyond that. People can evolve. The human condition can evolve. People can grow. People can move, Mr. Chairman, and I believe that very sincerely.

Mr. Chairman, at one point war was the dominant paradigm on this planet. The great gift we can give to our children and our children's children is to move beyond that war-making para-

digm. I believe that in the context of the post-cold war world, the scenarios we are more likely to encounter are the Somalias, the Haitis, the Rwandas, the Bosnias of the world. I believe right before our very eyes our warriors are transitioning to peacekeepers and peacemakers and peace enforcers.

It may be difficult for us to put our minds around that idea because our peacekeepers still look like warriors, they still dress as warriors, they still carry warriors' weapons, and in many ways they are trained like warriors. But this is a new world, a new day. We are moving beyond the paradigm of bombing and killing and maiming.

The world is more likely to be peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement. Because of that transition it is imperative that we as a major power on this planet learn about peacekeeping, peacemaking. Mr. Chairman, one thing we learned in our hearings, in looking at the question of peacekeeping in a post-cold war world, was that an important set of principles as a peacekeeper were make no enemies, take no sides. In Somalia we learned that the hard way. In Bosnia we have learned. No one has died.

I find it incredible that many of the same people who want to pull us out of peacekeeping would like, would be much quicker to carry us into war, where we really would harm and kill and maim. I do not understand that concept.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I will sum up. This whole question of Bosnia comes down to this. If we look at history, this thing first got started, and our President said all along, on numerous occasions over a period of years, that we would put no ground troops in Bosnia. We were doing different things, as Members know, on and off in that effort. But he kept reiterating, we would not ever put ground troops in Bosnia.

Then, of course, he did, along with the Dayton accord, so-called, the agreement was made that we would go and send ground troops along with NATO troops to Bosnia. That was back in 1996. He said at that time that we would be out in a year, and that year passed, and then the election came about and he transferred it on out another year, and said we would be out then, this time, in June of 1998.

That is the date we are talking about in both of these amendments, as I was trying to say earlier. With the talk that we hear back and forth on both sides, the fact still remains we have two amendments to consider today. Both of them just hold the President to his own date to withdraw in June of 1998. One of them is just a plain vote on getting out in June 1998, with some follow-on efforts being made by our people after that time.

The other one starts back 6 months before June 1998 and it tells the President to tell us what your plans for withdrawal are during the next 6

months in getting our people out, so you have a withdrawal plan and we would know about it. But both amendments, I reiterate, hold the President to his own declared deadline.

The reason this comes up today, this issue, is because on so many occasions before, the President has set a deadline and then did not go by it. As a matter of fact, he went into Bosnia in the first place without the agreement of Congress and the American people. All the polls showed overwhelmingly that the American people were opposed to it. Congress was opposed to it. He did it anyway. This is the first meaningful vote we will have, the Congress will have, to express itself on this whole issue. In the meantime, we have spent a lot of money and a lot of effort, and we still have a real problem before us.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in part 1 of House Report 105-137.

AMENDMENT NO. 8 OFFERED BY MR. BUYER

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 8.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment numbered 8 offered by Mr. BUYER:

Strike out section 1201(b) (page 373, line 4, through page 375, line 15).

At the end of title XII (page 379, after line 19), insert the following new sections:

SEC. 1205. UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA.

(a) LIMITATION.—Funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of Defense may not be obligated for the deployment of any ground elements of the United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina after—

(1) June 30, 1998; or

(2) such later date as may be specifically prescribed by law after the date of the enactment of this Act, based upon a request from the President or otherwise as the Congress may determine.

(b) EXCEPTIONS.—The limitation in subsection (a) shall not apply to the extent necessary to support (1) a limited number of United States military personnel sufficient only to protect United States diplomatic facilities in existence on the date of the enactment of this Act, and (2) noncombat military personnel sufficient only to advise the commanders North Atlantic Treaty Organization peacekeeping operations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(c) CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION.—Nothing in this section shall be deemed to restrict the authority of the President under the Constitution to protect the lives of United States citizens.

SEC. 1206. LIMITATION ON SUPPORT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN BOSNIA.

None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended after the date of the enactment of this Act for the conduct of, or direct support for, law enforcement activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, except for the training of law enforcement personnel or to prevent imminent loss of life.

SEC. 1207. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONDITIONS IN BOSNIA.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than December 15, 1997, the President shall submit to Congress

a report on the political and military conditions in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter in this section referred to as Bosnia-Herzegovina). Of the funds available to the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 1998 for the operation of United States ground forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina during that fiscal year, no more than 60 percent may be expended before the report is submitted.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report under subsection (a) shall include a discussion of the following:

(1) An identification of the specific steps taken by the United States Government to transfer the United States portion of the peacekeeping mission in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to European allied nations or organizations.

(2) A detailed discussion of the proposed role and involvement of the United States in supporting peacekeeping activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina following the withdrawal of United States ground forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to section 1205.

(3) A detailed explanation and timetable for carrying out the President's commitment to withdraw all United States ground forces from Bosnia-Herzegovina by the end of June 1998, including the planned date of commencement and completion of the withdrawal.

(4) The date on which the transition from the multinational force known as the Stabilization Force to the planned multinational successor force to be known as the Deterrence Force will occur and how the decision as to that date will impact the estimates of costs associated with the operation of United States ground forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina during fiscal year 1998 as contained in the President's budget for fiscal year 1998.

(5) The military and political considerations that will affect the decision to carry out such a transition.

(6) Any plan to maintain or expand other Bosnia-related operations (such as the operation designated as Operation Deliberate Guard) if tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain sufficient to delay the transition from the Stabilization Force to the Deterrence Force and the estimated cost associated with each such operation.

(7) Whether allied nations participating in the Bosnia mission have similar plans to increase and maintain troop strength or maintain ground forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, if so, the identity of each such country and a description of that country's plans.

(c) STABILIZATION FORCE DEFINED.—As used in this section, the term "Stabilization Force" (referred to as "SFOR") means the follow-on force to the Implementation Force (known as "IFOR") in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries in the region, authorized under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1008 (December 12, 1996).

Page 371, line 25, strike out "(1)".

Page 372, line 8, strike out "(2) For purposes of this paragraph," and insert in lieu thereof "(b) COVERED UNITED STATES FORCES.—For purposes of this section,".

Page 372, line 15, strike out "(3) and insert in lieu thereof "(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—"

Page 372, beginning on line 16, strike out "paragraph (1), for each activity identified in that paragraph" and insert in lieu thereof "subsection (a), for each activity identified under that subsection".

Page 372, line 18, strike out "(A)" and insert in lieu thereof "(1)".

Page 372, line 20, strike out "(B)" and insert in lieu thereof "(2)".

Page 372, line 23, strike out "(C)" and insert in lieu thereof "(3)".

Page 373, line 1, strike out "(4) The first report under paragraph (1)" and insert in lieu thereof "(d) SUBMISSION OF REPORTS.—The first report under subsection (a)".

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER] and a Member opposed each will control 10 minutes.

The gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] will control the 10 minutes in opposition.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER].

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I have enjoyed the substance of this debate. I would like to comment to the ranking member when he made mention that people have the capacity to evolve and that the human condition can change. I agree. What we are trying to do here is change the way the United States and our allies in Europe have had a relationship over the last 50 years.

They are in a comfort zone. They like the United States' security blanket. They like that. What we are trying to do here and say, as the United States is the sole remaining superpower, I believe as a foreign policy that we should be there to provide regional stability, and our regional allies should be there to ensure stability within their region when there is no possibility of destabilizing that region.

We can debate whether or not Bosnia in fact would destabilize Europe. That is debatable. But what we are trying to do here is evolve that human change the gentleman is talking about: How do we get our allies to be major players in this one?

When I mentioned earlier about an over the horizon, 18 months ago when we had this debate I also wanted durable peace in Bosnia. We can get into the moral obligation and talk about the peace. There is not anybody who wants the killing or the ethnic cleansing.

□ 1715

What we want is for Europe to take the lead. We have learned, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA] was very articulate, that Europe was not able to take the lead there. They were there with the United Nations and they felt inept.

So when the United States exercised some leadership, compliments to Bill Clinton. But I find myself in a very awkward position. I led the debate on the House floor saying no to ground troops. Now I come to the House floor saying, Mr. President, I will move to codify his date to withdraw. There are some Members on this side of the aisle and on that side of aisle that say, let us get them out in December. I now have to come to the House floor and say, whoa, time out. I think what we should do is be rational here. We want to send a message to our European allies, keep our commitments to our international agreements, and how do we move toward the President's date of June 30,

1998? It is the President's date. It is not my date. But I want to back up the President with his foreign policy and his commitments, and I want our allies in Europe to take the lead. You say, this is NATO. You are right. But over the horizon what I mean is for the U.S. presence, for us to be there with our air power, our sea power, our logistics by air and sea to provide our intelligence through our architecture. We are right there in Hungary.

But when we talk about what will we envision, two things I wanted to ask of this President. First, I want his plan for withdrawal. And second, after June 30, 1998, what is his plan for the follow-on force? What is there after SFOR? And under Dayton, it asked for an international police force. Are the U.S. troops going to participate in that? That gets into the mission creep issues at hand.

So I have got some pretty strong concerns. That is why we want that plan, and that is what the Buyer amendment is about, codifying, and for those two reports.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond.

The last comment the gentleman made, I totally agree. I think the report requirements here are important. I believe that there ought to be consultation. The President ought to be forthcoming with us about what is on the other side. What I am arguing is that we should not codify a date certain for both the political and the practical and the diplomatic reasons that I have already enunciated several different times.

I do not disagree with the gentleman's last statement. We ought to know what is on the other side of June 1998. I am simply saying, putting a date certain into legislation raises a number of significant and serious problems, but I think what the gentleman is trying to do is valid. I just think this particular vehicle is inappropriate. I am not challenging the gentleman at that level.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. LANTOS].

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding the time to me.

I would like to put this debate in somewhat of a historic perspective. When the history of the 20th century will be written from the vantage point of 100 years from now, the Bush administration will deserve and will get a great deal of credit for its performance in the Persian Gulf. It represented American leadership at its best. And the Bush administration will get enormous blame for its pathetic failure in preventing this tragedy that has unfolded in Yugoslavia, following the great victory in the Persian Gulf war.

Publicly, publicly and privately, many of us cautioned the administration that what was called for in 1991 was to use the deterrent capability of

NATO which would have prevented the death of a quarter million innocent human beings, the creation of 1½ million refugees, and material damage running into the tens of billions of dollars.

The Clinton administration, after a wobbly start, got it right. We are now in the process of destroying what has been gained since Dayton.

You do not telegraph your punches. This region is not inherently unstable. It is a misreading of history that these people have been at each other's throats for centuries. That is simply not the case. Throughout most of the period, there was stability and peace. There are ethnic complexities which create great difficulties, but it is a myth which is being perpetuated on the floor of the House today that these people simply cannot live together.

Just a few days ago, some of us advocated that one of the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia, be admitted to NATO now. I look forward to the time that all of the former constituent republics of Yugoslavia will be admitted into NATO and they will be admitted into the European Union.

To telegraph our punch now, that on June 30, 1998, everything ceases, is guaranteed to undermine NATO cohesion, NATO solidarity, the participation of our friends and allies, and, the most likely, outbreak of violence, hostility, and bloodshed again.

Have we not learned enough from the tragedy of the last few years? Did we not see enough pictures on television of children being massacred in Yugoslavia in the very heart of Europe so as not to advocate neoisolationism, which this proposal is. It is obvious that all those who want to break the peace which exists in the region would love to see nothing more than every single American soldier withdrawn on June 30, 1998. That would be the guaranteed commencement of the new outbreak of hostilities. To tell our NATO allies that this is your job completely misunderstands the nature of NATO. NATO is a collective security system. We do not unilaterally tell our NATO allies what we will and will not do. We have assumed some obligations when we joined NATO. It is now our responsibility to carry through with our obligation.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes and 30 seconds to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON], a member of the committee and a co-author of this amendment.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, we have a very interesting and telling decision before us, the three choices that may be made in all of this Bosnia business today. The first is to adopt an amendment, which I oppose, to take our troops out by the end of December of this year. That would be wrong. No. 1, that is rushing to judgment. No. 2, that would be in violation of what our President has openly stated.

The other is to leave the commitment open. To do so raises the issue as

to whether our European allies will be ready, will take up of gauntlet and perform the duties we have been urging them and wanting them to do and take care of the European problems themselves now that we have shown them the way and given them the leadership.

The other problem with the open-ended commitment is the operational tempo of our young troops, and I am immensely, immensely proud of them. But with the downsizing that we have already had of particularly the U.S. Army, the young soldiers will be meeting themselves going and coming.

The middle ground, I believe, is to accept the word of our President and to adopt the date that he suggested.

Mr. Chairman, over the past few years I have addressed this body no less than seven times regarding U.S. involvement in the region in southeast Europe. In March 1993, warning of the 1,000-year-old nature of tension in the region, I advocated American involvement in the form of organizing and leading a concert of nations for a regional peace. I called for a diplomatically focused coalition-building effort and advocated U.S. military involvement, involvement limited to the peripheral but essential roles of logistical support, intelligence, command and control, and communications; in the air and on the sea.

In December 1995, with the impending deployment of 20,000 American ground troops to that region, I appealed to this body to remember the importance of impartiality. I quoted the U.S. Army Field Manual: "Peacekeeping requires an impartial, even-handed approach." I voiced my angst that, as American peacekeepers, our sons and daughters posited themselves inside a centuries-old, three-sided conflict, just as America pledged to assist, train and equip one faction.

During the spring and summer campaigns of 1995, parity was reached between the armor-heavy Serbs and the infantry-heavy Croat-Muslim Federation. The combined forces of the Federation pushed the enemy from the Bihac region back towards the Sava and the Drina Rivers.

We have been fortunate. In 1997, we can be proud of our military personnel for their efforts and accomplishments. They have been professional and dedicated in their military duties. We have overseen a separation of the warring parties and a cessation of hostilities. We have allowed political reform to begin and refugee settlement to occur. We have led as no other Nation than America can.

Keeping our troops there until the end of June 1998 will be the best and correct thing.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, how much time remains on both sides in the debate?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] has 5½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER] has 3 minutes

remaining. The gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], has the right to close.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], chairman of the Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me, and I rise in support of the amendment by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER].

Mr. Chairman, in debating United States policy toward Bosnia, we have to begin with a candid assessment of where current administration policy is taking us. It is leading us apparently to another Cyprus.

Since 1974, U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed along the so-called green line in Cyprus, an artificial boundary separating Christian and Muslim communities that used to be able to live together as one nation. There is no end in sight of that peacekeeping operation.

Mr. Chairman, we do not want to be involved in another Cyprus, this time in the infamous tinderbox of Europe, the Balkan peninsula. As everyone knows, the President disregarded the deadline he initially set for the withdrawal of United States forces from Bosnia and predictably we now see signs that the second deadline is beginning to slip.

None of us should have any doubt that in the end the President may have to renege on his second deadline, just as he did on the first, unless we step in and hold him to his word. He will renege not because he is trying deliberately to mislead us but because he has become a prisoner of a policy that just will not work, a policy that can lead our Nation to only one place, to a Cyprus in the Balkans.

We need to help the President out of this quagmire. We need to help him remain true to his word. I know that some say that June 1998 is too far in the future. So the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. HILLEARY] has offered a perfecting amendment to move the deadline up to January 1998.

While I am sympathetic to the Hilleary amendment, ultimately we must recognize that it is unrealistic. It is going to be very hard to enact any funding cutoff for United States forces in Bosnia. We do stand a reasonable chance of enacting the withdrawal date that the President himself has promised. An earlier date almost certainly could not be enacted.

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We should not pick a fight that we cannot win. Instead, let us defy opponents of the June withdrawal date to explain to us today why the President must have flexibility to break for the second time his solemn commitment.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to defeat the Hilleary

amendment and approve the Buyer amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by Mr. BUYER, and I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

In debating United States policy toward Bosnia, we have to begin with a candid assessment of where the current administration policy is leading us. It is leading to another Cyprus.

Since 1974, U.N. peacekeeping have been deployed along the so-called Green Line in Cyprus, an artificial boundary separating Christian and Muslim communities that used to be able to live together in one country. Every day since 1974, soldiers from Britain, Austria, and other countries have patrolled the Green Line. Every day for the last 23 years, these soldiers have been exposed to great risks, and many have been killed.

Even though no U.S. forces have participated in this operation, American taxpayers have paid approximately \$250 million over the years to keep the operation going. And worst of all, there's no end in sight. No one today can tell you when, if ever, the Cyprus peacekeeping mission will end.

Mr. Chairman, we do not want to be involved in another Cyprus, this time in the infamous "tinderbox of Europe"—the Balkan Peninsula—and this time involving a permanent commitment of United States ground forces.

Many of us in this chamber have struggled mightily for many years to avoid precisely this outcome.

Four years ago last month, in May 1993, I was proud to join the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. HYDE, as an original cosponsor of the first bill to end the unjust and illegal international arms embargo of Bosnia. We offered that legislation because we believed that the only way to stop the aggression and the violation of human rights that we were then witnessing in Bosnia was to create a military balance between the aggressors and the victims of aggression. We were confident that, in the absence of such a military balance, U.S. military intervention to stop the fighting would become inevitable.

For more than 2 years, we tried to pass that legislation. Finally, during the summer of 1995, we succeeded. Both we and the other body passed legislation ending the arms embargo, and in both bodies the legislation was approved by veto-proof margins.

So when the Congress left Washington for the August recess in 1995, the President had a problem. Congress had just repudiated his policy, and our legislation was sitting on his desk. Even though he had promised to veto it, he needed to do something to make sure that his veto would not be overridden.

His solution was to launch a simultaneous military and diplomatic offensive. NATO bombers were called into action in Bosnia, and Mr. Holbrooke was dispatched to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

The result was the Dayton Peace Accords.

The problem with the Dayton Accords was that they provided for precisely the result that so many of us had feared—a massive United States military intervention in Bosnia.

Many of us predicted that if our forces faithfully carried out their mandate under the Dayton Accords, they would end up in armed conflict with the parties and likely sustain significant casualties.

This prediction was never tested because in fact our forces never carried out those portions of their mandate that could have led to conflict with the parties, such as arresting war criminals and facilitating the return of refugees. Indeed, the failure to do these things, and similar things collectively referred to as "civilian implementation" of the Dayton Accords, is one of the main reasons why we are told that we cannot bring our forces home from Bosnia today.

Of course, many of us predicted at the time that once our forces went into Bosnia they would never get out.

The President solemnly assured us that we were wrong about this. He promised us that our forces would stay in Bosnia no more than 1 year. Indeed, in a letter to us dated December 13, 1995, he stated:

IFOR's basic military tasks should be completed within six months. During the remainder of the year, IFOR will continue to facilitate implementation of the peace agreement while preparing for and undertaking an orderly drawdown of forces.

Of course, 1 year later, the President had to take all this back. In a letter to us dated November 27, 1996, he stated:

... our achievements on the military side have not been matched by progress on the civilian side. It will take longer than we and our Allies anticipated for Bosnia's economic and political life to reach the point where an outside security presence is no longer required.

It would be necessary to extend the United States military presence in Bosnia by another 18 months, the President said, to June 1998. But this time he was serious about the deadline for withdrawing our forces. We know because he told us so in the letter: "The new mission in Bosnia should end in June of 1998, and the remaining forces will completely withdraw from Bosnia quickly thereafter."

We already see signs, of course, that this second deadline is slipping. The President's advisors are said to be in disagreement about whether and how to renege on the President's commitment. And none of us should have any doubt, that, in the end, the President will renege on his second deadline, just as he did on his first—unless we step in to hold him to his word.

He will renege, not because he is trying to deliberately mislead us, but because he has become a prisoner of a policy that will never work. A policy that can lead our nation to only to one place—to a Cyprus in the Balkans.

We need to help the President out of this quagmire. We need to help him remain true to his word, or at least his second word. That's what the Buyer amendment is about, and that's why I urge its adoption.

Now I know that some say that June 1998 is too far in the future. We would like to bring our forces home sooner than that. So the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. HILLEARY] has offered a perfecting amendment to move up the deadline to January of 1998.

While I am sympathetic to the Hilleary amendment, ultimately we must recognize that it is unrealistic.

The fact is that we are embarked on a very difficult enterprise. Congress is understandably reluctant to impose mandatory deadlines on U.S. force deployments abroad. And the President is even more reluctant to accept them. This means that it is going to be very hard to enact any funding cutoff for United States forces in Bosnia.

We stand a reasonable chance of enacting the withdrawal date that the President himself has promised. Any earlier date almost certainly cannot be enacted.

We should not pick a fight that we cannot win. Instead, we should defy opponents of the June withdrawal date to explain to us today why the President must have flexibility to break for a second time his solemn commitment to withdraw United States from Bosnia by a date certain.

Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to defeat the Hilleary amendment and approve the Buyer amendment.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, hopefully, using the same clock, I yield myself the balance of the time.

Let me make a very few observations, if I might have the attention of my colleague, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER]. First of all, if we accept the argument by the previous speaker, then we would not be in the Sinai, we would not be in Korea. And if that is their position, step up to it and be real, step up to it and be consistent. But that argument is not a consistent argument. We are talking about keeping the peace, preventing war for tens of thousands of people not dying. That seems to me an appropriate role to play.

Now, Mr. Chairman, my position in this whole thing is we ought to stay there until the job is done. As Martin Luther King said, probably more eloquent than anyone, that peace is more than simply the absence of war, it is the absence of conditions that give rise to war. So our military people may only win a marginal role in the whole issue of peace, because peace is about economics and it is about human rights and it is about democracy and a whole range of things.

But sometimes people are so much adverse to each other that they need someone to come in to hold them off. Now the allies, my colleagues recall, we were all at some point in these chambers students of history, our allies tried to keep the peace on the ground; and it failed, not because the leadership failed, but because the circumstances did not provide for success.

What provides us with some opportunity for success? Because the parties to the killing and the dying came to this country, sat down, negotiated a peace plan, and said, as imperfect as it is, help us to achieve that peace. We do not trust each other. We have been killing and maiming each other. Give us a hand until we create the conditions that evolve a war and peace.

As I said earlier, we make peace with our enemies; we do not make peace with your friends. Peace is hard. Peace is difficult. I would like to say to my colleague, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER], who I think is sincere and genuine in his effort, if he recalls on his reporting requirements in this bill. In this bill, on page 373, under the heading Presidential Report on Political and Military Conditions in Bosnia, "The President shall submit to Congress," I read in part, under section (2)

paragraph (A), "the date on which the transition from the multinational force," and my colleagues all know that we only are providing 25 percent of the troops here, not all of them, no one said that in this debate, the multinational force known as the Stabilization Force to the planned multinational successor force to be known as the Deterrent Force. Now we asked for this report.

Further, paragraph (F),

Any plan to maintain or expand other Bosnia-related (such as the operation designated as Operation Deliberate Guard) if tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain sufficient to delay the transition from the Stabilization Force to the Deterrent Force and the estimated cost associated with each such operation.

What I am saying to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER], I think in the context of the conference, we can take what is already in the bill before us and we can work this in order to accommodate the concerns of the gentleman and this gentleman. We meet on common ground.

The place where we do not meet is when you take the extra step of putting in the date certain into legislative form, for all the reasons that the Chair, the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, I, and others have enunciated. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON], all have raised these questions.

I think that this can be accommodated. I know the gentleman is sincere in what he is attempting to do. But I think that there are other Members who, rather than, as I said earlier in the debate, Mr. Chairman, asserting our congressional prerogatives on the front end of the debate, where we should be, and that is should we go or should we not go. That is our responsibility. That is why we are getting paid. Step up to that constitutional responsibility.

But more often than not, in the 26-plus years I have been here, Mr. Chairman, we back off that, we do not have the heart or courage to stand up to that. We wait until the President walks out on a limb and then we come in the dead of the night, on the tail-end, saying no funds shall be used to cut off at a date certain on the end where we are micromanaging, putting troops in harm's way.

But I think we ought to step up to it earlier on and assert our constitutional prerogative. If you do not want troops some place, step up and say that. If we do, step up and say that. I came here opposing every military adventure that we engaged in. I am a man of peace. Now here I am advocating that we stay in Bosnia.

The world has turned completely in a flip. The people who wanted to go anywhere in the world bombing and killing and maiming do not want our troops in Bosnia. Now if people are smart, they realize that that means that the world has changed. Bosnia is about peace-keeping, not war-making.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. All time for debate on the Buyer amendment has expired.

It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9, printed in part 1 of House Report 105-137, as a substitute for the pending amendment.

AMENDMENT NO. 9 OFFERED BY MR. HILLEARY AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE AMENDMENT NO. 8 OFFERED BY MR. BUYER

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a substitute for the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment.

The text of the amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment is as follows:

Part one, Amendment No. 9 offered by Mr. HILLEARY as a substitute for Part 1, amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. BUYER:

Page 379, after line 19, add the following:

TITLE XIII—UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SEC. 1301. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "United States Armed Forces in Bosnia Protection Act of 1997".

SEC. 1302. FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:

(1)(A) On November 27, 1995, the President affirmed that United States participation in the multinational military Implementation Force in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would terminate in one year.

(B) The President declared the expiration date of the mandate for the Implementation Force to be December 20, 1996.

(2) The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff likewise expressed their confidence that the Implementation Force would complete its mission in one year.

(3) The exemplary performance of United States Armed Forces personnel has significantly contributed to the accomplishment of the military mission of the Implementation Force. The courage, dedication, and professionalism of such personnel have permitted a separation of the belligerent parties to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and have resulted in a significant mitigation of the violence and suffering in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(4) On October 3, 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the intention of the United States Administration to delay the removal of United States Armed Forces personnel from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina until March 1997 due to operational reasons.

(5) Notwithstanding the fact that the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured the Congress of their resolve to end the mission of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by December 20, 1996, in November 1996 the President announced his intention to further extend the deployment of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina until June 1998.

(6) Before the announcement of the new policy referred to in paragraph (5), the President did not request authorization by the Congress of a policy that would result in the further deployment of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina until June 1998.

(b) DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.—The Congress—

(1) expresses its serious concerns and opposition to the policy of the President that has resulted in the deployment after December 20, 1996, of United States Armed Forces on the ground in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina without prior authorization by the Congress; and

(2) urges the President to work with our European allies to begin an orderly transition of all peacekeeping functions in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the United States to appropriate European countries in preparation for a complete withdrawal of all United States Armed Forces by December 31, 1997.

SEC. 1303. PROHIBITION OF USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT ON THE GROUND OF ARMED FORCES IN THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

(a) **PROHIBITION.**—None of the funds appropriated or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina after December 31, 1997, in connection with peacekeeping operations conducted by the Implementation Force, the Stabilization Force, or any successor force.

(b) **EXCEPTION TO ENSURE SAFE AND TIMELY WITHDRAWAL.**—The prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to the deployment of United States Armed Forces for the express purpose of ensuring the safe and timely withdrawal of such Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but such a deployment may not extend for a period of more than 30 days beyond the date specified in subsection (a) (or the date otherwise applicable to the limitation under that subsection by reason of an extension of that date pursuant to subsection (c)).

(c) **EXTENSION OF REQUIRED WITHDRAWAL DATE.**—The date specified in subsection (a) for the applicability of the limitation under that subsection may be extended by the President for an additional 180 days if—

(1) the President transmits to the Congress a report containing a request for such an extension; and

(2) a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with section 1304, specifically approving such request.

SEC. 1304. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST BY PRESIDENT FOR 180-DAY EXTENSION OF DEPLOYMENT.

(a) **TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION.**—For purposes of section 1303, the term “joint resolution” means only a joint resolution that is introduced within the 10-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under such section, and—

(1) which does not have a preamble;

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That the Congress approves the request by the President for the extension of the deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a period ending not later than June 30, 1998, as submitted by the President on _____”, the blank space being filled in with the appropriate date; and

(3) the title of which is as follows: “Joint resolution approving the request by the President for an extension of the deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a period ending not later than June 30, 1998.”.

(b) **REFERRAL.**—A resolution described in subsection (a) that is introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on International Relations

and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(c) **DISCHARGE.**—If the committee to which a resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has not reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) by the end of the 20-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 1303, such committee shall be, at the end of such period, discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(d) **CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.**—(1) On or after the third day after the date on which the committee to which such a resolution is referred in the Senate has reported, or has been discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution in the Senate, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the Senate to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. A Member may make the motion only on the day after the calendar day on which the Member announces to the Senate the Member's intention to make the motion. All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the Senate shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the Senate until disposed of.

(2) Debate on the resolution in the Senate, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. A motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.

(e) **CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE AFTER CONSIDERATION BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.**—(1) If, before the passage by the Senate of a resolution of the Senate described in subsection (a), the Senate receives from the House of Representatives a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the House of Representatives shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the Senate except in the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the Senate—

(i) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the House of Representatives; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the House of Representatives.

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the House of Representatives, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution that originated in the Senate.

(f) **RULES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE.**—This section is enacted by the Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in subsection (a), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

SEC. 1305. PROHIBITION OF USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OR RELATED ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

None of the funds appropriated or otherwise available to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year may be obligated or expended after the date of the enactment of this Act for the following:

(1) Conduct of, or direct support for, law enforcement activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, except for the training of law enforcement personnel or to prevent imminent loss of life.

(2) Conduct of, or support for, any activity in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that may have the effect of jeopardizing the primary mission of the United Nations-led Stabilization Force in preventing armed conflict between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (“Bosnian Entities”).

(3) Transfer of refugees within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that, in the opinion of the commander of the Stabilization Force involved in such transfer—

(A) has as one of its purposes the acquisition of control by a Bosnian Entity of territory allocated to the other Bosnian Entity under the Dayton Peace Agreement; or

(B) may expose United States Armed Forces to substantial risk to their personal safety.

(4) Implementation of any decision to change the legal status of any territory within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina unless expressly agreed to by all signatories to the Dayton Peace Agreement.

SEC. 1306. REPORT.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than October 31, 1997, the President shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on the deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The report shall contain the following:

(1) A description of the extent to which compliance has been achieved with the requirements relating to United States activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina contained in Public Law 104-122 (110 Stat. 876).

(2)(A) An identification of the specific steps taken, if any, by the United States Government to transfer the United States portion of the peacekeeping mission in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to appropriate European organizations, such as a combined joint task force of NATO, the

Western European Union, or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

(B) A description of any deficiencies in the capabilities of such European organizations to conduct peacekeeping activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a description of the actions, if any, that the United States Government is taking in cooperation with such organizations to remedy such deficiencies.

(3) An identification of the following:

(A) The goals of the Stabilization Force and the criteria for achieving those goals.

(B) The measures that are being taken to protect United States Armed Forces personnel from conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, or terrorist attacks in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(C) The exit strategy for the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the event of civil disturbances or overt warfare.

(D) The exit strategy and timetable for the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the event the Stabilization Force successfully completes its mission, including whether or not a follow-on force will succeed the Stabilization Force after the proposed withdrawal date announced by the President of June 1998.

(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report described in subsection (a) shall be transmitted in unclassified and classified versions.

SEC. 1307. DEFINITIONS.

As used in this title:

(1) BOSNIAN ENTITIES.—The term "Bosnian Entities" means the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.

(2) DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT.—The term "Dayton Peace Agreement" means the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialed by the parties in Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.

(3) IMPLEMENTATION FORCE.—The term "Implementation Force" means the NATO-led multinational military force in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (commonly referred to as "IFOR"), authorized under the Dayton Peace Agreement.

(4) NATO.—The term "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(5) STABILIZATION FORCE.—The term "Stabilization Force" means the United Nations-led follow-on force to the Implementation Force in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries in the region (commonly referred to as "SFOR"), authorized under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1088 (December 12, 1996).

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. HILLEARY] and a Member opposed, [Mr. BUYER] each will control 10 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. HILLEARY].

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, for the purposes of debate only, I yield 5 minutes to my colleague on the other side of the aisle, the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. CONDIT] and I ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to control that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

There was no objection.

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, there are several different important differences between

the two amendments on Bosnia that are being offered here today.

First, the Hilleary-Condit-Kasich-Jones-Frank amendment is a bipartisan compromise; and with all those names, we know it is a bipartisan amendment. It is a bipartisan compromise of the much tougher H.R. 1172, the U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia Protection Act, which has 148 bipartisan cosponsors.

Our bipartisan compromise amendment would bring our troops home by December 31, 1997, but would still give the President some flexibility by allowing him to make a written request to Congress to extend the exit date to June 30, 1998, his present exit date.

Second, the Hilleary-Condit-Kasich-Jones-Frank amendment is the only vote we will have to show that we did everything we could to bring our troops home as soon as possible. Voting only for the Buyer amendment, although it is a worthy amendment, demonstrates that we are accepting the President's present exit date of June 1998, and accepting the responsibility for all the harm that may come to our troops the longer that they are there.

Think about this, Mr. Chairman: As it becomes apparent to the warring factions in Bosnia that the President has no intention of pulling our troops out, they will be increasingly motivated to perpetrate a heinous terrorist act on our troops to get our troops out, just like at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia or the car bomb in Beirut, Lebanon. The later we set the exit date and the longer our troops are in Bosnia, the greater the odds are that this type of act will occur.

This is serious business, Mr. Chairman. Let us get them out as soon as possible. Let us support the Hilleary-Condit-Kasich-Jones-Frank amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Hilleary amendment. To do so, to adopt that I think would be a travesty in this House and a travesty for our country. We have deployed our troops. And I might say I am immensely proud of what they have done in Bosnia. But we have been fortunate.

We should be proud that our military personnel and their efforts have been successful in their accomplishments. They have overseen a separation of warring parties. They have been professional. They have caused the hostilities to cease. We have allowed political reform to begin. Refugee resettlement is occurring, and we have led as no other nation can. We have relished support among Europeans and throughout other nations of the world to follow our deeds.

Today I ask my colleagues to help our uniformed personnel complete their mission in a timely, efficient, and

professional manner. In doing so, we must follow in honor of the word of the President of our Nation. He said some time ago that we should be out of there by June 1998. To cut it off at this time would be improper for our troops, to rush them out and not give them sufficient time to make plans to leave, to cause us to break our word as a nation, and to not give the former warring parties the time to complete their reconciliation, which the end of June 1998 will do.

We should honor the commitments of our Nation. We should honor the commitment of our President. We should honor the commitment of his word when he said June 1998. We must stick to that. We, as this Congress, should back him up and allow our troops to remain until that time.

I oppose the Hilleary amendment. It would be wrong for this body. It would be wrong for our Nation.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, as we stated, this amendment will require the withdrawal of our Armed Forces from Bosnia by December 31, 1997. In October 1995, the administration stated that our presence in Bosnia would last for 12 months.

Well, here it is a year and a half later, and the troops are still there; and now the withdrawal date is June 1998. Their mission is unclear. Their objective is uncertain. Our commitment changes as every deadline for withdrawal passes. Let us end the charade. If the troops cannot come home by December of this year, let the administration tell us why, let us execute our constitutional authority of either supporting the administrative policy or rejecting it. That is quite simple. Let them submit to us a plan. Let us approve it, or let us reject it.

This will force all of us to define our purpose and our objective in Bosnia. It will also force us to do something that is extremely important, and that is to have a discussion of what the role is of the Europeans, what role must they play in safeguarding Europe.

The Vietnam war, the Persian Gulf taught us a valuable lesson: Give our troops clear, definable, and achievable missions. To do less than this is to put them at risk, without full regard for the consequences.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

Actually, I would like to say to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], earlier when he was referring to the ellipsis as the actual bill itself, some report language with the President, if he would note from the amendment that I have before the committee, it is now the perfecting amendment, we kind of beefed that up. In his request for the spirit to work that in the conference, I would join him to do that.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I believe the gentleman is absolutely correct, he has beefed up these provisions and I think appropriately. I would be more than happy to work with the gentleman in the context of the conference to move it in the direction of the gentleman, because I think it strengthens these report requirements.

Mr. BUYER. I thank the gentleman in that spirit.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. HOBSON], who had an important meeting and could not be here during the general debate.

□ 1745

Mr. HOBSON. I appreciate the gentleman yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Buyer-Skelton amendment to terminate our mission in Bosnia by June of next year, the President's date.

Only through the leadership, good will, and commitment of our Nation has the fighting stopped in Bosnia. The peace accord that ended the Bosnian conflict was written and agreed upon in my district. I have made two trips to the Balkans and seen first hand the mess into which these people have gotten themselves.

Considering that the history of hatred in the Balkans dates back at least a millennium, 2 years of American presence there will not turn the situation around. We have been able to see a pause in this fighting that will hopefully endure, but the people of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia ultimately must be the architects of, frankly, their own peace.

I want to see our troops out of Bosnia as soon as possible, and I frankly was very disappointed when the President broke his word to all of us to have our troops out last year. This amendment that I am supporting will make sure that our troops come home by next June, and also ensure that sufficient planning takes place between now and then so that when they are withdrawn, it will be done in an organized fashion and a secure fashion.

If it were up to me, the troops would be out now, and I might not have sent them to begin with, but my first and foremost concern is their safety. Preserving that safety means that we get them out, and that our pullout is planned, organized, and well executed.

When I was last there, I met with the NATO Ambassador and some of their people. They said one of the problems they were having is getting the people to begin moving on with the accords in the civil side of this. We have done the military job. The longer they think we are going to stay there, the less they are going to move on the civil side.

That is why we need to set a date certain and get our troops out, get them home, let the people of the area get on with their lives, hopefully in a peaceful fashion. We are not going to solve this peace. We should get out, come home, and let the people do their job.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRIES

Mr. HILLEARY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, do I have the right to close this debate?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has the right to close.

Mr. BUYER. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. BUYER. As I understand, this is a perfecting substitute amendment to my amendment and I rise in opposition. Therefore, would I not have the right to close?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would advise that neither gentleman represent the position of the committee and, therefore, the sponsor of the substitute amendment would have the right to close.

Mr. BUYER. I thank the chairman.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I differ with some of those, and I support the Hilleary amendment. I differ with some of those who join me in supporting it. I think the mission has been successful. I think it was a good idea. I was glad the gentleman from California decried the argument that these are somehow subhuman people who cannot get along.

This is a mission that ought to be done but America should not be doing it. Where are our European allies? Yes; they are there with us. We are alone in South Korea with the Koreans, standing up to North Korea. We are essentially alone in the Middle East, standing up to Iran and Iraq. We do our part in Latin America and in Haiti. Is it never Europe's turn? Bosnia is in Europe. It is close to Germany, close to France. Can they do nothing by themselves?

We are the great enablers of dependency in this House, not of welfare but of a Europe that simply will not stand up for its own interests. Indeed, I think maybe we should send out an investigating committee, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure there is a Europe. I think that France and Germany and Italy and Denmark and Belgium, at least for military purposes, are a fraud that has been perpetuated on us. Because the fact is that when it comes to their own interests, when we are talking about problems 100, 200, 300 miles from their own border, this collection of wealthy, powerful democratic nations acts like a bunch of immature teenagers that have to hide behind the United States.

Yes, it was a good thing that the President did. Yes; it has been more successful than people thought. And there is a reason for people to stay. But with America in South Korea, America in the Middle East, America elsewhere, we have a right to tell our European allies this one is theirs.

At the recent summit meeting, the Europeans complained to the President

that he was thinking of leaving. Sometimes people have to learn to do things on their own. This is a job for the Europeans. We should adopt the Hilleary amendment and let the Europeans show that they can defend their own interests.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 4½ minutes.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the perfecting amendment of my good friend because what I want to do is accept the President's date. That is June 30, 1998.

I am from Indiana. It is corn country. We accept people at face value. Your word is your honor, is your bond. You do that until somebody has a little slippage in their word. The President slipped once. He slipped twice. Our Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, now is kind of hinting that there may be in fact a third slippage. Fool me once, fool me twice, but pretty soon it becomes shame on me.

What I have done is to step forward and codify the June 30 date. I have been a good listener to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA] and some others about codifying that date. I understand. It still is a little tough saying ill-defined, not providing flexibility and those kind of words, but I want to hold firm. I want to hold firm on the date and back up the President so he can move to our allies within the region so they can begin to accept those greater responsibilities, because I support the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] when he says, let us change human condition. I want to change human condition with our allies and how we interact. I understand also we are talking about NATO and U.S. leadership. I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA]. But let us talk about what is happening. We always focus on the military. It is the civil implementation of the Dayton accords that has got us in this mess. The military always meets their deadlines. They do a great job. IFOR was highly complementary. SFOR will be highly complementary.

The concern and our focus should be on the civilian implementation. Right now when we look at the implementation of the subregional arms limitations, it is to be complete in November 1997. I do not know if we are going to make that date.

The train, arm, and equip of the Bosnian Muslims is only half complete. I expect claims of compliance to be contested. Verification will be necessary on the checking to ensure that the checks and the balances are there for the stability of the region. Who is going to do that? That is where I believe, yes, the United States still needs to have our presence in the over-the-horizon, but on the ground I actually want our NATO allies there. I want them to have a greater role and presence in the peace and the stability

within their region, that is, the continent of Europe.

We also have the issue of war criminals. There are some that say that no lasting peace will be possible in Bosnia until the war criminals are brought to justice. Right now to date only 8 of 74 currently under indictment are in custody of The Hague. Only 2 of the 8 have been convicted. When we talk about two of the most prominent indicted persons, former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and former Bosnian Serb military chief Ratko Mladic, they are still at large. Who is going to go after them?

If we are talking about after the June 30, 1998, date and they are still in place and threaten the region's stability, what type of force? That is why I join with the gentleman from California to have it defined what will be the U.S. role and presence after the President's June 30 date. Let us not rush to judgment here.

We also have the concerns of the nation building. When I talk about that, it is the humanitarian, the political, and the reconstruction. The nationwide elections have been held, but what about the municipal elections? The multi-ethnic political institutions are still segregated. It is also, as I earlier had stated, and this is what pains me the most is it is questionable if the Dayton agreement has in fact created the durable peace because the only way I think that we can have the durable peace is because of this open-ended commitment.

The question is, how long will we be there? When I have heard this today, we have to be there until the job is done. It was Dayton that set up these parameters that has an open-ended commitment. What I want to do is set a date certain so we can work in mutuality with our regional allies in Europe, so we can have a plan to withdraw and we can have the assurance of a durable peace. That is in fact what we want.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. HALL].

(Mr. HALL of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to voice strong support for the Hilleary amendment and for ending deployment of our United States ground forces in Bosnia.

I did not support the administration's decision to send troops to Bosnia a year and a half ago, and I would vote to bring our troops home today if I could.

The best we can do, however, is to bring them home as soon as possible. The administration has stated repeatedly that our troops would be in Bosnia for no longer than 12 months. It has been well over a year since our troops were deployed there—and there still is no end in sight. The amendments offered today will require a date certain for troop withdrawal, require development of an exit plan,

and require a defined policy concerning the role of the United States and our allies in Bosnia following withdrawal of United States troops.

We have been most fortunate that in the past 18 months, no Americans have died from hostile fire in Bosnia. However, as frictions continue to get more heated and ethnic divisions continue to erupt in human rights violations, the dangers to our troops will intensify. Our mission in Bosnia still remains unclear—and without a clear policy, the future of our troop involvement also remains uncertain.

It is imperative that we have a clearly defined exit policy and that we stick to it. Today, we have an opportunity to express our support for our troops by voting our desire to bring them home, and I urge my colleagues' support.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Missouri [Ms. DANNER].

Ms. DANNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Hilleary amendment.

Before United States troops were deployed to Bosnia, I expressed skepticism that we would be there for only 1 year and that it would cost \$1.5 billion. We have been there 2 years already, we are up to \$6.5 billion, and the whole object is escalating. We are going to be there now perhaps as many as 3 years, and we could be up to we do not even know how many billions of dollars.

I think this has become a quagmire that we have to withdraw from. The American public believes, and I totally agree with them, that our European friends should be handling this. It should be something that they do. It is on their continent, and it has been proven that they have the ability to provide for their own common defense and to handle the issue of Bosnia.

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. STEARNS].

(Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment to put an end to this unauthorized operation by creating a date certain.

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. CAMPBELL].

(Mr. CAMPBELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Hilleary amendment.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. HILLEARY].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee is recognized for an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to close this debate to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] who has helped lead the effort to bring our troops home from Bosnia.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 3½ minutes.

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KASICH. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. HILLEARY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I am holding a letter from Maj. Gen. Jim Pennington, Retired U.S. Army, president of the National Association of Uniformed Services, expressing his strong support for the Hilleary-Condit amendment to H.R. 1119.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, let me just suggest to the Members that are listening, the President said that we should withdraw our forces in December 1996. The Hilleary amendment says that they can be there until December 1997. And at that point in time, our allies will assume the additional burden of patrolling the streets of the communities in Bosnia. We worked with them for 50 years to stop the advance of the Soviet military and an invasion of Europe. Surely they can in fact keep the peace and patrol the streets. If they have difficulty, we will help them, not with our soldiers but with all of our technical expertise and all of the logistics.

I look at the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA] who has been in the Chamber longer than I have, but I have been here now for 15 years, and I want to tell my colleagues when the U.S. military gets in trouble is when we send our troops into a circumstance that is not clear and a mission that is fuzzy and a mission that confuses the nature of what the mission is for our soldiers.

We have done our job. We went to separate the warring parties and we did it. It is not our job to build the infrastructure and the Government of Bosnia. We will not be successful in that. And so what I would suggest is if Members believe that the President has not made the case about the vital interests of the United States, if Members believe the President has not articulated a clear exit strategy, if Members believe that our allies should do more, if Members believe that the American people do not stand behind this mission, if Members believe that this entire role ought to be clarified, if Members believe we have done our job and we ought to come home, and if Members share the concern that our soldiers could find themselves in a fuzzy mission and the consequences that are related to that, they must support the Hilleary amendment.

□ 1800

And then what happens? The President should come to this House and make his case. He has not yet done it. The only way that we will force the President to spell out the mission, to give us the achievable objectives, to call to task our allies, and to prove to the American people and to prove to

the American people that this is a just mission, then my colleagues must vote for the Hilleary amendment and force the President to come here and tell us precisely what we are doing in Bosnia, what the mission is. Anything short of that leaves our troops in a confusing role with a dubious mission, without the kind of total support we need from allies who we supported for 50 years.

This is a support to get us on the road to clarifying U.S. military policy in the post Cold War period. This is a chance for my colleagues to stand up for the men and women who have put their lives on the line in Bosnia, and let us bring them home, and if not in December, force the President to make his case.

Support the Hilleary amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman, as the ranking minority member, is entitled to 5 minutes and is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I understand where the majority of this body is going on a date certain; that is the easy political thing to do. But I think we ought to be part of the educative process, and I choose to try to do that.

First of all, to this notion, Mr. Chairman. To this notion, Mr. Chairman, this is important to the Europeans; let them do it. Does that mean we do not care about human life, Mr. Chairman?

We had this debate this morning about China. We care about human life in China. A few years ago we were concerned about human life in South Africa. We had a discussion about that. What are we talking about it is only Europeans should be concerned about European life? If this had been in the context of Nazi Germany, would Members have gotten up and said let Europe do it?

Mr. Chairman, we have a moral obligation to stand up and to care about human life. A quarter of a million people were being killed, raped, maimed and murdered; 13,000 of them were children.

So we say let the Europeans do it, we have no responsibility?

I heard speeches down here when we talked about the Preamble to the Constitution, and they said it was not just about America. Read the RECORD tomorrow. We said that on the floor just a couple of hours ago. This is about the whole planet. Now, when we talk about people dying in another place, let Europeans do it.

I want my colleagues to recall history, Mr. Chairman. Europeans did try to solve this problem, and they died there. Historically they died. They left blood on the soil of Bosnia trying. They spent money trying. It did not work. But what did work is when we stood up as a moral leader in the world and we said to the parties:

"Come to the United States, come to Dayton; sit down around the table,

work out a peace plan," and when they did, they came to us, they invited us. That is the difference.

This is not some Vietnam quagmire. This is the United States standing up, caring about thousands of children not dying, women not being raped, mothers and fathers not dying because people could not figure out how to solve a problem. And they came to us and they said:

"Look, help us. Help us be peacekeepers."

I challenge anyone in this Chamber with their commitment to peace. I am committed to it. Mr. Chairman, I have given my whole life to peace. Peace is my passion, and this is what we are trying to do in the context of Bosnia. Europeans, they did not do it. It was not because they did not try, and somebody ought to stand up here and set the record straight; I would do that.

Mr. Chairman, in just 1 second I will be happy to yield to my colleague from Massachusetts.

Mr. Chairman, I understand all the date certain business. I am simply saying let us be proud of being peacekeepers and peacemakers. As my colleagues know, it is like there are people in the Chamber who would like to paint a big sign on the Pentagon. Do my colleagues know what the sign would say? "Hey, we only do the big ones. We don't do the peacekeeping, the peacemaking. We don't do the humanitarian assistance. We do the biggies."

But I think that our war years are transitioning, and I think the world is changing, and I think war is not the paradigm, and maybe I am ahead of my time, but I think we are changing, we are moving, we are growing, we are evolving, and, Mr. Chairman, we need to learn about the Bosnias. We need to learn how to be peacekeepers.

As I said, we did not do well in Somalia. We did better in Haiti, we are doing better in Bosnia, and maybe in some other place where we are called to be peacekeepers we can do it.

Final point and I yield to the gentleman:

All I say to my colleagues is that both of these resolutions do not give us the flexibility to dial down the 25 percent of our troops. We can dial down to 5 percent, 2 percent, special group of people. The gentleman's resolution does not give us that kind of flexibility. Rational, intelligent people in a changing and transitioning world ought to always be committed to enough flexibility to learn to grow and to evolve. That is all I am saying.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I agree that America should have gone in. I may differ with some of the others on this resolution. I think it was essential because only we could do it. But we have been in, and the fighting has stopped, and it is one thing to say, well, the Europeans should have

been able to do it from the beginning. I never said that. The question is now are the Europeans capable of maintaining this kind of maintenance force?

And the point I make is this. Of course I care about Europeans, I care about a lot of people, but there are limited resources, and for the United States to continue to encourage on the Europeans the notion that they do not have to do very much while we do it all I think is ultimately damaging to the values the gentleman is seeking. I think precisely because America does have important roles to play in various parts of the world where the mission has now been reduced to a more easily accomplished one than originally when we had to go in, we have a right to ask the Europeans to do a hand-off from now.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] has expired.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, as chairman of the committee the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE] is entitled to 5 minutes and is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I hesitate to do this because I hate to get 5 more minutes for one side in one amendment and the other amendment did not have that like amount of time, but that is the way things work out.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. STEARNS].

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] said this afternoon let us be proud to be peacekeepers.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPENCE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. Absolutely.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I say to the gentleman from California let us also be proud to abide by the Constitution.

Mr. DELLUMS. Absolutely.

Mr. STEARNS. Where in the U.S. Constitution does a President have the power to unilaterally place U.S. troops in combat environment without any congressional approval, let alone without notifying Congress?

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, the Constitution is clear about war making. The Framers of the Constitution did not contemplate the post-cold war world where we are talking about peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement, and I would dare say to the gentleman that the War Powers Act is an inept and impotent act in dealing with these conditions as well.

So the gentleman's point is not well-taken. The Constitution did not envision the Bosnias, the Somalias, and the Haitis of the world.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] it is clear under Desert Storm when President Bush came here and asked Congress for approval for that conflict, and every

President eventually came to Congress to do that, yet here we are, the law is not changed, the President does not have the constitutional authority to send U.S. combat troops into an indefinite situation, and even the President agreed they would be out far ahead of this time, yet it is not true.

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman from South Carolina yield for 10 seconds?

Mr. SPENCE. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, let me just state to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. STEARNS], President Bush did not ask for authorization. As a matter of fact, he did not think he needed authorization. The Congress forced that on the President.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield and let me reply to that?

Mr. SPENCE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA], did not President Bush come here, get a vote?

Mr. MURTHA. I led the fight.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. STEARNS].

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, the bottom line here is this is going on and on with no definite time when this is going to end.

Let me read quickly what Corp. Zechariah Gransbury of Orlando said. He is in Bosnia, he should know:

It is getting worse and worse. The repetition is awful. Morale in my battalion is terrible. Most soldiers do not do the job they are trained to do. No one is motivated. I think a lot of us concluded that we are not making any real change in Bosnia.

Now this is someone that is in Bosnia, not somebody on the House floor. It is time Congress put an end to this unauthorized operation by creating a date certain for the exit of United States combat troops on the ground in Bosnia, and that is why I support the Hilleary amendment.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield 10 seconds to me?

Mr. SPENCE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I took President Bush to court, I sued in the Federal court to guarantee Congress' prerogative in warmaking, and I went out there initially alone, my colleague. The gentleman was not there, there were no other people. I went alone initially to the courts of this country to preserve Congress' warmaking prerogatives on the issue—

Mr. STEARNS. President Clinton, will the gentleman take President Clinton to court?

Mr. DELLUMS. He has not violated the Constitution as I envision it.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized for 30 seconds.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thirty seconds to get us out of Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the President told us a year ago that we are going to be out of Bosnia. Look at Somalia, the extension we got, 22 Rangers killed. Haiti; Aristide is still there, and so are the same problems. Billions of dollars.

Izetbegovic is aligning himself with Iran because he knows the United States is eventually pulling out. There are thousands of mujaheddin and Hamas sitting there.

Will there be peace in Bosnia? Not in our lifetime, nor the Middle East, and we need to let Europe do it and let us get out of Dodge.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Buyer and Hilleary amendments.

What is the purpose of these amendments? Why should Congress get involved at this point?

Clearly United States actions in the NATO-led Bosnia mission have saved lives and not lost lives.

A target date for withdrawal has been set. Yesterday, the President reiterated that he expects the mission should be completed on schedule by June 1998. Do we want to eliminate any flexibility, even though the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff say it would be harmful to both the military and civilian effort in Bosnia? Secretary Cohen and General Shalikashvili have stated that a fixed, statutorily mandated date for the withdrawal of U.S. forces could undercut the safety of our troops.

When the consequences of a false step could be severe, Congress should be extremely careful how and where it treads. In this case, the stakes are high: the danger of renewed genocide. We speak out on this floor about the horrors of genocide. Let's not take an action that might increase the chances of a renewed nightmare.

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of both of the pending amendments.

Both these amendments would merely compel the administration to live up to its pledge to withdraw United States ground forces from Bosnia by June 30, 1998, at the latest.

To date, we have spent some \$6.5 billion on our peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. Meanwhile, we rob our training, maintenance, and other operational accounts to pay for this mission. Our service people must do more and more with less and less, while readiness suffers and our military families are strained to the limit by overseas deployments.

I strongly support peace in Bosnia, but we cannot perform the peacekeeping mission there indefinitely. Our forces have provided a significant period of tranquility for implementation of the Dayton accords. We have provided aid to help rebuild. Fundamentally, however, it is up to the people there to decide whether they will work for peace. If Bosnia's factions have not moved significantly toward resolving their problems by June 1998, how long will it take?

I urge my colleagues to support these amendments.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, article I, section 8, of the U.S. Constitution gives the

Congress, not the President, the right to declare war. We will have learned nothing from America's experience in Vietnam if we allow U.S. military to take part in a war without the explicit approval of Congress. At the very least, the war powers resolution should be honored. That law permits the insertion of U.S. troops into a circumstance where hostilities are imminent only for a maximum of 120 days before the explicit approval of Congress is obtained. In open hearings of the International Relations Committee, I asked of the Secretary of State why the President had not complied with this law in Bosnia. She answered in a way that brought me great sorrow—she claimed that hostilities were not imminent in Bosnia. Yet, allied troops have died in Bosnia. United States troops have been subject to sniper fire, and wounded, in Bosnia. To say this is not a situation of hostilities is to play with words—and that we must not do when American lives and the terms of the U.S. Constitution are at stake. The President has not obtained approval of the U.S. Congress for our troops to be in Bosnia. The Constitution compels they be brought home.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. HILLEARY] as a substitute for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair announces that pursuant to clause 2(c) of rule XXIII the Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on the underlying Buyer amendment.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 196, noes 231, not voting 7, as follows:

[Roll No. 233]

AYES—196

Aderholt	Combest	Gibbons
Archer	Condit	Gilchrest
Bachus	Cook	Goode
Baker	Cooksey	Goodlatte
Ballenger	Crane	Goodling
Barcia	Crapo	Goss
Barr	Cubin	Graham
Barrett (NE)	Cunningham	Granger
Bartlett	Danner	Green
Barton	Deal	Gutknecht
Bass	DeFazio	Hall (TX)
Bereuter	DeLay	Hansen
Berry	Diaz-Balart	Hastert
Bilbray	Dickey	Hastings (WA)
Bilirakis	Doolittle	Hayworth
Bonilla	Dreier	Hefley
Boyd	Duncan	Herger
Brady	Dunn	Hill
Bunning	Ehrlich	Hilleary
Burr	English	Hobson
Burton	Ensign	Hoekstra
Calvert	Evans	Horn
Camp	Everett	Hulshof
Campbell	Ewing	Hutchinson
Canady	Filner	Inglis
Cannon	Foley	Istook
Chabot	Forbes	Jenkins
Chambliss	Fowler	John
Chenoweth	Frank (MA)	Johnson (CT)
Christensen	Franks (NJ)	Johnson, Sam
Coble	Gallegly	Jones
Coburn	Ganske	Kasich
Collins	Gekas	Kelly

Kim
Kingston
Klug
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (KY)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
Markey
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mink
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Packard

Pappas
Parker
Paul
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Radanovich
Ramstad
Riggs
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanders
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Sensenbrenner
Serrano

NOES—231

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Armey
Baesler
Baldacci
Barrett (WI)
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Berman
Bishop
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Buyer
Callahan
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Cummins
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Ehlers
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah

Fawell
Fazio
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Fox
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Hooley
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hunter
Hyde
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee
(TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Linder
Livingston
Lofgren
Lowey

Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McHale
McHugh
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Millender-
McDonald
Miller (CA)
Minge
Moakley
Molinari
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Nadler
Oberstar
Obey
Oliver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Pascarell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Poshard
Price (NC)
Quinn
Rahall
Rangel
Redmond
Regula
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sandlin
Sawyer
Scott
Shaw

Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Smith (OR)
Smith, Linda
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark

Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Stupak
Skellton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson
Thurman
Towns
Turner
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky

NOT VOTING—7

Bryant
Cox
Schiff

Schumer
Torres
Weldon (FL)

Yates

□ 1833

Messrs. STOKES, MOAKLEY, OWENS, WHITE, Callahan, and FOX of Pennsylvania changed their vote from “aye” to “no.”

Mr. ISTOOK and Mr. PACKARD changed their vote from “no” to “aye.”

So the amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 233, I was unintentionally delayed. Had I been present, I would have vote “aye.”

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 233, I was inadvertently detained. Had I been present, I would have vote “aye.”

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BUYER].

The question was taken; and the chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 278, noes 148, not voting 8, as follows:

[Roll No. 234]

AYES—278

Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Berry
Billbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Cubin
Cunningham
Bonilla
Bono
Boyd
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan

Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Duncan
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cubitt
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeFazio
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey

Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Eshoo
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Filner
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons

Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Horn
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jackson-Lee
(TX)
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kildee
Kim
Kingston
Kleczka
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston

LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lucas
Maloney (CT)
Manton
Manzullo
McCarthy (MO)
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (CA)
Miller (FL)
Minge
Mink
Molinari
Moran (KS)
Morella
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Pascarell
Paul
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Redmond
Regula
Riggs
Riley
Rivers
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers

Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanchez
Sanders
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Sensenbrenner
Serrano

NOES—148

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Bentsen
Berman
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Conyers
Coyne
Cummins
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro

Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dixon
Doyle
Engel
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Foglietta
Ford
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gordon
Gutierrez
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Hooley
Houghton
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jefferson
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kennedy (MA)

Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Klink
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Millender-
McDonald
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Neal

Oberstar	Rush	Tauscher
Obey	Sabo	Thurman
Oliver	Sandlin	Torres
Pallone	Sawyer	Towns
Pastor	Scott	Velazquez
Payne	Sisisky	Vento
Pelosi	Skaggs	Visclosky
Pickett	Slaughter	Waters
Pomeroy	Smith, Adam	Watt (NC)
Price (NC)	Snyder	Waxman
Rahall	Stabenow	Wexler
Rangel	Stark	Weygand
Reyes	Stokes	Wise
Rodriguez	Strickland	Woolsey
Rothman	Stupak	Wynn
Roybal-Allard	Tanner	

NOT VOTING—8

Brady	Dingell	Talent
Bryant	Schiff	Yates
Cox	Schumer	

□ 1740

Mr. WYNN changed his vote from "aye" to "no."

So the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote announced as above recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 234, I was inadvertently detained. Had I been present, I would have voted "aye."

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 234, I was inadvertently detained. Had I been present, I would have voted "aye."

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to thank Chairman SPENCE and the committee for adding language to the Defense Authorization Act that would help resolve United States commercial disputes against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

As many of my colleagues are aware, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia refused to pay hundreds of millions of dollars owed to American firms. After years of inaction on the claims filed on behalf of these companies, language was included in the fiscal year 1993 defense appropriations bill establishing a claims resolution process for these cases. It charged the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Commerce with issuing periodic reports on the status of pending claims.

While many of these claims were resolved under this process, there are still debts outstanding. The directive language included in this bill is intended to re-open the claims process set up in 1993 and require the Department of Defense to conduct a broad and comprehensive search into any remaining claims.

With Saudi Arabia now seeking admission into the World Trade Organization, I believe it unconscionable that they refuse to settle their debts with private businesses. Over the years, at least 50 Members of Congress have urged the Saudis to pay their debt, but nothing has happened. Mr. Chairman, I am hopeful this directive and the ensuing report will illustrate to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the importance of honoring debts. I am also prepared to offer this language every year if necessary until each claim outstanding is resolved.

I want to thank Chairman SPENCE again for his time.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. JONES] having assumed the chair, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Chairman of the Committee

of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1119) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, on Friday, June 20, I was absent for rollcall votes 218 through 224. Had I been present, I would have voted "aye" on votes 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, and 224. I would have voted "no" on rollcall No. 221.

COMMUNICATION FROM STAFF MEMBER OF HON. JIM McDERMOTT, MEMBER OF CONGRESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from Charles M. Williams, staff member of the Honorable JIM McDERMOTT, Member of Congress:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, June 23, 1997.

Hon. NEWT GINGRICH, SPEAKER,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: This is to formally notify you pursuant to Rule L (50) of the Rules of the House that I have been served with a subpoena issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

I will make the determinations required by Rule L.

Sincerely,

CHARLES M. WILLIAMS.

COMMUNICATION FROM STAFF MEMBER OF THE HONORABLE JIM McDERMOTT

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from Wilda E. Chisolm, staff member of the Honorable JIM McDERMOTT, Member of Congress.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, June 23, 1997.

Hon. NEWT GINGRICH, SPEAKER,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: This is to formally notify you pursuant to Rule L (50) of the Rules of the House that I have been served with a subpoena issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

I will make the determinations required by Rule L.

Sincerely,

WILDA E. CHISOLM.

□ 1845

APPOINTMENT AS MEMBERS OF COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. JONES). Without objection, and pursuant to the provisions of section 3 of Public Law 94-304, as amended by section 1 of Public Law 99-7, the Chair announces the Speaker's appointment of

the following Members of the House to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe:

Mr. HOYER of Maryland,
Mr. MARKEY of Massachusetts,
Mr. CARDIN of Maryland, and
Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York.

There was no objection.

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

TRIBUTE TO DR. BETTY SHABAZZ

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DAVIS] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to Dr. Betty Shabazz, a woman of great courage, strength, and tenacity.

On Monday, June 23, a great presence in the lives of countless citizens of the world left this Earth. She was not just an inspiration to the African-American community, or just an advocate of equality for women or primarily a proponent of children's rights. She was so much more than that. Dr. Betty Shabazz was an inspiration to the human community, she was an advocate of equality for all people, indeed she was a proponent of every ideal upon which this Nation was founded, but often had difficulty adhering to.

Therein lies the inherent greatness of Dr. Shabazz. Despite the firebombing of her home in 1965 and the brutal murder of her husband, civil rights leader Malcolm X less than 3 weeks later, she refused to turn what must have been inconsolable anger into motivation for retribution against those who took the father of her children. Instead, Dr. Shabazz turned inward, furthering her education and strengthening her resolve as she embarked upon her mission to raise six children alone.

Dr. Shabazz possessed hope even in the midst of hopelessness. She refused to quit, and epitomized the American spirit. And what Dr. Shabazz accomplished should encourage all of us to greater heights. She lived her life making a difference, and she died trying to make a difference.

She received her undergraduate, master's and doctoral degrees from the University of Massachusetts. She became a college professor and radio talk show host, all the while providing a stable and sheltered home for her six daughters. She was the model of motherhood, without calling attention to her actions. She turned tragedy into triumph. Dr. Shabazz led by example and exemplified what we all might be able to do if we were willing to make sacrifices, which she did.

Soon after the death of her husband, and for many years thereafter, Dr. Shabazz was viewed by many as an extension of Malcolm X and his views.