

(9) The United States has made a financial commitment to the Palestinian Authority with the understanding that the rule of law would prevail, that there would be no official sanction to extrajudicial killings or violations of human rights, and that basic principles of peaceful and normal relations would be upheld.

(10) Despite claims to the contrary, there is no law in Israel forbidding the sale of land to Arabs or people of other ethnicities or nationalities.

(b) DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.—The Congress declares the following:

(1) The Congress condemns in the strongest possible terms the abhorrent policy and practice of murdering Palestinians for sales of land to Jews. Such actions are violations of international law and the spirit of the Oslo agreements, casting strong doubt as to whether the Palestinians are in compliance with their commitments to Israel. The Congress finds the endorsement and encouragement of this practice by the most senior leadership of the Palestinian Authority to be reprehensible.

(2) The Congress demands that this practice of murder and racism be condemned and renounced by the Palestinian leadership and that it will end immediately. If it does not, the Congress should not permit the provision of direct aid to the Palestinian Authority when the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995 is considered for reauthorization. The Congress urges the President to take this practice fully into account as he now determines whether the Palestinian Authority is in compliance with its commitments to Israel, which he must do in accordance with the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995.

(3) The Congress strongly urges the Palestinian Legislative Council to reject categorically legislation imposing the penalty of death on those who sell land to Israelis.

(c) TRANSMISSION OF COPIES.—The Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate are directed to transmit copies of this section to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the United Nations Secretary General, the United States Ambassador to Israel, the Consul General of the United States in Jerusalem, Israel, the Rais of the Palestinian Authority, all members of Palestinian Legislative Council, and the office of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Washington, District of Columbia.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. PAXON].

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SERRANO. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 425, noes 0, answered "present" 3, not voting 6, as follows:

[Roll No. 201]

AYES—425

Abercrombie	Bachus	Barrett (NE)
Ackerman	Baessler	Barrett (WI)
Aderholt	Baker	Bartlett
Allen	Baldacci	Barton
Andrews	Ballenger	Bass
Archer	Barcia	Bateman
Armey	Barr	Becerra

Bentsen	Fattah	Lantos
Bereuter	Fawell	Largent
Berman	Fazio	Latham
Berry	Filner	LaTourette
Bilbray	Foglietta	Lazio
Bilirakis	Foley	Leach
Bishop	Ford	Levin
Blagojevich	Fowler	Lewis (CA)
Bliley	Fox	Lewis (GA)
Blumenauer	Frank (MA)	Lewis (KY)
Blunt	Franks (NJ)	Linder
Boehlert	Frelinghuysen	Lipinski
Boehner	Frost	Livingston
Bonilla	Furse	LoBiondo
Bono	Gallegly	Lofgren
Borski	Ganske	Lowey
Boswell	Gejdenson	Lucas
Boucher	Gekas	Luther
Boyd	Gephardt	Maloney (CT)
Brady	Gibbons	Maloney (NY)
Brown (CA)	Gilchrest	Manton
Brown (FL)	Gillmor	Manzullo
Brown (OH)	Gilman	Markey
Bryant	Gonzalez	Martinez
Bunning	Goode	Mascara
Burr	Goodlatte	Matsui
Burton	Goodling	McCarthy (MO)
Buyer	Gordon	McCarthy (NY)
Callahan	Goss	McColum
Calvert	Graham	McCrery
Camp	Granger	McDade
Campbell	Green	McDermott
Canady	Greenwood	McGovern
Cannon	Gutierrez	McHale
Capps	Gutknecht	McHugh
Cardin	Hall (OH)	McInnis
Carson	Hall (TX)	McIntyre
Castle	Hamilton	McKeon
Chabot	Hansen	McKinney
Chambliss	Harman	McNulty
Chenoweth	Hastert	Meehan
Christensen	Hastings (FL)	Meek
Clay	Hastings (WA)	Menendez
Clayton	Hayworth	Metcalf
Clement	Hefley	Mica
Clyburn	Hefner	Millender-McDonald
Coble	Herger	Miller (CA)
Coburn	Hill	Miller (FL)
Collins	Hilleary	Minge
Combest	Hilliard	Mink
Condit	Hinchey	Moakley
Conyers	Hinojosa	Mollohan
Cook	Hobson	Moran (KS)
Cooksey	Hoekstra	Moran (VA)
Costello	Holden	Morella
Cox	Hooley	Murtha
Coyne	Horn	Myrick
Cramer	Hostettler	Nadler
Crane	Houghton	Neal
Crapo	Hoyer	Nethercutt
Cubin	Hulshof	Neumann
Cummings	Hunter	Ney
Cunningham	Hutchinson	Northup
Danner	Hyde	Northwood
Davis (FL)	Inglis	Nussle
Davis (IL)	Istook	Oberstar
Davis (VA)	Jackson (IL)	Obey
Deal	Jackson-Lee	Olver
DeFazio	(TX)	Ortiz
DeGette	Jefferson	Owens
DeLauro	Jenkins	Oxley
Dellums	John	Packard
Deutsch	Johnson (CT)	Pallone
Diaz-Balart	Johnson (WI)	Pappas
Dickey	Johnson, E. B.	Parker
Dicks	Johnson, Sam	Pascrell
Dingell	Jones	Pastor
Dixon	Kanjorski	Paxon
Doggett	Kaptur	Payne
Dooley	Kasich	Pease
Doolittle	Kelly	Pelosi
Doyle	Kennedy (MA)	Peterson (MN)
Dreier	Kennedy (RI)	Peterson (PA)
Duncan	Kennelly	Petri
Dunn	Kildee	Pickering
Edwards	Kilpatrick	Pickett
Ehlers	Kim	Pitts
Ehrlich	Kind (WI)	Pombo
Emerson	King (NY)	Pomeroy
Engel	Kingston	Porter
English	Klecza	Portman
Ensign	Klink	Poshard
Eshoo	Klug	Price (NC)
Etheridge	Knollenberg	Pryce (OH)
Evans	Kolbe	Quinn
Everett	Kucinich	Radanovich
Ewing	LaFalce	Ramstad
	LaHood	Rangel
	Lampson	

Regula	Sherman	Thornberry
Reyes	Shimkus	Thune
Riggs	Shuster	Thurman
Riley	Sisisky	Tiahrt
Rivers	Skaggs	Tierney
Rodriguez	Skeen	Torres
Roemer	Skelton	Towns
Rogan	Slaughter	Traficant
Rogers	Smith (MI)	Turner
Rohrabacher	Smith (NJ)	Upton
Ros-Lehtinen	Smith (OR)	Velazquez
Rothman	Smith (TX)	Vento
Roukema	Smith, Adam	Visclosky
Roybal-Allard	Smith, Linda	Walsh
Royce	Snowbarger	Wamp
Rush	Snyder	Waters
Ryun	Solomon	Watkins
Sabo	Souder	Watt (NC)
Salmon	Spence	Watts (OK)
Sanchez	Spratt	Waxman
Sanders	Stabenow	Weldon (FL)
Sandlin	Stark	Weldon (PA)
Sanford	Stearns	Weller
Sawyer	Stenholm	Wexler
Saxton	Stokes	Weygand
Scarborough	Strickland	White
Schaefer, Dan	Stump	Whitfield
Schaffer, Bob	Stupak	Wicker
Schumer	Sununu	Wise
Scott	Talent	Wolf
Sensenbrenner	Tanner	Woolsey
Serrano	Tauscher	Wynn
Sessions	Tauzin	Yates
Shadegg	Taylor (MS)	Young (AK)
Shaw	Taylor (NC)	Young (FL)
Shays	Thomas	
	Thompson	

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—3

Bonior	Paul	Rahall
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NOT VOTING—6

Farr	Forbes	Molinari
Flake	McIntosh	Schiff

□ 1706

Mr. THUNE changed his vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

WAIVING REQUIREMENT OF CLAUSE 4(b) OF RULE XI WITH RESPECT TO SAME DAY CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN RESOLUTIONS

Mr. GOSS, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 105-128) on the resolution (H. Res. 165) waiving a requirement of clause 4(b) of rule XI with respect to consideration of certain resolutions reported from the Committee on Rules, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

EUROPEAN SECURITY ACT OF 1997

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 159, I call up the bill (H.R. 1758) to ensure that the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] proceeds in a manner consistent with United States interests, to strengthen relations between the United States and Russia, to

preserve the prerogatives of the Congress with respect to certain arms control agreements, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of H.R. 1758 is as follows:

H.R. 1758

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "European Security Act of 1997".

SEC. 2. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

The Congress declares the following to be the policy of the United States:

(1) **POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATO ENLARGEMENT.**—(A) The emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that will be invited to begin accession negotiations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the NATO summit in Madrid on July 8 and 9, 1997, should not be the last such countries invited to join NATO.

(B) The United States should seek to ensure that the NATO leaders assembled in Madrid agree on a process whereby all other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that wish to join NATO will be considered for membership in NATO as soon as they meet the criteria for such membership.

(2) **POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA.**—(A) NATO enlargement should be carried out in such a manner as to underscore the Alliance's defensive nature and demonstrate to Russia that NATO enlargement will enhance the security of all countries in Europe, including Russia. Accordingly, the United States and its NATO Allies should make this intention clear in the negotiations with Russia, including those regarding adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of November 19, 1990.

(B) In seeking to demonstrate to Russia NATO's defensive and security-enhancing intentions, it is essential that neither fundamental United States security interests in Europe nor the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance be jeopardized. In particular, no commitments should be made to Russia that would have the effect of—

(i) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO members, including with respect to the deployment of nuclear weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other NATO members;

(ii) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory of new NATO members by, for example, restricting the construction of defense infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO to deploy necessary reinforcements;

(iii) providing any international organization, or any country that is not a member of NATO, with authority to review, delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of the North Atlantic Council or the implementation of such decisions, including with respect to the deployment of NATO forces or the admission of additional members to NATO; or

(iv) impeding the development of enhanced relations between NATO and other European countries that do not belong to the Alliance.

(C) In order to enhance security and stability in Europe, the United States should seek commitments from the Russian Federation—

(i) to demarcate and respect all its borders with neighboring states;

(ii) to station its armed forces on the territory of other states only with the consent of

such states and in strict accordance with international law; and

(iii) to take steps to reduce nuclear and conventional forces in Kaliningrad.

(D) As negotiations on adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty proceed, the United States should engage in close and continuous consultations not only with its NATO allies, but also with the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and the newly independent states of the Caucasus region.

(3) **POLICY WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA.**—(A) As the United States proceeds with efforts to develop defenses against ballistic missile attack, it should seek to foster a climate of cooperation with Russia on matters related to missile defense. In particular, the United States and its NATO allies should seek to cooperate with Russia in such areas as early warning and technical aspects of ballistic missile defense.

(B) Even as the Congress seeks to promote ballistic missile defense cooperation with Russia, it must insist on its constitutional prerogatives regarding consideration of arms control agreements with Russia that bear on ballistic missile defense.

SEC. 3. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO NATO ENLARGEMENT.

(a) **POLICY OF SECTION.**—This section is enacted in order to implement the policy set forth in section 2(1).

(b) **DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT ASSISTANCE.**—

(1) **DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES.**—Effective 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are each designated as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 and shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to section 203(d)(1) of such Act, except that any such country shall not be so designated if, prior to such effective date, the President certifies to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the country fails to meet the criteria under section 203(d)(3) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994.

(2) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—The designation of countries pursuant to paragraph (1) as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994—

(A) is in addition to the designation of other countries by law or pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of such Act; and

(B) shall not preclude the designation by the President of other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of such Act.

(3) **SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of the Congress that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—

(A) are to be commended for their progress toward political and economic reform and meeting the guidelines for prospective NATO members;

(B) would make an outstanding contribution to furthering the goals of NATO and enhancing stability, freedom, and peace in Europe should they become NATO members; and

(C) upon complete satisfaction of all relevant criteria should be invited to become full NATO members at the earliest possible date.

(c) **REGIONAL AIRSPACE INITIATIVE AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Funds described in paragraph (2) are authorized to be made available to support the implementation of the Regional Airspace Initiative and the Partnership for Peace Information Management System, including—

(A) the procurement of items in support of these programs; and

(B) the transfer of such items to countries participating in these programs.

(2) **FUNDS DESCRIBED.**—Funds described in this paragraph are funds that are available—

(A) during any fiscal year under the NATO Participation Act of 1994 with respect to countries eligible for assistance under that Act; or

(B) during fiscal year 1998 under any Act to carry out the Warsaw Initiative.

(d) **EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY REGARDING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.**—Section 105 of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1427) is amended by striking "1996 and 1997" and inserting "1997, 1998, and 1999".

(e) **CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO THE NATO PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994.**—Section 203(c) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking "without regard to the restrictions" and all that follows and inserting a period;

(2) by striking paragraph (2);

(3) in paragraph (6), by striking "appropriated under the 'Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund' account" and inserting "made available for the 'Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund'";

(4) in paragraph (8)—

(A) by striking "any restrictions in sections 516 and 519" and inserting "section 516(e)";

(B) by striking "as amended,"; and

(C) by striking "paragraphs (1) and (2)" and inserting "paragraph (1)"; and

(5) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (8) as paragraphs (2) through (7), respectively.

SEC. 4. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE.

(a) **POLICY OF SECTION.**—This section is enacted in order to implement the policy set forth in section 2(2).

(b) **AUTHORITY TO APPROVE THE CFE FLANK AGREEMENT.**—The President is authorized to approve on behalf of the United States the Document Agreed Among States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, adopted in Vienna, Austria on May 31, 1996, concerning the resolution of issues related to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty flank zone.

(c) **SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO CFE ADAPTATION.**—It is the sense of Congress that any revisions to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe that may be agreed in the ongoing CFE adaptation negotiations can enter into force only if those revisions are specifically approved in a manner described in section 33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)), and no such approval will be provided to any revisions to that Treaty that jeopardize fundamental United States security interests in Europe or the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance by—

(1) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO members, including with respect to the deployment of nuclear weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other NATO members;

(2) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory of new NATO members by, for

example, restricting the construction of defense infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO to deploy necessary reinforcements;

(3) providing any international organization, or any country that is not a member of NATO, with authority to review, delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of the North Atlantic Council or the implementation of such decisions, including with respect to the deployment of NATO forces or the admission of additional members to NATO; or

(4) impeding the development of enhanced relations between NATO and other European countries that do not belong to the Alliance by, for example, recognizing spheres of influence in Europe.

SEC. 5. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATIVE PROJECTS WITH RUSSIA.

(a) POLICY OF SECTION.—This section is enacted in order to implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(A).

(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA.—The Secretary of Defense is authorized to carry out a program of cooperative ballistic missile defense-related projects with the Russian Federation.

(c) CONDUCT OF PROGRAM.—The program of cooperative ballistic missile defense-related projects with the Russian Federation under subsection (b) may include (but is not limited to) projects in the following areas:

(1) Cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation with respect to early warning of ballistic missile launches, including the sharing of information on ballistic missile launches detected by either the United States or the Russian Federation, formalization of an international launch notification regime, and development of a joint global warning center.

(2) Technical cooperation in research, development, test, and production of technology and systems for ballistic missile defense.

(3) Conduct of joint ballistic missile defense exercises.

(4) Planning for cooperation in defense against ballistic missile threats aimed at either the United States or the Russian Federation.

(d) DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA.—The President should seek to initiate a dialogue with the Russian Federation aimed at exploring the potential for mutual accommodation of outstanding issues between the two nations on matters relating to ballistic missile defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, including the possibility of developing a strategic relationship not based on mutual nuclear threats.

(e) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than January 1, 1998, January 1, 1999, and January 1, 2000, the President shall submit to the Congress a report on the cooperative program under this section. Each such report shall include the following:

(1) A description of the conduct of the program during the preceding fiscal year, including a description of the projects carried out under the program.

(2) A description of the status of the dialogue under subsection (d) during the preceding fiscal year.

(3) A description of the funding for the program during the preceding fiscal year and the year during which the report is submitted and the proposed funding for the program for the next fiscal year.

SEC. 6. RESTRICTION ON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ABM/TMD DEMARCATION AGREEMENTS.

(a) POLICY OF SECTION.—This section is enacted in order to implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(B).

(b) RESTRICTION.—An ABM/TMD demarcation agreement shall not be binding on the

United States, and shall not enter into force with respect to the United States, unless, after the date of the enactment of this Act, that agreement is specifically approved in a manner described in section 33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)).

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO DEMARCATION AGREEMENTS.—

(1) OPPOSITION TO MULTILATERALIZATION OF ABM TREATY.—It is the sense of the Congress that until the United States has taken the steps necessary to ensure that the ABM Treaty remains a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation (such state being the only successor state of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that has deployed or realistically may deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system) no ABM/TMD demarcation agreement will be considered for approval for entry into force with respect to the United States (any such approval, as stated in subsection (b), to be effective only if provided in a manner described in section 33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b))).

(2) PRESERVATION OF U.S. THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POTENTIAL.—It is the sense of the Congress that no ABM/TMD demarcation agreement that would reduce the potential of United States theater missile defense systems to defend the Armed Forces of the United States abroad or the armed forces or population of allies of the United States will be approved for entry into force with respect to the United States (any such approval, as stated in subsection (b), to be effective only if provided in a manner described in section 33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b))).

(d) ABM/TMD DEMARCATION AGREEMENT DEFINED.—For the purposes of this section, the term "ABM/TMD demarcation agreement" means an agreement that establishes a demarcation between theater ballistic missile defense systems and strategic anti-ballistic missile defense systems for purposes of the ABM Treaty, including the following:

(1) The agreement concluded by the Standing Consultative Commission on June 24, 1996, concerning lower velocity theater missile defense systems.

(2) The agreement concluded (or to be concluded) by the Standing Consultative Commission concerning higher velocity theater missile defense systems, based on the Joint Statement Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty issued on March 21, 1997, at the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit.

(3) Any agreement similar to the agreements identified in paragraphs (1) and (2).

(e) ABM TREATY DEFINED.—For purposes of this section, the term "ABM Treaty" means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (23 UST 3435), and includes the Protocols to that Treaty, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974 (27 UST 1645).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 159, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN].

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to bring before the House the European Security Act of 1997. It is an important piece of legislation that will once again give the Congress the opportunity to demonstrate our support for prompt

enlargement of the NATO alliance and our special concern for the security of Romania and three Baltic States.

Furthermore, the legislation charts a course that will permit us to enlarge NATO, as well as to achieve our vital national objectives in the area of ballistic missile defense without disrupting relations with Russia.

This bill takes as a starting point the fact that NATO will begin the process of enlargement this summer consistent with the three laws that we have enacted on this subject over each of the last 3 years. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia currently are the front runners for admission in the first round of enlargement.

This bill identifies two problems with the way NATO enlargement is proceeding: First, we are concerned that a number of countries may not be properly considered for the first round of NATO enlargement, or may be left out of the first round and can find themselves in a security vacuum. Second, we worry that in the rush to mollify Russia, concessions may be made that could jeopardize European security and the effectiveness of NATO.

To reassure the countries that are not currently among the front runners for admission to NATO, this bill designates four additional countries to receive NATO enlargement assistance: Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The effect is to give these countries the same status under United States law as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia.

□ 1715

This bill goes on to express the sense of Congress that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be invited to join NATO as soon as they can satisfy all of the relevant criteria.

With regard to Russia, the bill spells out concessions that we would consider unacceptable. But then to make clear that the purpose of NATO enlargement is not to emasculate Russia, as many in Moscow appear to believe, the bill supports efforts to adapt the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, provided this is done in a way that does not make the new NATO members any second class citizens or otherwise jeopardize our security interests in Europe.

This bill supports adaptation of the CFE treaty because we know of no better way to demonstrate to Russia our genuine belief that NATO enlargement will enhance the security of all countries in Europe, including Russia.

With regard to ballistic missile defense, the bill again demonstrates that our objectives can best be achieved in the manner that enhances Russia's security as much as our own.

This legislation, Mr. Speaker, has garnered widespread support since it was first introduced back on April 24. It is supported by all of the major organizations representing Americans of Central and Eastern European descent, ranging from the Polish American Congress to the Armenian Assembly and

the Joint Baltic-American National Committee.

Just this week, Mr. Speaker, it has been endorsed by the editors of both the Washington Times and the Washington Post. If it can unite the editors of those two newspapers, who agree on very little, surely it can unite the Congress.

In that spirit, I urge my colleagues to join in supporting this important measure.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, first I want to remind Members about the manner in which this bill comes before us. There have been no hearings in the 105th Congress on NATO enlargement. There have been no hearings on the bill. There has been no consideration in the Committee on International Relations or anywhere else of this bill. Now we have it under a closed rule.

I think how the Congress handles important issues is important because it contributes to the public perception of the Congress. We talk a lot about the importance of the Democratic process in countries before they come into NATO. We could very well use some Democratic process in consideration of this bill.

The Committee on Rules has decided that on the most important foreign policy issue of the year, probably, there will be one vote, up or down, no amendments, on a bill that has had no process of review by the committee of jurisdiction.

Second, I do not oppose the content of this bill. I plan to vote for it. But I think Members should understand what the bill does and does not do. It is neither a very helpful nor a harmful bill.

Contrary to what some may say in this debate, this bill does not pave the way for another round of NATO enlargement. It does not provide additional assistance. It does not provide different assistance. The assistance that this bill would provide is exactly the same kind of assistance that the administration is currently providing or planning to provide.

Four countries, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, are designated to receive assistance under the NATO Participation Act. But the assistance authorities under that act duplicate existing authorities. No U.S. assistance program, plan, or activity in these countries will be changed because of this act. The bill amounts to a sense of the Congress.

The Baltic States and Romania certainly deserve consideration for NATO membership, but so do others who are not named. The message to the four countries designated under the NATO Participation Act is that "you have a leg up" in the next round of NATO expansion. The message to Bulgaria, to Slovakia, to Albania and to the others is, "Sorry, you lose." This bill says to

them, "No matter what you do, you are not now on the list of NATO membership."

The only meaningful change in authorities in this bill would be to allow the administration to use Department of Defense funds for the Regional Airspace Initiative in Eastern Europe, a program to modernize air traffic control systems. Usually in the Congress we have a good many Members at least who oppose raids on Defense Department funds for foreign aid purposes. This would provide about \$10 million a year from the operations and maintenance accounts for what these committees view as foreign assistance. While an air traffic control system in Central Europe is useful, we should be clear here that this authority will mean a further depletion in the defense budget.

On the question of the CFE flank agreement, the Senate has already acted. The Senate acted by May 15 to provide its advice and consent. The administration originally asked both the House and the Senate to act on the flank agreement last August. The House in this case is a day late and a dollar short. Its actions on the flank agreement are now irrelevant.

On the question of the ABM treaty and ballistic missile defense, the President will not be obliged to change his policy one iota. He already is carrying out a cooperative program on ballistic missile defense with Russia. He is already carrying out a dialog with Russia on the ABM treaty. He has already agreed to submit the demarcation agreement under the ABM treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent.

I do not approve of the way this bill came to the floor. As I suggested, I really would prefer no bill at this time. NATO enlargement is a complex process with huge stakes. It will not be easy to make it work. It makes sense to let the process unfold gradually, and let a consensus develop on which members should be admitted and in what order.

My preference would be for the Congress not to try to dictate the process by declaring favorites. There is something disturbing about seeing Members champion certain countries, trying to push their favorites to the front of the line.

But this bill is before us, and I do not wish to be recorded in opposition to NATO expansion. The bill will be viewed in Europe and certainly in Eastern Europe as an up-or-down vote on NATO enlargement. I do not intend to be seen as a Member who opposes the aspirations of the Baltic States and Romania. I think we would be better served if all countries seeking NATO membership were designated under the NATO Participation Act.

NATO enlargement, in my judgment, is going to happen. We have reached a point of no return. I had and still have many questions about enlargement, especially about costs and U.S. commitments. I do not think we have had sufficient debate or consideration of NATO enlargement.

I do believe that, if properly done, NATO enlargement can increase the security of all of Europe and increase the chances that Europe will not be the source of wars. NATO enlargement will certainly assure these new democracies of central Europe and strengthen Democratic and market reforms.

I do not think we have adequately considered the impact of enlargement on NATO itself and on those countries not included in enlargement. We certainly have not considered carefully enough the costs of NATO enlargement and how to deal with the hostile reaction of Russia. Much is going to depend on how we manage the process of enlargement.

I support NATO enlargement because I believe that the risks of proceeding with enlargement are less now than the risks of not going forward. You cannot have the President of the United States talk again and again about NATO enlargement, and have 16 governments support NATO enlargement, without enlargement going forward. U.S. credibility and NATO credibility would vanish if we tried to turn back now.

The question now is not whether to enlarge NATO but how to do it in a responsible way. We do not want to antagonize Russia unduly. We do not want to create a two-tiered NATO membership. We should not prejudge the next steps.

We should let the process of NATO enlargement unfold. We should bring in Members only when they are prepared and meet NATO criteria. We should encourage all countries in Eastern Europe to meet NATO criteria, not just a few. We should keep the process open and not create first, second, and third tiers of candidates.

Neither the process under which we consider this bill nor the content of the bill itself should make us especially proud. So far as I can see, it is a foreign policy bill driven largely by domestic political pressures. But neither is it a bad bill. I see no compelling reason to vote against it. I do plan to vote for it.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his supportive remarks with regard to this important bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on International Relations and Human Rights.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my strong support for H.R. 1758.

The language before us is designed first and foremost to preserve the effectiveness and the flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance. For nearly five decades the North Atlantic Alliance has served and advanced the interests of the United States in Europe by preserving peace, promoting economic prosperity, and advancing our shared principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

Mr. Speaker, I would point out that the underlying legislation provides important assistance to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Romania as they pursue membership in the alliance irrespective of the outcome of the NATO summit meeting scheduled to take place in Madrid in early July.

Recently the ambassadors from each of these countries, as well as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, appeared before the Helsinki Commission, which I co-chair along with Senator D'AMATO, and presented their government's case for NATO membership. I believe, especially after hearing from each of the ambassadors, that it would be an injustice of historic proportions if we did not take advantage of the unique opportunity that we have today to embrace these countries of the region that have demonstrably committed themselves to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

During President Constantinescu's short tenure, Romania has made very impressive progress, and I believe deserves every ounce of encouragement, support, and consideration in the lead-up to the July NATO summit. Mr. Speaker, as one of those who has closely followed developments in Romania since 1981, I would hope that Romania is included among those invited to accession negotiations on full NATO membership.

With respect to the Baltic States, I have seen no justification in delaying similar negotiations with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Despite decades of Soviet domination and brutal repression, the commitment of the Baltic peoples to freedom and democracy ultimately triumphed over totalitarianism. Having persevered for 50 years and overcome the odds by regaining their independence, the Baltic countries deserve to be fully integrated into the West, including NATO, without further delay.

Mr. Speaker, the important legislation before us is aimed at giving further impetus to the enlargement of NATO. It is of critical importance, in my view, that a genuine process be put into place to ensure that emerging democracies not invited in Madrid join NATO but that wish to join the alliance will be given every consideration, and that there be a transparent and a real process for doing so. Platitudes cannot substitute for process. The bill calls for the NATO leaders assembled in Madrid to agree to such a process.

Frankly, Mr. Speaker, I remain very concerned over the recently concluded negotiations undertaken by NATO Secretary General Solana that resulted in the so-called Founding Act between NATO and the Russian Federation. Part of my concern stems from the fact that the talks were conducted against the backdrop of an artificial deadline suggested by the Russians. It is of critical importance that the Founding Act in no way undermine the effectiveness of NATO or reduce new members of the alliance to second-class citizens.

I am particularly concerned about the seemingly one-sided nature of the recently concluded negotiations, focusing as they have on Moscow's security preoccupation, real or imagined. The pending legislation identifies three specific security concerns that I urge the Clinton administration to raise with the Russians until they have been resolved.

The first concern stems from the fact that Russia has not agreed to the international borders with several of her neighbors. Moscow has purposefully dragged its feet on this important issue with the aim of intimidating a number of the countries involved.

The second issue concerns the deployment of Russian forces on the territory of other states. Today there are thousands of Russian troops deployed in and around the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol. Russian troops are likewise stationed in Moldova. The pending amendment calls for a commitment from the Russian Federation to station its armed forces on the territory of other states only with consent of such states and in strict accordance with international law.

Finally, the bill calls for a commitment by the Russians to take steps to reduce nuclear and conventional forces in Kaliningrad, where Moscow has amassed a huge arsenal that poses a potential threat to the Baltic States and to Poland.

□ 1730

Mr. Speaker, the progress in resolving these outstanding issues would go a long way to advance peace and stability throughout Europe, a region of critical importance to our own security and to our own economic and political interests.

I urge adoption of H.R. 1758 in the interests of maintaining the effectiveness and the flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance. I urge strong support for the bill.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, how much time have we consumed?

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina). The gentleman from California [Mr. LANTOS] has 22½ minutes remaining and the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] has 21 minutes remaining.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I rise as a strong supporter of NATO expansion. Two weeks ago this past Sunday, I had the privilege in Bucharest of delivering to President Goncz of Hungary and President Constantinescu of Romania a letter by President Clinton. In this letter, President Clinton congratulated the two Presidents and the two countries for reaching an historic accommodation after centuries of bloodshed, bitterness and wars.

The long-awaited period of reconciliation and peace between these two important countries of central and Eastern Europe is now a reality. The two Presidents jointly responded to our

President, and the two governments strongly favor their simultaneous invitation as NATO members.

May I say, Mr. Speaker, that the debate in this country and in the other 15 NATO countries basically comes down to whether in the first round we should invite just three potential new members, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, or whether we should invite four or five, including Slovenia and Romania.

I strongly favor, as one who has spent a great deal of time over a lifetime in that region, the simultaneous invitation to membership to all five countries, with the clear understanding that a simultaneous invitation to membership does not guarantee simultaneous acceptance into NATO.

Such a formula, Mr. Speaker, would give us the best of all possible worlds. It would avoid the public relations disaster of having some countries invited and others not invited; it would avoid the backlash that would surely take place in Romania, which has gone through free and open and democratic elections, which has moved vigorously toward privatization and the free market, and which recognizes the importance of a free press and religious freedom. It now is as well qualified to be invited as any of the other five.

Yet I think we must understand that, in terms of economic development and other criteria, all five countries may not be ready to join NATO simultaneously. Therefore, my recommendation: simultaneous invitation; no guarantee of simultaneous admission.

I also believe, Mr. Speaker, that, should this formula not be acceptable, the very least the NATO countries should do at their July meeting is to designate a time certain when the second round of countries will be invited to join NATO. Failure to do so would lead to significant disappointments, a xenophobic backlash and a severe destruction of the spirit which now permeates this region.

These five countries, in my judgment, are fully prepared to begin negotiations in July, and with assistance from the existing NATO contingent will be ready within the next 2 or 3 years to enter NATO as full-fledged, fully equal members. This will be good for NATO, this will be good for the new members, and, I underscore, it will be good for Russia.

In the cold war days, the Soviet Union assumed that NATO is an aggressive military alliance. Those of us who understood NATO throughout argued that NATO is a defensive military alliance. It is a force for stability, prosperity, democracy and freedom. Those are the attributes in central and Eastern Europe that are beneficial to Russia, and I strongly urge my colleagues to support simultaneous invitation to all five countries mentioned, and I support the legislation of the gentleman from New York.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS], the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], and congratulate him on his successes earlier today.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the European Security Act strongly. Today we stand on the threshold of the July Madrid summit, where the invitations to seek membership in NATO will be issued, and they are sure to be among the most coveted invitations of the year. What this means is that it is time for this Congress to offer not only words but substantive measures designed to enhance the NATO enlargement process.

The Europe Security Act of 1997 is a strong statement in support of expansion with concrete measures designed to improve the European security environment. It reiterates this round of expansion cannot and should not be the last; that all countries able to meet the requirements for membership should be permitted to seek it. It also seeks to ensure that those countries not included in the first tranche are not left out in the cold, in some kind of a security vacuum.

H.R. 1758 seeks to do so by expanding the circle of countries eligible for enlargement assistance. It also addresses concerns that my colleagues and I have regarding the conventional forces in Europe and includes language to discourage the administration from making further agreements with nonmember states that will undercut the security of the alliance. In other words, it says no to appeasement.

Still further, it is intended to enhance Europe security with measures specifically designed to overcome legal and foreign policy impediments to ballistic missile defense by holding the line on the implementation of demarcation agreements negotiated with Russia and proposals from the White House that would multilateralize the ABM treaty.

The Europe Security Act will offer the opportunity to enhance U.S. security from ballistic missile attack, something of interest to all of us. In the end, the Europe Security Act is about consolidating the process of democratization in the central and eastern Europe, about ensuring that those countries that share our values and took the risks associated with casting off the Soviet Union will be part of the new European security order and enjoy the benefits of freedom.

Mr. Speaker, as the Madrid summit approaches, we know that a difficult process still lies ahead, but it is absolutely certain that enlargement is the right choice. We must not retreat from our world leadership role, we must not forsake our allies, old or new. We have

dealt with Russia, the Ukraine and all the interested parties in the past few years on this matter, and it is time to get on with it.

We have worked with the parliamentarians in the North Atlantic Assembly. We have visited with the governments and the people on their turf in Russia, the Ukraine, the Baltics, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and many others. And, of course, we have been to our NATO's home port and talked to them about this. This is not a new subject. This is a subject whose time has come. I support this legislation and I urge my colleagues to do so.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, it is a terrible thing that this central question of foreign policy comes before us under a closed rule with only 1 hour.

I think the concept of NATO expansion is a reasonable one, but it is not reasonable to go to the American taxpayer, in the light of a budget deal, which will severely constrain spending both in the defense and nondefense areas, and tell the American taxpayer that they will continue to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of defending Europe.

Everyone acknowledges that the expansion of NATO will cost money. The more countries involved, the more money it will cost. That is not a disqualification. But that cost should not be borne by the current formula, which has the U.S. taxpayer subsidizing the nations of Western Europe.

We talked about welfare reform last year. We did not go after the real welfare. The real welfare is the United States taxpayer, 52 years after the end of World War II, years after the Marshall plan succeeded, continuing to subsidize Germany and England and France and Denmark and Belgium. This bill assumes the status quo.

It is shocking that we were not allowed a chance to offer an amendment to this bill that would say that, whether one is for or against NATO expansion, we in the House do not want a continuation of this subsidy by the American taxpayer of our wealthy allies in Western Europe.

As the Western European nations struggle to meet their 3-percent deficit deadline to get into the Euro, we can be sure they will start cutting back on their military expenditures. And they will cut back on their military expenditures secure in the hope that the American Congress will again be suckered and bail them out.

What this bill does, erroneously in my judgment, is to assume that status quo. I will vote "no". I might be supportive of NATO expansion in some context, but this bill assumes an expansion of NATO under the same terms.

The Washington Post editorial that the gentleman from New York talked about referred to the need for more spending. Do not send the American

taxpayer once again to the defense of Europe when the European nations are allowed to get a free ride.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada [Mr. GIBBONS].

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I have a question about this legislation which I wish to direct to its principal sponsor, the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], and chairman of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GIBBONS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would be pleased to respond to the questions of the distinguished gentleman from Florida.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I note that the legislation states that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be invited to become full members of NATO at the earliest possible date upon complete satisfaction of all relevant criteria. The legislation also provides that these four countries are to be designated as eligible to receive assistance under the NATO Participation Act effective 180 days after the date of enactment.

Are these provisions intended to suggest that Congress believes that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be kept out of the first round of NATO enlargement this year and, instead, invited to join NATO at a later date in a second or third round of enlargement?

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I can assure the gentleman that it is not our intention to push these countries into any second or third round of NATO enlargement. The purpose of this legislation is to support the efforts of Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. We absolutely are not trying to hold them back.

If at the summit meeting in Madrid this July the members of NATO decide to invite Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to begin accession talks with the alliance as part of the first round of enlargement, we will welcome that. And if they are not invited to join in the first round, we will do all we can to make sure the door to the alliance remains open to them. And that is the purpose of this legislation.

Mr. GIBBONS. Why then does the legislation postpone for 180 days the effective date of the designation of these countries under the NATO Participation Act?

Mr. GILMAN. Well, that designation has to do with eligibility to receive U.S. assistance. The 180-day period provided under the legislation should not be read to suggest that we think it is necessary to wait the entire 180 days before deciding whether to invite these countries to join NATO.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman and esteemed chairman for his clarification, and with the assurance he has provided, I will be pleased to join him in support of this measure.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his interest in the legislation.

□ 1745

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. NEAL].

Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, sometimes this institution suffers from collective amnesia. What we honor tonight in this concept is what happened in Hungary in 1956, what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 with Alexander Dubcek, and what happened in Poland just a decade ago. What we honor here today is a simple concept of those electricians and that trade unionist from Gdansk, Lech Walesa, who turned events as we proceeded to the next century, on their ear. Internationally we honor the commitment that they made, and I assure Mr. FRANK's reservations about the manner in which costs are ascribed in these particular instances, but we cannot turn our backs on the heroism.

And remember once again those Soviet tanks as they rolled into Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Jaruzelski threatened to put down those trade unionists. It represents the triumph of the human spirit nurtured in this very institution.

I am pleased to lend my name in support of the concept of expanding NATO to include these republics.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina). The Chair would point out that the gentleman from California [Mr. LANTOS] has 14½ minutes remaining and the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] has 16 minutes remaining.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FOX], another member of our committee.

Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, it was not long ago, December 1994, that the NATO summit, the United States expressed its interest in expanding NATO in order to strengthen nations that share the U.S. belief in democracy, continue the development of free market economies, open the U.S. investment and trade, secure allies willing to share in cooperative efforts on a range of global issues, and preserve a Europe free from domination by any single power.

The enlargement we are discussing today will enhance stability by providing NATO security guarantee for candidate states working to construct viable democracies and free-market systems. H.R. 1758 declares that the door to membership in NATO should remain open to all emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and expresses the sense of Congress that the bulk of nations in Romania should be admitted to NATO and declares that Congress will not approve international agreements that accord second class status to new members. The bill declares the door to NATO should not close after the first round of NATO

enlargement this summer. Members left out of the first round must be assured they will be considered for NATO membership in the future.

So I rise in support of this important bill. NATO enlargement is important to our country, it is important to world peace, and it is important to the growth of human mankind.

I thank the gentleman very much for the opportunity to speak on behalf of this legislation and to our chairman, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], who has led this legislation forward.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the very distinguished gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. OBERSTAR].

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, last year during consideration of the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, the other body voted to designate Slovenia along with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as nations that have made progress toward meeting NATO's criteria for new members. And Slovenia certainly stands out as a sterling candidate for admission to NATO, and I appreciate the support on the Democratic side and on the Republican side of the committee in accepting the Senate amendment in conference.

We are soon to witness the Madrid meeting that will discuss the enlargement of NATO. I would urge the administration to keep uppermost on their agenda Slovenia as a candidate for the first round of expansion. Slovenia has moved successfully to privatize its economy. Everything from banking to aviation has been privatized. They have democratized their politics and their government. They have created 158 local governments and had local elections. They are a significant force in the modernization of trade in the former East European areas and deserve to be a member of NATO.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the administration to accept Slovenia in this first round.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRABACHER], another member of our committee.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, in the spirit of collegiality and civility, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRABACHER].

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRABACHER] is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I do appreciate this time, from the gentleman from California [Mr. LANTOS] in particular, because I am providing a legitimate opposition to this bill.

Mr. Speaker, today I rise in opposition to H.R. 1758. I do not do so with any type of situation where I have a problem in disagreeing with the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN]. Mr. GILMAN has my respect, and I know he is pushing this bill; the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON] is push-

ing for this bill. He has my respect. We worked together on so many issues, but I think that it is important for us to recognize the changes that have taken place in the world and for America to take a realistic view of what is going to be happening, what challenges we will face in the years ahead.

NATO did a good job in deterring a Soviet attack on Europe, but what purpose does NATO serve now? Is it worth the expenditure of tens of billions of limited American defense dollars? I do not think so. Europe no longer poses and what is happening in Europe no longer poses a national security threat to the United States of America. We need not spend our limited defense dollars that we have today for the stability of our European friends. They can pay for their own stability.

Why we were in NATO was because the Soviet Union, and a war with the Soviet Union, was a threat to our national security. Staying in NATO now wastes limited dollars that should be spent on American weapons systems that will enable the United States to project power from the continental United States. Spending money on NATO rather than spending money on B-2 bombers or American aircraft carriers, or, yes, on a missile defense system is a waste of money. We need not spend our limited resources for stability in Europe, especially when it takes our focus away from the real part of the world where the threat to American security lies.

By focusing on Europe, we are taking away our focus from Asia, where a belligerent, totalitarian, expansionist China is fast becoming a threat to our national security and a threat to world peace. Let us focus our efforts on strengthening our alliances in Asia, spending our money so that we can deter war on Asia rather than wasting it on NATO, which is a thing of the past.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes to respond to my friend from California, Mr. ROHRABACHER.

Mr. Speaker, NATO has been the cornerstone of American security for two generations. NATO has been the essence of our defense strategy vis-a-vis our most formidable opponent since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union, and it takes a great deal of naivete to assume that new threats might not reemerge on the Eurasian continent aimed at our allies and indeed the United States.

Expanding NATO and continuing to fund NATO perhaps in a more proportional fashion, as my friend from Massachusetts recommends, is very much in the American national security interests, and to send a message at this stage that the United States wishes to cut back its NATO commitment would be the most suicidally shortsighted gesture of U.S. defense and foreign policy.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge my colleagues to reject the notions presented by my good friend from California.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York, the chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for yielding me this time. I commend him for bringing this measure to the floor in this timely manner. And Mr. Speaker, I just hope that one of the greatest Presidents this country has ever known is able to be watching this debate here tonight because it is because of he, and his name was Ronald Reagan from the gentleman's State, my good friend; it was because of he and his policies of peace through strength back in the 1980's, backed by Republican and Democratic bipartisan support, including the gentleman from California [Mr. LANTOS] sitting over there, a good Democrat, that brought down the Iron Curtain, that brought down the Berlin wall, and saw peace breaking out and democracy breaking out all over Eastern Europe in countries that the people there, tens of millions of them, that were enslaved by deadly atheistic communism that has no respect for life or human rights at all; those people today have hope because they are now part of a sovereign nation. Be it Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia, or Poland, or the Czech Republic or Hungary, those people now have hope, the same kind of hope that we Americans have enjoyed, and that is why we need to have this bill on the floor here today.

My colleagues know we fought two world wars in this country, and we fought a very expensive cold war, expensive to the American taxpayer because we had to rebuild our strength, and we had to show the evil empire, as Ronald Reagan said, that we would not tolerate this kind of inhumane philosophy in this world, and that is why just before President Clinton went to Helsinki to meet with President Yeltsin I spoke with him for almost an hour to make sure that we Republicans were speaking the same as the Democrat leadership and the same as the President of the United States that we were going to keep that door open for all countries formerly oppressed by this philosophy called communism, that we would keep that door open for all of these sovereign countries.

Mr. Speaker, President Clinton assured me that there will be no quid pro quo with Yeltsin, that what was said in public would be what was said in private and that those doors would be kept open to these countries once they met the criteria.

And what is that criteria? That criteria is that these sovereign nations, these new sovereign nations, must have advanced to irreversible democracy, that they must have moved to a free market economy, privatizing their industries, that they must live by the rule of law and that they must respect

human rights both within their country and across their borders and that, finally, they must be able to participate militarily. What this bill says is to those countries: "You have previously been under Russian influence, that all of your military is not able to communicate or inter-operate with our NATO defense alliance," and this bill is meant to help those countries do just that.

Mr. Speaker, that is why it is so important for us to pass this legislation here today.

This is not spending money, I would say to my good friend from Massachusetts. This is saving money because let me assure my colleagues that once these countries are brought under the greatest defense alliance in the history of the world that there will be no more wars in that part of the world because what is that defense alliance? It says that if Latvia is invaded by an outside military aggressor, that these countries, including America, will come to their rescue to protect their sovereignty. That is what this measure says.

And my colleagues know it is not just for these countries, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and Romania and Slovenia, the Warsaw Pact countries who have already met that criteria, but it is also for Bulgaria and Slovakia and, yes, even Ukraine, and, yes, my colleagues, even Russia. If Russia would meet this criteria, then they also could become a part of NATO, and their boundaries would also be protected from outside military aggression. That is how to guarantee peace in that part of the world, and it is how to guarantee that U.S. soldiers and sailors and marines and Air Force will never have to go into battle in that part of the world again.

Mr. Speaker, that is why my colleagues need to come to this floor, they need to support this legislation, they need to cast a vote for Ronald Reagan and for the expansion of NATO, because that is how to bring about peace in the world.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to my friend from New York I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would merely like to suggest to the distinguished gentleman who has just spoken that in addition to President Reagan, beginning with President Truman, all of our Presidents, Republican and Democratic alike, deserve a great deal of credit, as do Members of Congress who on a bipartisan basis have been so strongly supportive of NATO through the decades.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. ENGEL].

□ 1800

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from California for yielding me this time. I rise in strong support of this bill. I have long been in favor of NATO expansion, and I am very pleased

that we finally seem to be moving forward.

Mr. Speaker, I think this bill states what is obvious: That NATO expansion is a good thing, and that countries can join NATO if they meet certain criteria. I think it is very important at this stage to state that in July, we know that certain countries are going to be admitted to NATO, and we want the Congress to go on record as saying that once these countries are admitted to NATO, that the door does not swing shut, that the door is open, that NATO expansion is still on the table, that this Congress is in favor of the concept of expanding NATO.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism, the Western world, the democratic world, the United States would be foolhardy if it did not take advantage of the fact that these countries, which were formerly Communist countries and dictatorships, want to have free market economies, want to have democracy, and want to be a part of the Western world, of the free world, of the democratic world. It would make no sense for us not to bear the fruits of what happened, and I think if we delay NATO expansion, that is exactly what we would be doing.

No one is saying that countries should be admitted before they meet the criteria. This is simply saying that Romania and the Baltic nations can be considered when they meet the criteria, and again, if there are other nations in Eastern Europe that can meet the criteria and want to become NATO members, they too ought to be considered; that would be the next logical step to this bill.

The bill also makes it clear that such enlargement of NATO does not end at Russia. Indeed, we want to have cooperation with Russia. The President, in the pact that he signed with Mr. Yeltsin, states that, that Russia can be a partner with the West, but that Russia cannot have a veto power over NATO expansion, and that Russia cannot dictate to NATO how NATO expands or to which Nation an invitation is given to join NATO.

So I think that on balance, this is a very, very good measure. It is a measure that is very, very important. It is a measure that will go a long way in guaranteeing democracy, free market economies, and peace as we approach the 21st century.

I compliment the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the chairman and my friend, for putting forth this measure.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA].

Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] for yielding me this time.

Quite frankly, I say to my colleagues, I regret that this bill picks winners and losers in the quest to join NATO, as was pointed out by the ranking member of the committee. I personally believe that Slovakia should be

and should have been selected for NATO admission in the first round last year, and certainly should be included this year. Unfortunately, this whole process has become a popularity contest rather than a well-considered international security consideration.

Let me submit for the RECORD comments relating to Slovakia's readiness to join NATO. Nicholas Burns of the State Department said April 17, 1997, "The Slovak Republic has made impressive economic progress in four years since independence, and is co-operating fully in Partnership for Peace. We have also been gratified by the Slovak Republic's contribution to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia."

Just a few days ago, Speaker GINGRICH said in the Washington Times, "I do not think there is any sense to exclude Slovakia."

My grandfather was born in Slovakia and the Slovaks are a patient and peaceful people. They have been free and independent for only 4 years. They were oppressed for 1,000 years. They will wait patiently for a little while longer to take their rightful place in NATO, and I hope that we can support that effort in the future.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. CAPPS]. Although he has been with us only this term, he has already made great contributions to the body.

Mr. CAPPS. Mr. Speaker, I know I will probably vote for this, but I find it somewhat curious that this is probably the only debate we are going to have, which will probably be the most important foreign policy decision that this Congress will make this term, and we are doing it within an hour right now, with very little preparation. This is probably the only time we will be talking about this before the Madrid summit, NATO summit in July.

I just think the ramifications of this are so profound, so deep, so extensive, that I regret that we have to do it in this fashion. I know for a new Member to come here and lecture other Members on how we ought to be doing this is probably not very polite of me, but I think that until we can trust the process that we are using, it is difficult to restore the trust between the people and their representatives here.

Mr. Speaker, I just think by naming four more countries, we are creating expectations among those countries. Also, there are other candidates for NATO membership that are not included on this new list. That means that they will understand what their position is relative to the people who are on the list. I think we raise expectations, we diminish expectations, we create a false euphoria.

So I have lots of problems not just with the bill, but with this matter of proceeding. Because of my great respect for NATO, for the timeliness of NATO expansion, as I say, and I want to associate myself with the remarks

of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON], I will probably vote for the bill, because I think it is a very important step forward. However, I think procedurally, there is a lot lacking in the way we have gone about it.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON].

(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the legislation introduced by my colleague and friend the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], and I rise as one of the original cosponsors of this legislation.

I want to speak to the issue of a new era of cooperation with Russia, because there are perhaps some in this body and perhaps some in this country, and perhaps others outside of this country who think that this bill is attempting to undermine a new relationship with Russia and some of the other former Soviet States. Nothing could be further from the truth.

In fact, in this legislation, Mr. Speaker, is a specific provision that allows us to begin a new era of engaging Russia, especially in the area of missile defense.

Now, this is not necessarily a new area, because in the Committee on National Security for the past several years we in fact have supported funding for joint missile defense initiatives. But what this legislation calls for is a formal process of working with Russia to build a sense of understanding about what we are trying to accomplish. It does not mean that we are going to reveal any secrets, it does not mean that we are going to give the Russians any strategic information; it means that we are going to build confidence and that we are going to continue to work on programs like the RAMOS and the follow-on to the agreed project, which engage our physicists and scientists in new relationships that allow us to show Russia that perhaps the old relationship that was best identified by the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty is perhaps not suitable for the current relationship between our country and Russia.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, what is kind of interesting is, the Russians have just participated in a 2-year study with us that has been funded by our ballistic missile defense organization, headed up by Dr. Keith Payne and Dr. Shoumikin on behalf of the Russian side, that in fact has called for the possibility of a new bilateral relationship that would allow for, instead of a process of mutually assured destruction upon which we base our bilateral relationship, that we move into looking at the possibility of asymmetrical deterrence, which means that we include offensive missiles in an attempt to bring them down, and as we do so, that we also discuss and perhaps look at changes to the ABM Treaty to allow defensive systems to be put into

place without creating a destabilizing impact on our relationship. This bill lays the groundwork for that to happen.

Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, the administration seems to be going in the opposite direction. I say that because recently at the Helsinki summit there was an agreement to expand the ABM Treaty to include demarcation provisions relative to theater missile defense systems.

Mr. Speaker, a number of us in this body, including a significant number of Members of the minority party, have expressed their concern through a bill that I introduced that said, this is the wrong time to be expanding the ABM Treaty to include theater missile defense systems, and this legislation puts the House on record expressing our concern in that regard.

This legislation also, Mr. Speaker, identifies the strong concerns of this body with the idea and the notion of multilateralizing the ABM Treaty. Many of us think that that would hamper our ability to move away from the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty and comes at a very inopportune time where Russia has, in fact, given us the willingness in the form of a signal that they are now willing to talk about moving into a posture away from relying on the ABM Treaty as our key instrument in terms of our bilateral relationship.

I think this is extremely important, and yet at the same point in time in approaching this new dialogue with Russia, we want to reassure them that we are not about tweaking them. We are not in this bill attempting to isolate Russia.

In fact, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON] made a very important point that he has made in my presence before Russians that were here just a few short weeks ago. He said ultimately, we even envision the day where Russia may be able to qualify for membership in NATO. So in fact, I think that is a basic underlying premise here.

The question is how we get there, and in this era of emerging threats from rogue nations and the threat of destabilization in the Russian military relative to their offensive arms, North Korea and China deploying long-range missiles, we can no longer rely on an outmoded ABM Treaty. This bill allows us to move into a new era where in fact our bilateral relationship is not just based on a strict ABM, but actually allows us to move into a new era of relationship building on cooperate missile defense and also looking at ways that we can in fact move away from the strict interpretation that allowed us in the past to rely on a theory of mutually destroyed destruction.

As the administration moves ahead with NATO expansion, we must make every effort to assure Russia that we are pursuing this new arrangement to enhance everyone's security, not to threaten them. This bill goes a long way toward doing that by establishing a

program to pursue joint missile defense projects such as early warning sharing and lay in a groundwork for the revival of United States-Russia talks on the ABM Treaty and missile defense cooperation.

Mr. GILMAN has stated that he believes it is essential that we take proactive steps to build confidence with the Russians. NATO expansion will not be a complete success if it results in a revival of tensions between Russia and the United States. He believes this bill sets us on the right course by establishing initiatives that set the tone for long-term dialog and cooperation.

This bill makes clear our intent to work with the Russians, it states our intention to ensure the fundamental security interests of the United States and that of our NATO partners. While I believe that is wholly appropriate, I think we want to clarify that point. As you know, the bill states that no commitments should be made that would limit the rights or impose responsibilities on new NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO members—including the deployment of nuclear weapons. That statement could be perceived by the Russians as a sign that we intend to support the creation of a new threat at their borders.

Mr. GILMAN has stated that that is certainly not the intent of this bill, nor is it in the administration's plans. In fact, the NATO Council issued a statement on December 10, 1996, that its members have "no intention, no plan, and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the new member states. He also said that so far as he is aware, no one in this House takes issue with that statement.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia [Ms. NORTON], my good friend and distinguished colleague.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding me this time.

I come to the floor because I am amazed by the nature of this debate. It is amazingly subdued when we consider the historic basis upon which we are proceeding. It is almost a historical debate, because the expansion of NATO may surely come to be as important as the creation of NATO itself.

□ 1815

Yet, this is being handled in an hour's worth of debate as just another matter coming before the House of Representatives at the end of a long day.

I have three concerns; domestic, the commitment of troops and burdensharing. I have to measure everything we do on this floor against the Democratic sacrifices that are being agreed to by us all in the name of deficit reduction.

On the matter of burdensharing, this bill does not pass that test. I would feel much better about what we are doing here in this discussion and debate if in fact we had come to some agreement about burdensharing, a word that is virtually empty of content and meaning. I would have thought that the pressures of deficit reduction could produce some progress on burdensharing. There has been little. Instead, we see burden expansion.

But perhaps I am most concerned about article 5 of the treaty itself, and whether in fact this means that there may be the commitment of troops to central Europe as a result of this expansion. That is an issue of primary importance in a country which seems unwilling to commit troops for very much anymore. I really wonder whether or not we really mean, in a place where there has been much disagreement about Bosnia, where there has been great trouble throughout the United States, that we are now right in the middle of that.

Mr. Chairman, we fell into this expansion. It developed influenced by the last campaign. There has been little debate in this country. The American people do not recognize that they may right now, as this bill is passed, be committing troops, if need be, to central Europe.

I can be convinced, and I will come to the floor this evening to say as yet no one has even tried to convince me or the American people that this historic commitment should be expanded this day, in June 1997.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. COX], the distinguished chairman of our policy committee.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to seek clarification concerning one provision of the bill. Section 6(c) is entitled "Opposition to Multilateralization of ABM Treaty." It states the sense of the Congress that no agreement demarcating the boundary between theater and antiballistic missile defense will be considered until the United States has taken the steps necessary to ensure that the ABM Treaty remains a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Russian federation.

It is my understanding that this provision takes no position with respect to whether such a demarcation agreement should be reached after such steps are taken, or, indeed, whether the United States should take steps to continue the ABM Treaty in force even if it is a bilateral agreement limited to Russia and the United States.

Section 6(c), according to my understanding, simply makes absolutely clear that the administration's rush to conclude an immediate demarcation agreement must be stopped, and that no such demarcation agreement should be concluded prior to resolution of the question of Russia's successorship under the ABM Treaty; and finally, that, should Russia not be deemed to have succeeded, then no such demarcation agreement should be considered at all.

I would ask the gentleman, Mr. Speaker, is that his understanding?

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COX of California. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is correct. That is my understanding as well.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would conclude by suggesting that perhaps the relatively calm and deliberate and judicious tone of this debate reflects the bipartisan judgment of Congress of NATO's quintessential importance during the past two generations to our security, and our bipartisan commitment to the expansion of NATO.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LANTOS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to stress again what this legislation intends. It is about achieving two of our vital national objectives, enlarging NATO and defending our Nation against the risk of ballistic missile attack in a way that does not upset our relations with Russia.

With regard to NATO enlargement, we are especially concerned that no emerging democracies in central and eastern Europe be left in a security vacuum, and the Baltic states in particular must be regarded as strong contenders for NATO membership. For this reason, our legislation designates these countries as being eligible to receive transition assistance within the NATO Participation Act. I urge our colleagues to support the measure.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my concerns about H.R. 1758, the European Security Act. Critical issues related to NATO enlargement have not been adequately thought through—unfortunately, politics appears to have been put ahead of policy.

I am primarily concerned about the military and financial obligations the United States will assume under an expanded NATO.

First, we need to think further about the military obligations assumed by the United States in enlarging NATO. In bringing in new members, we must not degrade the ability of the alliance to conduct collective defense. We must guard both against this degradation, and against the possibility that the U.S. burden to the defense of NATO will increase by bringing in countries whose interoperability with NATO—key to collective defense—is still a long way off.

Second, we have been presented with a number of estimates of the financial costs of NATO enlargement—and those estimates vary widely.

The administration estimates a total cost of between \$9 billion and \$12 billion over the 1997–2009 period, with a cost to the United States of between \$150 and \$200 million.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that—depending on how NATO structures its forces after enlargement—costs will range from a low of \$61 billion to a high of \$125 billion over 15 years—1996–2010, with a U.S. share of \$5 to \$19 billion over the same period.

Which is the more accurate estimate?

Mr. Chairman, Congress needs more information on the financial costs of enlargement in order to make an informed decision. Specifically:

What portion of these costs are due to developing the required interoperability among new and old members?

What portion to developing infrastructure required by the enlargement of NATO?

How will the on-going adaptation of alliance strategy and structures impact on the costs of enlargement?

How will these costs be apportioned among the allies—old and new?

Mr. Chairman, until these questions are answered, there cannot be a coherent policy that takes account of our resources and security interests.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Russia and the Commonwealth of Newly Independent States [CIS] of Eastern Europe, management of the post-cold-war environment has proven to be a novel and challenging task. The securities and certainties of the "us versus them" world are gone. Today, traditional allegiances are blurred and future motives are questioned. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], however, has prevailed as the one remaining post-cold-war constant. As during the cold war era, the NATO commitment to collective defense is the core of the alliance. It is this guarantee to deter aggression that has prompted the CIS to seek admittance into NATO. Realizing that Russia, still armed with nuclear weapons, might one day become more unstable and aggressive, NATO membership is highly prized. As one who supports a stable and secure Eastern Europe through the expansion of NATO, I am pleased that Congress has not let this situation go unnoticed. In fact, the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996—PL 104-208—was adopted last Congress, which named Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia as having made the most progress toward meeting NATO membership criteria. In keeping with this sentiment, I encourage my colleagues to support the European Security Act of 1997 so that the door to NATO is not closed after the first round of enlargement and that additional European countries receive U.S. assistance for transition into NATO. I would also like to encourage the members of NATO to accept Slovenia into membership when it meets in Madrid this July.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina). All time has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 159, the bill is considered read for amendment.

Pursuant to the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I am, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts moves to recommit the bill (H.R. 1758) to the Committee

on International Relations with instructions to report the bill back forthwith with the following amendment:

At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

SEC. 7. BURDENSARING.—It is the sense of the Congress that the United States already pays more than a proportionate share of the costs of the common defense of Europe, and that the European members of NATO should pay the bulk of the costs of NATO expansion which are incurred by existing NATO members."

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the motion be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion to recommit.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I offer this on behalf of myself and the gentleman from California [Mr. CONDIT].

Mr. Speaker, there are differing views about NATO expansion. There is, I think, great agreement in this Chamber that the cost of NATO expansion should not be paid in the same formula in which existing and past NATO costs have been paid.

As Members mentioned, NATO grew out of a time when the United States had a degree of superiority in the world as a result of World War II that was unparalleled probably in recent history. America was quite generous in helping bring, among others, our European allies and our former European enemies, it should not be forgotten, up to the current level that they now enjoy. But we believe, and I think it is a widely shared sentiment across this House, that it is no longer appropriate for our European allies to accept a subsidy in the form of disproportionately large payments by the United States.

What this motion to recommit says is that we believe that the increased NATO costs that will come from expansion, there will have to be military standardization and communication upgrades, that to the extent they are borne by existing NATO members, the European members of NATO should pick up the bulk of those costs.

In other words, we are not here trying to impose more costs on the new NATO members. We are saying that the existing NATO members, wealthy and prosperous and the beneficiaries, as they have been over all these years, of our beneficence, and it may have been in our interests as well as theirs; it was in our interests as well as theirs, but it was our dollars much more than theirs, we ask that they now do more than they have been doing.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, on our part we think the gentleman from Massachusetts makes an extremely valid point, and we are pleased to accept his recommitment concern of burdensharing for the Democratic side.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I want to make this clear, this should not be interpreted as an anti-NATO-expansion argument. Indeed, I would tell those who are in favor of a full-fledged unrestricted NATO expansion that it is in their interests to be supportive of burdensharing.

Franklin Roosevelt was described once by John Kennedy in a phrase that is very important for Members to remember. When John Kennedy began the Alliance for Progress and he looked back to Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy as a first step toward a recognition of mutual interest, he said that Franklin Roosevelt was able to be a good neighbor abroad because he was a good neighbor at home.

The American people will more willingly support international engagement militarily, economically, and other sorts, if they feel they are being treated fairly, if they do not think it is coming at their expense.

The United States, I believe, is prepared to support foreign assistance to people in need, to deal with disease and poverty and economic development. But I think the American people understandably say with regard to France and England and Germany and Denmark and Belgium, and some of the wealthiest and most successful societies in the world, countries that have already benefited greatly from our generosity, that it is time for them not to subsidize us, but no longer to be subsidized by us.

What the gentleman from California [Mr. CONDIT] and I seek to do in this is to say, and I believe frankly it will underpin NATO expansion, it will give the American people more willingness to support this, because we have just done a budget deal. Defense spending will be constrained, not as much as I would like, but it will be constrained. Domestic spending will be constrained. It is simply inappropriate for our allies to allow a disproportionate share of the funding to fall on the American taxpayer.

We have one particular fear. The European nations have to, those that are in the European Union, the majority of whom are in NATO, they have to get their deficits down to 3 percent of their gross domestic product. We are the only country that would meet the European Union's definition, I think, right now.

There will be a strong temptation for them to do that by further cutting their military expenditures. We need for them to understand that they cannot do that in a way that shifts the burden to the United States. It is entirely legitimate, yes, there will be

benefits to the United States, but there will be even more benefits for Europe. Peace and security in the Czech Republic, in Hungary, and Slovenia, and Romania and elsewhere will be of at least equal benefit to our European allies; and under the current rules, they do not pay an equal share.

Mr. Speaker, I would hope that we would be willing to adopt this, and as I say, I believe it will strengthen the case for NATO expansion among the American people.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] wish to be recognized on the motion to recommit?

Mr. GILMAN. I do, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] is recognized for 5 minutes on the motion to recommit.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the House delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly, I can attest that European members do pay the bulk of NATO costs now. While we believe that new members of NATO, as they are added, should and will pay most of the cost of expansion, we agree to that, we believe that would be the case. That is our expectation.

Beyond that, we agree that the existing 14 European countries should pay and will pay the bulk of the expansion costs. Therefore, we agree with and support the instructions offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.

The motion to recommit was agreed to.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the House on the motion to recommit, I report the bill, H.R. 1758, back to the House with an amendment.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

"SEC. 7. Burdensharing

"It is the sense of Congress that the United States already pays more than a proportionate share of the costs of the common defense of Europe, and that the European members of NATO should pay the bulk of the costs of NATO expansion which are incurred by existing NATO members."

□ 1830

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina). The question is on the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 159, the text of H.R. 1758 will be appended to the engrossment of H.R. 1757, and H.R. 1758 is laid on the table.

AUTHORIZING THE CLERK TO MAKE CORRECTIONS IN ENGROSSMENT OF H.R. 1757, FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1998 AND 1999

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in the engrossment of the bill, H.R. 1757, the Clerk be authorized to correct section numbers, punctuation, and cross references and to make such other technical and conforming changes as may be necessary to reflect the actions of the House in amending the bill, H.R. 1757.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in within which to revise and extend their remarks on H.R. 1757 and on H.R. 1758.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

COMMUNICATION FROM MEMBER OF STAFF IN OFFICE OF THE HONORABLE DAN MILLER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from Laura Griffin, member of the staff in the office of the Honorable DAN MILLER, Member of Congress:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, June 5, 1997.

Hon. NEWT GINGRICH,
Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: This is to formally notify you pursuant to Rule L (50) of the Rules of the House that I have been served with a subpoena issued by the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, Manatee County, State of Florida.

After consultation with the General Counsel, I will make the determinations required by Rule L.

Sincerely,

LAURA GRIFFIN.

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. DREIER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. DREIER addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Ms. WATERS] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Ms. WATERS addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. BOB SCHAFER, is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. BOB SCHAFER of Colorado addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. GEJDENSON] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. GEJDENSON addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. JONES] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. JONES addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. PASCRELL] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. PASCRELL addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. KINGSTON] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. KINGSTON addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. MENENDEZ] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. MENENDEZ addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]