

THE 50TH WEDDING ANNIVERSARY OF BEVERLY AND BOB LEWIS

(Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, late Saturday afternoon, ABC Sports reported that on August 2, my very dear friends, Beverly and Bob Lewis, will be marking their 50th wedding anniversary. It was not simply because it was their anniversary, but it was the fact that they are the very proud owners of the winner of the Kentucky Derby.

Their horse, Silver Charm, won by a neck. It was great for all of us to see Beverly and Bob Lewis stand there with such enthusiasm. It is difficult to imagine two more wonderful human beings, two people who are more deserving of this. So, as they look toward their 50th wedding anniversary, it is difficult, again, to imagine a better gift, unless it would be the Triple Crown.

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

IT IS TIME TO TRULY TAKE BACK OUR NEIGHBORHOODS CRIME FIGHTING ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. FILNER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, today I introduced a bill which I call Taking Back Our Neighborhoods Crime Fighting Act. This is to bolster our Nation's crime-fighting efforts and to encourage citizens to get involved in crime prevention. The only way that we can, in fact, lower our crime rates dramatically, citizens involvement.

I am joined by the cochairman and 6 members of the Law Enforcement Caucus. More importantly, this legislation is backed by over 200 police chiefs, sheriffs, district attorneys, community groups and elected officials, including mayors of cities big and small, from across the country who supported this bill in the last Congress.

The Taking Back Our Neighborhoods Crime Fighting Act would give a \$50 tax credit to people actively involved in Neighborhood Watch groups and other organizations committed to the reduction of local crime, active involvement in Neighborhood Watch groups.

I am proposing this tax credit because Neighborhood Watch works. It is the most effective crime reduction program available to our communities. Throughout the country, Neighborhood Watch groups have made people feel safer and more secure in their home,

parks and streets. It works because Neighborhood Watch establishes relationships amongst neighbors and it established partnerships between neighborhoods and their police officers. Citizens are trained how to watch out for their families, monitor their neighborhoods, how to be observant and reliable witnesses, and how to assist their local police.

Some 64 police chiefs, 12 sheriffs, 17 district attorneys, and 55 mayors around the country firmly believe in Neighborhood Watch and have endorsed the idea of encouraging participation through tax credits.

The mayor of Pittsburgh, PA, Mayor Tom Murphy, said, "One of the ways the City of Pittsburgh encourages community involvement in public safety is through its 300-plus Neighborhood Watch Block Clubs. Linking a Federal tax credit to a citizen's twice-a-year attendance at these anti-crime meetings in which our community-oriented police officers participate will dramatically strengthen this program."

Over the past decade in my Congressional district in San Diego, CA, we pioneered and refined the practice of community-oriented policing and we have seen the difference it makes. I served on the San Diego City Council for 5 years before I came to the Congress, and I worked hand-in-hand with residents to attack crime. We helped establish Neighborhood Watch groups block by block. We went on walking patrols through the streets and created support networks amongst neighbors. We established what we call drug-free zones to keep dealers away from our schools. And we organized a graffiti patrol to clean up our neighborhoods and restore pride in our community.

Most importantly, we worked directly with local police to create innovative crime-fighting strategies. Teams of police officers walked our streets, our schools and our neighborhoods. They got to know the neighborhoods they protected and the people in them. They talked to residents, and residents knew exactly who to call if they saw someone in trouble. They knew the names of the officers. They had their beeper numbers. They had their confidence. And we brought crime rate down.

Efforts all over the country like this have been successful. During the last 3 years in San Diego, we have seen an overall reduction of 36 percent in the crime rate and almost 50 percent decrease in robberies, homicides and burglaries.

Most importantly, those who are involved in Neighborhood Watch, my constituents who work with the local police, feel stronger, they feel empowered, they feel less alienated, they feel a sense of community, and they knew that a difference had been made in their own neighborhoods. But we still have a long way to go to feel safe in our homes and our streets. Encouraging people in Neighborhood Watch group participation will help us protect our families.

San Diego's chief of police, Jerry Sanders, said the success of community policing depends on Neighborhood Watch. As he wrote, "Voluntary citizen participation in neighborhood meetings is paramount to successfully battling crime. Adoption of a tax credit would greatly enhance our efforts," he concluded.

Neighborhood Watch groups have proven to be an effective and economical approach to providing a better and more secure society for ourselves and our children. Giving people in Neighborhood Watch groups a \$50 tax break will support the many citizens already involved in crime prevention and encourage more community participation.

I ask my colleagues to support this important piece of legislation. Working together, and only by working together, in participation with our local police, we can truly reclaim our streets.

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: BUDGETS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1977, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, in all of this budget business, which has been in the headlines, I found not one word referring to the budget for national security. Thus, this second of three speeches I am making about the future of the U.S. military is not only appropriate, but timely. This afternoon, I will address whether projected defense budgets are sufficient to support the military strategy that is emerging from the Quadrennial Defense Review or QDR the reassessment of defense policy that the Defense Department is due to provide to Congress on May 15. In the first speech, I discussed the principles that should shape U.S. military strategy in coming years. In the final speech, I intend to consider how we are treating our people—the men and women in the Armed Forces and the civilian personnel who support them.

CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS

As I remarked in my first speech on these topics, I intend to begin each statement by reiterating a simple point under the Constitution, it is Congress' responsibility to ensure that the size and composition of U.S. military forces are sufficient to provide for the common defense. I referred to article 1, section 8 of the Constitution. Historically, Congress has often failed in this responsibility. As a result, the United States has repeatedly been unprepared for the military challenges it has faced. The price for this unpreparedness has been paid in the blood of young men and women in the Armed Forces. I fear in the future that the price will be even greater. At the very least, I fear, our security will erode because we will no longer have the strength to keep smaller scale conflicts

from weakening international stability. And at worst, I fear, major new threats will evolve in the future that would not have developed if we had maintained our strength.

My fellow Missourian, Harry S. Truman, made the point clearly: We must be prepared to pay the price for peace, or assuredly we will pay the price of war. I believe that Harry Truman's assessment is no less true now than when he spoke those words. Once again, however, as so often in the past, the U.S. Congress appears unwilling to pay the price of peace. Since the mid-1980's, the Department of Defense budget has declined by 40 percent in real, inflation-adjusted dollars. Funding for weapons procurement has declined even further by 67 percent since 1985. Today we are spending just one-third as much on new weapons as we did in the mid-1980's.

I do not believe that these levels of spending can be tolerated without critically weakening our military capabilities. And yet, there is all too little support for restoring even modest rates of growth in military spending. On the contrary, the budget plan that the administration presented earlier this year projected that defense spending would continue down in fiscal year 1998 and then, essentially, level off in real terms. The budget agreement that was announced last Friday calls for inadequate levels for defense across the board—both in budget authority and budget outlays. Even more importantly, for long-term planning purposes, the Quadrennial Defense Review is being carried out on the assumption that defense budgets will be frozen at about \$250 billion per year, in constant prices, as far as the eye can see. The military services have been required to plan, therefore, on the assumption that any real growth in costs will have to be offset by reductions in programs—and, as I will argue shortly, I believe that growth in costs is unlikely to be avoided in the military.

THE PRICE OF PEACE IS SMALL

The reluctance to support modest growth in defense spending is all the more tragic because it is so unnecessary. Looked at from any reasonable, long-term perspective, the price of peace today is extraordinarily small. In 1997, the defense budget amounts to 3.4 percent of gross domestic product. Under the new White House-congressional budget plan, it will decline to 2.7 percent of GDP by 2002. As recently as 1986, defense spending was over 6 percent of GDP, and even at its lowest level in the mid-1970's, it was about 5 percent. As a share of the Federal budget, defense spending has declined even further and faster: defense is now 16 percent of the Federal budget, down from 25 percent in the mid-1970's and 1980's, and down from 42 percent as recently as 1970.

Suppose we were to allow military spending to decline to, say, 3 percent of GDP and then grow at no more than 1 or 2 percent in real terms each year thereafter. As I will argue shortly,

such very modest real growth in defense spending is necessary to maintain a well-equipped, high-quality, well-trained force. At that level of spending, the defense budget would represent less than half the burden on the economy it did at the end of the cold war, and it would decline over time. This, to me, would be a disproportionately small price to pay for the benefits we derive from having a force that can maintain a significant, visible U.S. military presence abroad, respond to crises across the whole spectrum of conflict, and prepare for advanced technological challenges in the future.

Instead of trying to bolster public and congressional support for so modest a defense burden, however, the administration, supported by the congressional leadership, has decided to try to support its defense strategy with budgets that start out two sizes too small and will become tighter and tighter as the years go by. As I pointed out last week, the strategy that the Defense Department is articulating in the QDR is appropriately broad and demanding. It calls for forces able to shape the international security environment, respond to the full range of challenges to our security, including two concurrent major theater wars, and prepare for potential future threats. This strategy is rightly more ambitious than the strategy that was laid out in the Bottom-Up Review of 1993. The QDR strategy is an improvement because it explicitly takes account of the fact that activities short of major theater war have imposed great strains on our current forces and have to be taken into account in shaping forces for the future.

I do not see how it will be possible to support such a strategy with a force smaller than the force designed to support Les Aspin's Bottom-Up Review—a strategy that sized the force simply to deal with two major regional contingencies. The new strategy, as I said, is rightly more demanding. And yet, by all accounts, in the QDR, the civilian leadership of the Pentagon is mandating reductions in forces in order to find savings with which to finance a very modest increase in funding for weapons modernization.

The reason for this inconsistency between strategy and plans is not far to seek—the QDR is being driven by budgets, not by strategy. Force cuts, probably proportional reductions imposed on each of the services, have to be considered because budgets will not support existing force levels, while allowing any room to increase weapons funding.

Now it would be one thing if the cuts in forces being driven by budgets were a onetime deal. That would be bad enough. My concern is that the effort to maintain even a slightly smaller force with flat budgets will lead to a perpetual cycle of budget shortfalls, cuts in weapons programs, reductions in maintenance and training, and pressures to cut forces yet again. The tur-

bulence in the force that has been such a burden on our people will never end. And, in the long run, we will see a slow, steady, but almost imperceptible erosion in our military capabilities until, eventually, our forces are not present in key regions of the globe, we give up on responding to important threats to the peace, and we encourage others to challenge our eroding strength in key regions of the globe.

THE NEED FOR GROWTH IN DEFENSE BUDGETS

To me, it is terribly ill-advised for the Defense Department to attempt to plan on the basis of flat budgets for the foreseeable future. Indeed, until recently, the Defense Department rightly insisted that modest growth was necessary in the long term. As recently as a year ago, I recall Secretary of Defense Perry telling the National Security Committee how the Defense Department planned to reverse the decline in weapons procurement that I referred to earlier. Funding to recapitalize the force, he said, would come from three sources: First, the four rounds of military base closures that had cost money in the past would soon begin to achieve savings, and the entire increment would be used to boost procurement funding; second, savings from acquisition reform, though not assumed in the budget, would also be allocated to procurement; and, third, modest growth in defense spending that was then projected in Administration plans, would also go for weapons modernization. All three sources, he said, are necessary to recapitalize.

Well, that was just a year ago. Now, the story is, we will recapitalize the force, how? Also with savings from base closures and improved ways of doing business but not with modest increases in the budget. Instead, the Defense Department is being driven to make reductions in force levels in order to meet targets for increasing weapons procurement. But without a resumption of some growth in the future, where will this process end? And how much can we count on savings from infrastructure reductions, outsourcing, inventory cuts and other efficiencies to substitute for the growth in spending that was previously in the plan?

Historically, we have not been able to support a force of a given size with flat defense budgets. A couple of years ago, the Congressional Research Service did a study which simply measured the trend in defense spending relative to the size of the force from fiscal year 1955, just after the Korean war, projected through the year 2000 under the administration plan. It found that defense budgets have, on average, grown by about 1.7 percent per year in real, inflation-adjusted prices per active duty troop.

For defense budget analysts, this is not a surprising finding. Some of you may recall in the late 1970's the debate over whether to increase defense spending by 3 percent per year. The premise

was that defense budgets should increase in real terms over time for several reasons. For one thing, in order to keep quality people in the force, the quality of life in the military has to keep pace with the quality of life in the civilian sector. So pay, housing expenditures, facility maintenance accounts and other related activities have to increase with the overall growth of the economy. Second, we have found that modern, advanced weapons grow in cost from one generation to the next. According to a recent report on theater, or tactical fighter, aircraft programs by the Congressional Budget Office, each generation of aircraft typically doubles in price, in real terms, compared to the generation that went before. So budgets should grow to allow the military services to take advantage of evolving technology. Finally, although the services have always hoped that new weapons would be more reliable and cheaper to operate and maintain than the generation that went before, this has never turned out to be the case. Since weapons necessarily are designed to maximize performance, operation and maintenance costs typically grow in real terms.

Now if the Defense Department believes that these long-term trends in the costs of doing business have changed, then they should explain the reasons why. For my part, I cannot see how these trends would be reversed. On the contrary, a number of factors ought to make it more difficult to limit cost growth. We have not, for one thing, been able to reduce the size of the defense infrastructure in proportion to cuts in the size of the force, and I am very doubtful the Congress will approve another round of base closures in the near future. So we have to maintain a relatively large support structure, which drives up costs relative to the size of the force. Second, we are trying, in at least some parts of the force, to use technology to substitute for force size so the capital investments required will be relatively large compared to the size of the force. Moreover, with an all-volunteer force, it is more important than ever that the quality of life be protected. In recent years, we have been skimping on military pay raises; much military housing is in terrible condition and we have only belatedly begun efforts to improve it; we have deferred maintenance of military facilities for many years, and the backlog of requirements will inevitably catch up with us; and we have projected savings in military health care costs that will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. Finally, requirements that the military comply with environmental regulations and with health and safety norms are increasing costs in the Defense Department as in every other part of the society.

So the requirement that the military services plan on the basis of flat budgets is a prescription for perpetual underfunding of long-term defense requirements and the steady erosion of

our military strength. Modest, steady, sustainable rates of real growth in military spending are necessary to maintain a well-equipped, well-trained, high-quality force of a size large enough to carry out the U.S. military strategy and protect U.S. national security.

HOW NOT TO THINK ABOUT DEFENSE SPENDING

Now, for some of my colleagues, that the notion that defense spending should grow over time must seem rather alien. In fact, my conclusion that defense budgets should increase follows straightforwardly from clear thinking about defense. The only proper way to decide how much to spend on defense is, first, to begin by deciding on a military strategy that will ensure our security, second, to determine what size force is needed to support the strategy, and then, finally, to calculate what resources are needed to ensure the quality of the force. But all kinds of other, extraneous arguments about defense spending get in the way of this clear line of thought.

One common argument against defense spending is that potential enemies today appear to spend so much less than the United States. The implication is either that threats are not so great as our planning assumes, or that the U.S. military should be able to maintain its strength with much less money. The flaws in such reasoning are legion. For one thing, potential enemies simply have to be strong in only one area of military capability in order to challenge stability in their own regions. Possible challenges to U.S. security, however, come from so many different directions and in such a wide variety of forms that the United States must maintain strong military capabilities of all types. Second, the U.S. military is not in the business of being barely stronger than the Iraqis of the world. As General Shalikashvili has said repeatedly, we had military dominance in the Persian Gulf war, we liked it, and we want to keep it.

More fundamentally, however, it is not enough for those who want to cut U.S. military spending to cite how much possible enemies spend. Instead, those who call for cuts ought to be able to identify aspects of U.S. military strength that they would give up. If the argument is that North Korea is not as great a threat as U.S. military plans assume, for example, because North Korea spends so little, then let us consider whether to weaken the U.S. military posture in Korea. Looked at that way, however, the argument is harder to sustain. Whatever North Korea spends, our intelligence assessments tell us how threatening their military capabilities are, and anyone who looks closely at the situation is aware of how much damage North Korean forces could wreak even if confronted by strong United States and South Korean troops. Few, therefore, would want to encourage aggression by weakening our deterrent posture in Korea. So an argument based on North Korea, or Iraqi, or

Iranian levels of military spending is irrelevant. The only real issue is what are the threats and what U.S. posture is needed to deal with them.

A second common argument for cutting U.S. defense spending is that the United States today is spending about as much on defense in inflation-adjusted dollars as it did, on average, during the cold war. The implication is clear—now that the cold war is over, we should be able to spend less. The flaw in this argument is one I have already discussed. To maintain forces of a given size costs more over time because of the need to improve the quality of life, pursue more advanced technology, and operate more sophisticated weapons. The fact is, we have cut the size of the force substantially since the end of the cold war. In 1987, the active duty force level was about 2.1 million. Today, it is about 1.4 million—about one-third less. A force of that size understandably should cost more than a larger force 25 or 30 years ago—but it is nonetheless substantially smaller and less costly than a force of the size that would be necessary if the cold war had continued.

HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

So if those are some of the ways not to think about defense spending, how should we think about it? How much is enough for national defense? Mr. Speaker, 2 years ago, I prepared an alternative defense budget that I believed at the time was adequate to maintain U.S. military strength over the next 5 years. It called for spending about \$45 billion more on defense than the administration was projecting at the time. I still think that alternative budget is wise.

Today, however, I want to talk a bit more broadly about the principles that the Congress should apply in fulfilling its responsibility to decide how much is enough.

First, I do not believe that we should cut force levels further. I am disturbed by reports that the QDR may include a decision to reduce total defense end-strength by as much as 144,000 individuals. To me, such reductions would be destructive and dangerous. They would be destructive because they would break faith with the men and women who serve in the Armed Forces. As I noted just a few minutes ago, we have already gone through a defense drawdown that has reduced active duty force levels by about one-third. This drawdown has imposed an immense burden on military personnel. It has meant that people have had to change jobs much more often than would have been necessary if force levels were stable, because people have had to be moved around to replace the larger number of people who were leaving. It has imposed an immense strain on the military education and training system, and often people have started new jobs without complete training. It has made the military personnel system rather brutally competitive—many military personnel have complained to me that the pressure to force people

out means that any single mistake will cost a good soldier his or her career.

Military planners have a term of art for all of this—they call it turbulence in the force. In fact, it has meant a good deal of turbulence in peoples' lives. In my view, the good people who serve in the Armed Forces have suffered through this turbulence for long enough. For years we have told them that the problems that attended the drawdown would ease once the reductions were over. We told them to hang in and that things would get better. I do not believe it is right to ask these people to go through yet another period of such turbulence. To start another drawdown on top of the one just completed is to break faith with the people who serve.

I also think that we cannot afford to reduce force levels for strategic reasons. All of the services are being strained to the breaking point by the multiple requirements imposed on them by the demands, first, to be trained and ready for major wars and, second, meanwhile, to be engaged in the multiplicity of smaller operations which have proliferated since the end of the cold war. Already the Army is short about 40,000 slots in support positions. This has meant that operations in Haiti or Bosnia, for example, require that support personnel be taken out of units that are not deployed abroad in order to fill out units that are being deployed. The remaining support personnel then have to do twice the work they should. Now we are talking about further thinning Army ranks, which, inevitably will make these shortfalls even worse.

FOUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES

We should be guided by four principles:

First, I do not believe we should reduce force levels further.

The second principle is, increase weapons investments enough to get back to a steady state replacement rate for major items of equipment. A key goal of the QDR, reportedly, is to find funds to increase weapons procurement substantially—the target that has been set for several years is \$60 billion a year for procurement. This will require an increase of about one-third from current levels—for the past couple of years, we have spent about \$45 billion on procurement. I hope that the QDR will get there—though not at the cost of cuts in the size of the force. I am doubtful, however, that \$60 billion a year will be enough.

To explain my doubts, it will take a little arithmetic. Currently, between them, the Air Force and the Navy have about 3,000 fighter aircraft in their inventories—about 2,000 in the Air Force and 1,000 in the Navy. If we assume a 20 year average service life for fighters—which is getting pretty long in the tooth—then, on average, we have to buy 150 aircraft a year to maintain a steady-state replacement rate. For the past few years, we have bought about 28-42 fighter aircraft a year. So, by my

calculations, we need to increase aircraft procurement by at least 400 percent to get to the right level.

Similarly for the Navy—the Navy now needs a minimum of about 350 battle force ships. If we assume an average service life of 35 years, we need to buy 10 ships a year. Lately we have been buying four or five. So we need to double shipbuilding budgets to get back to a steady state replacement rate.

Add to those increases, the need to increase spending modestly each year in order to exploit new technology. Suffice to say, \$60 billion a year won't do it. So the next question is, what are we giving up by not modernizing as fast as we probably should, and how are we going to adjust to the shortfalls? We may be able to keep some equipment going longer by pursuing upgrades instead of new systems. We may be able to limit cost growth between generations of new weapons by careful attention to cost—as the services plan for the Joint Strike Fighter. But all of these adjustments come at a price in reduced military strength. The compromises should be kept to a minimum.

The third principle is that we should not allow military readiness to decline. On this issue, I am skeptical about DOD budget plans that show operation and maintenance costs declining in the future relative to the size of the force. Some savings, to be sure, may be achieved from base closures and other changes in ways of doing business. But it is unrealistic to expect training costs to decline or to plan on reduced maintenance costs of major weapons.

Fourth, and finally, while I do believe that some savings can be achieved by improving DOD business practices, I am very skeptical about claims that very large savings can be achieved. It may be true that there is waste in defense business practices—but waste is not a line item in the budget that can easily be eliminated. I am very concerned that proponents of revolutionary changes in government procurement practices are vastly overstating the savings that can be made.

IN CONCLUSION

Mr. Speaker, these four principles—maintain force levels; increase weapons modernization funding substantially; protect military readiness; do not overstate savings from improved business practices—force me to conclude that currently projected levels of defense spending are not enough. And as the years go by, if defense spending is frozen at the current inadequate level, I fear that we will see the erosion of U.S. military strength and, as a direct result, the slow decline of U.S. global leadership.

MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS FOR CHINA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

(1430)

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, President Ronald Reagan was a champion for human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He spoke up in defense of freedom and democracy. He raised the cases of dissidents during the high-level meetings with Soviet officials. He made passionate and eloquent speeches outlining America's values, but he engaged forthrightly and he backed up engagement with action.

We all remember his famous 1983 speech to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, FL. It was then that he called the Soviet Union the Evil Empire. That courageous speech, ridiculed by some as too belligerent, was a decisive moment in American history and a decisive moment in the cold war.

In that speech, President Reagan says, and I quote, he said, it was C.S. Lewis, who, in his unforgettable *Screwtape Letters* wrote, "the greatest evil is not done now in those sordid 'dens of crime' that Dickens loved to paint. It is not even done in concentration camps and labor camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered, moved, seconded, carried and minuted, in clear, carpeted, warmed and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voice."

He went on to say that, well, because these quiet men do not raise their voices, because they sometimes speak in soothing tones of brotherhood and peace, because, like other dictators before them, they are always making, quote, their final territorial demand. So some would have us accept them at their word and accommodate ourselves to their aggressive impulses. But if history teaches anything, it teaches that simpleminded appeasement, where wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly, it means the betrayal of our past and the squandering of our freedom.

Mr. Reagan went on to say, while America's military strength is important, let me adhere that I have always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might; the real crisis we face today is a spiritual one. At its root it is a test of moral will and faith. I believe we shall rise to the challenge, he said. I believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written.

"I believe this because our source of strength in the quest for human freedom is not material but spiritual, and because it knows no limitations, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow men."

□ 1445

I do not know and it would be unfair for me to say how President Reagan would have voted today on most favored nation trading status for China. I