

Speaker, the Air Force Memorial Foundation, in large part because of flawed and fraudulent information and procedures related to placing this monument, has insisted on building this facility on the hand-picked hollowed ground that has been home to the Iwo Jima Monument for nearly fifty years. That monument has come to represent so much to so many people around this country and the world and in many ways, is one of the most famous monuments in our history. I would hope that those who have served in uniform and are in a position to impact the placement of the proposed Air Force Memorial would stand down and leave this site with honor and grace in respect to the Marine Corps, Marines, their loved ones, and all Americans who recognize the sanctity of this solemn memorial. I appeal to them to take heed of former Secretary of the Navy, James Webb, Jr.'s, advice and commend to everyone the following column that was printed in the Washington Post today. The eloquence and heartfelt manner in which Mr. Webb expressed himself is indeed powerful and sincere and constitutes the most compelling argument as to why this hallowed ground should be preserved as is that I have come across to date. His account is all you need read to understand the deep significance of this renowned monument to so many.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1997]

JAMES H. WEBB JR.—WRONG PLACE FOR THE AIR FORCE MEMORIAL

Earlier this year I had the sad honor of burying my father, Col. James H. Webb, Sr., U.S. Air Force (retired). His grave sits on a gentle hill in Section 51 of the Arlington National Cemetery, just next to the small park on which stands the nation's most famous military landmark, the Marine Corps War Memorial.

Between his grave and the sculpture of the Marines raising the flag at Mount Suribachi on Iwo Jima, the Air Force Memorial Foundation proposes to build a large and intrusive memorial of its own. It is deeply unfortunate that the location of this proposed memorial promises nothing but unending controversy. And I have no compunction in saying that the foundation's methods in lobbying for this site would have puzzled and offended my Air Force father, just as it does both of his Marine Corps-veteran sons.

Until late this summer, few among the general public even knew that this site, which is within 500 feet of the Iwo Jima statue, had been approved by the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC). The Air Force's first choice had been a place near the Air and Space Museum, a logical spot that would provide the same dignity, synergy and visitor population that benefit the Navy Memorial's downtown Washington location. Later, deciding on Arlington Ridge, the Air Force during hearings erroneously maintained that the Marine Corps posed no objection to the erection of a memorial so near to its own. The Marine Corps had yet to take an official position, and no Marine Corps witnesses were called to discuss the potential impact.

Once the NCPC decision became publicly known, it was met with a wide array of protest, including that of citizen groups and a formal objection from the Marine Corps. Despite a lawsuit and several bills having been introduced in Congress to protect the site, the Air Force is persisting.

This is not simply a Marine Corps issue or a mere interservice argument. Nor is it a question of whether the Air Force should have a memorial. Rather, it is a matter of the proper use of public land, just as impor-

tant to our heritage as are environmental concerns. We have witnessed an explosion of monuments and memorials in our nation's capital over the past two decades. New additions should receive careful scrutiny. Their placement, propriety and artistic impact concern all Americans, particularly those who care about public art, through which continuing generations will gain an understanding of the nation's journey.

The mood around the heavily visited "Iwo" is by design contemplative, deliberately serene. The site was selected personally just after World War II by Marine Commandant Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., who was concerned that the statute required "a large open area around it for proper display." Dozens of full-dress official ceremonies take place each year at the base of the hallowed sculpture. Even casual ballplaying is forbidden on the parkland near it. It is, for many Americans, truly sacred ground.

To put it simply, the proposed Air Force memorial would pollute Arlington Ridge, forever changing its context.

The main argument in favor of this location—that it is within a mile of Fort Myer, where the first-ever military flight occurred in 1908—is weak, as all the services have extensive aviation capabilities that might be traced to that flight. The Air Force also argues that since the "above-ground" aspect of its memorial would be 28 feet lower than the top of the flagpole on the Iwo Jima statue, it will not interfere with the grandeur of the Marine Corps memorial. What Air Force officials take pains to avoid discussing is that if one discounts the flagpole, their memorial would actually be higher, wider and far deeper. Some 20,000 square feet of below-the-ground museums and interactive displays are planned, enough floor space for 10 average-sized homes.

The Air Force plan for an extensive three-story museum and virtual-reality complex at its proposed memorial is a clear departure in context from this quiet place. During the period leading up to America's bicentennial commemoration, the Marine Corps itself considered constructing a visitor center and museum on the land adjacent to the Iwo Jima memorial. It abandoned this plan because such facilities would be inconsistent with the purpose and the impact of the monument itself. It is not without irony that the land the Marine Corps deliberately left open is now being pursued by the Air Force for the very purpose that was earlier rejected.

Existing federal law precludes this sort of intrusion. Title 40 of the U.S. Code states in section 1907 that "a commemorative work shall be so located as to prevent interference with, or encroachment upon, any existing commemorative work and to protect, to the maximum extent possible, open space and existing public use." There can be no clearer example of the intentions of such law than the case of the Marine Corps War Memorial.

The puzzling question is why the Air Force leadership argues so vociferously that its memorial will not negatively affect the Iwo Jima memorial.

I grew up in the presence of some of the finest leaders our Air Force has ever produced, leaders who would never have considered dissembling before a political body about whether the Marine Corps concurred in a proposal that might diminish the impact of its most cherished memorial—leaders who in this situation would have shown the public, and particularly the Marine Corps, great deference, knowing that its open support was vital. Indeed, leaders who remembered that the very mission in the battle of Iwo Jima, carried out at a cost of 1,000 dead Marines for every square mile of territory taken, was to eliminate enemy fighter attacks on Air

Force bombers passing overhead and to provide emergency runways for Air Force pilots who had flown in harm's way.

It is now up to Congress to enforce the law and assist the Air Force in finding a memorial site that will honor its own without taking away from the dignity of others.

## APALACHICOLA-CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT RIVER BASIN COMPACT

SPEECH OF

**HON. GEORGE W. GEKAS**

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, November 4, 1997*

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to unanimous consent granted on November 4, 1997 during debate on House Joint Resolution 91, I introduce the report on that joint resolution from the Congressional Budget Office which was not available at the time of the filing of the committee report:

U.S. CONGRESS,  
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,  
*Washington, DC, November 4, 1997.*

Hon. HENRY J. HYDE,  
*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.J. Res. 91, a joint resolution granting the consent of Congress to the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Gary Brown, who can be reached at 226-2860.

Sincerely,

JUNE E. O'NEILL.

Enclosure

## CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE SUMMARY

H.J. Res. 91 would grant congressional consent to the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (ACF Basin) Compact. The compact would establish the ACF Basin Commission, which would determine an allocation formula for apportioning the surface waters of the ACF basin among the states of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. The commission would consist of state and federal representatives.

Provisions in the compact that could have an impact on the federal budget include: an authorization of appropriations for a federal commissioner to attend meetings of the commission and for employment of personnel by the commissioner, an authorization for federal agencies to conduct studies and monitoring programs in cooperation with the commission, and a requirement that the federal government comply with the water allocation formula once it has been adopted by the commission (to the extent that doing so would not conflict with other federal laws).

CBO estimates that enacting H.J. Res. 91 would result in new discretionary spending of less than \$500,000 in fiscal year 1998, and about \$12 million over the 1982-2002 period, assuming appropriations consistent with its provisions. The compact also would increase direct spending; hence, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply to the legislation. But CBO estimates that enacting H.J. Res. 91 would increase direct spending by less than \$500,000 a year, beginning in fiscal year 1999.

The resolution does not contain any intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as

defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) and any costs resulting from the compact would be borne voluntarily by Alabama, Florida, and Georgia as a result of the agreement.

#### ESTIMATED COST OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Implementing H.J. Res. 91 would effect both spending subject to appropriation and direct spending. CBO estimates that enacting H.J. Res. 91 would result in new spending subject to appropriation of less than \$500,000 in 1998, about \$4 million in 1999, \$3 million in 2000, and \$2 million a year thereafter. CBO estimates that the compact would increase direct spending, beginning in 1999, by reducing offsetting receipts from recreation fees and federal hydropower operations, but any such changes would likely be insignificant. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 300 (natural resources and environment). The estimated budgetary effects of H.J. Res. 91 are shown in the following table.

(By fiscal year, in millions of dollars)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
<b>Spending subject to appropriation—</b>					
Spending Under Current Law:					
Estimated Authorization Level <sup>1</sup> ..	31	31	31	31	31
Estimated Outlays .....	32	32	31	31	31
Proposed Changes:					
Estimated Authorization Level ....	(2)	4	3	2	2
Estimated Outlays .....	(2)	4	3	2	2
Spending Under H.J. Res. 91:					
Estimated Authorization Level <sup>1</sup> ..	31	35	34	33	33
Estimated Outlays .....	32	36	34	33	33
<b>Changes in direct spending—</b>					
Estimated Budget Authority .....	0	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Estimated Outlays .....	0	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)

<sup>1</sup>The 1998 level is the amount appropriated in that year for programs conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the ACF basin. The amounts shown for subsequent years reflect assumed continuation of the current-year funding level, without adjustment for inflation. Alternatively, if funding were increased to cover anticipated inflation, funding under current law would gradually grow from \$31 million in 1998 to \$35 million in 2002.

<sup>2</sup>Less than \$500,000.

#### BASIS OF ESTIMATE

##### Spending Subject to Appropriation

For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that (1) the compact is approved in the next few months, (2) a commission is formed in 1998, (3) all amounts estimated to be authorized by the legislation will be appropriated, and (4) a new plan for allocating water among the states will be approved in fiscal year 1999. New discretionary spending would be necessary for expenses of a federal commissioner to participate in the ACF commission, for conducting studies and monitoring activities in coordination with the commission, and for operating federal facilities in the river basin in a manner consistent with the new allocation plan.

##### Federal Commissioner.

CBO estimates that the cost of sending the federal commissioner to meetings of the commission and of funding a personal staff with be less than \$500,000 a year beginning in 1998. The commissioner would serve without compensation. General expenses of the commission would be paid by the states of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.

##### Studies and Monitoring.

CBO estimates that the compact would result in new spending subject to appropriation of about \$2 million in fiscal year 1999 and about \$1 million in 2000 for completing an environmental impact statement of options for allocating water in the ACF basin, for developing a plan for monitoring water levels and quality in the basin, and for conducting additional studies. Additional spending of less than \$500,000 a year beginning in 2000 would occur for implementing, operating, and maintaining programs and equipment for monitoring the basin.

Beginning in 1991, the Congress has appropriated to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

(the Corps) an average of almost \$2 million a year—about \$13 million in total—for studying the long-term needs for water and availability of water resources in the ACF and Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) basins. An additional \$5 million was provided to the Corps in 1997 for conducting a preliminary environmental impact statement regarding options for allocating water in the ACF and ACT basins.

##### Federal Facilities.

Based on information from the Corps, CBO estimates that operating federal facilities in the ACF basin in a manner that complies with a new water allocation plan may result in additional discretionary spending of about \$2 million a year, beginning in 1999. We expect that these annual cost could range from near zero to \$4 million a year, depending on whether a new allocation plan is adopted and whether it results in a significant change in water use in the river basin.

Most of the expense of implementing a new water allocation plan would be for operating and maintaining channels for navigation because the cost of that activity is highly dependent on water flows. Under current law, CBO estimates that the Corps will spend about \$14 million in 1998 for navigation-related activities in the ACF basin. CBO anticipates that the cost of other major activities in the basin would not change significantly as a result of the compact. The cost of operating and maintaining hydropower facilities is not likely to change significantly as a result of minor changes in water flows. Moreover, any major flood control activities in the basin would likely require further authorization by Congress.

##### Direct Spending

CBO anticipates that the compact would have an impact on direct spending by reducing the amount of receipts returned to the Treasury from recreation facilities operated by the Corps and the Department of the Interior in the ACF basin. A new water allocation plan could affect receipts from recreation areas by directly or indirectly changing water levels at lakes and other recreation areas so that their use if reduced. This type of impact would be most likely in years when total water supplies were already low, for example, because of below-average rainfall. CBO estimates that the impact on receipts from recreation elements would be less than \$500,000 annually, beginning in 1999.

The compact could also affect receipts from hydropower operations, but CBO estimates that the net impact on hydropower revenues from any likely water allocation plan would be insignificant. A new plan could affect power operations by limiting the amount of water that can flow through federal power-generating facilities. This could affect the amount of power that can be produced and sold. However, CBO estimates that any impact on hydropower receipts is likely to be significant because federal law requires that, to the extent market conditions permit, hydropower operations cover expenses. In the case of limits on power production, the price could be increased to offset any reduction in the quantity of power produced and sold.

#### PAY-AS-YOU-GO CONSIDERATIONS

The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 specifies pay-as-you-go procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. CBO estimates that enacting H.J. Res. 91 would increase direct spending by less than \$500,000 a year, beginning in 1999. Enacting the legislation would not affect governmental receipts.

#### INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE-SECTOR IMPACT

H.J. Res. 91 would give the consent of the Congress to an agreement mutually entered

into by three states, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. The resolution contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, and any costs to the states resulting from the compact would be borne voluntarily as a result of the agreement.

Estimated prepared by: Federal costs, Gary Brown, impact on State, local, and tribal governments, Leo Lex.

Estimated approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

## THE PRINTED CIRCUIT INVESTMENT ACT OF 1997

HON. PHILIP M. CRANE

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 5, 1997

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce the Printed Circuit Investment Act of 1997 and to encourage my colleagues to support this legislation.

This simple and straightforward bill will allow manufacturers of printed wiring boards and printed wiring assemblies, known as the interconnecting industry, to depreciate their production equipment in 3 years rather than the 5 years in current law. Printed wiring boards are those ubiquitous little green boards loaded with tiny wires and microchips which are the nerve centers of electronic items from television sets to computers to mobile phones.

The interconnecting industry, as with so much of the electronics industry, has changed dramatically in just the last decade. While the industry was once dominated by large companies, the industry now consists overwhelmingly of small firms, with many of them located in my home State of Illinois. The rapid pace of technological advancement today makes interconnecting manufacturing equipment obsolete in 18 to 36 months—tomorrow's advances will further reduce that time to obsolescence. This makes the interconnecting industry very capital intensive. In fact, capital expenditures totaled \$2.1 billion in 1996 and are expected to be \$2.3 billion this year. Considering that this is an industry dominated by small U.S. firms competing in ever more competitive world markets, clearly we need a Tax Code that more clearly reflects reality.

The depreciation rules found in the Tax Code, of course, have not kept pace with the realities of this dynamic market. The industry currently relies on tax law passed in the 1980's, which was based on 1970's era electronics technology. U.S. competitors in Asia, however, enjoy much more favorable tax treatment as well as direct Government subsidies. We must remove the U.S. Tax Code as an obstacle to growth in this industry. The Printed Circuit Investment Act will take a step in that direction. Quite frankly though, I view this as a very modest step and would like to provide much more generous tax relief to these businesses, considering the fierce competition from foreign countries.

Mr. Speaker, the Printed Circuit Investment Act of 1997 will provide modest tax relief to the interconnecting industry and the 250,000 Americans whose jobs rely on the success of this industry. I urge my colleagues to join me in providing this relief by cosponsoring the bill.