

Los Angeles to be the organizing pastor of a new church in Tarzana, St. James Presbyterian Church.

The membership grew quickly, from 132 members in 1952 to 1,295 members in 1961. Luckily they were able to begin construction of a sanctuary to accommodate all who wanted to worship. They dedicated their magnificent sanctuary and the first service was so moving it was televised on the program "Great Churches of the Golden West." Unfortunately, it was this sanctuary that was destroyed by the earthquake.

Many members have struggled financially with the hopes of worshiping with the entire congregation under one roof again. This dream is finally a reality with today's groundbreaking ceremony.

Mr. Speaker, distinguished colleagues, please join me in celebrating the groundbreaking of this beautiful sanctuary. The members of this congregation deserve this recognition for their dedication and sacrifice.

IN RECOGNITION OF THE FORMAL
DEDICATION OF ANHEUSER-
BUSCH HALL AT WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HON. STEVE R. ROTHMAN

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 26, 1997

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to offer my sincere best wishes and congratulations to the Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, MO, as the school formally dedicates its new building, Anheuser-Busch Hall. This state-of-the-art facility will provide plenty of much-needed space and provide the students and faculty with all of today's modern technology to make for a productive learning environment. This environment will enable Washington University students to continue to excel and will allow the distinguished faculty to continue to provide an excellent education for the lawyers of the 21st century.

As a graduate of Washington University's School of Law, it is exciting to see this new five-story structure open, complete with its 350,000 volume law library. Mudd Hall, the old site of the law school and the building in which I spent many days and nights studying, taking classes, and working, holds special memories for me and many others. However, I am sure that Anheuser-Busch Hall will only enhance the law school's ability to provide a high quality education for our future leaders.

I urge all of my colleagues to join me in congratulating the university and school of law, all its students, faculty, and benefactors, and wish them the best in Anheuser-Busch Hall.

DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE,
JUSTICE, AND STATE, THE JUDI-
CIARY, AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1998

SPEECH OF

HON. NITA M. LOWEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 25, 1997

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2267) making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1998, and for other purposes:

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Bartlett Amendment.

This extreme amendment blocks the U.S. from taking even the first step toward fulfilling its debt to the U.N.

Mr. BARTLETT cloaks his amendment in the rhetoric of reform. He claims that his amendment will somehow take us down the path to reform.

But let's be very clear, Mr. Chairman. This amendment is NOT about U.N. reform. This amendment is simply about blocking the U.S. from fulfilling its obligations to the U.N.

I don't think there is anyone in this House who is not supportive of further U.N. reform. That is why we worked to elect a new Secretary General. That is why the Administration and the Congress have come up with a reform and arrears plan that is currently being negotiated by a conference committee. And that is why we will continue to advocate far-reaching reforms throughout the U.N. system.

But this amendment approaches the issue in an irresponsible, haphazard manner. In fact, the amendment would upend the ongoing negotiations between the Administration, Congressional leaders, and the U.N., setting back our efforts to implement reform in the U.N.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. has a tremendous amount of influence within the U.N., but that level of influence is in danger of decreasing.

Our outstanding debt to the U.N. is draining our power in the organization and has created a climate of resistance to U.S. proposals.

The U.N. has historically served U.S. interests, but our debt is making it hard for the organization to carry out the very activities that serve these interests.

For all of these reasons, the U.S. must fulfill its financial obligation to the U.N. But that will not happen if the Bartlett Amendment passes.

In the interest of reforming the United Nations, I urge my colleagues to vote "no" on the Bartlett Amendment.

INVESTIGATE ABUSES SURROUND-
ING THE CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.
PROGRAM

HON. MARK E. SOUDER

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 26, 1997

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Speaker, I am submitting additional evidence supporting the need for my amendment approved by the House on September 24, 1997 which provides \$2,000,000 for the inspector general's office at

the Justice Department to complete a thorough and objective investigation of the abuses surrounding the Citizenship U.S.A. Program accelerating the naturalization process prior to the 1996 elections. This evidence includes an executive summary of the KPMG Peat Marwick LLP Report, a statistical listing of the naturalizations where complete background checks were not done provided by the Justice Department, and an editorial in the Washington Post entitled "Burned Again."

Naturalization is a critical symbol of the American democratic experiment and the continuing contribution immigrants made. The time has come to eliminate this blemish on the immigration system and those, the overwhelming majority of whom, legally pursue their citizenship. These abuses of the Clinton/Gore administration should not be tolerated which cheapen the integrity of citizenship and the naturalization process.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, NATURALIZATION QUALITY PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW

FINAL REPORT—APRIL 17, 1997

Executive Summary: The Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, engaged KPMG Peat Marwick LLP to review the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) implementation of the November 29, 1996 Naturalization Quality Procedures (NQP). The Naturalization Quality Procedures address seven key enhancements to the naturalization process. These enhancements include (1) standardization of work process, (2) fingerprint check integrity, (3) enhanced supervisory review, (4) instructions regarding temporary file (T-file) use, (5) implementation of a standardized quality assurance program, (6) guidance regarding revocation procedures, and (7) requirements for increased monitoring of outside English and Civics test sites. The instructions contained within the November 29, 1996 memorandum were effective upon receipt, and affected interview scheduling and oath ceremonies.

DoJ contracted with KPMG to conduct a review of NQP implementation to evaluate the effective implementation of these procedures. This document contains our review of the NQP directed internal controls implemented by INS to determine if INS field offices and service centers were complying with Memorandum provisions. We conducted our review between February 19 and March 26, 1997. The sites reviewed by KPMG represent approximately 85% of the INS naturalization processing capacity and provide a cross-section of INS offices. Our review indicates that, of the seven areas addressed by the Memorandum, the INS continues to have the most significant control problems with the fingerprint process and the identification of statutorily-barred applicants.

A key control implemented by the Naturalization Quality Procedures was the establishment of a data match between INS naturalization tracking systems and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) billing system to identify aliens with a disqualifying criminal history. This data match allowed INS to direct that no cases could be scheduled for interview or oath ceremony until receipt of a definitive response from the FBI regarding criminal history had occurred. Although this data match utilizes the same methodology used to determine the number of cases identified for the felony case review, there is one important exception. Unlike the methodology utilized during the felony case review, the production system requires a match of not only the A-number, but also the first and last names of the applicant. This additional

requirement should increase the accuracy of the matching results. However, it should be understood that, although this is an improvement over the previous methodology, the introduction of any data manipulation into the matching methodology also introduces potential errors into the results.

The root cause of this potential error is the continued lack of quality control in the completion of FD-258 fingerprint cards. Although the automated matching process does provide some control, a correct identification from the FBI is not assured. Currently, INS is experiencing a growing backlog of cases that are classified "not found" as a result of the failure of the FBI and INS matching effort. Additionally, in a sample conducted by INS of 200 cases identified as NON-IDENT by the FBI, 25 applicants admitted to previous arrests during their interviews.

In addition to the potential error in the matching methodology between INS and FBI systems, local and state agencies are not required to report criminal arrest data to the FBI. Although the problem with state and local agency reporting is beyond the control of the INS, the integrity of FD-258 data is clearly within the INS purview, and should be corrected immediately. Based on our review, the use of Designated Fingerprint Services (DFS) has done little to increase the accuracy of this data.

To ensure that no cases are scheduled for interview or oath ceremony until a definitive criminal history response from the FBI is received, a unique system-generated control number is required to be entered on the N-400 processing worksheet. However, in our review, we often were unable to verify that this mandatory check had taken place. Since this is the validation step of this critical control, we feel this constitutes a material weakness in the criminal history validation process.

Upon further examination of the fingerprint process, we discovered pending case files with fingerprints that had been rejected by the FBI and are currently on indefinite hold pending a policy decision from INS Headquarters. The categories of fingerprint rejections currently being held pending a policy decision include: Applicants whose fingerprints had been rejected twice by the FBI as unclassifiable; applicants who had not responded to a request to be reprinted; and, applicants whose rejection notice was undeliverable due to an incorrect address given by the applicant.

The number of rejections we witnessed further supports our conclusion that the DFS initiative is not significantly improving the overall quality and integrity of the FD-258 process.

In addition to the findings regarding the criminal history validation process, our remaining findings focused on two major areas: dissemination of the new procedures and staff training. With regard to dissemination of the NQP, we discovered three different versions of the memorandum had been distributed throughout the INS. One is the Commissioner's signed copy, a second is an unsigned cc:mail version of the Commissioner's memos with different attachments, and the third is an early version drafted for the Deputy Commissioner's signature. The cc:mail version being used did not require FBI verification, completion of a processing worksheet with initials and dates, nor enhanced supervisory review for IDENT, T-file, or complex cases. If a sense of urgency regarding the NQP was communicated from INS Headquarters, it became diminished as it worked its way down the chain of command. In addition, generally staff at the first-line supervisor level and below were not informed of the reasons behind the implementation of the changes.

In reviewing the training records related to the NQP memorandum, we discovered that INS Headquarters decentralized training down to the individual office level. There were no standards set, no curriculum established, and no policies established regarding the recording of attendance for accountability purposes. This was a major contributing factor in the INS' inability to implement fully the NQP.

As a result of our site reviews, it is now clear that the NQP has increased internal control and helped reduce the risk of incorrectly naturalizing an applicant. But it is also clear that criminal history validation, a key control of the NQP, remains ineffective. In addition, the NQP standards outlined in the memorandum were unevenly applied across the INS as a result of the lack of standardized training and an inability to effectively communicate the NQP requirements.

Due to the inherent weaknesses in the FBI and INS matching, and the continued lack of control within the overall fingerprint process, we cannot provide assurance that INS is not continuing to incorrectly naturalize aliens with disqualifying conditions.

Distribution of Naturalized Persons

[Sept. 1995-96]

| | |
|---|------------------|
| Non-Idents: Persons identified as having no FBI criminal history records | 766,959 |
| Idents: ¹ Persons identified as having FBI records which include INS administrative actions, misdemeanor and felony arrests and convictions | 81,492 |
| Reject/unclassifiable: ² Persons identified as not having had definitive criminal history checks conducted because their fingerprint cards were rejected by the FBI because of poor quality prints | 124,740 |
| Not matched: ² Persons for whom it cannot be determined whether or not FBI records checks were ever conducted | 55,750 |
| Elder/minor (not submitted): Elders and minors for whom INS policy does not require FBI records checks | 19,685 |
| Pending: Persons whose records checks were still being processed by the FBI at the time this data was produced | 1,241 |
| Total naturalized persons ... | 1,049,867 |

(1) Includes 9,145 candidate IDENTs resulting from full FBI CJIS name check, without full 10-print identification, as well as some expunged records.

(2) No record found from full FBI CJIS name check. No criminal history record based on name/date of birth check.

Breakdown of idents

[Persons identified by FBI as having criminal records]

| | |
|--|---------------|
| Administrative Violations: Individuals arrested only for INS administrative violations | 31,000 |
| Misdemeanor: Individuals arrested for at least one misdemeanor, but no felonies | 25,000 |
| Felony: Persons arrested for at least one felony | 16,400 |
| Candidate Idents: Possible matches based on name checks; some expunged records | 9,100 |
| Total idents | 81,500 |

Table 3.—Case files reviewed by INS/KPMG

| | |
|--|--------|
| Proper decision: Cases in which the NRT adjudicators found that the statutorily defined residency and good moral character criteria were met (64.5%) | 10,030 |
| Presumptively ineligible: Cases in which the NRT adjudicators found that the statutorily defined residency and good moral character criteria were presumptively not met (2%) | 296 |
| Needs further action: Cases in which the NRT adjudicators found that they could not validate that the statutorily defined residency and good moral character criteria were met based on the information contained in the case files the NRT has in Lincoln (33.5%) | 15,210 |

Total cases reviewed

¹ Plus 4,650 involve failure to reveal felony arrest.

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1997]

BURNED AGAIN

On subject after subject, this turns out to be a White House that you believe at your peril. Six months ago, Republicans were accusing it of trying to make political use of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The charge was that the White House had put the arm on the INS to speed up and cut corners in the naturalization process, the theory being that new citizens would more likely vote Democratic than Republican, and therefore the more of them, the merrier.

The administration responded that there was no way it would do a thing like that, manipulate the citizenship process for political gain, and folks believed it. We ourselves wrote sympathetically that, while "some congressional Republicans suspect a Democratic plan to load up the voter rolls . . . the administration replies that there are good and innocent reasons for [the] increase."

So now, guess what? It turns out the White House was in fact leaning on the INS to hasten the process, in part in hopes of creating new Democratic voters. There are documents that amply show as much. The attempt was described in a lengthy account in this newspaper by reporter William Branigin the other day. It was centered in the office of Vice President Gore, where they do reinventing government projects. But it wasn't just another reinvention. "The president is sick of this and wants action," Elaine Kamarck, a domestic policy adviser to Mr. Gore wrote in an e-mail last March, the "this" being that the INS wasn't moving people along at the proper speed.

The Republican charge is that, in speeding up the process, the INS made citizens of some applicants with criminal records who should have been barred. The Democratic defense—the current version—is that some of this may indeed have occurred, but not because of political interference. Rather, it was the result of simple bungling. You are told now that you shouldn't take the political meddling in this process—essentially a law enforcement process—seriously not because it didn't happen but because it was ineffectual. Now there's a comfort.

The INS has long been an agency in disrepair. It had and still has a huge naturalization backlog, partly the result of increased applications after the grant of amnesty to certain illegal aliens in the immigration act of 1986, partly now the result as well of last year's welfare bill, which cuts off benefits to immigrants who fail to naturalize. The agency was already trying to cut the backlog, as well it should, and if ever there were a candidate for reinvention, it's the INS. So you

had a legitimate project until the folks with the hot hands in the White House decided it should be a political project as well, at which point it was compromised.

Some of the worst ideas ginned up in the White House never got anywhere, in part apparently because of stout INS resistance.

Nor is it yet clear how many people with disqualifying records were made citizens, nor how much of that was due to political pressure and how much to just plain everyday incompetence. But in a way it doesn't matter. What matters is that once again the political

people couldn't keep their distance from a process that should have been respected and left alone on decency-in-government grounds, and then they were untruthful about it. Who believes them and goes bail for them next time?