

an advocate for them as a member of the city council.

Even though he had reached 75 years of age, Frank McCarty believed that there was always something more to do, something new to experience. He refused to let the knowledge that he was ill discourage him from further activity. He viewed what time he had remaining not as a time to dwell upon his own situation, but rather as a time to show that no matter what our own difficulty might be, there is always something more that can be done for others, whose situation may be worse than our own.

The people of Flushing knew Frank McCarty as both a public servant and as a businessman. His service station was a key point of activity in town, and provided many jobs for young people looking to enter the work force for the first time.

Last year, a baseball stadium in Eastview Park was named after Frank, and his wife Maxine, in recognition of his years of service. This was a most fitting tribute to a family that has been as important to the community as the community has been to the family. His devotion is what earned him the Citizen of the Year Award in 1989, and the Award for Outstanding Contribution to the Community in 1996.

His wife Maxine, and his daughters Sharon, Ann, Mary Beth, Amy, and Nancy, had the privilege to share in his entire life, so I am sure their loss is even greater. They should know, Mr. Speaker, that the city of Flushing reveres what Frank McCarty has done. The work of this gentleman shows in every neighborhood and in thousands of faces. The many associations who were privileged with his membership, including the Genesee County Small Cities and Villages Association, and Central Communications Consortium, the Main Street Reconstruction Group, the Fire Services Committee, the Flushing Area Senior Citizens Advisory Committee, and the Library/Senior Annex Board.

Occasionally life presents us with an outstanding and dedicated individual. We want that person to be with us forever, but must satisfy ourselves with the memory of the individual, the record of achievement, and the example of devotion. Frank "Mac" McCarty was such a man. He will be missed.

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS: ONE OF OUR BEST NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTMENTS

HON. JOHN M. McHUGH

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 4, 1997

Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Speaker, I call your attention to an issue of great importance to the defense posture of the United States which takes on an even greater significance as the Department of Defense undertakes a study of the military of the future.

An August 1996 Congressional Budget Office report, "Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options," and specifically section [DEF-17] entitled "Reduce the Number of Light Infantry Divisions," is seriously flawed in both its analysis and conclusions.

I believe it is imperative that the facts be known as to why we cannot afford to eliminate

one light infantry division. I am also compelled to set the record straight regarding CBO's assertions about the 10th Mountain Division's role in Somalia. To let CBO's assumptions go unchallenged would be a disservice to our Nation and those men and women in uniform who risk their lives to defend it.

Mr. Speaker, I believe the facts presented in the following January 16 letter to the Director of the CBO will provide a solid basis for future consideration of such important issues. I am especially pleased that in her response, which also follows, the Director has pledged to "be more explicit about the advantages and merits attributable to light infantry divisions" in future editions of the report.

Mr. Speaker, I submit the exchange of correspondence for your interest and commend it to our colleagues for their thoughtful review.

U.S. CONGRESS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Washington, DC, January 16, 1997.

Ms. JUNE E. O'NEILL, Director,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MS. O'NEILL: I call to your attention the August 1996 CBO report, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options and specifically the section (DEF-17) entitled "Reduce the Number of Army Light Divisions." At the onset, I want to thank you for your response to my August letter in which I asked for the data supporting the conclusion that the number of divisions be reduced.

DEF-17 asserted that the Department of Defense could save over \$16 billion in six years by eliminating one light infantry division (LID) and an airborne division by consolidating the airborne and air assault divisions into one division. The remaining light infantry divisions would consist of one light infantry division and one airborne division of two air assault brigades and one airborne brigade.

Having reviewed the matter carefully, I must emphatically disagree with CBO's conclusions. I have found many of the assertions contained in DEF-17 to be faulty and without merit. As a Member of the National Security Committee, I well understand the need to spend every defense dollar wisely. It is in that context that I believe our light infantry divisions are one of our best national security investments. They have enabled us to meet the ever-increasing demands on the United States in this post-Cold War era. That having been said, I feel compelled to provide you with facts as to why we cannot afford to eliminate one light infantry division. I also believe it imperative that I set the record straight regarding the 10th Mountain Division's role in Somalia. To let DEF-17 go unchallenged would be a disservice to our men and women in uniform.

One of the primary lessons of military history is that to accurately predict the timing and location of future conflicts is nearly impossible. It is, therefore, essential to have military forces capable of being tailored for a variety of scenarios. Even in the mid-1980s military planners visualized a need for forces to protect our national interest in other than the European theater, forces that must be prepared to conduct low- to mid-intensity conflicts. Heavy units need lighter forces to operate between and among them on terrain not suitable for heavy vehicles: forests, mountains, urban and other areas. The Army needs traditional general-purpose light infantry utilizing light infantry tactics: forces that could be used in a wide variety of environments and provide the National Military Strategy with its rapid and mobile strategic punch or show of force to deter or compel potential adversaries. Light infantry divisions

can be lifted into any region in the world with just 500 sorties of C-141s vs. over 2,300 for the Army's mechanized divisions (first units are loaded in 18 hours).

In the paragraphs which follow, I challenge the CBO assertions with the facts.

CBO Assertion: Recent history indicates that the United States may not need those divisions. Between 1945 and 1991, about 120 incidents—excluding major conflicts such as those in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq—required commitment of U.S. ground forces. Of those, the Army was involved in about a third and, even then, generally not in large numbers.

Fact: I have found your assertion that light infantry forces were used very little from 1945 to 1991 to be a misleading statement. The infantry units in question were created in the mid-1980s, covering only six years of the CBO study. According to an October 1996 study by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), light infantry units have been deployed in battalion or larger force a total of 13 times in the last 15 years. During five of these deployments, a division or larger light infantry force was used (URGENT FURY—Grenada 83; JUST CAUSE—Panama 89; DESERT SHIELD/STORM—SWA 90; RESTORE/CONTINUE HOPE—Somalia 92; RESTORE/UPHOLD DEMOCRACY—Haiti 94).

CBO Assertion: The light infantry divisions have limited firepower and tactical mobility once deployed.

Fact: Light infantry divisions, by their very nature do not have the firepower or mobility existing in the U.S. mechanized divisions because they are, in fact, tailored for other missions. Light infantry divisions must be offensive, capable of using stealth and attacking by infiltration, air assault, ambush and raids. These forces, by virtue of the terrain in which they are required to operate, do not have the capability to carry high caliber weapons. To offset a lack of firepower the LID dismounted company size is near double the size of a mechanized dismounted company force; around 120 in light company and about 68 in a mechanized company. A recent study by SAIC for the 21st Century concludes that, in the future, more conflicts will be fought in densely populated, urban environments. Heavy forces are not as well designed to combat infantry in urban environments where it takes time and manpower to clear buildings and blocks. These capabilities together with its strategic projection capability offer excellent balance to the full spectrum Army.

CBO Assertion: The Defense Department made a strong statement about the utility of the LIDs in combat when it failed to use any light infantry forces during Operation Desert Storm.

Fact: Your report states that the Department of Defense failed to use any light infantry forces during Operation Desert Storm (ODS). This is totally an inaccurate statement. Both the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne (AASLT) were deployed in ODS. Although the 82nd Airborne Division did not parachute into the area of operations, it was the first U.S. ground force rapidly projected to Saudi Arabia to show U.S. military commitment and resolve to the region. The highest demonstration of U.S. resolve to defend Saudi Arabia from Saddam Hussein was to put soldiers on the ground as quickly as possible. The 82nd Airborne was on the ground within 24 hours. This action drew the line in the sand and allowed time for the heavier units to arrive in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). The 101st was utilized not only in Desert Storm by air assaulting 153 miles into the enemy rear and securing key tactical objectives along the Euphrates River, but also early in Desert Shield as a covering force in defense of Saudi Arabia. It should also be

noted that the light infantry divisions remained in the continental U.S. to provide the U.S. with a strategic reserve to react to any threats seeking to capitalize on the U.S. deployment.

CBO Assertion: The 10th Mountain Division's firepower and protection proved to be inadequate against even the unsophisticated and poorly equipped troops in Somalia.

Fact: The 10th Mountain Division deployed to Somalia in 1992 with the mission of providing protection to the relief workers as they distributed food to the hungry. During the entire time the 10th Mountain Division was deployed to Somalia it accomplished its mission of protection and food distribution without any soldiers losing their lives. Mission creep (an evolving escalating requirement) redefined the U.S. role in Somalia and the forces were not re-tailored. As a result of this mission creep, Special Operating Forces (SOF) were deployed to key objectives to disrupt enemy command and control nodes. During one of the operations, the SOF operating in a different AOR required immediate support and regrettably none was available. After this operation it became apparent that the mobility and protection that armor forces have were necessary in the region if the U.S. was to pursue its redefined mission.

CBO Assertion: There have been no division size parachute assaults involving an entire division since World War II. Additionally, paratroop-qualified units exist in the special forces branch of the Army, and it is not obvious that the Army needs an entire division designed to be dropped by parachute.

FACT: While CBO correctly stated that there has been no division level airborne insertions since 1944, the capability for an airborne division insertion still exists. Special Operating Forces, in this case the Rangers, are required to have the capability for initial forced entry. The only reinforcement we have to expand lodgment is to assault airdrop; to insert vertically; or if tactically feasible to air assault. Assault airdrop places vulnerable Air Force Strategic lift assets on the ground and can be accomplished only if the insertion unit can secure an airfield and if the airfield is not damaged. In fact, many plans require airborne engineer units to build an airstrip to establish an aerial port of debarkation. Airborne insertion is by far the fastest way to mass combat power for initial entry. The standard airborne force package requires a brigade task force. In order to maintain a brigade on two hour notice and capable of deploying in 18 hours to any AOR, the division must rotate the duty among two other brigades. The necessities three airborne brigade task forces.

The balance of the current Army force structure is based upon the commitment of the U.S. around the world and the requirement to execute the National Military Strategy. The Army has four divisions which are strategically fixed; two in Germany for our NATO commitments, one in Korea for deterrence by treaty arrangement, and one in the Pacific to support USCINCPAC requirements. The Army must also be prepared to commit two corps of at least three divisions to Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) in the East and West. Accepting that, at least one division will be forward deployed in the region and the Army must deploy five additional divisions for a total of ten divisions. The light infantry divisions offer the capability of rapid strategic mobility and a balance to the Army's total force. They are designed to be utilized in low- to mid-intensity conflicts with limited support; to integrate with armor forces in high-intensity conflicts, and to fight where armor cannot.

I believe the above analysis clearly indicates that DEF-17 is faulty in its assertions.

Surely this is not characteristic of the type of thoughtful work we have come to expect from the Congressional Budget Office. In the future, I hope that your military analysts will be more careful in their study of such important issues.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN M. MCHUGH,
Member of Congress.

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, January 29, 1997.

Hon. JOHN M. MCHUGH,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: Thank you for your letter of January 16, 1997 outlining your objections to CBO's option concerning the Army's light divisions in our August 1996 edition of *Reducing the Deficit*. We appreciate your taking the time to inform us of your concerns. In future editions of *Reducing the Deficit*, we plan to be more explicit about the advantages and merits attributable to light infantry divisions, and also to clarify some statements that may have been misinterpreted.

I would ask you to please keep in mind, however, the fact that each of the entries included in *Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options* is just that, an option to be considered as a means to reduce the deficit. CBO does not endorse any of those options and draws no conclusions regarding their merit.

Sincerely,

JUNE E. O'NEILL, Director.

THE IMPACT OF THE IRISH POTATO FAMINE ON AMERICAN HISTORY

HON. RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 4, 1997

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, today I introduced legislation along with Representative MENENDEZ to encourage America's schools to teach our young students about a tragic period in history that nearly destroyed the people and country of Ireland and forever changed the face of America.

The mass starvation in Ireland from 1845 to 1850 initiated by the dramatic failure of the Irish potato crop is most commonly referred to as the Irish potato famine. Although Europe's poorest country in the middle 19th century, Ireland's 8 million inhabitants were curiously well nourished. The Irish people relied on the potato for the bulk of their diet since it was inexpensive and high in nutrients. However, in 1845, the Irish potato crop was ruined across the entire countryside by *phytophthora infestans*, an airborne pestilence. At the time, no one knew what caused the potato blight and so little could be done to save the crops. Across the whole of Ireland, potatoes simply rotted on the ground.

The failure of the potato crop led to the inability of most Irish families to pay the rent on their cottages which, after Britain's annexation of the island in the late 18th century, were often owned by British landholders. The vicious cycle of poverty was held intact by both the continuation of the potato blight and the active exportation of the Irish grain crop by the British Crown. Those who traveled across the island during the famine noted the horrifying

situation in which they encountered the Irish people. Men, women and children literally starved to death on the roadside and families huddled together in the cold waiting to die. In fact, while visiting Ireland in 1845, the African-American abolitionist Frederick Douglass wrote that the people of Ireland "are in the same degradation as the American slaves."

A number of British groups threw aside the prevailing prejudices against the Irish to provide relief from what had become a starvation of epidemic proportions in the colony. The Quakers, or the Society of Friends, even set up a vast array of soup kitchens throughout the countryside. However, it was not enough to stop the hunger and loss of farming wages. By the end of the epidemic in 1850, more than one million Irish had perished from the hunger, cold and disease brought about by the potato blight. It seemed the only way to elude the horrors of the famine was to leave Ireland—and so many did just that.

Although the voyage was treacherous and relatively expensive, more than one million Irish emigrated to the United States during the famine. Initially, they settled in the cities of the northeastern seaboard such as Boston and New York. Later they pushed westward to Chicago, the Great Plains and the uncharted western territories. With them they brought their Celtic culture and determination. Aside from impacting the basic makeup of the American people, Irish-Americans have made significant contributions in American business, law, music, athletics, literature, religion and politics. In fact, U.S. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, considered by many to be the greatest Presidential orators of their respective political parties this century, are both from Irish-American families.

Perhaps, though, the legacy of the Irish famine's immigration wave to America is most evident in our everyday lives. Today, more than 1.5 million of New Jersey's 8 million inhabitants claim some Irish descent, as do millions of other Americans. The resolution put forth today by myself and Representative MENENDEZ recognizes the contributions made by Irish-Americans to our greater American heritage. Irish-Americans have left an indelible mark on our American culture and history, and for that reason our children should learn more about the tragic famine which brought so many of them to our shores in search of freedom from hunger, freedom from want and freedom from colonial rule.

THANKING KENNETH SAMUEL
MCCALL

HON. ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 4, 1997

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues from the great State of Maryland, and of this House, to join me in saluting a constituent of the fourth Congressional District of Maryland and a great American. Mr. Kenneth Samuel McCall has made outstanding contributions to the Edison Electric Institute during his 41 years of dedicated service. I congratulate him on the occasion of his retirement, and offer my best wishes to him and his family as he enters a new chapter in his life.