

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER RECENT EVENTS IN SIERRA LEONE IN THE WAKE OF THE RECENT MILITARY COUP

HON. AMO HOUGHTON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 16, 1997

Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Speaker, today a bipartisan group of colleagues and I have introduced a bill condemning the recent military coup d'etat in the Republic of Sierra Leone. The coup caused a great setback for democracy in this small West African nation. Let me explain.

On February 26, 1996, Sierra Leone held their first democratic elections in nearly 30 years. There had been a military coup less than a month before the election, and a civil war was still taking place in the countryside. A runoff election to choose between the two frontrunners in the presidential race occurred on March 15, 1996.

Despite some minor inadequacies, a group of international observers deemed the elections to be free and fair. On March 29, 1996, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party was sworn in as the President of Sierra Leone. This peaceful transition from a military regime to a freely elected civilian government was a tremendous step onto the road to democracy.

Not long after the inauguration, I came to the floor with some of my colleagues to congratulate President Kabbah and the people of Sierra Leone through House Concurrent Resolution 160. The bill passed unanimously through both the House and Senate.

Things were going well in Sierra Leone during their first year as a democracy. For example, when there were problems in neighboring Liberia, Sierra Leone allowed the United States Marines to use their airport as a base to evacuate American citizens from Monrovia.

Unfortunately, on May 25, 1997, an unruly gang of thugs staged a coup d'etat, taking many of us by surprise. Johnny Paul Koroma and his Armed Forces Ruling Council took responsibility for the coup. President Kabbah and members of the government were forced to leave the country as the United States Marines arrived to the country again—this time to evacuate our citizens and other foreign nationals from Sierra Leone. Those who had to stay behind were subject to rampant killing, looting, raping, and a disruption of critical relief supplies throughout the country.

It is because of all this that a group of our colleagues, specifically ALCEE HASTINGS, TONY HALL, Chairman ED ROYCE, Ranking Member BOB MENENDEZ, and the entire membership of the House Subcommittee on Africa, decided to introduce a concurrent resolution expressing our concern for the people of Sierra Leone. In the resolution, we call for an end to violence, restoration of the democratically elected government, the protection and safety of international aid workers who remain in the coun-

try, and what is most important, a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

So, it is my hope, Mr. Speaker, that you and all of my colleagues in the House and Senate will join us in support of democracy and order in Africa—specifically in the Republic of Sierra Leone.

UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS: THE CASE FOR ENGAGEMENT

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 16, 1997

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, last week the Asia Society sponsored a major conference here in Washington on the subject of "China, Japan, and Korea: Challenges for United States Business and Policy in Northeast Asia."

The Asia Society deserves commendation for organizing a conference on this important topic. The Asia Society is known throughout the country, and indeed throughout the world, for both its efforts to foster a better understanding of Asia, and its attempts to bring this understanding to a broader audience here in the United States. Last week's conference represented another attempt to fulfill this latter task.

I was privileged to address this conference on the subject of United States-China relations. The Congress later this month will engage in a very important debate on the future of China's trade status—a debate that could set the tone for United States-China relations for many years to come.

Given the importance of the coming debate, I would like to place my comments before the Asia Society in the RECORD, in the hope that my colleagues might find them of some use as they look forward to congressional consideration of China's trade status.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: THE CASE FOR ENGAGEMENT—REMARKS BY LEE H. HAMILTON—ASIA SOCIETY—JUNE 11, 1997

One big question of the coming decade is: Where is China going? Will China become a rival or even a threat to the United States? Or will it choose to cooperate, to participate in global political, economic, and security regimes, and abide by international norms and rules of behavior?

This is not an academic question. How China evolves over the next decade will profoundly affect our economic, political and security interests around the world. If China becomes a threat to the United States, our defense budget will go up, tensions in Asia will rise, and Asia's remarkable prosperity will be at risk.

If China and the United States keep their relationship on track, peace and security in Asia will be strengthened, the prospects for human rights will be enhanced, and Asia's remarkable economic growth can continue.

China is emerging as a great power. We could not halt that evolution if we wanted to. But we can and should try to shape the kind of power China will become. We can try

to ensure that China is integrated into the world community, rather than isolated from it.

At the heart of this debate, indeed every foreign policy debate, is one central question: what is the U.S. national interest?

Our overriding interest is to have sound relations with China.

China is, after all, the world's most populous country—it has grown by 400 million people since Richard Nixon visited in 1972—and possesses one of the world's largest economies.

With the world's largest standing army, China's actions have a direct bearing on peace and stability throughout East and Southeast Asia.

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China is not only a key country in Asia, but has a significant impact on U.S. interests around the world.

U.S. efforts to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction in Iran, North Korea and elsewhere can succeed only if China cooperates with us and the rest of the international community.

In the economic front, American exports and American jobs are dependent upon sound relations with China. Last year we sold nearly \$12 billion of goods to China. These exports supported 170,000 high-wage American jobs.

Our two countries, despite our differences, share many interests: a stable, peaceful, and prosperous East Asia; a global economy characterized by predictability, reduced trade barriers, and widely-accepted rules; stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction; and avoiding a regional arms race or even a new cold war.

THE MOOD TODAY: A NEW ANGER AT CHINA

This is the most difficult bilateral relationship to understand and to manage, even in the best of times—and right now we are in the midst of another China-bashing season.

Many Americans are angered by China's human rights practices; its proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons technology and components; its sales of missiles; its bullying of Taiwan and oppression of Tibet; its trade practices, which have led to a huge bilateral trade imbalance; and reports of illegal campaign contributions to U.S. candidates.

Citing these concerns, politicians and pundits have identified China as America's next adversary. They have concluded that China will never play by the rules, and it is useless to try to integrate it into global political, security, and economic regimes.

IS CHINA A THREAT TO THE U.S.?

But is China a threat? I believe there is no basis for believing that China will pose a serious threat to the U.S. any time soon. China is simply not in our league.

In 1995, China's GDP stood at \$698 billion. Ours was ten times that size. The disparity in GDP per capita is even more striking: \$620 for each Chinese, \$27,000 for each American.

The military imbalance is as stark: China has fewer than a dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles; we have 755; China has roughly 300 strategic nuclear warheads; we have more than 11,000; China has no aircraft carriers; we have 12; China has approximately 50 top-of-the-line warplanes; we have more than 3,400; China lacks the ability to project military power much beyond its borders.

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

This overwhelming American military edge is likely to persist: present U.S. defense spending outstrips Chinese spending by a factor of 8½ to one. In short, a Chinese threat to U.S. security interests just doesn't stand up to scrutiny.

DEFINING ENGAGEMENT

Instead of viewing China as a threat, we should seek it as an opportunity. China is an emerging superpower. The correct policy approach is to engage China, not isolate it.

Engagement is not endorsement. It is not alliance. It is certainly not appeasement. It means actively engaging China to resolve our differences. It means standing up for U.S. interests when consultations and negotiations are not fruitful, even when this creates tensions in the relationship. This is what the Clinton Administration did: when it sent two aircraft carrier groups into the Taiwan Strait last year; when it threatened to impose sanctions because of Chinese violations of intellectual property rights; and when it imposed sanctions on Chinese companies of their violation of U.S. non-proliferation laws.

ENGAGEMENT SERVES U.S. INTERESTS

I support a policy of engagement, not as an end in itself, but as a tool to promote U.S. interests, including our human rights concerns. It has produced tangible benefits for the United States. Because of engagement: China has helped to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, perhaps the most dangerous place in the world today; China has moved in our direction on non-proliferation. It has committed itself to international non-proliferation rules by signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention; China worked constructively with us in the United Nations Security Council in the Gulf War, and on many peace-keeping efforts since then; China cooperates with us on terrorism, the environment, public health, alien smuggling, and on illegal narcotics—all matters with a direct impact on our well-being.

Engagement has not solved all problems. But it offers a better prospect for achieving U.S. policy objectives than isolation or containment.

MFN AND ENGAGEMENT

Granting China normal trading status—as we have done for 17 years—is a natural consequence of our policy of engagement. It is the routine way nations conduct trade. All of our major trading partners enjoy this non-discriminatory tariff treatment.

But on Capitol Hill, opponents of engagement are gearing up for an all-out attack on the President's decision to extend normal trading status for another year.

The decision to grant normal trading status is not simply a narrow trade issue. It represents a fundamental choice—a choice between engagement and containment.

To revoke normal trade relations would be to declare economic warfare against China, and it would make a policy of engagement impossible. It would disrupt the cooperation we already enjoy and end the chances of greater cooperation.

MFN NOT A REFERENDUM ON CHINESE BEHAVIOR

The upcoming vote on China's trade status should not be a referendum on whether we approve or disapprove of Chinese behavior. No one disputes that China does things we find highly objectionable—and will surely continue to do so. Supporters and opponents of a normal trade relationship with China share the same goals. The debate is about the best method to achieve these goals.

Revoking normal trade relations is too blunt a tool for achieving our goals—indeed, it would be counterproductive. We have more

effective ways to influencing China's behavior: targeted sanctions; public embarrassment; Radio Free Asia broadcasts; force deployments; and tough, effective and sometimes secret diplomacy.

Normal trade relations with China is a way of protecting U.S. interests and promoting American ideals—not a way to confer a seal of approval on China.

MFN AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Revoking normal trade relations will not achieve our human rights goals. Obviously China continues to fall short of our hopes in the area of human rights. China today is an oppressive society where political expression is severely circumscribed and the rights of the individual are subordinated to the well-being of the state—as defined by a self-selected party elite.

But a policy of engagement offers a better hope of prodding China into more acceptable behavior than a policy of isolation or containment.

The lesson of the past quarter century in China—and the lessons of South Korea, Taiwan, and other former authoritarian countries that have evolved into democracies—is that the best way to promote human rights is for the United States to stay engaged.

That is why many of those who care deeply about freedom in China—Wei Jingsheng, Martin Lee, and many of the Tiananmen Square dissidents, for instance—advocate the renewal of MFN. That is why many Christian religious leaders—in the United States as in China—support MFN. That is why Presidents of both parties, ever since President Nixon first visited China in 1972, have endorsed a policy of engagement. The overarching reality is that the human rights situation is improving because we have followed a policy of engagement, and will continue to improve if we stay engaged.

MFN REVOCATION WILL DAMAGE HUMAN RIGHTS

Those who advocate the withdrawal of normal trade relations say this action will further human rights in China. But they offer no evidence—because they have no evidence.

To the contrary, there's plenty of evidence to show that revoking normal trade relations would only make things worse. China is a great nation with an ancient culture and a proud tradition. It is, moreover, a nation immensely conscious of slights—real and imagined—suffered at the hands of the West.

I cannot imagine that China would buckle under the threat of MFN withdrawal—any more than we would back down in the face of a comparable threat.

A direct challenge by the United States is likely to make human rights conditions in China worse: Do MFN opponents really think an isolated China would be more likely to respect the rights of its people? That a return to the cold war of the 1950s and 1960s would promote human rights?

Are human rights advanced if, as a consequence of a deteriorating U.S.-China relationship, China: sells more missiles to Pakistan? steps up its nuclear cooperation with Iran? encourages North Korea to threaten the peace of the Korean peninsula? or bullies Taiwan?

The human rights situation is not good today, but China is light years ahead of where it was 25 years ago, when President Nixon first visited. While political expression remains severely circumscribed, personal freedoms for the average Chinese—choice of employment, place of residence, freedom of movement—are greater than ever before. And Chinese are now voting in village elections.

China is still evolving. In another decade, it will be vastly different, just as the China of 1997 is dramatically different from the China of 1972. But these changes have not,

and will not come overnight. They will be less likely to come at all if we isolate ourselves from China.

The way to improve human rights in China is to stay engaged, encourage the trends already underway, and make certain that the Chinese understand that they will enjoy a full relationship with the United States only when they stop oppressing their people.

MFN AND THE TRADE DEFICIT

The \$38 billion trade imbalance is another source of tension in U.S.-China relations. Yet revoking normal trade status will not reduce this deficit.

Terminating MFN will create considerable economic pain for American workers, manufacturers, and consumers. But it will not bring jobs and production back to the United States, because there are other countries that, like China, can produce labor-intensive goods more cheaply than we can.

Rather than revoking MFN and closing off trade, we should concentrate on opening China's market.

First, we need to continue to use our trade remedy laws—including targeted sanctions—to persuade China to lower import barriers and end unfair practices. This approach worked last year when we persuaded China to crack down on counterfeit music recordings, computer software, and videos. It worked again when we won market access provisions for our textiles. We should not hesitate to use this tool whenever it is needed.

Second, we need to bring China into the WTO on tough commercial terms.

The United States should insist that China abandon its discriminatory economic and trade policies as a condition for joining the WTO. Once China becomes a WTO member, it can be challenged in WTO dispute-settlement proceedings if it fails to live up to its commitments.

THE RISKS OF REVOKING MFN

Those who favor cutting off normal trade relations with China do not spell out the consequences. Ending normal trade relations and ending America's quarter century of engagement with China would damage U.S. interests in China, in the region, at home, and around the world.

INSIDE CHINA

Within China, abandoning engagement—as ending normal trade relations would surely mean—would undermine the stature and influence of those Chinese we most want to support—reformers, students, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs. It would strengthen the hand of reactionary elements in China: the army, the bureaucrats and government functionaries, and the hardline communists. It would slow the flow of western culture and ideas into China. It would destroy the little influence we now have on the Chinese leadership, and eliminate any incentive for them to abide by global norms. And as we have seen, it would almost certainly make the human rights situation there worse, not better.

IN THE REGION

In the region, Hong Kong and Taiwan—who wholeheartedly support the continuation of MFN—would suffer economically because they benefit from U.S.-China trade. They might also suffer direct political or military pressure from China as well.

If America abandoned the policy of engagement, regional tensions would rise. Our allies in the region would lose confidence in our judgment and our ability to play a constructive role in East Asia. Unsure of our allies, we would have to increase our defense expenditures in the region. The region could embark upon a destabilizing arms race, and make a new cold war more likely.

AT HOME

Ending normal trade relations would also severely impact the United States. We would lose markets for \$12 billion worth of U.S. exports, which support 170,000 high-paying American jobs. It would mean higher prices for Americans who shop for low-cost imports.

It would deny us access to China's huge market, not only in the present, but for the foreseeable future. And faced with the need for higher defense expenditures, our hopes for balancing the budget and dealing with our domestic problems would evaporate.

AROUND THE WORLD

Ending normal trade relations has international consequences as well. We would lose the support of one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, which would have a significant impact on U.S. interests around the world.

U.S. efforts to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction in North Korea and elsewhere would be set back.

We would no longer count on Chinese help on regional security issues, or in addressing transnational issues such as narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, or international crime.

IMPORTANCE OF A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN HONG KONG

The debate over China's trade status is not occurring in a vacuum, of course. The other major China-related event that will take place in the next few weeks is Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese control. I have been watching the transition process in Hong Kong with keen interest—and with a mixture of hope and concern. It is critical that the transition go smoothly.

HONG KONG TRANSITION WILL HAVE GREAT IMPACT ON U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

The Hong Kong transition will have a great impact on how most Americans view U.S.-China relations. If the transition goes well, this will sustain political support in the Congress and throughout the country for a policy of engagement with China. But if the transition goes badly—if Americans see television pictures of people being led off in manacles, and read news reports that suggest that Hong Kong's unique way of life is being threatened—then support for engagement will falter.

The Chinese leadership understands this. But I am less confident that those who wield power in Beijing will be able to exercise the necessary discipline, restraint and flexibility if—as is possible—the July 1st transition is met with public demonstrations and protests.

I'm equally worried about the long term outlook—the potential erosion of Hong Kong's freedoms over the next few years.

CONCERNS ABOUT THE TRANSITION

But the die is not yet cast for Hong Kong. China has taken a number of encouraging steps. It has approved Hong Kong's continued participation in international organizations. It will continue to link Hong Kong's currency to the U.S. dollar, and preserve Hong Kong's substantial foreign exchange reserves. It will keep Hong Kong's respected civil servants in place.

The key question, of course, is whether China will honor its pledges to uphold the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration—whether it will abide by its promise to establish and maintain "one country, two systems."

WHAT THE U.S. CAN DO TO ENHANCE A SUCCESSFUL HONG KONG TRANSITION

None of us can answer that question today, just as none of us knows what Hong Kong will be like 3 or 5 or 10 years from now. The chief actors, of course, will be China and

Hong Kong. But there are things the United States can do to increase the likelihood that the Hong Kong of the 21st century will retain the vitality and opportunity and freedom it enjoys today.

First, in all our dealings relating to Hong Kong, U.S. officials should underscore our deep commitment to freedom and democracy there.

Second, we should give Hong Kong's new chief executive some running room, so he is not immediately caught between those who say he must work with China and those who say working with China is impossible.

Third, we should refrain from threatening China, although we must not shrink from stating our views.

Fourth, we should firmly and repeatedly state our expectation that China abide by the Joint Declaration especially as it applies to civil liberties, rule of law, basic freedoms, and true autonomy.

Fifth, we should let the new authorities know we expect them to surpass Hong Kong's record in the rule of law, the honesty of the civil service, and the impartial administration of government.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE HONG KONG TRANSITION FOR TAIWAN

The Hong Kong transition also has implications for Taiwan. China understands that if the transition goes well, this will make the question of Taiwan's eventual reunification with China infinitely more manageable.

If for no other reason than this, Beijing has every incentive to make the Hong Kong reversion succeed. So do the other members of the Asia-Pacific community. The unsettled relations between Beijing and Taipei pose one of the most serious threats to peace and stability in East Asia. If a successful Hong Kong reversion helps to dampen tensions between China and Taiwan, then we all benefit.

CONCLUSION

Maintaining sound relations with China is essential for achieving a wide range of U.S. foreign policy objectives—including regional peace and stability, prosperity for our Asian friends and ourselves, and improved conditions inside China itself.

If we are to have sound relations with China, we must maintain normal trading relations. We must approve MFN for another year.

But that is only the beginning. U.S. policy toward China will require a steady and skillful hand over the long haul. We should not delude ourselves or engage in false expectations. We can expect rough patches along the way. Success will require a consistent policy, principled stands on key issues, and patient diplomacy aimed at finding solutions, not aggravating tensions. It will also require a China willing to abide by international rules and norms.

I want to leave you with two thoughts.

First, we cannot isolate China. We could not build a coalition to contain or isolate China if we tried.

No one would support us.

We can disengage from China. But China is too big and too important for us to isolate successfully. If we try, we will only isolate—and hurt—ourselves.

Second, if we treat China as an enemy, it will become our enemy. Our hand should remain open.

Thank you.

JUNETEENTH CELEBRATIONS HONORING FREEDOM AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN HISTORY

HON. KEN BENTSEN

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 16, 1997

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to recognize the upcoming Juneteenth celebrations honoring freedom and African-American history. Texas has honored Juneteenth as a State holiday for nearly 20 years, observing the day with joyous public celebrations. But outside of the Lone Star State, many do not understand the significance and meaning of Juneteenth in the lives of African-Americans past, present and future.

Juneteenth is a celebration of freedom for African-Americans. It honors the day that black slaves in Texas finally learned of their emancipation. Juneteenth honors a day that was far too long in coming. Though President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation freeing slaves was signed on January 1, 1863, the proclamation did not bring immediate freedom for slaves. Only after the Civil War ended in 1865 was the Emancipation Proclamation enforced, using Union soldiers to finally free slaves in the South. On June 19, 1865, Gen. Gordon Granger of the Union Army arrived in Galveston, TX., to ensure the freedom of the slaves. Though news of the Emancipation Proclamation had been kept quiet throughout the war, the word had spread, and when General Granger arrived in Galveston a large number of slaves turned out to greet him and his troops.

Legends abound of the origins of Juneteenth. One holds that word of emancipation spread through the Union Army via black soldiers who spread the news as the Army moved South. Another states that a messenger carrying the news was murdered on his way to Texas, while another claims that a black ex-Union soldier rode a mule from Washington, DC, with a message given to him by Abraham Lincoln. But the origins are not as important as the purpose of the celebration itself?

Today, Juneteenth is widely known as Black Independence Day, as significant to many African-Americans as July 4th. It is a chance for all Americans to celebrate freedom and learn more about African-American history. June 19, 1865 is the day when blacks in Texas began to realize their opportunities as free Americans. Though the struggle continues, Juneteenth allows us to recognize how far our Nation has come and celebrate the history, achievements and contributions African-Americans have made to our Nation.

REGARDING REV. FRANK BEALL

HON. JOE SCARBOROUGH

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 16, 1997

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, it is with pride that I take the floor of the House of Representatives today to pay homage to a distinguished member of my district. He is a man who has held himself to a high standard while showing unconditional love to those who