

Secretary of State. In addition, this same law states that "the President [FCC] may withhold * * * such license when he shall be satisfied after notice and hearings that such action will assist . . . in maintaining the rights or interests of the United States or of its citizens in foreign countries * * *." I have requested the Secretary of State to withhold his approval of Telebermuda's license application, until the case involving my constituents is resolved.

Mr. President, this case is not only important to my constituents, it is important for all businesses who operate overseas. It is our duty to ensure that they are treated fairly. We cannot allow foreign governments to take advantage of U.S. businesses. If the Bermudian telephone monopoly or other Bermudian interests want to buy the MacDonalds interest in Bermuda Cable they should pay the fair market price for the MacDonalds interest in the company. Mr. President, I am not asking for special treatment for the MacDonalds, but I believe they are entitled to receive justice.

Mr. President, I hope that the Bermudian Government will reexamine this situation involving my constituents and determine that it is in their best interest to treat all businesses fairly and not punish people because they are from the United States or other foreign countries.

THE YEAR 2000 COMPUTER PROBLEM

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, on the 31st of July, I took the liberty of writing to the President concerning a problem that could have extreme negative economic consequences in the year 2000 when we will have to make the transition of computers from the 20th to the 21st century.

This is a matter that will necessarily concern the Congress. I ask unanimous consent that my letter to the President and a summary of an accompanying report by Richard M. Nunno be printed in the RECORD at this point. Cost considerations prevent having the entire report printed in the RECORD. The report can be obtained from the Congressional Research Service.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., July 31, 1996.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I hope this letter reaches you.

I write to alert you to a problem which could have extreme negative economic consequences during your second term. The "Year 2000 Time Bomb." This has to do with the transition of computer programs from the 20th to the 21st century.

The main computer languages from the '50s and '60s such as COBOL, Fortran, and Assembler were designed to minimize consumption of computer memory by employing date fields providing for only six digits. The

date of this letter in "computerese," for example, is 96-07-31. The century designation "19" is assumed.

The problem is that many computer programs will read January 1, 2000 as January 1, 1900. Computer programs will not recognize the 21st century without a massive rewriting of computer codes.

I first learned of all this in February and requested a study by the Congressional Research Service. The study, just now completed, substantiates the worst fears of the doomsayers. (A copy of the CRS study is attached.) The Year 2000 problem ("Y2K") is worldwide. Each line of computer code needs to be analyzed and either passed on or be rewritten. The banking system is particularly vulnerable. A money center bank may have 500 million lines of code to be revised at a cost of \$1 per line. That's a \$500 million problem. (I learn from Lanny Davis that his client, the Mars Company, estimates the cost of becoming Y2K date compliant at \$100 million to \$200 million. Mars is only a candy company.) One would expect that a quick fix of the problem would have been found but it hasn't happened and the experts tell me it is not likely.

There are three issues. First, the cost of reviewing and rewriting codes for Federal and state governments which will range in the billions of dollars over the next three years. Second, the question of whether there is time enough to get the job done and, if not, what sort of triage we may need. I am particularly concerned about the IRS and Social Security in this respect. Third, the question of what happens to the economy if the problem is not resolved by mid-1999? Are corporations and consumers not likely to withhold spending decisions and possibly even withdraw funds from banks if they fear the economy is facing chaos?

I have a recommendation. A Presidential aide should be appointed to take responsibility for assuring that all Federal agencies including the military be Y2K date compliant by January 1, 1999 and that all commercial and industrial firms doing business with the Federal government also be compliant by that date. I am advised that the Pentagon is further ahead on the curve here than any of the Federal agencies. You may wish to turn to the military to take command of dealing with the problem.

The computer has been a blessing; if we don't act quickly, however, it could become the curse of the age.

Respectfully,

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN.

THE YEAR 2000 COMPUTER CHALLENGE (By Richard M. Nunno)

SUMMARY

Most computer systems in use today can only record dates in a two-digit format for the year. Under this system, computers will fail to operate properly when years after 1999 are used, because the year 2000 is indistinguishable from 1900. This problem could have a serious impact on a wide range of activities that use computers. Information systems must be inspected, and modified, if necessary, before January 1, 2000 to avoid major system malfunctions.

Many managers initially doubted the seriousness of this problem, assuming that an easy technical fix would be developed. Several independent research firms, however, have refuted this view, with the conclusion that inspecting all computer systems and converting date fields where necessary and then testing modified software will be a very time-consuming and costly task. Research firms predict that due to a lack of time and resources, the majority of U.S. businesses and government agencies will likely not fix

all of their computer systems by the start of the new millennium.

Most agencies and businesses have come to understand the difficulties involved, although some have not yet started implementing changes. Several companies have emerged offering services to work on the year-2000 conversion, and software analysis products are commercially available to assist with finding and converting flawed software code. Even with the assistance of these products, however, most of the work will still have to be done by humans.

Federal agencies are generally aware of the year-2000 challenge and most are working to correct it. Agencies that manage vast databases, conduct massive monetary transactions, or interact extensively with other computer systems, face the greatest challenge. An interagency committee has been established to raise awareness of the year-2000 challenge and facilitate federal efforts at solving it. The interagency committee has initiated several actions, such as requiring vendor software listed in future federal procurement schedules to be year-2000 compliant and specifying four-digit year fields for federal computers. The shortage of time to complete year-2000 computer changes may force agencies to prioritize their systems. Agencies may also need to shift resources from other projects to work on year-2000 efforts. State and local governments, as well as foreign organizations, will also have significant year-2000 conversion problems.

Congressional hearings have been held recently to investigate the year-2000 challenge, and a legislative provision was introduced directing the Defense Department to assess the risk to its systems resulting from it. Several options exist for congressional consideration. One option is to provide special funding to federal agencies for year-2000 conversion. While agencies are reluctant to request additional funds, some observers contend this may be necessary. Another option is to give agencies increased autonomy in reprogramming appropriated funds for year-2000 efforts. A third, less controversial alternative is to continue to raise public awareness through hearings and by overseeing federal efforts.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Wednesday, September 4, the Federal debt stood at \$5,228,998,407,724.89.

Five years ago, September 4, 1991, the Federal debt stood at \$3,617,415,000,000.

Ten years ago, September 4, 1986, the Federal debt stood at \$2,113,008,000,000.

Fifteen years ago, September 4, 1981, the Federal debt stood at \$979,768,000,000.

This reflects an increase of more than \$4,249,230,407,724.89 during the 15 years from 1981 to 1996.

AVIATION SECURITY CHALLENGES

Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the vitally important issue of aviation security challenges. Last month, the Commerce Committee which I chair held an open hearing to examine aviation security. Later this month, we will hold a closed hearing to further consider this vitally important issue.

At the outset, let me stress that the United States continues to have the

best aviation safety record in the world. Every day, 1.5 million people fly commercially in the United States and we have a marvelous record of getting passengers safely to their destinations. Regrettably, however, recent incidents have caused the traveling public great anxiety. It is our responsibility to help reassure the public of our superb air safety record.

Impressive as U.S. aviation safety statistics are, we cannot rest on our laurels. Statistics are no comfort to a family which has lost a loved one or friend in an aviation tragedy. On a bipartisan basis, Congress and the administration must constantly strive to do better in the area of aviation safety. In fact, I believe we must rededicate ourselves to the goal of zero aviation accidents, whether caused by safety lapses, security breaches, or other factors.

Today, I would like to briefly discuss three points.

First, it is imperative that Congress and the administration resist the temptation to rush to embrace any simple solution to the very complex aviation security challenges we face. Rather, an effective aviation security program depends on a number of components working together in a coordinated manner to form a virtual security net protecting the traveling public. These elements include: the collection of intelligence information used to identify potential threats; coordination of efforts by law enforcement agencies to interdict threats; human factors including effective passenger screening; and technology. As is the case with any system, aviation security is only as strong as the weakest link in the security chain.

Each of these components needs to be improved. In the areas of technology and human factors, there is vast room for improvement. Simply put, we can do a better job protecting the traveling public. We must do a better job.

In recent weeks the aviation security debate has understandably focused on the lack of explosive detection capability in our Nation's airports. This focus is well placed. After all, in 1990 Congress recognized explosive detection systems needed to be installed in our airports and directed FAA to mandate deployment of such systems by November 1993. Yet today—nearly 6 years later and after the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] has spent more than \$150 million in taxpayer money on explosive detection research—our airports continue to lack the capability to screen checked baggage for explosives. To make matters worse, our airports stand out as soft targets for aviation terrorism because many airports around the world already have put in place U.S.-manufactured explosive detection devices as part of their heightened security measures.

While I am pleased we are finally field testing a FAA-certified explosive detection system, the current absence

of explosive detection capability in our airports raises a fundamental policy question: Should Congress require interim deployment of existing explosive detection devices until a FAA-certified explosive detection system successfully completes operational testing and is available in sufficient quantities to be deployed at least in our highest risk airports? I strongly believe the answer is yes. We should take a very hard look at those U.S.-manufactured bulk and trace explosive detection devices which currently are widely used around the world.

Tempting as it is, however, I hope the aviation security debate does not continue to be transfixed on technology. For instance, I am equally concerned about the shortcomings in so-called aviation security human factors. Passenger screening personnel are our most visible line of defense at airports. Unfortunately, all too often they are inadequately trained and suffer from a very high rate of turnover. Currently, companies hired by airlines to provide screening services at our Nation's airports are not subject to any certification requirement. Similarly, screening personnel are not required to be certified. We should carefully consider whether such certification requirements would provide the quality control assurance we expect and the traveling public deserves. At the same time, Congress should not overlook measures that should be taken to strengthen the intelligence gathering and enforcement elements of our aviation security system.

As the aviation security debate continues, our goal should be nothing less than improving every component of our security system and ensuring we have no weak links.

Second, Congress and the administration must be very cautious to avoid a "one size fits all" approach to aviation security policy. The security challenges faced by small airlines and small airports are truly unique. They differ markedly from those faced by international carriers and major hub airports. Accordingly, it is critically important these differences are not overlooked in a rush to heighten aviation security standards.

Earlier this year, the U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO] released a study I requested which found that many small communities across the country currently suffer from inadequate air service. Having just returned from my home State of South Dakota where maintaining adequate air service is a day-to-day struggle, I can report from the front lines that GAO is absolutely correct. Even where a small community is lucky enough to have air service, often that service is economically fragile. Even a small economic shock can sever a community's only remaining air service link to our national air service network.

Passengers traveling to and from small cities must have the same level of security as those traveling to and

from large hub airports. I believe, however, there are thoughtful ways of accomplishing this goal without toppling this fragile economic balance. For instance, is it good policy to force a small community like Mitchell, SD, which had just 34 commercial boardings in July to install at its airport a CTX-5000 explosive detection machine costing \$1 million? How about Brookings, SD, and Yankton, SD, which in July had 104 and 112 boardings respectively? I believe the answer clearly is no, particularly since hand searching of selected luggage at our small airports is a viable, cost-effective and common sense alternative.

Unfortunately, this kind of "one size fits all" approach was embraced by the House last month when it adopted Section 111 of the Aviation Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1996 which calls for new, costly security measures to be imposed on small airlines. I have no doubt this is a well-intentioned provision. However, it fails to recognize FAA's ongoing assessment of the threat faced by small airlines and the unique security needs of passengers traveling on such carriers. One thing is certain—this expensive, unfunded mandate likely would cause a further erosion of air service in our small cities and that is why I will oppose it in the Senate.

Before I move on to my final point, let me reiterate that persons traveling to and from small communities deserve the same level of security as those traveling in larger markets. Due to profound differences in both passenger numbers and in threat levels, however, we can meet this goal without resorting to the identical, very expensive measures called for in our major international hub airports. Continued air service to many small communities depends on an appreciation of this simple, but critically important, point.

The final point I wish to discuss today is that the enormous potential cost of security upgrades requires that heightened security measures be based on the philosophy of focussing limited resources on the most threatening passengers and cargo. For that reason, I have advocated the use of passenger profiling as the ideal way to weed out non-threatening passengers and thereby enabling airlines to target security resources more effectively. I stressed this point in the Commerce Committee's aviation security hearing last month and want to reemphasize it today.

As in the case of explosive detection systems, the problem in the United States is not developing sophisticated weapons to fight aviation terrorism, the problem is deploying them. Passenger profiling is another case in point. While countries with highly regarded aviation security systems such as Israel and the Netherlands put great emphasis on passenger profiling, thus far we have failed to follow their lead. What makes this so remarkable is U.S. carriers have long recognized the security benefits of passenger profiling and

Northwest Airlines, in close cooperation with the FAA, recently developed perhaps the most sophisticated automated profiling system available. I am very pleased that FAA is working closely with Northwest to put the finishing touches on this system and to make it available to other airlines as soon as possible.

In my view, using passenger profiling as the bedrock of any aviation security system is good common sense policy. This is especially the case when one considers the cost of explosive detection systems, the limited space available in many of our airports for such systems, and the commercial need for our airlines to avoid unnecessary ground delays. An increased reliance on passenger profiling as the first step in assessing passenger threats makes perfect sense. It can help make an overall aviation security program effective, quick and efficient for the traveling public. At the same time, it can help make heightened security measures cost-effective and operationally viable for our airlines.

Is passenger profiling a flawless or foolproof piece to our aviation security puzzle? No. Short of grounding all airplanes, no perfect solution exists. However, automated passenger profiling holds great promise as a key part of an integrated aviation security system. For instance, Northwest's system looks at more than 100 criteria for each passenger and—based on a ranking system and parameters that can be flexibly set based on perceived threats in any market—calculates which passengers should receive special security attention. Although no system can predict human behavior with 100 percent accuracy, this system appears to hold the promise of helping to allocate security resources with a very high probability of certainty.

In addition, I am sensitive to the concerns some have raised about the constitutional implications of passenger profiling. While much has been written about potential economic costs of heightened aviation security measures, inevitably there will be civil liberties costs as well. As with economic considerations, we must balance costs and benefits. Considering that passenger profiling looks at an enormous number of varied factors, I believe any civil liberties costs resulting from passenger profiling will be very minimal compared to the significant social benefits resulting from minimizing public anxiety about the security of air travel.

Let me conclude by reiterating that we can, and we must, do a better job in aviation security. If Congress, the administration, airlines and airports work cooperatively in the spirit of making every component of our security system as strong as possible, I have no doubt we will meet this challenge.

TRIBUTE TO LORET MILLER RUPPE

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to pay tribute to Loret Miller Ruppe, a woman of uncompromising dedication for peace at home and abroad, who died at the age of 60. In addition to her remarkable career as the Director of the Peace Corps from 1981 to 1989 and Ambassador to Norway from 1989 to 1993, Loret Miller Ruppe was a beloved wife to former Rep. Philip Ruppe (R-Mich), mother of five daughters, sister to six siblings, and grandmother of three.

Her accomplishments were vast and far reaching, her constitution strong, and her character was humble yet filled with passion. Her main passion was for peace. She struggled relentlessly to promote peace and justice throughout the developing world and here at home. In a speech celebrating the 35th Anniversary of the Peace Corps Mrs. Ruppe spoke about the future of the organization and its mission, "Peace, that beautiful five-letter word we all say we crave and pray for, is up for grabs in the '90's." For her, peace was not simply the absence of war, but the absence of the conditions that bring on war such as hunger, disease, poverty, illiteracy, and despair. Mrs. Ruppe worked hard to protect the fragile state of peace in regions around the globe. She achieved this goal through supervising programs in more than 93 countries, serving as a role model to field volunteers, and strengthening the Peace Corps organization.

Mrs. Ruppe also fought battles at home. When President Reagan appointed her in 1981, the Peace Corps budget was rapidly declining and was less than that of the military marching bands. By the end of Mrs. Ruppe's tenure she had succeeded in increasing the agency's budget almost 50 percent. In addition to budgetary challenges, Mrs. Ruppe gave the agency a political face-lift by projecting the agency as non-partisan, despite the fact that she herself was a political appointee, and increasing its viability on both national and local levels. As she noted "We took Peace Corps out of the pit of politics and made it non-partisan. It must always signify Americans pulling together for peace." As a result of her efforts, Mrs. Ruppe was respected and admired by Democrats and Republicans alike. In terms of national visibility, she brought much needed congressional and executive level attention to the Peace Corps. Prior to her leadership the organization was nicknamed "the corpse" and many believed its end was near. Under her command however, the organization was revitalized and its future secured. On a local level, she worked hard to increase young Americans' interest in participating in the program. By 1989, she had raised the number of volunteers by 20 percent.

Mrs. Ruppe was also an initiator who maintained the simple motto "we can do it." She founded three important programs which continue to thrive

today: The African Food Initiative, Women in Development, and the Leadership for Peace Program. Additionally, she brought seven new countries to the Peace Corps program.

As the longest tenured director of the Peace Corps, Mrs. Ruppe contributed much indeed to the organization. It was through her vision, dedication, and leadership that the Peace Corps continues to play a vital role in American foreign aid efforts. Under Mrs. Ruppe's leadership the organization responded to new challenges, transformed itself, and now stands prepared to continue promoting peace in the next century. Mrs. Ruppe's absence will be felt throughout the world. I will especially miss her. To me Loret was more than a dedicated and gifted public servant—she was my friend. I know her husband Philip, her daughters Antoinette, Adele, Katherine, Mary, and Loret will miss her very much, and so will I.

Mr. President, I know that all of our colleagues join with me in extending our sincere condolences to her family members.

200TH BIRTHDAY OF LIBERTY HALL

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, October 2, 1996 will mark the 200th birthday of Liberty Hall in Frankfort, KY. This historic hall is one of Kentucky's finest 18th century-homes, serving as the residence for U.S. Senator John Brown and four generations of his family.

Senator Brown was one of Kentucky's first U.S. Senators, holding office from 1792 to 1805. He was known as a strong advocate and voice for the developing lands west of the Allegheny Mountains. At the time of his death, he had the distinction of being the last living member of the Continental Congress.

Liberty Hall itself has been a house museum since 1937. Its architecture and gardens rank it among the finest homes in the country of that period. Constructed by Senator Brown between 1796 and 1800, the house was named after his father's grammar school in Virginia.

The celebration of this fine home's 200th birthday, not only highlights an important landmark in Kentucky's history, but also serves as a tribute to the preservation movement and its achievements in Kentucky.

I hope all those who visit Kentucky's capital city, Frankfort, will take time to visit Liberty Hall to not only see a beautiful 18th century mansion, but also learn about this honorable man who contributed so much to Kentucky and the Nation.

THREE CHEERS FOR CRANSTON WESTERN

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, during the August recess, 14 youngsters from Cranston, RI, achieved something that no Rhode Islanders had ever achieved before. On August 22, the Cranston