

combat terrorism: anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Anti-terrorism activities deal with traditional defensive measures such as barriers, fences, detection devices and Defense personnel who have as part of their mission protecting DoD personnel and facilities against the threat of terrorism. The Defense Department spends nearly \$2 billion annually on such anti-terrorism activity overall. Traditionally we have not budgeted anti-terrorism activities in a single program because force protection is part of each individual commander's responsibility and is therefore budgeted by every installation in, for example, their operation and maintenance accounts.

In the area of counter-terrorism, DoD has many programs and activities which are more often associated with proactive activities undertaken to neutralize the terrorist threat or respond to terrorist acts. All combatant forces in Defense potentially have as part of their mission a counter-terrorism function; however, these activities are more commonly associated with special operations forces, which have annual budgets in excess of \$3 billion. Further, that amount is in addition to the considerable sums spent from our intelligence portion of the budget to counter terrorism.

The JCS report did fault DoD procedures for funding unanticipated contingencies, and urged the establishment of a special annual contingency fund for anti-terrorism emergencies. Currently, when a crisis emerges, we have to put together a special team and borrow funds from other accounts. The JCS report argued that we needed a separate contingency account, controlled centrally by OSD. I accepted that recommendation and directed the Comptroller to proceed accordingly.

It is unfortunate that a minuscule portion of the JCS review is now being used to draw wider, and inappropriate, conclusions in light of the Dhahran bombing. I have concluded, however, that the Department does need more systematic insight and control over its widely-dispersed anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts. That could very well mean a reassignment of priorities and additional funding to reflect that reassignment. To this end, the Defense appropriations floor amendment proposed by Senators McCain and Levin providing targeted anti-terrorism spending can help facilitate this effort. Further, I have specifically directed that Deputy Secretary John White head up a comprehensive effort for systematic programming and budgeting in this area. I will keep you and all members of Congress informed of our plans as they unfold.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. PERRY.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, is there a time limit?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a time limit on this amendment.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am constrained to say that if the Senator's amendment were to be adopted, our bill would be subject to a point of order. I hope that will not happen. So I move to table the Senator's amendment, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The vote will follow the Harkin amendment.

MORNING BUSINESS

(During today's session of the Senate, the following morning business was transacted.)

COLONEL ROBERT L. SMOLEN, U.S. AIR FORCE

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, as we debate the fiscal year 1997 Department of Defense Appropriations bill, I hope my colleagues will take a moment to reflect on the enormous assistance we receive from the legislative liaison offices for the various branches of the Armed Forces.

The men and women who serve in the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps legislative liaison offices are a valuable link between Members of Congress and the Pentagon. These offices give us with the Pentagon's views on defense bills and specific amendments being considered on the Senate and House floors. They also provide timely answers to our questions and help educate us on a variety of defense issues. Moreover, they are instrumental in notifying us about actions affecting military installations or activities in our States or districts.

South Dakota is the proud home to Ellsworth Air Force Base and the B-1B bomber. As I have worked to promote Ellsworth and the B-1 over the years, I have had the opportunity to get to know many of the fine men and women who serve in the Air Force's Legislative Liaison offices. I must say that Maj. Gen. Normand E. Lezy, the Director of the Air Force's Legislative Liaison Office and Brig. Gen. Lansford E. Trapp, Jr., the Deputy Director, and their staff at the Pentagon, have been understanding, responsive and fair.

The Air Force Legislative Liaison staff located in the Russell Building has also been very helpful to me on a number of matters that my staff and I have brought to their attention. They, too, perform a tremendous service for the Air Force and the U.S. Senate. Although we may at times take their assistance for granted, I know all my colleagues truly appreciate their hard work and dedication.

I have been particularly impressed by Col. Robert L. Smolen, the Chief of the Air Force's Senate Liaison Office. Colonel Smolen is an extraordinarily gifted and dedicated officer whose military experiences in the United States and the Republic of Korea have made him an enormous asset to the Air Force's Legislative Liaison Office. During the past year, I have had the opportunity to work with and get to know Colonel Smolen. He has been very helpful to me and to many of my colleagues in the Senate.

Earlier this year, for instance, he devoted a great deal of time to arranging a congressional delegation trip for me, Senator HATCH and Senator REID. General Trapp and Colonel Smolen graciously accompanied us on our trip to the former Yugoslavia. Despite dif-

ficult circumstances, it was a very successful and informative trip due in large part to their excellent preparation and assistance.

Unfortunately for all of us in the Senate, Colonel Smolen is departing Washington for Oklahoma where he will be the new Air Base Wing Commander at Tinker Air Force Base. I have a great deal of respect and admiration for Colonel Smolen. I know he is scheduled to leave this week, and before he does, I would like to review some of the highlights of his distinguished career in the U.S. Air Force.

Bob Smolen began his career in the Air Force in 1974 as a graduate of the Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Program at Allegheny College in Meadville, PA. In what I would argue may have been his best assignment, he served at Ellsworth Air Force Base as an Airborne Missile Operations Officer in the 4th Airborne Command Control Squadron's 28th Bomber Wing from January 1977 to March 1979.

Since then, Bob Smolen has served in a number of capacities for the Air Force in the United States and around the world. He served as an aide to the Commander in Chief of the North American Aerospace Defense Command in Colorado Springs, CO. He also served in Washington before as a Congressional Liaison Officer and Special Assistant to the Director of the Legislative Liaison Division in the Office of the Secretary in the early 1980's.

Bob Smolen has also been a squadron and deputy air base commander. He served as the Deputy Commander for the 12th Air Base Group in Randolph Air Force Base in Texas from October 1989 to August 1991. He also served as the Commander of the 750th Support Squadron at Onizuka Air Force Base in California. In addition, he was the commander of the 51st Support Group at Osan Air Base in the Republic of Korea from May 1993 to June 1995.

After returning to the United States, Colonel Smolen served as the Chief of the Inquiry Division of the Air Force Office of Legislative Liaison from July 1995 to September 1995. Since then, he has been the Chief of the Air Force's Senate Liaison Office.

Knowing of Colonel Smolen's previous assignments here and abroad, I am confident the Air Force made the right decision in selecting him to be the new 72nd Air Base Wing Commander at Tinker Air Force Base. I congratulate him on his new assignment and wish him, his wife Adriane, and their three children the very best.

S. 1936—THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss an issue of great importance to the State of Arizona and the Nation. As you may know, Arizona is home to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, the Nation's largest nuclear power plant. Palo Verde's three 1,270 megawatt pressurized water reactors serve more than

4 million customers in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. This facility is not only effective and efficient for customers in those States; it serves as an example for other plants across the country. In 1987, Palo Verde was selected to receive the Outstanding Engineering Achievement Award, the Nation's highest engineering honor from the National Society of Professional Engineers and in 1995, received an INPO 1 rating—the highest rating for excellence by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. I am also pleased to announce that just last week, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued its "Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance," or SALP report, for Palo Verde. In three categories—operations, maintenance and engineering—Palo Verde received a Category 1 rating, reflecting superior safety performance. Let me quote the NRC in a July 5 letter to Arizona Public Service, Palo Verde's operator: "It is clear that Arizona Public Service has established the programs and processes necessary to achieve and sustain superior performance. Management attention is evident at all levels." I commend Palo Verde for its outstanding performance. These are achievements to be proud of.

Palo Verde also deserves awards for its low impact on the environment. Because it uses uranium as fuel, Palo Verde has saved the earth 51 million tons of coal; 12 million barrels of oil; and 272 billion cubic feet of natural gas. By avoiding fossil fuels, Palo Verde avoided disseminating 2 million tons of sulfur oxide, also known as acid rain, 40 million tons of carbon dioxide, and 700 thousand tons of nitrogen oxides. In addition, Palo Verde contributes to the local environment in Phoenix by recycling 40,000 gallons of municipal effluent per minute.

All of these benefits do not come without some cost, of course. Palo Verde, like nuclear plants all over the world, produces high-level radioactive waste, in the form of spent fuel rods, that must be disposed of in an environmentally sound manner. Currently, these rods are stored on-site, in cooling ponds. This storage, as is the case at so many other plants, was designed to be temporary. Palo Verde cannot accommodate all the spent fuel that it will produce in its lifetime. Palo Verde, and other nuclear plants across the country, relied on the commitment by the United States Government to begin taking spent fuel by 1998. By that year, 26 U.S. reactors will exhaust existing spent fuel storage capacity. Fuel managers at Palo Verde estimate that the three reactors will lose the ability to discharge the entirety of their cores in 2004.

For years, we have debated what to do with the spent fuel rods from commercial reactors as well as high-level defense waste. In 1982, Congress made a commitment to the American people to take the waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act laid the groundwork to develop storage and disposal facilities for com-

mercial and defense waste. Under this legislation, the Department of Energy has an obligation to provide safe, centralized storage for the Nation's spent fuel. In return, electricity consumers would finance this program by paying a few additional cents on their monthly electric bills, the so-called 1 mill per kilowatt charge. Since 1982, electricity consumers have paid billions of dollars into the nuclear waste fund. Including interest, their contributions come to over \$11 billion. Consumers in the southwestern states served by Palo Verde have paid in over \$175 million.

Unfortunately, significant progress toward long-term storage has not been made. Although characterization and viability assessments are underway at Yucca Mountain, NV, the proposed site of the permanent repository, the Federal Government is not now ready to accept high level waste. And absent extraordinary actions by DOE, it will not be ready any time soon—certainly not by the 1998 deadline. DOE has already conceded that the permanent repository could not possibly be ready before 2010. Compounding the problem, DOE has not even begun the basic planning required for an interim facility.

Failing to meet the deadline in 1998 is deplorable but it seems it is unavoidable. The consequences for some utilities could be devastating. Some could be forced to shut down. If those 23 plants that run out of storage space in 3 years were to shut down, America would lose enough power for nearly 11 million people—power that doesn't result in air pollution.

Another option for plants would be for these utilities to build additional on-site storage. This would cost tens of millions of dollars—money that would come from the pocketbooks of electricity customers. Those same consumers who have already paid so many billions of dollars to the Government for spent fuel storage would be forced to pay twice for the same service. Officials at Palo Verde estimate that their initial capital costs and licensing for new on-site storage would be in the neighborhood of \$20 million with annual monitoring expenditures of about \$10 million.

To remedy this inequity, along with several other Senators, including Senators CRAIG and MURKOWSKI, I introduced S. 1271, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1995. This bill proposes an interim storage facility at the Nevada Test Site near Yucca Mountain and would enable the Government to meet its obligation to begin accepting spent fuel and defense waste in 1998. This bill passed out of the Energy Committee in March of this year. Just last week, Senators CRAIG and MURKOWSKI introduced S. 1936, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1996, in an attempt to address a number of concerns that had been expressed with respect to S. 1271. The new bill was also drafted to broaden the bipartisan support for this important legislation. I am pleased to co-sponsor this new legislation.

The bill has been successful in gaining bipartisan support, as evidenced by the cloture vote of 65 to 34 on July 16. I believe that the changes made are reasonable and will go a long way toward reaching agreement with the House bill. Just as important, Senator BENNETT JOHNSTON, the ranking member on the Energy Committee, has agreed to cosponsor S. 1936 and has sent a letter to the White House, urging the President to reconsider his previous veto statement. As Senator JOHNSTON points out in his July 11 letter to President Clinton:

Nuclear waste has never been a partisan issue. While the current law was signed by a Republican president, it has its roots in the Carter administration. It was passed by a Democratic House and a Republican Senate and amended by a Democratic House and a Democratic Senate, with broad bipartisan support. It would be a terrible, terrible mistake to make it a partisan issue now.

Continuing in this bipartisan tradition is S. 1936, which amends the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. Introduced July 9 by Senators LARRY CRAIG and FRANK MURKOWSKI, it retains the fundamental principles of S. 1271, which passed Energy Committee in March. S. 1936 would develop an integrated management system for used nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power plants and for high-level radioactive materials from defense activities, all of which is now stored in 41 States.

CENTRAL INTERIM STORAGE

Under S. 1936, construction of an interim facility could begin December 31, 1998. If the President determines by that date that Yucca Mountain is not a suitable site for a permanent repository, an alternate interim storage site may be chosen. An alternate storage site must be selected by the President by June 30, 2000, and Congress must approve construction at that alternate site by December 31, 2000. If those milestones are not met, an interim storage facility will be built at the Nevada Test Site. This provision is significant because it ensures that the construction of an interim storage facility at the Yucca Mountain site will not occur before the President and Congress have had an ample opportunity to review the technical assessment of the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site for a permanent repository and to designate an alternative site for interim storage based upon that technical information. This provision of S. 1936, in effect, de-links permanent and interim storage. This linkage was a criticism of S. 1271 which would have allowed construction of an interim storage facility on October 1, 1998. S. 1936 provides time to determine if Yucca Mountain is a viable site for a permanent repository before building an interim site in Nevada. If it is not, S. 1936, again, provides the option for finding an alternate interim storage site.

RATEPAYER FUNDING OF THE WASTE DISPOSAL PROGRAM

S. 1936 ensures that funds are available for the program when needed. The

bill continues electricity customers' payments into the Waste Fund at the rate of 1 mill per kilowatt-hour, or about \$600 million per year, until September 30, 2020. After that date, the program will be funded by a user fee, which will be capped at 1 mill. The bill also requires that all one-time fees owed by utilities for spent fuel generated before 1983 be paid by September 30, 2020 and imposes a penalty on utilities that fail to pay the one-time fee. In S. 1271, the 1 mill fee would have continued indefinitely. One-time fees would have been paid when DOE fulfilled its contractual obligation to begin taking waste in 1998.

S. 1936 ensures that electricity customers' deposits of about \$12 billion to the Federal Nuclear Waste Fund are made available as needed for the nuclear waste management program, and that the monies are spent for their intended purpose.

Both bills assure continued funding for the nuclear waste management program. S. 1936 resolves budget issues relating to "PAY-GO" and assures that funds are made available to the program, and not used to offset the budget deficit.

INTERIM STORAGE CAPACITY

Both bills establish a two phase approach for acceptance of waste at the central facility to encourage timely completion of the permanent repository, without burdening nuclear power plants, many of which are rapidly running out of on-site storage capacity. Under S. 1936, spent fuel acceptance in Phase I would begin November 30, 1999, and the facility capacity would be capped at 15,000 metric tons. Phase I under S. 1271 would have begun on the same date, with a 20,000 MTU capacity. Under S. 1936, Phase II begins by December 2, 2002. The storage capacity would increase to 40,000 MTU. However, a provision in S. 1936 would increase the capacity cap to 60,000 MTU if DOE fails to complete the Yucca Mountain viability assessment by June 30, 1998, or if it fails to submit a repository license application by February 1, 2002, or it fails to begin repository operation by January 17, 2010. Phase II in S. 1271 would have also begun by December 31, 2002, but with a 100,000 MTU capacity. S. 1936 provides storage capacity through 2019 and maintains pressure to complete construction of a repository by 2010.

TRANSPORTATION

Like S. 1271, S. 1936 designated Caliente, NV, as an intermodal transfer point and provides for heavy haul truck transfer to the Nevada Test Site. S. 1936 clarifies that transporting spent nuclear fuel will be governed by all Federal, State, and local requirements to the same extent as anyone engaging in interstate transportation. S. 1936 also contains more stringent requirements for promulgating employee safety rules, provides greater detail in transportation requirements, and provides training for workers in all phases of the integrated waste management

system and emergency response personnel.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND PREEMPTION

S. 1936 requires that DOE conduct an environmental impact statement for licensing both the interim spent fuel storage facility and the permanent repository. Environmental reviews are also required for the intermodal transfer facility. S. 1936, far from overriding all State and local laws, actually expands jurisdiction of all applicable Federal, State, and local and tribal laws. The only time Federal law would override, or preempt, State or local law is when these are patently unreasonable as would be the case if a State passed a law declaring illegal the passage of nuclear waste through it. Such laws as this, which would be an insuperable obstacle to carrying out S. 1936, would be preempted. This is in contrast to S. 1271, which said the storage facility would be governed solely by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Atomic Energy Act, and the Hazardous Material Transportation Act, to the exclusion of all laws below the Federal level. S. 1936 takes into account an expanded universe of Federal, State, and local and tribal laws, while ensuring that the program is not obstructed.

LOCAL RELATIONS

S. 1936 restores financial assistance to Nevada's local governments and to tribes, and it provides land transfers to Nye and Lincoln Counties, and the city of Caliente. The bill's affected areas see the land transfer provision as attractive, since the vast majority of Nevada land is government owned. S. 1936 provides equitable treatment for Nevada's local governments and tribes.

TRANSPORTATION

The Federal Government must plan today to ensure its ability to transport spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power plants to a central storage facility beginning in 1999. The Energy Department is responsible for transporting spent nuclear fuel to a central storage facility and repository. S. 1936 instructs DOE to use private contractors to the fullest extent possible in each aspect of the transportation network. Spent fuel must be transported from nuclear power plants to an interim storage facility in containers certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. DOE selects transportation routes for spent fuel shipments to Nevada, and the agency must notify States along the transportation routes in advance of spent fuel shipments. As mentioned, the containers would be transferred at an intermodal facility at Caliente, NV and shipped by heavy haul truck over the final 120 miles to the central storage facility.

The bill also provides technical assistance to States, local governments and Indian tribes for training in procedures required for routine transportation and in emergency response. The transportation provisions in S. 1936 are consistent with preemption authority

found in the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act.

AMOUNTS TO BE SHIPPED

Radioactive materials currently account for about 3 percent of the 100 million packages of hazardous materials shipped each year in the United States. Of those 3 million radioactive packages, fewer than 100 contain high-level radioactive waste. The number of spent fuel shipments will increase to about 300 to 500 per year by the turn of the century, when the DOE is expected to begin accepting high-level radioactive waste at a central storage facility. Even then, high-level radioactive waste will comprise a small percentage of all hazardous material shipments.

During the past 30 years, the commercial nuclear industry has built a solid safety record during more than 2,400 shipments of spent fuel over U.S. highways and railroads. During this time, no fatalities, injuries or environmental damage have been caused by the radioactive nature of the cargo. Spent nuclear fuel is placed in dry, rugged containers for shipment. These specially designed containers—certified by the NRC—use heavy steel-walled technology to safely confine radioactive materials.

Because of the strict controls by DOE, NRC and other State and Federal agencies, utilities and other U.S. companies have a long history of safe spent fuel transportation. Spent fuel has been shipped from temporary storage facilities at West Valley, NY and Morris, IL, back to utilities; from the Three Mile Island plant to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory; and from the Hope Creek nuclear power plant in New Jersey to a General Electric facility in California.

DESIGNATION OF TRANSPORTATION ROUTES

Spent fuel can be shipped only along specified rail and highway routes. The routes will be selected by the DOE, but States participate in the designation process. Eleven States have registered preferred routes for transportation of high-level radioactive materials. S. 1936 requires DOE to adhere to NRC regulations requiring advance notification of State and local governments prior to transportation of spent fuel.

For those shipments that will be transported by truck, most of the designated routes travel along interstate highways and bypasses—not through major cities and towns. However, States may propose alternatives to the interstate highway system. Potentially affected States must be consulted in the designation of alternative routes. Shippers must file a written route plan with the NRC, including the origin-destination of the shipment, routes, planned stops, estimated arrival times at each stop, and emergency telephone numbers in each State the shipment will enter.

PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY DURING SHIPMENTS

Federal regulations for transporting radioactive material ensure that the

public and the environment are protected from dangerous releases of radioactivity. Three Federal agencies each play a key role in the safe transfer of radioactive materials from nuclear power plants to a central storage facility. The DOE is responsible for accepting, transporting, storing and disposing of spent fuel from nuclear power plants. The DOT regulates highway routing, packaging, labeling, shipping papers, personnel training, loading and unloading, handling and storage, as well as transportation vehicle requirements. The NRC regulates container design and manufacturing to ensure that containers maintain their integrity under routine transportation conditions and during severe accidents. S. 1936 requires that containers for nuclear fuel transport be licensed by the NRC. The agency also examines shipping routes to ensure the security of spent fuel shipments.

According to NRC regulations, the radiation level of containers during shipment cannot exceed 10 millirem per hour at a distance of 6 feet from the truck. At this level, a person who spends 30 minutes standing 6 feet away from the vehicle carrying radioactive materials would receive 5 millirem of radiation. By comparison, the average person receives about 300 millirem each year from natural background radiation.

ACCIDENTS

Between 1971 and 1989, seven accidents occurred involving transportation of spent nuclear fuel. None caused any release of radioactivity. The most severe of these accidents occurred in 1971 in Tennessee. A tractor-trailer carrying a 25-ton spent fuel shipping container swerved to avoid a head-on collision, went out of control and overturned. The trailer, with the container still attached, broke free of the tractor and skidded into a rain-filled ditch. The container suffered minor damage, but did not release any radioactive material.

LOCAL RESPONSE-TRAINING

The Federal Government provides training and other assistance to the States so they may adequately respond in the event of an accident. Under existing law and S. 1936, DOE provides funding from the Federal Nuclear Waste Fund to train State and local officials and tribal emergency rescue workers and to develop emergency response and preparedness plans. S. 1936 also required the Secretary of Transportation to establish training standards applicable to workers directly involved in the removal, transportation, interim storage, and disposal of high-level radioactive waste.

The DOE operates a Radiological Assistance Program, with eight regional offices staffed with experts available for immediate assistance. If necessary, police will summon those experts to handle the transportation package and remove any radioactive material that may have been released.

TERRORISM

Terrorism has been given considerable attention in the planning, procedures and regulation of spent fuel transportation. It is highly unlikely that a terrorist would have the opportunity, the equipment, or the required expertise to sufficiently damage a spent nuclear fuel container to cause a radiation release.

Points of origin, schedule, route, and mode of transportation are known only by a core group of Federal and State government officials. Special devices on vehicles, sophisticated satellite tracking, and armed security through populated areas will be employed to deter terrorist threats.

Tests by Sandia National Laboratories evaluated the possibility of a terrorist attack. For security reasons, much of this information is classified; however, we do know that, for testing purposes, a container was subjected to a device 30 times more powerful than a typical anti-tank weapon. This test was conducted in a carefully controlled environment and resulted in a one-fourth of an inch in diameter hole through the primary containment wall. The NRC estimates that even a device this powerful would have caused a release of less than 10 grams of spent fuel.

THE 100 MILLIREM STANDARD

S. 1936 establishes a 100 millirem standard for release of radioactivity from the repository as a maximum annual dose to an average member of the general population in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. This standard is consistent with current national and international standards designed to protect the public health and safety and the environment. S. 1936 also would allow the NRC to establish another standard if it finds that the 100 millirem level would pose an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of Nevadans.

CONCLUSION

In sum, I believe that S. 1936 is an effective short-term solution to our nuclear waste disposal, for both commercial and defense waste. A central interim storage facility is both environmentally and economically sound. To me, the choice seems clear. Why leave nuclear waste scattered throughout the country in various sites when it can be safely transferred and stored in one central site? A single storage site is clearly the pro-environmental option. Interim storage at a central Federal site enhances safety and efficiency in the management of spent fuel. In addition to the environmental benefits, central storage is significantly more cost-effective for electricity customers. Storing used fuel at a central interim storage facility would save consumers \$4.3 billion if the facility is operating by 2000 and a repository begins accepting spent fuel in 2010.

America's 110 nuclear power plants are this Nation's second largest source of electricity, constituting about 20 percent of our electric power. Nuclear

energy supplies over 40 percent of all the new electricity required by the American people since 1973. Our nuclear power plants will also make the largest contribution of any technology toward meeting the Administration's year 2000 goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Whether we build new nuclear power plants in the future or not, we must deal responsibly with the nuclear fuel produced by our currently operating plants. We must also deal with the defense waste that this Nation has produced. S. 1936 is good policy and represents a safe, responsible solution that enjoys strong bipartisan support.

TRIBUTE TO LTG ROBERT L. ORD III

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, today I wish to congratulate and pay tribute to a great American leader, statesman and soldier. Lt. Gen. Robert L. Ord, III, Commanding General of the U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) will retire on July 31, 1996 after more than 34 years of dedicated service to our nation and our Army.

A native of Medford Lakes, NJ, Lieutenant General Ord graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1962 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant of Infantry. Over the course of the next three decades, he served our country honorably and faithfully in a variety of exceptionally challenging troop and staff assignments in the United States, Vietnam, and Korea.

A leader in both peace and war, he has commanded at every level from platoon to division and Army major command. Lieutenant General Ord commanded a rifle company in Vietnam and the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Benning, Ga. Following graduation from the Army War College in 1980, he served as the Operations Officer, Chief of Staff, and Commander of the 9th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, CA. He then served in the Pentagon as the Executive Officer to the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel followed by promotion to brigadier general and assignment in Korea as Chief of Staff of the United States-Korea Combined Field Army. Subsequently, he returned to Fort Ord as Assistant Division Commander of the 7th Infantry Division (Light), where he participated in Operation Just Cause in Panama, followed by Command of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command in Washington, DC.

From February 1992 until September 1993, Lieutenant General Ord served as the commanding general of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) and the United States Army, Hawaii where his relentless pursuit of excellence and focus on mission training placed the 25th Infantry Division (Light) on the cutting edge of combat readiness. Through his innovative, aggressive and creative