

been provided training by either the Iranians or the Syrians, then I suggest we should respond and respond in the strongest fashion.

I do not say every situation is similar, but I do remember with great clarity after the bombing of a cafe in Germany where American lives were taken, and we traced it back to Mr. Qadhafi, and there was a bombing raid on Mr. Qadhafi. Mr. Qadhafi has been very quiet ever since then—ever since. I do not suggest we bomb Damascus. I am not suggesting that we do anything to the Iranians militarily. That is a decision that the President as Commander in Chief makes, sometimes in consultation with the leaders of Congress.

What I am suggesting is that antiterrorism photo ops do not do the job. The United States should lead. The United States should urge our allies to cooperate and assist us. I think it is about time. There seems to be some problem between ourselves and our European allies as to how to treat Iran. I would remind our European friends—and they are indeed our close and dear friends—that there are 20,000 American troops in Bosnia as we speak, who have their lives on the line. We believe that Iran is a threat to the peace and security, not only of the West, but the men and women in our military.

So I applaud the Senator from North Carolina for his resolution. I know all of us support it. All of us share in the anguish and the anger and the sorrow of the families of Americans who have suffered death and injury in this latest outrage. Words do not adequately describe how strongly we feel about that.

But now, or very soon, our efforts should be made to prevent a recurrence of this tragedy, this kind of tragedy which has already happened twice in the country of Saudi Arabia. The answer is not to leave Saudi Arabia, Mr. President, in my view, because when we leave countries because Americans are killed, it only encourages our adversaries to kill other Americans in other countries. But we do owe these men and women who have volunteered to defend the Nation, not only every possible security measure—which I am sure is being taken as we speak—but we owe them a response. We owe a response to this act of terror, which will prevent further acts of terror from being contemplated by the evil that seems rampant through the world.

I yield the floor. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENNETT). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. The clerk will continue to call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

# NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

AMENDMENT NO. 4367

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I want to express my thanks to the distinguished Senator from Georgia. We have some difference of opinion over the NATO expansion amendment. The Senator has gone out of his way to advise me that he was going to offer it, and out of consideration, to let me have a copy in advance. And he also was kind enough to adjust the time of which he would offer it on the floor to fit my schedule. I was tied up in a meeting on Afghanistan I was chairing, and I could not be here. I think he exhibits exceptional courtesy. I want to express my thanks to the Senator from Georgia for his consideration.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator very much. I look forward to working with him. As I mentioned, I have not spoken on this subject yet. But as I talked to the Senator from Colorado and the Senator from Arizona, it is my intent in this amendment, and the intent of all of us, not to tilt this amendment one way or the other, but, rather, to ask the questions that need to be asked before we make this very important decision about expanding an alliance where we extend article V protection. And article V protection includes nuclear protection. That is a very serious matter.

I think we have not started nor has the administration thought through nor has NATO thought through some of the tough questions here. We all have an obligation to do that. This could be a matter before the Senate for ratification of the expansion of the treaty next year.

So it is my intent to have questions that are tough questions, the hard questions, but also fair questions, on both sides. I invite my colleagues that may perceive that this is a tilt, one way or the other, to work on the language. And I would certainly be amenable to taking a look at their suggestions.

So Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this amendment be temporarily laid aside. We will continue to work on it. So we are open for amendment. I know Senator THURMOND and I, as managers of this bill, encourage people to come down with relevant amendments on the defense matter.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection the amendment is laid aside.

Mr. NUNN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 4367

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in the interest of time, while we are waiting on an amendment to be presented, I will go ahead and make my remarks on the amendment which was pending and which has been temporarily laid aside.

This amendment has been offered on behalf of myself, Senator HUTCHISON, Senator BRADLEY, Senator KASSEBAUM, and Senator COHEN. I note at the outset this amendment is not intended to prejudice the case for or against NATO enlargement or even the pace at which NATO might enlarge.

The amendment requires the President to submit a report on NATO enlargement to the Senate Armed Services Committee and their counterpart committee in the House at the same time that the President submits the budget request for fiscal year 1998 to the Congress.

This amendment is designed to provide the information that will stimulate a comprehensive and informed discussion in the Congress on this important matter. If there are questions that are not in this amendment that people on the other side of the aisle or this side think should be added, I certainly would be receptive to that.

Mr. President, there have been a number of editorials and op-ed pieces favoring a rapid pace for NATO enlargement. These pieces generally focus on two aspects. First, on the positive side, the need for greater security for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic so they can continue on the road toward democratization and free market economies. On the second side is the need to ensure that Russia does not have a veto over the process by which NATO decides to enlarge.

There have also been a number of editorials and op-ed pieces opposing NATO enlargement. These opposition pieces tend to focus on the potential that NATO enlargement would have to produce the very thing that we are trying to prevent; namely, a Russian military threat to European security and also the impact it would have on Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia if those nations were not included in the first stage of NATO enlargement.

What is missing, however, are a number of other issues that are directly involved in NATO enlargement that have not been discussed in the various commentary on either side of the issue and that need to be carefully considered. This amendment provides for the President's report to comprehensively discuss a host of issues. In the interest of time, I will mention only a few of the issues for purposes of illustration.

What would the cost be for NATO enlargement and who would pay these costs? Certainly that is a question the American people are entitled to have us debate and actually examine and present. There ought to be at least some projection of that by the administration and by NATO.

Incidentally, the Congressional Budget Office has concluded a study on the cost of defending the Visegrad countries—that is Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland—over the 15-year period from 1996 through 2010. That study concludes that the cost would range from \$61 billion to \$125 billion. Whatever part of that range you choose, this is a substantial amount of money. It seems to me the Senate of the United States is not performing its duty if we do not tell the administration, at least their best projection, before they make a commitment committing this country, which, of course, would have to then be ratified by the Senate.

A second question: Since article V of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for a NATO member nation to treat an attack on one as an attack on all, what is the general strategy that NATO would adopt to defend the potential new member nations, including defense against a possible nuclear threat? Do we deploy forces? If so, are our allies prepared to join us in that deployment? Would it be American troops in those host countries without allies, or will allies join? Which allies are willing to join? These are questions that have to be answered.

The third question: The North Atlantic Council recently decided to create more deployable headquarters and more mobile forces to mount non-article V operations, as well as traditional collective defense missions and to develop a European defense identity within the alliance. The question is whether the enlargement of NATO should proceed prior to NATO's reorganization of its military command structure and the completion of the other actions required to carry out these decisions. How is the enlargement going to impact these kinds of fundamental changes in NATO beginning to prepare itself to operate out of an area, and vice versa?

The next question is whether an enlarged NATO can continue to function on a consensus; that is, a basis of unanimous consent, before major decisions are made. Here on the Senate floor we operate by unanimous consent. We know sometimes that is difficult. If we expand NATO, will we have a two-thirds rule, three-fourths rule, or say any nation, including one of the new nations that may come into NATO, would be able to veto any decision of NATO? That is a fundamental question that NATO, it seems to me, has to answer.

Another question regards the relationship of prospective new NATO members to the European Union and what the impact that gaining NATO membership would have on the possibility and timing of such nations gaining associate and then full membership in the European Union. What is the plan of the European Union? My impression of some of the countries is the main thing they need now is not a military protective shield but rather an economic expansion, economic trade

opportunity and the ability to trade with the European nations and with other nations in the world. What are the Europeans going to do about opening the European Community to these nations? I know the administration is going to have to give their best estimate on this. Certainly we cannot speak for the Europeans. But at least it is something we ought to consider very strongly.

There is another very important part of this expansion that has not been talked about. What about the Conventional Forces Treaty? If we expand NATO enlargement, do we have to really do that treaty over? Because basically, the CFE Treaty allocated forces and tanks and artillery based on the two alliances that then existed. If part of that alliance now is on the other side, what does that do to the CFE Treaty? Of course, we hope at some point we will be able to say there are no sides in Europe, that they are all basically working together in peace, but I am not sure we have arrived at that point at this point in time.

The next question: The anticipated impact of NATO enlargement on Russian foreign and defense policies, including the emphasis Russia would place on defense planning on nuclear weapons. This at least has to be contemplated. Are we going to basically be prepared to respond if the Russians decide that they are going to go back to deploying tactical nuclear weapons because they do not have conventional defenses and if they perceive this enlargement as being a threat? I am hoping they will not have that perception as we move forward in this regard, but it has to be carefully considered because it will affect tremendously our response and the cost and the question of deploying American forces. All of these are important questions that need answers.

Another question: The impact a NATO enlargement would have on the political, economic, and security well-being of the nations, such as Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, if they are not included in the first stage of NATO enlargement.

Mr. President, this is a sampling of the issues that the President would report on. I stress once again that this amendment was not drafted and is not designed to prejudice the case either for or against NATO enlargement or the pace of NATO enlargement, but it does require the administration to begin to think through important issues and questions, tough questions in my view, and lay them out on the table. They need to be on the table so that the Congress and the American people can start to consider the matter of NATO enlargement in a comprehensive and informed manner.

If there are other questions that need to be added to this amendment that some Members are concerned about, I would be pleased to consider that language and to work with my colleagues on that.

Finally, I would note that the ultimate question that the Senate will

have to address with respect to the ratification of any agreement to enlarge NATO, and that both the Senate and House will have to address with respect to the funding of the costs associated with NATO enlargement, is the question of extending our nuclear umbrella over any new NATO members.

Mr. President, this is an extraordinarily serious decision, and I hope that a comprehensive report by the President, which is called for in this amendment, would provide much of the information needed for the debate on that question, and, most important, I hope it will stimulate the kind of in-depth thinking that we need to have on this issue.

Mr. President, I know that my colleagues who have cosponsored this—Senators HUTCHISON, BRADLEY, KASSEBAUM and COHEN—would like to speak on this subject at some point as we consider it. At this point in time, I yield the floor.

Mr. McCain addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. McCain. Mr. President, on this amendment, I think it is unfortunate timing to start with. Russian elections are coming up in barely a week. We all know the incredible sensitivity that issues like these have during a political campaign. I am not sure if a debate on the floor of the Senate concerning the enlargement of NATO is appropriate at this time.

Let me also say, Mr. President, that I have given a cursory review to some of the provisions of the bill. I appreciate the fact that the Senator from Georgia would be agreeable to other questions, but I also suggest that there are questions that are raised here that really have no answer, or have a very negative connotation.

Here are just a few examples:

The extent to which the European Union has opened its markets to prospective new NATO members?

What would that have to do with membership in NATO? That is none of our business. I do not know how you answer this question, or how anybody in the Pentagon could answer this.

The relationship of Russia with NATO, including Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace Program and NATO's strategic dialog with Russia?

That is related as to how we approach Russia, related to who is conducting our foreign policy and foreign affairs. I can give the Senator right now several different scenarios in which they would all be the right answer, depending on what happened.

The anticipated impact of NATO enlargement on Russian foreign and defense policies, including in particular the implementation of START I, the ratification of START II, and the emphasis placed in defense planning on nuclear weapons.

I say to the Senator from Georgia, again, that is directly related to who

the President of the United States is, who the President of Russia is, who the Defense Minister of Russia is, and our relations with Russia over time. To ask that question, in my view—there is no answer to it because it is directly related to events, as to who the President of Russia is. I say right now, if Mr. Zyuganov wins the election, you will have one answer; if Mr. Yeltsin wins, you will have another answer. They will be dramatically different.

I still do not understand the effect that the gaining of membership in NATO by a nation would have on the possibility and timing of that nation gaining associate membership and subsequently full membership in the European Union. Again, that eludes me, as to what membership in the European Union has to do with membership in NATO.

Let me pursue it.

The extent to which prospective new NATO members are committed to protecting the rights of all of their citizens, including national minorities.

Should we now have a review of present members of NATO and how they treat the rights of their citizens, including minorities?

The extent to which prospective new NATO members have established democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of their armed forces, including parliamentary oversight of military affairs and appointment of civilians to senior defense positions, and the rule of law.

I would suspect strongly that unless they were in compliance with those, there would be no prospect of them being engaged.

The strategy by which attacks on prospective new NATO member nations would be deterred, and, if deterrence fails, defended, including whether the strategy would be based on conventional forces or on nuclear capabilities. If based on conventional forces, the extent to which the strategy would be based on host nation forces and the extent to which it would be based on NATO reinforcement.

I say to the Senator from Georgia, it would be the same policy that applies to every nation that is a member of NATO and would be directly related to the crisis and situation at the time. If there is a ground attack in one part of NATO that could be countered by conventional forces, then, clearly, you do not launch a hydrogen bomb.

The thrust of these questions, I say to the Senator from Georgia, or of these requirements, whether they are intended to or not, would, frankly, to the uninitiated, portray a situation where the United States of America is departing from our traditional position and role in Europe, which is to abide by the fundamental premise of NATO, which is that an attack on one is an attack on all; and that, with the expansion of NATO, I say to the Senator, cannot be violated. And the response is directly dictated by the kind of attack, the kind of threat it is, and the com-

mitment on the part of the United States and our allies is directly related to that.

If the Senator from Georgia can envision every possible scenario that would be an attack on a new member or old member of NATO, then fine. But I do not see how anyone has the kind of clairvoyance to know exactly what that would be.

So the fundamental premise of NATO, as I understand it, of the Atlantic Alliance is that, if one nation is attacked, then all are attacked, and all will join in response to that attack. But nowhere in NATO doctrine do I see an ironclad, dictated response to an attack, because it depends on the kind of attack; it depends on what the threat is. If it can be countered, obviously, by a short-term conventional response, that is fine. But if there is a nuclear attack, clearly, there is a nuclear response, as well.

Mr. NUNN. If the Senator will yield, I want to ask something on another subject. I have a meeting to try to move this bill along back here in the other room. It is one of those things that happens to all of us. I need to be in two places at one time. But I know the Senator from South Carolina would like for me to give my first priority to working out some agreements to move the bill along.

I would like to thank the Senator for yielding and say that I support the Harkin amendment. He will bring that up when he gets the floor. That has been cleared on both sides, I believe. I will be available to Senator THURMOND in Senator DASCHLE's office, if I am needed.

Mr. MCCAIN. Could I say, first of all, I understand the concerns that the Senator from Georgia has. I believe he is correct and that these questions must be answered. There has to be a clear definition of exactly what the United States is going to do.

What I ask the Senator is, perhaps we can sit down and maybe simplify these questions to some degree, so that we can get answers to the questions, but in a realistic fashion, and one that might be agreeable to this side. Would that be all right?

Mr. NUNN. I would be glad to work on that with my friend from Arizona and my friend from Colorado. The amendment is temporarily laid aside.

I just ask this. I do not intend to have a second-degree amendment to it. I informed people that I was planning on doing that, and I wanted to accord other Senators a chance. I only ask that there not be a second-degree amendment while we have not laid it aside and are working in good faith on it.

Mr. MCCAIN. I thank the Senator from Georgia. Again, I appreciate what the Senator from Georgia is trying to find out. Those facts are going to have to be made known to the U.S. Senate and the American people prior to any two-thirds vote on the floor of the Senate that would accompany enlarge-

I am worried with setting a stage that might in some ways prejudice in a negative fashion what I think is critical for the future of the spirit of Europe.

Mr. President, earlier I stated on the floor when discussing Senator HELMS' amendment concerning the expression of sorrow over the tragedy that took place in Saudi Arabia that I had heard that the Secretary of State was going to Syria. That is not the case. I retract that remark.

I do think that I will stick to my previous statement, though, that 24 times he has been in Damascus, which is probably sufficient for some period of time. I do believe that the Secretary of State is doing a dedicated job. He is a fine and outstanding man, and in no way do I mean my remarks to be in any way a diminution of the very outstanding and dedicated work that the Secretary of State has done.

Mr. President, I believe that the Senator from Colorado who has a second-degree amendment with the Senator from Georgia, and perhaps we can craft an amendment and make changes in the amendment which hopefully would more narrowly focus the questions and be able to move forward with this very important amendment.

I want to state again. It is not healthy at this point for the U.S. Senate to debate the issue of the expansion of NATO with Russian elections coming up in just a few days.

I hope we can do whatever we can to avoid that at this time.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

AMENDMENT NO. 4177, AS MODIFIED

(Purpose: To provide for defense burdensharing)

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 4177, and I send a modification to the desk and ask that it be considered at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Iowa (Mr. HARKIN), for himself, Mr. KERRY, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. LAUTENBERG, and Mr. DORGAN, proposes an amendment numbered 4177, as modified.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

**SEC. 1044. DEFENSE BURDENSARING.**

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Although the Cold War has ended, the United States continues to spend billions of dollars to promote regional security and to make preparations for regional contingencies.

(2) United States defense expenditures primarily promote United States national security interests; however, they also significantly contribute to the defense of our allies.

(3) In 1993, the gross domestic product of the United States equaled \$6,300,000,000,000,

while the gross domestic product of other NATO member countries totaled \$7,200,000,000.

(4) Over the course of 1993, the United States spent 4.7 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, while other NATO members collectively spent 2.5 percent of their gross domestic product on defense.

(5) In addition to military spending, foreign assistance plays a vital role in the establishment and maintenance of stability in other nations and in implementing the United States national security strategy.

(6) This assistance has often prevented the outbreak of conflicts which otherwise would have required costly military interventions by the United States and our allies.

(7) From 1990-1993, the United States spent \$59,000,000,000 in foreign assistance, a sum which represents an amount greater than any other nation in the world.

(8) In 1995, the United States spent over \$10,000,000,000 to promote European security, while European NATO nations only contributed \$2,000,000,000 toward this effort.

(9) With a smaller gross domestic product and a larger defense budget than its European NATO allies, the United States shoulders an unfair share of the burden of the common defense.

(10) Because of this unfair burden, the Congress previously voted to require United States allies to bear a greater share of the costs incurred for keeping United States military forces permanently assigned in their countries.

(11) As a result of this action, for example, Japan now pays over 75 percent of the non-personnel costs incurred by United States military forces permanently assigned there, while our European allies pay for less than 25 percent of these same costs. Japan signed a new Special Measures Agreement this year which will increase Japan's contribution toward the cost of stationing United States troops in Japan by approximately \$30,000,000 a year over the next five years.

(12) These increased contributions help to rectify the imbalance in the burden shouldered by the United States for the common defense.

(13) The relative share of the burden of the common defense still falls too heavily on the United States, and our allies should dedicate more of their own resources to defending themselves.

(b) **EFFORTS TO INCREASE ALLIED BURDENSARING.**—The President shall seek to have each nation that has cooperative military relations with the United States (including security agreements, basing arrangements, or mutual participation in multinational military organizations or operations) take one or more of the following actions:

(1) Increase its financial contributions to the payment of the nonpersonnel costs incurred by the United States Government for stationing United States military personnel in that nation, with a goal of achieving the following percentages of such costs:

- (A) By September 30, 1997, 37.5 percent.
- (B) By September 30, 1998, 50 percent.
- (C) By September 30, 1999, 62.5 percent.
- (D) By September 30, 2000, 75 percent.

An increase in financial contributions by any nation under this paragraph may include the elimination of taxes, fees, or other charges levied on United States military personnel, equipment, or facilities stationed in that nation.

(2) Increase its annual budgetary outlays for national defense as a percentage of its gross domestic product by 10 percent or at least to a level commensurate to that of the United States by September 30, 1997.

(3) Increase its annual budgetary outlays for foreign assistance (to promote democra-

tization, economic stabilization, transparency arrangements, defense economic conversion, respect for the rule of law, and internationally recognized human rights) by 10 percent or at least to a level commensurate to that of the United States by September 30, 1997.

(4) Increase the amount of military assets (including personnel, equipment, logistics, support and other resources) that it contributes, or would be prepared to contribute, to multinational military activities worldwide, including United Nations or regional peace operations.

(c) **AUTHORITIES TO ENCOURAGE ACTIONS BY UNITED STATES ALLIES.**—In seeking the actions described in subsection (b) with respect to any nation, or in response to a failure by any nation to undertake one or more of such actions, the President may take any of the following measures:

(1) Reduce the end strength level of members of the Armed Forces assigned to permanent duty ashore in that nation.

(2) Impose on that nation taxes, fees, or other charges similar to those that such nation imposes on United States forces stationed in that nation.

(3) Reduce (through rescission, impoundment, or other appropriate procedures as authorized by law) the amount the United States contributes to the NATO Civil Budget, Military Budget, or Security Investment Program.

(4) Suspend, modify, or terminate any bilateral security agreement the United States has with that nation.

(5) Reduce (through rescission, impoundment or other appropriate procedures as authorized by law) any United States bilateral assistance appropriated for that nation.

(6) Take any other action the President determines to be appropriate as authorized by law.

(d) **REPORT ON PROGRESS IN INCREASING ALLIED BURDENSARING.**—Not later than March 1, 1997, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on—

(1) steps taken by other nations to complete the actions described in subsection (b);

(2) all measures taken by the President, including those authorized in subsection (c), to achieve the actions described in subsection (b); and

(3) the budgetary savings to the United States that are expected to accrue as a result of the steps described under paragraph (1).

(e) **REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY BASES FOR FORWARD DEPLOYMENT AND BURDENSARING RELATIONSHIPS.**—(1) In order to ensure the best allocation of budgetary resources, the President shall undertake a review of the status of elements of the United States Armed Forces that are permanently stationed outside the United States. The review shall include an assessment of the following:

(A) The alliance requirements that are to be found in agreements between the United States and other countries.

(B) The national security interests that support permanently stationing elements of the United States Armed Forces outside the United States.

(C) The stationing costs associated with the forward deployment of elements of the United States Armed Forces.

(D) The alternatives available to forward deployment (such as material prepositioning, enhanced airlift and sealift, or joint training operations) to meet such alliance requirements or national security interests, with such alternatives identified and described in detail.

(E) The costs and force structure configurations associated with such alternatives to forward deployment.

(F) The financial contributions that allies of the United States make to common defense efforts (to promote democratization, economic stabilization, transparency arrangements, defense economic conversion, respect for the rule of law, and internationally recognized human rights).

(G) The contributions that allies of the United States make to meeting the stationing costs associated with the forward deployment of elements of the United States Armed Forces.

(H) The annual expenditures of the United States and its allies on national defense, and the relative percentages of each nation's gross domestic product constituted by those expenditures.

(2) The President shall submit to Congress a report on the review under paragraph (1). The report shall be submitted not later than March 1, 1997, in classified and unclassified form.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I also ask that Senators CONRAD, LAUTENBERG, and DORGAN be added as cosponsors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I believe, as modified, this amendment is agreeable to the managers. It has been worked out. I thank them. I thank the manager and the ranking members for their help in working this out. I thank also my colleagues for their cooperation in working out this important proposal.

Basically, what this amendment, which passed the House recently by a vote of 353 to 62, would do is begin to ask our allies in Europe to pay a fairer share of the costs for their own defense. The CBO says this amendment would save taxpayers up to \$11.3 billion over the next 6 years. I personally think we need to go even further in reducing the taxpayer subsidy for Europe and Japan's defense, but this is a major step in the right direction. It is a victory for deficit reduction and the American taxpayers.

Again, I thank the managers for their cooperation.

Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment on behalf of myself, and Senator KERRY of Massachusetts, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. LAUTENBERG, and Mr. DORGAN that calls on our NATO allies to share more of the burden for maintaining stability in Europe and their own defense. This amendment is nearly identical to one on the House Department of Defense authorization bill that was agreed to by a strong bipartisan vote of 353 to 62 on May 14. The CBO has scored our amendment as saving \$11.3 billion over the next 6 years.

It is time we stopped asking American taxpayers to underwrite the security of our European allies. We are all justifiably proud of the role American played in rebuilding Europe after World War II. The Marshall plan stands as a monument to American generosity and concern for our fellow citizens around the world.

We not only helped our wartime allies, but we aided our former enemies as they rebuilt their war-torn societies. Aiding our former enemies to restore

their society is the true mark of American generosity.

But that was then, and this is now. Times have changed.

Germany and Japan are no longer prostrate, exhausted from years of all-out war. Far from it. Germany and Japan are now economic giants, providing significant competition to the United States across a broad spectrum of industries.

After World War II, we were justified in stationing troops in Europe and Japan to restore basic order, to provide the security necessary for vibrant economies to flourish and grow. But now it is time for our allies to take over the cost of their own defense. Not only has the threat of world domination by the Soviet Union evaporated, but our allies now have the financial means and internal stability to provide their own defense.

In 1991 Japan agreed to pay for 75 percent of the costs of stationing United States troops on Japanese soil by this year, excluding salaries of United States servicemen and women, and United States civilian contractors. Mr. President, Japan has done what it promised. Our total nonpersonnel cost there is \$5.8 billion and Japan contributes \$4.6 billion or 79 percent. That contribution should increase further, but they are making progress.

Why can't our NATO allies pick up a larger share of their defense burden? This amendment allows them to increase their contributions in one or more of 4 areas to meet the goal of increased burden sharing.

The NATO allies' four options are:

First, gradually increasing their contributions over 4 years to 75 percent of the nonpersonnel costs incurred by U.S. military forces stationed on their soil. They currently contribute about 25 percent of the \$8 billion annual costs.

Second, increasing their defense spending as a percentage of GDP by 10 percent or at least to a level equal to that of the United States by September 30, 1997. Although U.S. defense spending is declining, the spending by the NATO Allies is declining more rapidly. This provision prevents the United States from picking up the growing difference in defense spending.

Third, increasing their budgetary outlays for foreign assistance by 10 percent or to a level equal to that of the United States. This provision gives the NATO allies a nonmilitary mechanism to contribute to the security of Europe.

Fourth, increasing their contributions of military assets to multinational, United Nations, or regional peace operations. This provision will prevent the United States from having to bear an unfair amount of the responsibility in future peacekeeping missions.

Mr. President, I reiterate, our NATO Allies can choose any combination of the above options to meet the requirements of this amendment. They need not do all four.

Should our NATO Allies miss the targets specified above, the President is authorized by this amendment to do one or more of the following:

First, reduce the levels of troops stationed in NATO countries.

Second, impose taxes or fees similar to those that other nations impose on the U.S. forces stationed in the foreign nation.

Third, reduce through rescission, impoundments or line-item veto, the amount the United States contributes to the NATO budget or other bilateral aid accounts.

Fourth, take any other action that is currently authorized by law to make our NATO allies pick up a fair share of the defense burden.

Mr. President, this amendment also requires the President to report to Congress by March 1, 1997, the progress that has been made in achieving the goals enumerated here. This deadline is set so that we may review the progress in time for next years' Defense authorization bill.

This is indeed a very modest amendment. I think we should go much further to reduce the American taxpayers' subsidy for Europe and Japan's defense. As we work to balance our budget and reduce the debt, I do not think we can justify any subsidy. But this is a reasonable first step to that end.

Mr. President, this amendment has been endorsed by Taxpayers for Common Sense and Citizens Against Government Waste. Let me read a couple of paragraphs from their letters.

**Taxpayers for Common Sense:**

As the United States attempts to rein in its defense budget, it is no longer acceptable for the U.S. taxpayer to pay the lion's share for keeping American troops in Europe. While the Japanese Government pays over 75 percent of all non-personnel costs for American military bases in Japan, our wealthy European allies typically make a collective contribution of less than 25 percent. We support your amendment's call for a 75 percent contribution standard.

**Citizens Against Government Waste:**

This amendment, which would require host countries to pay 75 percent of nonpersonnel costs, is essential to maintaining a strong and cost-effective military partnership with our allies around the world. If enacted, this proposal would save taxpayers \$11.3 billion by 2002.

As the United States continues to define its role in the post-Cold War era, we must realize that we can no longer afford to bear the brunt of maintaining a large presence overseas. However, we do recognize that American strength is necessary to maintain peace and cooperation worldwide. Your amendment successfully addresses both issues.

The 104th Congress' clear mission is to eliminate unnecessary spending, while ensuring that vital obligations, such as protecting our national security, are fulfilled. Your amendment is a vital part of that mission. Not only does it provide for continued international cooperation, but it also saves the taxpayers billions of dollars.

Your amendment makes a fundamental contribution to the debate on the Defense Authorization and its passage is an important step toward achieving a balanced budget. We strongly urge its adoption by the Senate.

Our amendment is also supported by the State Department and the Defense Department. Let me read from their respective statements:

**State Department:**

We support this amendment because it supports U.S. policy objectives in achieving equitable responsibility sharing of global security interests with our allies. This amendment does not tie the hands of the Administration in the execution of U.S. policy. This amendment does allow the President the flexibility in pursuing different avenues in attaining the same objective without undermining the credibility of the United States commitments to our allies. It recognizes that one formula does not fit every allied country or every region and permit[s] our allies to choose to contribute on an equitable basis tailored to their own political, economic, cultural, and historical perspectives.

**Department of Defense:**

After detailed review, analysis and consideration of the provisions in the amendment, the Department believes it provides a solid basis upon which to proceed in future discussions and negotiations with our allies around the world to attain greater Responsibility Sharing in defense and security issues of common concern.

This amendment has the overwhelming support of the House, and the support of the administration. If you agree that our allies are now sufficiently strong economically to pay a fair share for their security, then I urge that you also support this amendment. I ask unanimous consent that the letters of support be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

POSITION PAPER ON PROPOSED  
BURDENSHARING AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3230

#### DESCRIPTION OF THE BILL

The amendment to the DoD Authorization Bill calls on our allies to equitably share in the roles, risks, responsibilities as well as costs in global security. The amendment recognizes that the United States continues to pay an unfair share of the "common defense burden" and calls for our allies to take one or more of four actions to increase their contributions to share equitably in global responsibility sharing.

These four actions include: increased cost-sharing with established goals of 37.5%, 50%, 62.5%, and 75% by September 30 of each successive year starting in 1997; or increasing national defense budgets by 10% or comparable to the U.S. by September 30, 1997; or increase its annual budget for foreign assistance by 10% or at least to a level commensurate to that of the U.S. by September 30, 1997; or increase the amount of military assets that it contributes, or would be prepared to contribute, to multinational military activities worldwide, including United Nations or regional peace operations.

The amendment also provides authority for the President to take certain actions with our allies should they not meet any of the four obligations above. Although threatening and punitive in nature, these actions are non-binding.

The amendment does direct the President to submit an annual report to Congress not later than March 1, 1997 in classified and unclassified form reviewing the effects of our allies compliance to our responsibility sharing initiatives.

## DEPARTMENT POSITION

We support this amendment because it supports U.S. policy objectives in achieving equitable responsibility sharing of global security interests with our allies. This amendment does not tie the hands of the Administration in the execution of U.S. policy. This amendment does allow the President the flexibility in pursuing different avenues in attaining the same objective without undermining the credibility of the United States commitments to our allies. It recognizes that one formula does not fit every allied country or every region and permits our allies to choose to contribute on an equitable basis tailored to their own political, economic, cultural, and historical perspectives.

## TALKING POINTS AND BACKGROUND TO SUPPORT THE DEPARTMENT'S POSITION

We agree with the findings of this amendment that the United States continues to pay a higher cost for global defense compared to that of our allies. We also acknowledge that many of our allies are sharing equitably in the global responsibilities of defense while others are beginning to assume increased roles, risks, and responsibilities.

We support this amendment because it supports U.S. policy objectives in achieving equitable responsibility sharing of mutual global security interests. This amendment does not tie the hands of the President, allowing him the flexibility in pursuance of those goals while maintaining the credibility of the United States commitments to our allies.

We believe that by working together with Congress on this issue, U.S. interests are preserved and that the basis for our policy or responsibility sharing serves the best security interests of our country and that of our allies in promoting peace, stability, democracy, and free-market economies.

We note with concern, however, that rigid percentage cost-sharing goals by specified dates are incompatible with recently concluded and highly favorable cost-sharing agreements. We ask that only one small change to the amendment be incorporated.

## POTENTIAL AMENDMENT

(Prepared by Mike Walsh)

## SERVICE AFFECTED

US military forces and activities around the world.

## AMENDMENT NUMBER

Amendment 102 to H.R. 3230

## STATEMENT OF AMENDMENT

Amendment consists of four parts: Findings, which detail discrepancies Congress perceives between US and allied defense spending and resource allocation, generally concluding that the US continues to bear greater defense burden than allies, and that they should do more to defend themselves; Efforts to Increase Allied Burdensharing, which provides President latitude to seek increased allied contributions in four areas (i.e., cost sharing, defense spending, foreign assistance, military assets to multinational military activities); Authorities to Encourage Allies, which provides President with authority to take specific actions to obtain allied compliance (i.e., wide range of options, including withdrawals, impositions, funding or program rescissions, suspensions, terminations, reductions or similar actions); and Revised Reporting Requirements, stipulating reporting on relevant measures and actions by allies to determine compliance.

## DOD POSITION

The Department generally supports the amendment, but has some reservations about specific provisions, discussed below [After detailed review, analysis and consideration

of the provisions in the amendment, the Department believes it provides a solid basis upon which to proceed in future discussions and negotiations with our allies around the world to attain greater Responsibility Sharing in defense and security issues of common concern. The Department has long sought such an orientation, as it offers us the most latitude in seeking greater contributions. Additionally, provisions in this amendment establish the basis for a renewed Executive-Legislative consensus on determining progress in these matters, another long-sought goal.] The Department is concerned however, with a couple of provisions in the amendment. In paragraph (b) Efforts, sub-paragraph (1), Congress proposes adopting a specific schedule of financial contributions by allies between 1997-2000. We have not found this to be a viable approach to attain the goals the Department and Congress want to reach. We recommend deleting the schedule and instead substituting language (consistent with the other parts of this section) that encourages "greater allied equity in sharing roles, risks, responsibilities, and costs for global security". This will afford President more flexibility and options for attaining increased contributions from various sources. We also recommend, in paragraph (d) Reports, that these two new reporting requirements be combined into a single report, due 15 April each year, and that these reporting requirements supersede current burdensharing reporting requirements (see PL 98-525, FY85 DOD Authorization Act, Title X, Section 1002, et seq.), which are both obsolete and inconsistent with the intention of this amendment. The Department urges Congress to consider favorably these minor adjustments.

SAVE U.S. TAXPAYER UP TO \$11.3 BILLION—  
SUPPORT "BURDENSARING" AMENDMENT

## TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE,

Washington, DC, June 25, 1996.

DEAR SENATORS HARKIN AND KERRY: Taxpayers for Common Sense is please to support your "burdensharing" amendment to the FY97 Defense Authorization Bill. This amendment takes an important step towards reducing the \$16 billion direct cash subsidy paid each year to our allies for their national defense. As you know, the House passed this amendment during consideration of the Defense Authorization.

As the United States attempts to rein in its defense budget, it is no longer acceptable for the U.S. taxpayer to pay the lion's share for keeping American troops in Europe. While the Japanese government pays over 75% of all non-personnel costs for American military bases in Japan, our wealthy European allies typically make a collective contribution of less than 25%. We support your amendment's call for a 75% contribution standard.

Despite the end of the Cold War and a steadily decreasing defense budget, the U.S. still spends more on defense than all of its allies. For example, while Japan spends 1.1% of its GDP on defense and European nations average 2.5%, the U.S. spends 4.7% of its GDP on defense. The American taxpayer cannot afford to continue subsidizing our allies defense budgets. Not only are taxpayers asked to shoulder higher defense spending and increased deficits, but as consumers and producers they face a competitive disadvantage from countries whose economies do not bear the full cost of defending their own territories.

This year's amendment gives the President and the Secretary of Defense more than a year to negotiate increased contributions from our allies who benefit from the 200,000 U.S. troops stationed abroad. If those con-

tributions do not increase, the amendment provides options for pressuring our allies to increase their contributions through measures such as a reduction of troops and/or a recession of bilateral aid and NATO appropriations.

The Congressional Budget Office projects potential six year outlay savings, from the amendment, to be around \$11.3 billion. These savings are significant and would provide a welcome relief to overburdened American taxpayers. We urge all members of the Senate to support your amendment.

Sincerely,

JILL LANCELOT,  
Legislative Director.

COUNCIL FOR CITIZENS AGAINST  
GOVERNMENT WASTE,  
Washington, DC, June 25, 1996.

Hon. TOM HARKIN,  
Hon. JOHN KERRY,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATORS HARKIN AND KERRY: On behalf of the 600,000 members of the Council for Citizens Against Government Waste, I am writing to endorse the Harkin/Kerry amendment to the FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, S. 1745. This amendment, which would require host countries to pay 75 percent of nonpersonnel costs, is essential to maintaining a strong and cost-effective military partnership with our allies around the world. If enacted, this proposal would save taxpayers \$11.3 billion by 2002.

This amendment won overwhelming bipartisan support in the House by a vote of 353-62. It deserves the same in the Senate this year.

As the United States continues to define its role in the post-cold War era, we must realize that we can no longer afford to bear the brunt of maintaining a large presence overseas. However, we do recognize that American strength is necessary to maintain peace and cooperation worldwide. Your amendment successfully addresses both issues.

The 104th Congress' clear mission is to eliminate unnecessary spending, while ensuring that vital obligations, such as protecting our national security, are fulfilled. Your amendment is a vital part of that mission. Not only does it provide for continued international cooperation, but it also saves the taxpayers billions of dollars.

Your amendment makes a fundamental contribution to the debate on the Defense Authorization and its passage is an important step toward achieving a balanced budget. We strongly urge its adoption by the Senate.

Sincerely,

TOM SCHATZ,  
President.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the Senator from Iowa and Massachusetts. I appreciate their efforts to craft an amendment that would provide a number of actions that our allies could take to increase their contributions to defense burdensharing.

I agree that the United States pays an unfair share of the common defense



burden and our allies should do more. This amendment would provide the United States with a basis by which to achieve agreements with our allies to increase their share of costs for defense.

Let me emphasize that U.S. forces are deployed overseas to advance U.S. security interests. Although we seek common efforts with our allies to secure peace and promote U.S. interests abroad, we do not always necessarily agree on how those interests are to be advanced.

As a result, I am not comfortable with the notion that one action an ally could take to increase its cost share would be to increase its peacekeeping or humanitarian activities—that would be considered of equal value to an ally increasing its participation in coalition operations or increasing its defense budget.

Would Congress be satisfied if an ally agreed to increase its contributions to foreign assistance, and at the same time, reduce its defense expenditures? This would be counter to our efforts to get our allies to contribute more for global and regional security. Our objective should be to get our allies to agree to increase their efforts in all areas.

With those remarks, I recommend that my colleagues adopt the amendment.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague Senator HARKIN in offering an amendment which seeks to relieve the American taxpayer of some of the enormous burden of defending our allies.

This amendment is straightforward. It requires the President to seek increased contributions from countries which have cooperative military relations with the United States. It requires the President to negotiate agreements under which our allies will be responsible for bearing a greater share of the common defense burden.

The end of the cold war has signaled the need for us to reevaluate our spending priorities. Despite the end of the cold war, the United States continues to pay an unfair share of the costs of defending our allies. American taxpayers should no longer be responsible for the lion's share of the common defense burden.

According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's data for 1993, we spent 20.1 percent of our budget on military expenditures, while European NATO nations spent only 6.2 percent of their combined budgets. That's \$1,153 per capita spent by the United States on military expenditures compared to \$419 per capita spent by our European NATO allies.

It is simply time for the United States to negotiate a better deal, and this amendment represents a positive step in that direction.

The amendment allows the President to negotiate an increase in our allies' contributions in four areas. First, the President may require an ally to gradually increase its contributions to

75 percent of the nonpersonnel costs incurred by our forces stationed on its soil. Second, the President may require a host country to increase its defense spending as a percentage of its GDP by 10 percent or at least to a level equal to that of the United States. Third, the President may negotiate for a foreign country to increase its budgetary outlays for foreign assistance by 10 percent or to a level commensurate with the United States. Finally, the President may choose to require an ally to increase its contributions of military assets to multinational, United Nations, or regional peace operations.

Although far from perfect, our agreement with Japan is a good example of what the President would be required to negotiate under this amendment. Currently, Japan pays for 79 percent, of nonpersonnel costs incurred by stationing troops on its soil. The administration recently negotiated an agreement under which Japan will increase its contributions by approximately \$30 million a year over the next 5 years. This is an pretty good deal compared to the meager 24 percent that our European NATO allies contribute to the nonpersonnel costs the United States incurs in Europe.

Budget estimates for fiscal year 1996-97 reveal that the United States will incur \$8 billion in nonpersonnel costs in Europe and that our NATO allies will only contribute \$2 billion of that amount. I think this is an outrage.

This amendment would remedy this situation by requiring the President to negotiate a better deal.

Mr. President, critics of this amendment may argue that it will compromise U.S. troop presence and global national security interests. This just isn't the case. If this amendment is implemented, and I hope it will be, the United States will continue to pay enormous amounts to defend collective security interests. We will still spend billions defending our allies.

This amendment provides the flexibility necessary to preserve our commitments to our allies. It allows the President to accommodate each country's unique economic, political, and military situation while creating a more equitable balance of the common defense burden. Each of our allies has different capabilities and limitations to sharing the costs of the common defense. This amendment recognizes these differences and gives the President flexibility needed to secure greater participation by our allies.

Mr. President, American taxpayers deserve a better deal. If implemented, this amendment would be a solid starting point for requiring our allies to chip in more for the common defense. It would send a clear message to our citizens that we are committed to relieving them of some of the enormous burden of defending our allies. This initiative is long overdue, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask that the yeas and nays be vitiated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is their objection to the amendment?

Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.

The amendment (No. 4177), as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.

AMENDMENT NO. 4367

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, one of the items that I want to draw the Senate's attention to with regard to the Nunn amendment is really the astounding story of the United State's history with regard to central Europe since the Iron Curtain fell down.

I think a decade ago, or two decades ago Americans, would be amazed to think that the Iron Curtain could fall and that the world could change as it has.

I do not know whether Members remember watching the television coverage of President Reagan in Berlin talking about how in the future Russian leaders would tear down that wall. But I confess my thoughts were that the wonderful Irishman was engaging in wishful rhetoric, perhaps more than a serious prediction. Lo and behold, the President turned out to be more than correct, and his words were prophetic.

I think more shocking than his statements was the fact that the wall came down and that the Soviet Union dissolved. However, even more shocking is the way this country has treated the central European governments.

I simply do not know of a place in the world where Americans are more popular than central Europe; more popular than they are in America at times even.

But, Mr. President, you cannot be in central Europe and not experience the warmth of people who love, admire, and respect freedom and independence, who are grateful to the United States for championing freedom and independence, who want to be like Americans in many, many ways.

I think to most Americans would be shocked if they realized how we have treated those people who looked at us so eagerly and with so much affection, and so much thanks and so much hope of making their countries like America; so much hope of bringing freedom to their countries.

What are the facts? The facts are that when the Iron Curtain fell and those countries developed new governments, we did not react to them as we had reacted to Western Europe at the end of World War II.

I will remind Senators what happened. At the end of World War II when

Western Europe had problems, we did a couple of things because of concern about their future and the future of the freedom and democracy there.

First, we opened our markets to them and ensured that they had a way to earn their way out of the incredible destruction and poverty that they were in.

The second thing we brought forth was assistance to them to provide the emergency needs and help give them a boost to get things started again.

Mr. President, I do not think anyone would doubt that those efforts were helpful. We can debate whether or not we did too much, or too little, whether we gave it to the right or wrong country, whether we gave it the right way or the wrong way. Those are legitimate questions and ought to be debated. The key point is we came forward at a time of need and we ensured that their spark of freedom survived and grew, and democracy is greater and stronger in the world because we did it.

I hope that the distinguished Senator who offers this amendment and others who may be tempted to join him will look at the contrast of how the Central Europeans were treated versus the way the Western Europeans were treated, where we came forward and opened our markets to them and gave them a chance to earn their way out of the dire circumstances they were in. The Western European powers said they were going to study for 5 or 10 or 20 years whether or not Central European countries will be let into Common Market.

Western European countries went through hell. When they went through hell, we opened our markets to them. Now Western Europe says they are going to study for a long, long period of time whether they will let Central European countries into the Common Market.

That is not right. It is in our interest, in the interest of freedom-loving people around the world to see Central Europe do well. To think of selfish subsidies and self-interests at a time when we ought to be opening the world of opportunity to them is wrong.

Second, when Western Europe was threatened, we joined our arms with them. We offered them NATO, and we volunteered to stand side by side with them and not only carry our share of the burden, but to do even more. And what did the Western European countries do? When Central Europe asked to join NATO, they decided to study it.

This Congress has acted on this issue. Three years ago, we passed the NATO Participation Act I, and it was meant to address the questions that are brought up in the amendment of Senator NUNN and others. It was done because the administration was dragging its feet and turning its back on the cry of those free people for help and assistance and participation.

These are proud people. They are not coming and asking for a handout. They are coming and asking to be our

friends, to be our comrades, to be our allies, and to stand with us—in the words of Americans, to pledge their lives and their sacred honor in a joint enterprise with us.

I suppose you can turn the back of your hand to people like that, but I think they at least deserve an answer. What this country has done and what some Western European countries have done is turn their back on them, not even given them the courtesy of an answer.

It was this Senator's belief, and I know it is not shared by all Senators that the administration was very slow to respond to the situation in Central Europe. As Western Europe and the United States have been slow to embrace the freedom-loving people of Central Europe, the forces of totalitarianism in those countries have had a new boost of strength at the ballot box.

I have listened to Ambassadors and Members of Parliament from countries all across Central Europe. They ask me, where we should be aligned? Who should we be close to? Who do we work with? Where is our future? And they are shocked to find that America and Western Europe are slow to embrace them and slow to want them to be part of us. They want to go West. They want to be part of the free world. They want to stand up with us to protect against totalitarianism.

These people, who love Americans so much, are confused and puzzled at our slowness in allowing them to stand with us in NATO and are almost mystified at the slowness and reluctance of the Europeans to allow them into the Common Market. It is almost as if all these years we thought of them as an enemy, and when they want to join our side, we will not let them.

Some people have said we have to consider the cost. We have to figure out whether it is in our interest. We have to look at this detail and that detail and this detail.

That was 5 years ago. Three years ago, we finally passed a bill that required those things to be addressed, the NATO Participation Act I, because the administration had not done its work and because this Congress had not done its work. Last year, we passed the NATO Participation Act II to urge the project on further.

I want Members to ask themselves this: Toward the end of World War II there was something of a coup or an overthrow of the Government in Italy. Italy, which had been fighting against us and with the Nazis, switched sides, declared war on Germany and joined the Allies' cause.

How much did it cost to have Italy join us? Was it to our advantage to have hundreds of thousands of troops that had been fighting us to change sides and join us? I suppose some people could come and say we ought to have studied that seriously. But I do not think it would take too many people very long to figure out that it is

much better to have hundreds of thousands of troops that were opposed to you on your side.

Is it an advantage to have Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary on our side, pledged to help defend our freedom with the potential of very valuable bases and hundreds of thousands of service men and women willing to help defend our freedom rather than the other side? I do not think, with all due respect, it takes a genius to figure out that is a plus, not a minus.

Reference is made here to a study as to what could be spent in terms of the defense of that area. Mr. President, you can spend any amount you want. The question comes back to two things. Is it better to have them on our side rather than opposed to us? Of course. And maybe most importantly of all, what is the cost if we do not do it? How do they react to the slap in the face that says, "We do not want to stand with you"?

What is the cost if we again fail to recognize that area as part of the sphere of influence of other powers? I submit to Members that the cost is very heavy, indeed, and far outweighs any other.

Last, let me simply say this. I do not know how any American can review the history of what went on when the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany invaded Poland and free men and women failed to understand that our freedom was in part dependent on their freedom. I do not know how we can ignore that history. I do not know how anyone could ignore what happened when this country guaranteed the freedom of the Polish underground if they would negotiate with the Soviets and then refused to even speak up on their behalf when they were arrested and tried and sentenced to death, even though we had asked them to surrender. I do not know how any American can look at the history of what happened in the cold war and see the flame of freedom snuffed out in Poland during the 1940's by the Soviets and not feel a twinge of horror that another 40 or 50 years of enslavement followed.

I do not know how we as a country can turn our back on freedom in central Europe, and so I look forward to working with the Senator from Georgia. I hope very much this can be resolved, but I do know one thing. I do know that stalling and delay in endless reports and endless studies and a Mississippi literacy test to get into NATO are not the answer.

Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise, I might say with regret, to oppose the amendment introduced by the Senator from Georgia, now temporarily laid aside. I rise with regret because I have such respect for the Senator from Georgia, Mr. NUNN. But on this issue I respectfully disagree. I associate myself with the eloquent remarks of the Senator from Colorado. The questions



raised by the amendment introduced by the Senator from Georgia and others are important questions. They go to the heart of this great opportunity, challenge, and debate that is coming on the question of NATO enlargement.

I certainly agree this body has to consider all these questions. But I feel very strongly that this is not the right time nor is it the right bill on which to carry out this debate. Let me state clearly from the outset where I stand. I believe a strong transatlantic partnership serves America's interests. For reasons of history and economy, war or instability in Europe inevitably harms American interests. In this century alone, the United States has fought two world wars and the cold war, all of which had their origins in Europe.

Today, we are involved in a conflict in the former Yugoslavia, keeping the peace, helping to provide the ground on which a country can regain its feet after the slaughter and aggression it suffered, in Europe. There, as part of an international implementation force, we are again expressing what is a basic fact of American history, which is that what happens in Europe matters to us. That is part of what NATO is all about.

We are now developing a consensus, slowly, methodically—too slowly, frankly, for some, including this Senator—but a consensus moving forward, nonetheless, in the United States and with our allies and like-minded countries of Europe, on the future of the North Atlantic alliance, this extraordinarily successful alliance often referred to as the most successful defensive alliance in the history of the world. In fact, NATO did deter Soviet aggression, the prospect of Soviet aggression westward into Europe throughout the course of the cold war.

I hope, over the coming months, we will be able to work together, Democrats and Republicans, the President and Congress, to advance the adaptation as well as the enlargement of NATO to meet the challenges of the post-cold-war world.

The amendment before us raises questions. But I do think it also expresses the underlying skepticism of its sponsors about either the idea of enlarging NATO or the pace of NATO enlargement. The amendment, however, does not express the views of many of us in this body who have thought through the same issues and come, respectfully, to a different conclusion. That is why I rise in opposition to the amendment.

In my view, we must look to the future and expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in two significant ways. I think we need to deepen this great partnership to develop a reliable coalition of like-minded countries to share the burdens of maintaining international security and we need to enlarge NATO by admitting new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to full membership.

I believe we should enlarge NATO for two basic reasons. The first I will call

moral. Senator BROWN referred to this. Throughout the cold war, we promised these nations our support to achieve freedom and democracy. The millions of people who come together to form these nations were forced to live under the yoke of Soviet dictatorship. And we reached out to them and tried to give them encouragement during those years. We referred to them as "captive nations." That is a term that seems so wonderfully dated today. Today they are no longer captive. They are free and independent. They are working their way to strengthen democracy, market economies, freedom, full expression, better lives for their citizens. The question is whether we will remember this promise we made to them, that if only they would persist through the dark years of Soviet domination, Communist domination, we would greet them, we would embrace them, we would stand with them. So I think we owe these people the opportunity to join with us in this alliance of free nations.

The second reason I believe NATO should be expanded is strategic. By enlarging NATO to include the free and democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe, we can help to ensure the stability and security of Europe. NATO is often viewed as a defensive alliance, because of the cold war history, an alliance to defend its members against the threat, that then existed, of Soviet movement across Western Europe. The fact is, NATO from the beginning, and particularly today in the post-cold-war world, has a second and I would say today much more important purpose, which is to serve as a body in which the potential conflicts among its members are moderated and defused. That is the role it has played and that is the role it will continue to play, once these fledgling democracies and market economies of Central and Eastern Europe reach the plateau which will be established, at which they can join NATO. That is the role NATO will play for them as well.

Secretary General Solana, the Secretary General of NATO, was here earlier this week and he made a very important point, which is that one of the standards for membership in NATO will be not only the extent to which human rights are recognized in the potential NATO member, not only the extent its market economy is flourishing, not only its military capacity to participate in the NATO alliance, et cetera, but also the extent to which it has eliminated conflicts with its neighbors. That is a precondition of joining NATO. Conflicts between, for instance, Hungary and Romania over the rights of ethnic minorities—it seems to me one of the preconditions of membership in NATO will be for those countries, if they are to be considered, to resolve those conflicts. And that is a perfect indication of the way in which NATO has had an internal purpose, to preserve stability in Europe. It is important to remember that the members of

NATO have, in a very profound sense, given up the use or threat of force in relationship to each other. That is clearly at the heart of our hopes for continued stability in Europe in the post-cold-war world.

While some Russians view NATO enlargement as a threat, NATO is a defensive alliance. NATO, as an organization to maintain the peace among its own members, does not pose any risk to Russian security. We are going to have to work hard to make this point to some of those among our friends in Russia. We have to work hard, but we can do it, to make it clear that NATO already has established and wants to build on a friendly and peaceful relationship with the new post-cold-war Russia.

The NATO enlargement process is moving forward, thanks to leadership from President Clinton, Secretary General Solana, and a host of leaders in both parties in this country. Senator Dole is, obviously, a strong supporter of NATO enlargement, and others in Europe are strong supporters as well. The study agreed to by the NATO defense ministers last December provides, I think, a generally sound basis for the admission of new members. This is not moving precipitously, it is moving very methodically—in fact too slowly for some of us. The individualized dialogues with interested countries, an important stage in the process, are now underway.

Mr. President, I am concerned that the amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia to mandate yet another study would have the effect of delaying the NATO enlargement process already underway.

The requirements of the study in the amendment before us seem to emphasize only the costs and commitments that the United States would undertake and the anticipated impact on Russia. These questions, if I may say so with respect, seem to be the questions of an attorney in a courtroom leading the witness.

In another sense, Senator BROWN has referred to this as a literacy test, as a pre-civil-rights-era literacy test that used to be applied to respective African-American voters in the South with the intention of denying them the opportunity to vote. I am afraid the effect of these questions will lead to a conclusion that there are not going to be any countries joining NATO in the near future, and that is a result that I am opposed to.

It is possible, as has been suggested by the Senator from Colorado and the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from Georgia, that discussions can be carried on that would alter or at least broaden the nature of the questions. Some of these questions ought to ask about the positive effects, of which there are many, in expanding NATO: standing true to American principles of human rights that we expressed so often during the cold war, creating a kind of burdensharing for ourselves that NATO has represented.

NATO for us, more and more, means that we are not going to be called on to be the sole policeman of the world. Remember what happened in the gulf war. We did not have to fight that conflict alone; our allies from NATO were with us. They are with us in Bosnia today. Years into the future, as we worry about continued security and stability in the Middle East and in Asia, I think our allies in NATO will provide an opportunity to share the burdens and cost of world leadership that the United States would otherwise be called upon to expend.

The point is this: The process is underway under which Ministers of the member nations of NATO will meet in December to make some key decisions about how to enlarge the alliance. We cannot forego that opportunity while we await the results of another study.

I will say two things. Perhaps it is worth trying to alter these questions to make them more balanced. My preference, frankly, is that this amendment be defeated, because I think it confuses an ongoing process. In some ways, it begins to tie the hands of the President and the executive branch. These are all questions that, should there be a decision in NATO to enlarge, will come back to this floor for a great debate, because no one can automatically be added to NATO without the Senate of the United States—this body—being asked to ratify an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty alliance by a two-thirds vote. So I say these questions are preliminary.

The first choice would be we defeat the amendment. Second, perhaps we could work on some questions and withdraw others to make it a more balanced series of questions.

Third, I hope we make it clear, and I hope within the text of the amendment that these questions are not intended to delay in any way the process that is now going on in NATO, meeting in December, a presumed summit to occur sometime in the first 6 months of 1997, to formally continue the process of NATO enlargement.

If we are going to go forward in the spirit of compromise, let us make it clear it is not intended to inhibit the President or his designees in any way in what they will do between now and when the study will come forward.

I see other colleagues on the floor. I have spoken at length. It is an important issue. It is an issue we are going to debate and we ought to debate in the interest of our national security. Respectfully, I do not think this is the right time to have this debate or adopt this resolution, and I will vote against it, certainly, as it is before us at the current time.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

Mr. SIMON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I join in questioning this amendment. I say to my colleague from Georgia, for whom I have great respect—I notice the Senate staffers were asked by Washingtonian

magazine which Senator retiring would be missed the most, and the person who came out first in that contest was SAM NUNN. I agree with that assessment.

I was home grabbing a bite to eat. We just live about 10 minutes from here, and I heard Senator NUNN speak and Senator MCCAIN. I hope the Senator from Colorado will forgive me, but as soon as he got up to speak, I got in my car to come down here and heard the end of Senator LIEBERMAN's comments.

The point that Senator MCCAIN made that this is ill-timed, I think, is appropriate, and I hope my colleague from Georgia will think about deferring this amendment until we get to the foreign ops bill after the election.

This is an emotional issue in Russia. You can argue that it should not be an emotional issue, but the people in Russia were told year after year after year by the propaganda machine that NATO represents a military threat, and even though the Soviet dictatorial apparatus is gone, that fear of NATO is there. It is an emotional issue in Russia.

For those who say, "Well, emotions shouldn't govern decisions on foreign relations," take a look at—and I know many of my colleagues will disagree with me on this—take a look at what the United States is doing vis-a-vis Cuba. Our policy in Cuba is clearly a reaction to national passion rather than national interest. We could not have devised a policy ultimately that is more favorable to Castro than the policy that we designed. So in Russia, you have an emotional reaction to NATO.

The amendment that is before us is tilted. There is just no question about it. I have enough confidence in the Senator from Georgia that if this were to be withdrawn and then some of us get together before we have the foreign ops bill and try to fashion something, I think we can do it.

I will add here, I think there are ways of defusing this a little bit in Eastern Europe. The President of the Parliament of Belarus was here about 10 days ago and visited with me. One of the things he said to me was, "I hope you don't permit NATO to be expanded. It's a very emotional issue in Belarus."

I said, "What if we were to say that nuclear weapons could not be based in any of the additional countries that come into NATO?"

He said, "That would be a very different thing. That would make it much more acceptable."

Frankly, because nuclear weapons can reach anyplace in a matter of minutes today, militarily it is not necessary.

I think some compromises can be worked out. Let me just add, for anyone from the Russian Embassy who is interested who may be listening, I think this is in the best long-term interest of Russia. Yes, I am concerned about Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary and the other Central European governments.

I had the privilege, some of you may recall, of being the chief sponsor of the

bill to provide aid for Poland in 1989, right after the change there. It has been dramatic. I have been in touch with the situation in Poland for some time. They have fears. Whether they are legitimate or not, that is a matter of judgment, but they have fears of their neighbor to the east.

Ultimately, the great threat that Russia faces militarily is from China, not from the West. I hope when we have a more stable democracy in Russia—and Russia is moving in that direction, clearly—I hope Russia can become a member of NATO. But I think to adopt this amendment right now is not in our interest.

Frankly, I do not think even having a vote on this amendment right now is in our interest. I think—and I again have a huge respect for my colleague from Georgia, who is one of the giants of this body—but I think it would be much better to consider this after the Russian election, the runoff election, which is not that many days off. But if we have to vote, I will vote for a substitute or vote against this amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. BRADLEY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia. I think this amendment is vitally important to prevent us from precipitously going down the path of NATO expansion without considering the consequences.

This amendment forces us to ask the who and the when, to take a hard look at the consequence of NATO's expansion before we leap. I and many in this body are absolutely thrilled by the dramatic geopolitical changes in the last several years. The end of communism as far as an active, vital, dominant force in the landmass of the Soviet Union is a startling development. The breakup of the Soviet Union itself was a startling development.

When the cold war ended, it thrust the United States, Russia, the former republics of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and our NATO allies all into uncharted waters.

As long as the Soviet Union existed, the United States-Soviet rivalry was defined as an era in fundamentally ideological terms. It was the prominent feature of the international system in a bipolar world, and it was the primary justification for NATO, one of the two treaties—the other with Japan—that governed our sovereign commitments to allies around the world, commitments that required us to send American troops to defend the nations with whom we had made the treaty.

Now the Soviet Union no longer exists. We are in a period of transition. As a result, NATO in particular is redefining its role in the world, in a world without the Soviet Union, which was the pretext for its founding. But just as NATO is trying to redefine its role in

the world, so Russia itself is struggling to redefine its future. It is in the midst of that redefinition period now, in the midst of a Presidential election.

In early May, I was in Moscow. I arrived the day that there were 30,000 or 40,000 supporters of Mr. Zyuganov in the streets, with red flags, pictures of Lenin, the whole thing, parading for their candidate. That same day I drove past the park and saw a candidate up on a big platform speaking, with great speakers, and four or five generals with ribbons standing next to him.

I said, "Who's that?" They said, "Zyuganov." I said, "Stop." I and a Republican colleague melded into the crowd. I know the Chair might think it is difficult for me to meld into any crowd, but we did so. And I asked our interpreter, "What is he saying?" The interpreter said, "He has just said that the German-Israeli-American conspiracy to destroy Russia will not succeed if I am elected President." To which my response was, "Well, at least we were third."

Indeed, he did not make a successful showing in the Presidential election. The first round has been held. Mr. Zyuganov and Mr. Yeltsin are in a final runoff that will be decided in the next several days.

Russia is in a period of redefinition. It is beginning to say—will it cast its lot more in the direction of democracy, market reform, moving into integration into the world economic and political system, or will it once again retreat to a more isolationist position in the world?

So the Presidential elections in Russia are very much about all this. As Russia defines itself internally, what kind of system it wants, what kind of democracy it wants, Russia will also continue to redefine itself in relation to both the West and the East. It has grave concerns and worries about China. It is very concerned about Turkish influence in a lot of the Central Asian republics.

It has much less concern about the West. The war of ideology is over. There is no reason for them to fear the West. We know that. They see where their geopolitical worries are, to the south and to the east. They are now in the process of not only redefining themselves internally but also externally. In this process the nature of those relationships are not a foregone conclusion.

The Eastern European countries that are seeking NATO membership are also in a process of transition. They have turned their backs on Soviet Russian influence and are firmly allying themselves with the West. We welcome that. We want them to be integrated into the West. We want them to become a member of the European Community. We want them to be a part of a Western future. They want to integrate as quickly as possible to get the economic benefits as well as the promise of greater security.

So, Mr. President, as we consider NATO's expansion against this back-

drop of sweeping change, of redefinition in the West as well as the East, I think we have to be honest about what we hope and what we can realistically expect to accomplish.

First, on the issue of increased security and stability, the primary rationale voiced by the proponents of NATO enlargement is that it will increase security and stability in Europe.

How that can be accomplished, though, in real terms has yet to be explained. Achieving stability is a long-term process that will require strategic dialogue with all parties. It will also require the completion of the fundamental economic and political reform process that the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia are still undergoing. This is not going to happen overnight. It is far from certain that NATO's immediate expansion will promote either of those tasks.

In fact, NATO expansion is likely to cut off or possibly even polarize a strategic dialog between the West and Russia about Turkey or about Asia or about where they perceive their threats coming from.

Further, NATO enlargement is not an automatic guarantee of security, particularly, as this amendment suggests, as many important questions related to membership enlargement of NATO have yet to be answered, particularly with regard to the effect that enlargement will have on NATO itself, including its nuclear posture and its security guarantees. Indeed, an expanded NATO is probably no more likely to respond militarily to an invasion of Eastern Europe than an unexpanded NATO.

If we consider these countries sufficiently vital to our interest, the West will act without a treaty; if we do not consider them vital, no treaty is going to force a President to send American troops into the region.

Nor will NATO's expansion guarantee the vital political and economic reform that is a prerequisite to security. You can have a lot of military armor deployed forward, a nuclear deterrent, and if you have an economy crumbling, because the comparative advantages available in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia cannot bring full fruit because the Western Europeans will block all their products from being imported into the markets of the West, it is a hollow victory.

In fact, one might argue that NATO expansion enlargement may hinder such reform by encouraging the diversion of limited resources in these countries to military modernization rather than to economic development.

Mr. President, it is important we also try to think through before we take this step. The amendment, I think, forces this thinking process. What does it say about Russia? We have to be honest about the role of Russia, both in our motivation toward expanding NATO and in our assessment of the potential stabilizing or destabilizing effect of enlargement.

First, the motivation. Despite protestations to the contrary by some policy-

makers and NATO itself in its enlargement study, fears of Russian aggressiveness are clearly a significant motivating force behind NATO expansion. That is a legitimate feeling on the part of the peoples of Eastern Europe because they were dominated, occupied, by a Soviet Army for 45 years. Naturally, they have a fear, but to assuage those fears, do we want to jump headlong before we consider some of the larger strategic questions?

I think this fear of Russian aggressiveness is obviously the case for these Eastern European countries seeking enlargement immediately. It could very well be the motivating force for many Western policymakers.

What is the effect? While NATO's own study and others downplay the effect of NATO expansion on Russia, it is clear to even the most casual observer that NATO's enlargement is viewed as a threat by Russia, particularly given that those who would expand NATO are seeking to do so because of their fears of Russian aggressiveness reasserting itself as if it were a genetic quality.

Russia's view of NATO expansion is not surprising when one looks at the post-cold-war world from a Russian vantage point. Russia has been stripped of its empire, gone the way of new republics, new countries, and is but one of 15 countries—the largest, but one of 15—in the former Soviet space. By expanding the West's military bloc—and that is what NATO is, that is why it was formed, that is what its primary funding is, let's be honest—by expanding the West's military bloc along its borders, Russia could not help but feel boxed in by an organization whose primary aim for most of its existence has been to act as a shield against a potentially aggressive Soviet Union.

If expansion is accelerated, a threatened and increasingly nationalistic Russia may further isolate itself from the West, and the prophecy about Russian aggressiveness could easily become a self-fulfilling one. I think that is unlikely because of the economic circumstance in Russia.

However, immediate NATO expansion enlargement gives a pretext for those who would play on those fears and those who would stir that pot. We need to think about this and ask some tough questions.

If expansion is accelerated, a threatened and increasingly nationalistic Russia may further, as I said, isolate itself from the rest of the world. The hopes of Russia's implementation of START I or the ratification of START II would become increasingly remote. Tensions could increase. NATO's immediate enlargement will not solve our security concerns. Indeed, I believe it is very possible that it could heighten them.

Rather than isolating Russia, we should seek to engage Russia and others in a long-term strategic dialog about what they perceive to be their

security concerns. If we engage that dialog without a precipitous action of enlargement in that dialog, it will become clear that their concerns are more oriented toward China and to the Turkish activity in the former republics of central Asia than it is to the West, particularly NATO, particularly Western Europe, and certainly Eastern Europe.

Mr. President, I think we should work to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons by ensuring implementation of START I and START II, but I have some reservations about precipitously expanding NATO at the expense of our own national security. Our consideration of these concerns is not, as proponents of enlargement like to argue, the result of Russia bullying the United States or NATO. It is in our own self-interest to consider the impact that enlargement would have on Russia. It is in our own interest to do this. If the purpose of NATO expansion is to increase security, our security, obviously, its destabilizing impact on Russian-NATO and Russian-United States relations need to be a part of that analysis.

What about the effect on NATO and U.S. participation in NATO? Finally, we have to be honest about the effect of enlargement, as I said, on NATO itself and on the increased responsibilities it will entail for the United States.

Enlargement could have significant repercussions for how NATO operates. I do not think these issues have been actually explored. That is really the purpose of the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Georgia.

Enlargement will also require NATO to devote less energy to important reforms, helping it to adopt to the realities of the post-cold-war world, and the enlargement will impose even greater responsibilities and costs on the United States without any serious assessment of whether such responsibilities and costs are in the United States' interest.

Mr. President, as the foregoing illustrates, NATO expansion is not an easy issue. It is a quick fix, a form of what I call "cold war lite," that is likely to cause a lot more harm than good. It is more a leftover from cold war thinking than it is a rethinking of U.S. security interests worldwide. It is more a predictable human response to the call to assuage the worries and historical concerns of our friends in Eastern Europe than it is a longer term view of how to guarantee their security over time.

Mr. President, I have serious concerns about precipitously rushing into NATO expansion. At a minimum, we should ask some difficult questions and take the time to study the issue seriously. I think that is precisely what the amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia requires.

I support the amendment fully. It is his amendment to decide how to pursue in the remaining hours. If he chooses to have a vote, I will be for it. If he chooses to wait and have a vote a little bit later, I will be for it then.

It is enormously important that we ask the questions before we leap and find we have precipitated a response that will create less security, not more security, for the very countries to whom the enlargement is expected to give greater security.

So, Mr. President, I support the amendment.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I know there is a good-faith effort to now see if we can draft some additional language, or perhaps some substitute language for some of this amendment. I am certainly pleased to work with my friend from Arizona and others on that approach.

I am a bit curious, though, how a vote on an amendment that is asking what it is going to cost to expand NATO and how much the American taxpayers are going to pay—that that information is tilted. I do not quite understand that logic. I really do not understand the logic that says that we do not want to know what the strategy is going to be as we expand the defense alliance that involves possible commitment of American forces and the possible—in fact, automatic, if there is an article V protection for full NATO members, an automatic basic nuclear umbrella being extended, meaning that we are willing to, in an extreme situation, use nuclear weapons, if we have to, to defend our allies. That is a serious undertaking.

I am not sure why there is any reluctance to ask the President to tell us what the strategy is. Is that something we do not want to know? If he cannot give us the complete strategy, and if he says there are certain contingencies, fine, that is what he will answer. But why should we be afraid to ask the question? I am not sure why we would not want to ask the question of whether it is going to involve prepositioning American equipment and how much that is going to cost. Why would we not want to know the answer to that?

I am not sure why we would not want to know the answer to whether air forces are going to be involved, or whether there is going to be forward stationing of ground forces. Are we really going to expand the alliance and not ask ourselves those questions? I am puzzled.

I am not sure why we would not want to know the extent to which prospective new NATO members have achieved, or are expected to achieve, interoperability of their military equipment, air defense systems, and command, control, and communica-

tions systems and conformity of military doctrine with those of NATO.

That is the purpose of the Partnership for Peace. That is what they have been doing for the last 3 years. Why are we reluctant to ask the question? I am not sure why we would not want to know the extent to which the new NATO members have established democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of their armed forces, including parliamentary oversight of military affairs and appointment of civilians to senior defense position, and the rule of law.

Is there reluctance to find out or get the assessment of the President of the United States sometime next year, giving him plenty of time? This is not something we are going to have answers to tomorrow or the next day. It is not going to come until January of next year.

One of our colleagues said that, of course, the answers would vary as to whether Mr. Zyuganov is elected or Mr. Yeltsin is elected. Precisely. I would assume that any President would take that into account before they filed a report next January. If they did not, then I would be amazed. Certainly, the circumstances will make a difference.

I do not know why we would not want to know the extent to which the prospective new NATO members are committed to protecting the rights of all of their citizens, including national minorities.

Is there someone that does not want to ask that question? Is that a painful question to ask? I know the Senator from Connecticut made the statement—and I think he is right—that one advantage of NATO is to keep the countries from having armed conflict with each other. Certainly, that is the case, I think, in the case of two allies, Greece and Turkey. Their membership in NATO has helped prevent that—although the animosities are, unfortunately, still present.

Why would we not want to know something about the treatment of national minorities? It seems to me that was a fundamental question that should have been asked by our allies and the United States of the newly emerging states in the former Yugoslavia before we recognized them. We should have asked the question about their treatment of minorities and their respect for human rights and their rule of law.

Is there really a sentiment in the Senate that we do not want to know the answer to that question, or we do not even want to ask it? Is that tilting? It does not seem to me that it is.

Is there somebody who does not want to ask the question whether the prospective new NATO members are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area? Is that a painful question? Is this some kind of inside-the-beltway steamroller that is going so strong with people, having taken positions

about NATO expansion and not asking these questions, that we cannot ask them now? What is going on?

Are the American people not entitled to know what it is going to cost? Are they entitled to know whether we are going to forward deploy our forces? Are they entitled to know whether we are going to preposition our equipment? Or are they at least entitled to have the President tell the Congress what we are going to do in terms of strategy? Some of it may be classified. Is that something that we are going to do, put blinders on and say, let us charge out and see who can take the strongest stance and expand NATO the quickest, without asking questions? Is that what our colleagues are concerned about?

I know that there are people who have taken the position we should expand NATO. I think there is a case that we should. I, myself, believe we should expand NATO. I believe that the logical step, though, as the Senator from New Jersey said so well, is to make sure that countries which are not now under military threat secure their economy and their political system.

I really find it a little puzzling that some of our European colleagues could say it is too difficult to expand the European Community. They need access to trade. What they need is markets. It is too difficult to decide whether we are going to let new countries in that grow vegetables and they might ship them across the border. It is easier for the U.S. to extend a nuclear guarantee. I mean, we can be the country that decides that question, but we do not want to ask the question.

I mean, is it really harder to open up markets and let countries that are newly emerging and need the markets—is it harder to give them access than it is to extend a nuclear guarantee, saying that if there is a war, we would go even to the extent, in extreme situations, of using nuclear weapons?

Are we basically saying that politicians cannot deal with economic issues; let us all turn it over to the military?

I favor a logical sequence of expansion of NATO. I think it makes all sorts of sense as the European Community expands to take those new members, and, if they meet NATO standards to give them serious consideration for membership, then I think in most cases they would be eligible for membership.

I also think if there is a threat that we ought to be willing to respond to that threat where it makes sense militarily and where we can be effective militarily. If the Russians elect an extremist or nationalist who decides they are going to rebuild the threat against Central Europe, of course, we ought to be alert to that. The difference now though is that—in the cold war we may have had 15 days of warning time or we may have had 3 months warning time of any kind of attack—now all of our intelligence and military people would tell us we have years of warning time;

years of warning time before any kind of threat to certainly some of the countries that we are talking about taking in.

Does anyone really not want to ask the question, and ask the President to think before we agree to immediate expansion of NATO, of the effect on Ukraine? If you look at the map, Ukraine geographically may be the most vulnerable and may be the most important country to retain its sovereignty. But if they are not going to be in the first tier, not going to be part of NATO but we expand NATO and nationalism kicks up in Russia in response to it and they start basically putting pressure on Ukraine, are we ready to deal with that, or do we not want to ask that question?

Is that one that is too hard to ask? Should we restrain ourselves and not ask it because it might be a hard question?

What about the Baltics? What about the countries that have been suppressed for years and years by the former Soviet Union that are now not only building their own sovereignty but are doing pretty well in democracy, and in their economy? If they get left out of the NATO expansion in the first round, are they likely to come under real pressure from a nationalistic kind of response in Russia? Is this something we do not want to think about? Do we want to just say let us not think about it?

Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to work out language. I think there are some questions that can be added to this.

Certainly it seems to me that every question in here is relevant, and every question in here I would be appalled if I did not think the President of the United States leading our country as Commander in Chief had thought through these questions before we make the final decisions. I would be appalled if I did not think NATO had thought through them.

I know they have not all been thought through now. I understand that. But by the time NATO makes these decisions, if they do not ask themselves these questions, and if our leadership in the Congress does not ask these questions, and if the President does not ask these questions, then we are not fulfilling our constitutional obligation to the American people.

Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to work with people on this amendment. I find it a little bit puzzling that the argument is being made that this amendment asking the questions might place some adverse effect on the Russian elections when we are asking the questions but a NATO expansion amendment that pushes forward with it that is put on the Foreign Relations appropriations bill today has no bearing.

One amendment—this one—asks the questions. How could that have an adverse effect on the Russian elections when NATO let us expand quickly and

let us pick out the members by a legislative fiat amendment, basically which is put on the Foreign Relations Committee bill the same day? I find that also puzzling.

Mr. President, these are all questions that need to be asked. I will not be here when this debate takes place next year, or whenever it takes place, on the NATO expansion. But I will be watching the debate as will other people all over this country, and I will certainly hope that all of these questions would have not only been asked but also to the best extent possible been answered.

You cannot forecast every scenario and every possible type of conflict. But that does not mean you do not have a strategy.

Is the NATO strategy something we cannot talk about? For 45 years we have had a strategy in NATO. The first report out of the U.S. Senate was on NATO's strategy; a critique of it. It was not classified. We had a strategy. We had a strategy of forward defense. America has had a strategy for years not only of conventional deterrence in NATO that was avowed, but we had a declared open strategy of being willing to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack. That was not a secret. Maybe somebody did not know it. But we had that as a strategy. That was part of our strategy. If the NATO alliance were overwhelmed with conventional weapons, we reserved the right by declaration of being the first ones to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to that. That was our strategy; an open declared strategy.

Now are we going to expand NATO and not have a strategy? Is that what we are being told? If so, then I dissent.

NATO has to have a strategy. That is why when the politicians start telling the military, "OK. Folks, it is too hard to talk about economic expansion. It is too hard to talk about access to markets. Those are tough questions. But you go out and you expand and give these military guarantees, and we are not going to ask any hard questions about how you are going to do it."

Well, if we ever have to do it, if there is ever a threat and we have to respond, we will demand that our military have thought through that strategy, and any of them who have not in leadership positions would be properly criticized. They would not have fulfilled their duty, and they know that. That is why they are busy scratching their heads with these questions, and basically trying to figure some of them out when we may be reluctant to even ask them to think about it.

Mr. President, I find it puzzling. But I am sure that we can continue to work and perhaps work out some language on this. I can assure my colleagues, if we do not work out language now, we will be revisiting this issue this year because at least I am determined that we have a framework—a kind of framework that the American people have every right to expect of us where the Congress of the United States will be

called on to ratify this treaty, this expansion of the NATO alliance. We will be called on to ratify it, and I think our constituents—the American people—have every right to expect that we will be asking these questions and that President Clinton, or President Dole, or whoever is President, when this decision is made will have asked and have a projection of the answers to these kinds of questions.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAMS). The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I wanted to just talk for a moment or two about the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Georgia dealing with NATO expansion.

Obviously, the immediate step that both NATO and the United States and Central Europe have talked about is the potential of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary jointly. There are other countries that wish to join as well, and in time they will be evaluated and pass the standards that have already been developed.

While this amendment is put in the framework of asking a whole series of new studies, I compare it to the old-style Mississippi literacy test because it is this Senator's belief that they are designed to have the same effect. That is to take on the pretense of a study or ascertaining a fact, but in reality to simply flatly prohibit anyone from ever entering.

I understand that is not the intent of the Senator from Georgia, and I do not mean to attribute that intent to him, but that is my belief of its impact.

I wanted to deal specifically with one of the issues raised, and that is the cost. The amendment discusses a study done by the Congressional Budget Office as to what it might cost to defend Central Europe. Mr. President, the question is not the cost of defending Central Europe in the event of a military conflict. With all due respect, it is the difference in cost of defending Central Europe if they are part of NATO and if they are not part of NATO.

You do not have to have a CPA to figure out this question. If 400,000 Polish troops are on your side instead of opposed to you, does it cost more to defend Central Europe or does it cost less? That is why I feel this the amendment is so ludicrous. Of course it is better to have 400,000 Polish troops on your side than opposed to you. Of course it is in your interest to have the Czech Republic on your side rather than opposed to you. Of course it is in

your interest to have Hungary on your side rather than opposed to you. Does a war cost less if they are on your side than if they are opposed to you? Of course it does. This is phrased in the terms of reference of the Congressional Budget Office—how much more does it cost to do it?

That is stupidity. I am not referring to individuals. I am referring to concept. The question is not what it costs to defend them. The question is, what does it cost if we do not defend Central Europe? To suggest that if you have more allies and more troops and more strength it is more costly to defend that than with less is not a serious question. To ask if it increases your cost to have a bigger enemy or a smaller enemy, I do not think is a serious question.

Now, what is the question? The question is basically this. Do we want to recognize a sphere of influence by Russia over the future fate and defense policies of Central Europe? That is the real question that we have to address. My sense is that if we are clear that they must be masters of their own destiny, or at least have that option, we put the question to rest. It would be solved. It would be decided. But if we leave it open, as has happened the last 4 years, then we invite people in countries that might want to control Central Europe to imagine that we would sit idly by and allow them to dictate their future.

Mr. President, if there is a lesson that comes out of World War II, it is that uncertainty as to your intentions can be devastating at times. But I hope we will debate that issue, because a sphere of influence is a reasonable debate. It is an important question. It may be there are those who think giving others a control, a sphere of influence over Central Europe is a wise policy that will placate them. That may well be. There is a case to be made there, a debate to be had. But to suggest it is less costly to have troops and allies based on the other side than our side I do not believe is a serious question.

I must say, Mr. President, there is a suggestion here that somehow we are going to be the ones to pay for the troops in Poland and pay for the troops in Hungary and pay for the troops in the Czech Republic. No one from those countries has suggested that. They have not asked for it. We have not volunteered it. I do not think it makes any sense, nor should it. But I do think it makes sense for them to be on our side and not opposed to us.

We have talked about sharing surplus material with them as we do with other countries around the world. But let me suggest that there is a real plus in the development of joint material with those countries. It helps develop a common bond, a bigger production base and more unity, and I think it is worth pursuing. So I hope we will discuss the issue and debate it and will move quickly on it. But I think it is a mis-

take for us to hold out a hand of friendship and then not answer their question when they ask to stand side by side with us. If we really want someone else to have a sphere of influence over them, we ought to be straightforward enough to say it. I think it would be a bad policy, but we ought to be straightforward about it. But year after year after year to say:

Oh yes, we want you as part of NATO but just not this year.

Well, when?

Well, maybe next year. Maybe the year after. We are certainly talking about the year after that.

These are smart people. They are not foolish. If we treat them that way they will understand what is happening to them and they will react. Is it in our interests to give the back of our hand to people who want to be our friends and allies, our comrades? I do not think so. But we ought, at least, to be straightforward.

If the question is recognized sphere of influence of other countries over them, we ought to at least face up to that. But if we think they should have an opportunity to be independent and free, and this country stood for that for a long, long time, and we think the addition of their forces standing side-by-side with ours would make that more likely to be realized, their freedom and long-term independence, then we ought to get on with it. We should not play games. A 2- or 3-year study on top of 4 or 5 years of study is not a way to decrease our problems.

I yield the floor.

Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I am not sure what our state of affairs is, but I wonder if I may speak as in morning business for 3 or 4 minutes.

Mr. NUNN. Yes, we are waiting on amendments. There is an amendment pending, a NATO amendment, my amendment, but it is temporarily laid aside so if anyone wants to bring a defense-related amendment in we would welcome it.

In the meantime, we will all be fascinated with the Senator's remarks.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I appreciate my friend from Georgia. I am sure he will be fascinated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ENERGY POLICY CONSERVATION ACT EXTENSION

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I would like to bring the attention of this body to a piece of legislation that is pending, S. 1888, the Energy Policy Conservation Act extension. I think my friend from Georgia will find it does have an application to the defense of our Nation, because this bill is very simple, and its immediate passage is extremely important to our Nation's