

the Government. For reasons that I find a little hard to understand, there was not a recognition that this was a shared responsibility. It was as much the responsibility of the White House as it was Members of Congress because the President vetoed the reconciliation package which would have basically kept the Government going. He vetoed about six of the appropriations bills and signed the others. Those would have funded the Government.

So the responsibility is very much that of the executive branch—the President and the White House—as we reflect on the last attempt at a fiscally responsible effort to try to address what the public wants, what we know is good for the country, and that is the realistic balanced budget process. Unfortunately, that process, in the opinion of the Senator from Alaska, has failed as a consequence of the inability of the administration to recognize that we simply have to reduce the rate of growth of Government. That does not mean we have to cut programs. We simply reduce the rate of growth.

That was so evident in the debate over Medicare. We are not cutting Medicare payments. Medicare payments would increase each year. But the rate of growth would be reduced from nearly 10 percent to somewhere in the area of 6 percent.

So, Mr. President, again as we reflect on where we are, and the coming crisis with the debt ceiling, it is a responsibility of the administration and the President to recognize that it is not in the interest of the country to proceed with a debt ceiling increase without a realistic way to address a process that will achieve a balanced budget in 7 years.

So I urge my colleagues to reflect on just where we are going and the significance that. If we all believe in a balanced budget and we still do not have the self-discipline in the process to recognize that somehow we are going to have to achieve a balanced budget in a meaningful way and we have at the same time the obligation to increase the debt authorization of this country—there is a direct connection between the two. If we believe in a balanced budget, we should know that to increase the debt authorization without a realistic way of balancing the budget is basically irresponsible in the long-term for the fiscal and monetary policy of this country.

Our debt has to be brought under control and the spiral of its increase has to be reversed. And we run the risk of increased interest rates on that debt. So, Mr. President, we should make the necessary corrections now by having as part of the debt ceiling increase a realistic accord on a balanced budget process that is meaningful and achievable.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all quorum calls during the designated period for morning business be equally divided.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Alaska suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask that I be recognized to speak as if in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is advised that we are currently in morning business until 1 o'clock with the time divided between the two leaders.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair. (The remarks of Mrs. FEINSTEIN and Mr. D'AMATO pertaining to the introduction of S. 1547 and S. 1548 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THOMAS). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise today on behalf of the minority leader and our Democratic caucus to ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of the bill to increase the debt limit. I will explain in just a moment my intention and the reason I offer this unanimous-consent request.

All of us understand what we have just been through in this past year. We have been through a pretty difficult time. We have struggled as between different philosophies on a range of issues, and we have seen Government shutdowns on two occasions. We have seen and heard people boast about potentially not extending the debt limit and causing a default on the debt. So we have been through a very difficult period.

I think most Members on both sides of the aisle would like very much never to see that repeated. I do not know of anyone who has a continued appetite to see another Government shutdown. I frankly do not know of anyone who, at this point, thinks it would be a good idea if this country were to default on its debt. And yet, we are now at about February 1 and at the end of this month, the Secretary of the Treasury indicates that he will not have the re-

sources with which to meet the requirements to repay the bonds that exist, and there would be a default unless the debt limit is extended.

Some say, "Well, let us wait until the end of February, until we have done certain things to find a way to reach an agreement between this party and the other party." I understand that, and I understand the reason why some would like to postpone this for a while.

On the other hand, there are others of us who are anxious that we move as quickly as we can to get something into a conference so we have some movement on extending the debt limit, so we can tell the people of this country that we are working on it and making progress on it. To wait for the final 3, 4 days or the final week prior to the need for a debt limit extension, prior to default, does, it seems to me, given the circumstances of the last year, create a condition that could provide some risk. That is why some of us feel that this would be the time to move a piece of legislation that would increase the debt limit and move that into a conference.

So with that purpose in mind, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of a bill, now at the desk, to increase the debt limit, that the bill be read a third time and passed and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. COATS). Is there objection?

Mr. LOTT. Reserving the right to object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The assistant majority leader and Senator from Mississippi is recognized.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I certainly understand why the distinguished Senator from North Dakota would make this effort at this time. I point out, I still believe, I still hope that there is an opportunity for a budget agreement. I am an incurable optimist. The President has indicated he is willing to continue that effort. I know there are informal discussions going on at the staff level.

The problem with debt limits, as the Senator well knows from his days in the House in particular, even in the Senate, is that there are some Senators and some Congressmen who would prefer not to vote for a debt limit going over \$5 trillion for the first time in history until there is some guarantee that there is going to be fiscal restraint, that there is some budget agreement that will control the rate of growth of spending, control the annual deficits and the debt.

If there is any hope that we might get an agreement, then certainly a good place to consider putting that would be on the debt limit. Plus, there also continues to be an effort across the aisle in a bipartisan way, in the House and Senate, to come to a bipartisan coalition agreement. It looks to me like good progress has been made in that area.

I have looked at the numbers from the coalition group and the numbers in the House and both of them are actually better than the results of the discussions between the President and the leaders in Congress from both sides of the aisle.

That may be the way to do this: Get a budget No. 3 that we can vote on that would have broader bipartisan support than we had earlier. Once again, maybe put it on the debt limit and move it forward. Or in addition to that, I do know the House is meeting this week and they are looking at other alternatives as to how that might be considered.

So, in an effort to get it through the House and get it through the Congress and get it to the President, we want to make sure we thought it through carefully, have done it right. We do not want to go through a futile exercise of getting something to the President he will veto.

I assume there is a time sensitivity, although the Secretary of the Treasury indicated there were going to be real problems last November, and while he was working to avoid those problems, now we do not really know where the problem does develop. Is it the middle of February, the first of March, middle of March, or can we go on indefinitely by actions of the Secretary of the Treasury?

I do not think he can go on indefinitely, but I do know that the intention of the majority leader is that we act on this in a timely fashion, and the House and the Speaker are acting on some legislation that will allow us to act probably the week of February 26, maybe before that. If we can come to some sort of agreement, maybe we can do it before that.

But I think just to move it here at this point would be a futile exercise and maybe even would be unhelpful in trying to get an agreement.

So at this point, Mr. President, I object to the request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, the Senator from Mississippi is absolutely correct that a logical place to increase the debt limit would be in a budget agreement, and if there is a budget agreement—and I hope there is—then obviously the debt limit should be increased in that agreement.

The dilemma is, the Moody's organization last week served notice publicly, because of the potential of a default, because of the potential that perhaps the debt limit will not be extended, because of the potential that there might be some who want to use the debt limit as leverage, and the ultimate leverage, of course, being default if there is not a budget agreement, because of that, Moody's has indicated they are taking a look at whether to downgrade the creditworthiness of U.S. Government bonds.

It seems to me that ought to be a warning to all of us that we ought not fool around with this question of the grading of Government bonds and the creditworthiness of Government bonds.

This is a very important issue. The Senator from New York, Senator MOYNIHAN, has spoken at some length on it. I say to the Senator from Mississippi, I know that Senator DOLE is not in any way suggesting that he would want to default. In fact, I do not think Senator DOLE felt that the Government shutdowns were the way to run the Government. So I am not suggesting that there are those whom we are discussing at this point who believe this would be a wise course. I think there are some in the Congress who probably have said in the past, "It does not matter to us if we do not pay the bondholders 30 or 60 days afterward," the implication of that suggesting that default certainly is an option as one of the pieces of learning we will use in the negotiations.

So many of us feel that rather than waiting until it is too late, let us start early here and be offering some UC requests to see if we cannot move this along. I know the minority leader has indicated that when the Senate is in session during this month, he feels that we should be offering requests. I am offering this on his behalf today to extend the debt limit. And, again, I understand the reasons for the objection today. My hope would be that in the days ahead we will find a way to advance this through the Senate and go to conference so we can send a message to the country and the world that no one around here will play with the creditworthiness of this country. No one will use the issue of default as leverage in this context. I think most of us believe that would be terribly, terribly risky, and a very unsatisfactory outcome.

So I understand the point the Senator from Mississippi has made. I hope he understands why I have offered this today. He would expect to see it offered again in the days ahead when the Senate is in session.

I would like to, if I might, Mr. President, propound a question to the Senator from Mississippi. Although we are in session today—

Mr. LOTT. If the Senator will yield first, because I think he is fixing to change the subject, I want to get this into the RECORD.

I think there is some question, also, just for the information of the Senators, about the Senate acting first on a clean debt ceiling, whether this is a revenue effort under those conditions and therefore subject to a point of order. I make that observation. I am not pursuing it at this point.

For the information of the Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point the history, going back to 1984 through 1990, of how debt ceilings were extended and the riders that were added to those debt ceiling bills in order for them to be

able to complete and go through the process.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LEGISLATIVE RIDERS ON PAST DEBT LIMIT
EXTENSIONS
1990—H.R. 5355

Passed by the House, but not by the Senate. Would have increased the debt ceiling by \$322 billion to \$3.444 trillion. Rider: Amended the rules on sequestration to exempt Social Security.

1989—H.R. 3024

Increased the debt ceiling by \$70 billion for the period from August 7, 1989, through October 31, 1989. Rider: Made changes regarding the current accrual value of certain obligations issued on a discount basis.

1989—H.J. RES. 280

Increased the debt ceiling to \$3.1227 trillion. Rider: Repealed Section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code (relating to health benefits provided under certain discriminatory employee benefit plans).

1987—H.J. RES. 324

Increased the debt ceiling to \$2.8 trillion. Rider: Gramm-Rudman II, which contained provisions relating to sequestration, overall budget caps, and budget process reform.

1986—H.J. RES. 668

Increased the debt ceiling by \$189 billion for the period from October 21, 1986, through May 15, 1987. Rider: This debt limit was attached to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986.

1985—H.J. RES. 372

Increased the debt limit to \$2.0787 trillion. Rider: Gramm-Rudman Deficit Control Act, which contained provisions relating to sequestration and set overall budget caps.

1985—H.R. 3721

Increased the debt ceiling to an amount no greater than \$1.9038 trillion for the period from November 14, 1985, to December 6, 1985. Rider: Contained riders that delayed the effective dates of the following provisions by one month: Tax increase on cigarettes; section 285 of the Trade Act of 1974; section 10(d) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act and, section 5(c) of the Emergency Extension Act of 1985.

1984—H.R. 5692

Increased the debt ceiling by \$30 billion to \$1.520 trillion. Riders: Allowed the Treasury to hire experts or consultants as contract employees. Reimburse the State Department for health and medical services provided to overseas employees; maintain uniforms provided to Treasury employees; provide athletic services for students at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia; install fencing, guard booths, lighting, and other maintenance for Treasury Department facilities and enter into reciprocal assistance with state and local law enforcement agencies.

Mr. LOTT. Now I will respond to another question.

Mr. DORGAN. I think it might be worthwhile to put in the RECORD the reports of last week by the Moody's organization about the evaluation of the potential downgrading of Federal bonds. That might describe in some more detail the issue of the risks that some of us are concerned about. I ask unanimous consent that the report I cited be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. DEBT RATING THREATENED

Alarmed by the protracted budget brawl in Washington, a venerable Wall Street credit rater is threatening to downgrade America's prized triple-A rating if the deadlock forces the government to default on its debts for the first time.

The unprecedented warning Wednesday from Moody's Investors Service, which has been judging borrower credit worthiness for nearly a century, would mark a stunning blow to the U.S. government's credit standing and sully the pristine status of \$397 billion in Treasury debt with interest due in coming months.

The warning marked the bluntest negative reaction from the financial world so far to the possibility that Uncle Sam might renege on a pledge to repay borrowed money, which has never happened and has helped make U.S. government IOUs the safest and most coveted securities in the world.

"This is a wake-up call," said Mike Casey, an international economist at Ramirez Capital Consultants Inc., a New York investment research firm.

Moody's said it was obliged to make the warning because "the positions being taken in the current debate over the budget and the debt ceiling have significantly increased the risk of a default on the above-mentioned security obligations."

It said the possible downgrade doesn't reflect "any underlying deterioration in the fiscal position of the United States Government, but rather from the peculiar circumstances surrounding the present political controversy over the direction of federal economic and social policy."

Some congressional Republicans have threatened to allow the government to default if the Clinton administration doesn't capitulate on spending cuts in the battle to balance the federal budget. The administration has said Congress must raise the \$4.9 trillion debt limit by March 1 or a default could result.

Although most economists say the possibility of default remains extremely remote, many still regarded the Moody's warning as a sobering reminder that it's not possible.

"In a sense it's like nuclear warfare," said Robert Brusca, chief economist at Nikko Securities International in New York. "If it happens it's a terrible problem. But nobody thinks it's going to happen."

The Moody's warning coincided with conciliatory moves in the budget battle, and House Speaker Newt Gingrich said he wanted to avoid a default. But it was unclear whether Gingrich also was speaking for more militant Republicans, many of them freshmen in the House, who have used the threat of default as a bargaining tactic.

After a meeting with Gingrich Wednesday evening, one freshman congressman, Rep. David McIntosh, R-Ind. said his class was "pretty much on board" with the speaker.

Moody's said it was placing Treasury bonds and notes with interest payments due Feb. 29 and April 1 "on review for possible downgrade."

The rating agency didn't make clear what these securities would be downgraded to. But the loss of triple-A status could make it more expensive for the Treasury to borrow, adding billions of dollars in extra interest to the government's overall debt and reverberating throughout the economy with pressure for higher interest rates.

Bond prices were sharply lower by midday today, continuing a slide that began late Wednesday afternoon as word of the Moody's announcement spread. But traders said prices were falling for other reasons as well.

Standard & Poor's Corp., another leading debt-rating service, made similar warnings

on Nov. 10, when the issue of a possible default first arose in the budget negotiations. Still, the wording of the Moody's announcement was far more blunt and specific, referring to particular groups of medium- and long-term Treasury bonds that would be affected.

S&P said a spokesman that it is examining the spillover effects of a potential default of U.S. Treasury securities and expects to make an announcement about that in the next several days.

Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin responded to the Moody's announcement with a brief statement expressing his belief that the debt impasse will be resolved by the end of February.

Some Wall Street economists theorized that Moody's made the warning partly because of sensitivity to the credit-rating industry's past failures to forewarn of brewing financial debacles.

Just in the past few years, for example, both Moody's and Standard & Poor's have been rebuked for failing to sound the alarm on impending crises in Mexico and Orange County, Calif., which cost investors huge losses.

"Moody's and S&P have caught a lot of grief in the past," said Casey. "They have lot of history of locking the barn door after the cows have gone."

Mr. DORGAN. Let me ask the Senator from Mississippi a question about something that will come up later this week that I know is important to many of us, including the Senator from Mississippi. We are in session today on Tuesday and we do not have recorded votes and will not have recorded votes Wednesday. We will have recorded votes on Thursday. My understanding, from the discussion I had with the majority leader last Friday, was that on Thursday of this week we would be turning to the issue of the farm bill. I am very concerned about trying to get us to move a piece of farm legislation.

I know there are people with very different views about what kind of farm bill would best serve the interests of family farmers in this country in the future. Some say, the so-called Freedom to Farm Act must be passed, or else. Others say that there is the Farm Security Act's marketing loans, and other things. In your part of the country, in Mississippi, we are in the circumstance where farmers are ready to go into the fields at some point soon. I confess that, as of an hour ago when I last talked to somebody in North Dakota, there is not anybody close to starting up a tractor and going into a field today because it is awfully cold there today. But down south people are close to starting to want to do spring's work. In our part of the country, farmers want to talk to bankers and to their agribusinesses about the farm plan. They want to know under what conditions will they plant this spring, and what will the farm program be? We were supposed to have passed a 5-year plan last year. There was one put in the reconciliation bill, which everybody knew would be vetoed. We have nothing at this point.

My hope is that we can work together, Democrats and Republicans, and if we need to demonstrate a burst

of bipartisanship here, there is no place better to do that than on a farm bill. Your farmers have the same needs as mine. I have strong feelings about what we ought to do, and I know others do as well. Especially, we owe them an answer. I hope very much that, come Thursday—I think we will have a couple of cloture votes on a couple of different plans, and perhaps we will not invoke cloture on either. If that is the case, I hope we can find a way Thursday to advance some kind of basic farm plan in order to put it into conference so we can work hard in the next week or so and finally move a farm plan out of the Congress. Farmers deserve that. We owe that to them.

I ask the Senator from Mississippi his view on the urgency of this, and whether he thinks that we are going to be able to move forward Thursday with some dispatch to deal with this issue.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, in responding to the Senator from North Dakota, he brought back memories of bipartisan efforts in the past on the farm bill. I think it was maybe 1982. I remember that at the time I was in the House and I was the minority whip. At that time, the majority whip was a fellow named Tom Foley. We were working on the farm bill. It was very delicate and tedious. Everybody wanted a farm bill, but some of the people did not necessarily want to go on record voting for that particular version. I remember even exchanging vote counts with the majority whip. We managed to get a pretty good farm bill through, but one that was pretty evenly divided between the two parties. So that is always the way it should be done. I think usually that is the way agriculture policy is developed, in a bipartisan way.

I do agree that there is an urgency, too. During the years I have been a Member of Congress, I never had to go back home in February—that is when we start going into the field in my State—to tell farmers that we do not have a farm bill. They do not know what to expect. There has never been an instance where I recall where we let existing law expire, which opens the door to utilizing outdated, expensive, and ineffective 1938 and 1949 so-called permanent laws. That is what is about to happen. If we do not do something on this, we are going to revert back to the so-called permanent law. That causes all kinds of confusion not only for the farmers, but the lenders and the suppliers, which are an important part of the economy in my State and, I know, in your State. Even the Secretary stated that reversion to the permanent law has all kinds of problems. Authorization for wheat, feedgrains, and rice programs under current law have already expired. So there is an urgency.

I know the Senator from North Dakota knows that an effort is underway now where Senators and their staffs are working on what is the best approach. We did have the farm bill that was in the reconciliation package, as

the Senator said. It was vetoed by the President. Some of us would like to look at that as a base and maybe make some changes. I know the Senator has a different approach. We are working on what is the best procedure to get an agreement, and we are going to try to have some understanding worked out later on today—hopefully very shortly—as to exactly what votes will occur Thursday on or in relation to agriculture legislation. We are going to be very careful to be fair in how we proceed and give those who have different views a chance to make their case, and have one or more cloture votes, but try to make an effort to get this issue moving in such a way that maybe we can get into conference and work out an agreement that we can get to the President in the shortest possible period of time. So we are working right now on a unanimous-consent agreement that would get us into consideration on Thursday that would allow for a vote or votes to occur and try to find a way to move it forward.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Mississippi.

One of the dilemmas here is that the farm bill, which was placed in the reconciliation bill and passed last year and vetoed, would have eliminated the permanent law, the 1949 act. Many of us had great concern about that. There are new and innovative ways to deal with the issue of payments, and other approaches in the short term. But in the long term we feel strongly that the needs of a network of family farms will only be met if we retain some kind of permanent authority for farm legislation. But I guess the point I was making—and I am comforted some by the Senator's comments—I think at the end of Thursday we need to have found a way to reach agreement on something that we can move into conference that builds a bridge between the various proposals that now exist. I think we have not seen much bipartisanship in the last year or so. In fact, it has been some while beyond that, I guess. If ever we need a burst of strong bipartisanship, it is to find a way to move this farm legislation forward.

I look forward to working with the Senator. There is an effort underway; we have a lot of staff people on a bipartisan basis searching for some common ground. Perhaps that will result in the ability to move something on Thursday. Time is very short. It is very urgent that we provide farmers an answer about what will be the conditions under which they plant this spring, what kind of a farm program will exist in this country.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, we also still hope there is the possibility that we would have a vote or votes this week on the telecommunications issue. That has not been clarified yet.

Speaking of bipartisan efforts, that is one where last year a lot of work went into that legislation. It is a very important piece of legislation. I believe it

passed by a vote of something like 81 to 18. It is on the verge of being ready to come out of conference. We hope we can get an agreement worked out on that also sometime today. If we can, we would hope maybe we could have a vote on that also on Thursday.

We could have at least two or three votes on Thursday, both of them on very, very important issues: agriculture and telecommunications. That is almost a year's work. Time is short on both of them. We are going to work very hard to try to get an agreement worked out.

I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FRIST). Without objection, it is so ordered.

TRIBUTE TO THE LATE LT. COL. RICHARD SAKAKIDA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I want to take the floor of the U.S. Senate to tell my colleagues and the people of Hawaii and the country about a Hawaii-born unsung hero of World War II. His extraordinary story has never been fully told.

In a description of Colonel Sakakida's wartime activities, it is written that today Richard Sakakida is alive and well and living in California.

I was deeply saddened by the death last week of Lt. Col. Richard Sakakida near his home in Fremont, CA, after a lengthy illness. Colonel Sakakida, one of America's genuine war heroes, faced death with the same stoicism and dignity as he displayed in facing the dangers of war and the constant pain of his war injuries.

Colonel Sakakida will be mourned by the many who knew him personally or by reputation, including the thousands of Japanese-Americans who followed his footsteps to serve in their country during the Second World War.

He is survived by his beloved wife of many years, Cherry, to whom I offer my deepest condolences.

Colonel Sakakida was a true hero, one whose contributions, tragically, have never fully been recognized by his own Government. His was one of the most amazing stories to come out of World War II.

As a United States Army undercover agent and prisoner of war of the Japanese in the Philippines 50 years ago, he endured isolation, privation, disease, shrapnel wounds, the constant threat of discovery, and unspeakable physical torture in carrying out daring intelligence missions for his country. His sacrifices not only resulted in the advancement of the Allied cause during the Second World War, they reflected a

great sense of duty and personal courage rarely seen even in that great conflict.

As one of the very first Nisei recruited to the United States military service, Colonel Sakakida also helped to pave the way for the thousands of other Japanese-Americans who would make their own contributions to the war effort as members of the famed 100th/442d Regimental Combat Team and the lesser known Military Intelligence Service. Later, though he modestly would have denied this, Colonel Sakakida's achievements opened doors of opportunity in the military and society at large for subsequent generations of Japanese-Americans and other minorities.

In death, as they never were in life, Colonel Sakakida's accomplishments deserve to be remembered and honored. To this end, I hope that Members of Congress will actively support efforts to ensure that his military valor is one day recognized by his Government.

For the benefit of those who do not know this remarkable soldier's story, I ask unanimous consent that a description of Colonel Sakakida's wartime activities as excerpted from "America's Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counter Intelligence Corps" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMERICA'S SECRET ARMY: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
(By Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting)

SAKAKIDA

Of all the unsung heroes of World War Two, Richard Sakakida must rank as one of the most remarkable. For courage, fortitude and loyalty to his adopted homeland there were few to rival him. Yet outside a small circle of veteran CIC agents Sakakida's name is almost unknown, and his extraordinary story has never been fully told.

Richard Sakakida was a native of Hawaii, the son of Japanese parents who had emigrated there from Hiroshima at the beginning of the century. Most Americans would have described him as a Japanese-American, but the Japanese had a special word for such expatriates—Nisei, meaning the firstborn away from the homeland. Educated at a American high school in Honolulu and brought up as an American citizen in a Japanese family, Sakakida was a man of two cultures and two languages. The outbreak of war between America and Japan might easily have led to a hopeless confusion of loyalties in a person of his dual background, but it did not. Like the great majority of Nisei, many of whom were later to distinguish themselves in action against the Germans in Europe, Sakakida firmly considered himself to be an American first and last. In March 1941, nine months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, this resolute, soft-voiced, earnest-mannered young man was invited to put his unusual linguistic and cultural qualifications to practical use by joining the specialist branch of the U.S. Army best able to take advantage of them—the CIC. Along with another young Nisei, Arthur Komori, he was sworn in as a CIC agent in Hawaii with the rank of sergeant. These were the first Japanese-Americans ever to be recruited into the CIC, and they were to be among the handful of their detachment to survive the war against Japan.