

employees of the White House Travel Office whose employment in that Office was terminated on May 19, 1993, for any attorney fees and costs they incurred with respect to that termination.

(b) **VERIFICATION REQUIRED.**—The Secretary shall pay an individual in full under subsection (a) upon submission by the individual of documentation verifying the attorney fees and costs.

(c) **LIMITATION.**—Payments under subsection (a) shall not include attorney fees or costs incurred with respect to any congressional hearing or investigation into the termination of employment of the former employees of the White House Travel Office.

(d) **NO INFERENCE OF LIABILITY.**—Liability of the United States shall not be inferred from enactment of or payment under this section.

## SEC. 2 LIMITATION ON FILING OF CLAIMS.

The Secretary of the Treasury shall not pay any claim filed under this Act that is filed later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

## SEC. 3 REDUCTION.

The amount paid pursuant to this Act to an individual for attorney fees and costs described in section 1 shall be reduced by any amount received before the date of the enactment of this Act, without obligation for repayment by the individual, for payment of such attorney fees and costs (including any amount received from the funds appropriated for the individual in the matter relating to the "Office of the General Counsel" under the heading "Office of the Secretary" in title I of the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1994).

## SEC. 4. PAYMENT IN FULL SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

Payment under this Act, when accepted by an individual described in section 1, shall be in full satisfaction of all claims of, or on behalf of, the individual against the United States that arose out of the termination of the White House Travel Office employment of that individual on May 19, 1993.

This section shall become effective 2 days after the date of enactment.

### DOLE AMENDMENT NO. 3955

Mr. DOLE proposed an amendment to the instruction to the motion to refer the bill H.R. 2937, *supra*; as follows:

In lieu of the instructions insert the following: with instructions to report back forthwith with the following amendment:

#### SECTION 1. REIMBURSEMENT OF CERTAIN ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of the Treasury shall pay, from amounts in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as are necessary to reimburse former employees of the White House Travel Office whose employment in that Office was terminated on May 19, 1993, for any attorney fees and costs incurred with respect to that termination.

(b) **VERIFICATION REQUIRED.**—The Secretary shall pay an individual in full under subsection (a) upon submission by the individual of documentation verifying the attorney fees and costs.

(c) **LIMITATION.**—Payments under subsection (a) shall not include attorney fees or costs incurred with respect to any Congressional hearing or investigation into the termination of employment of the former employees of the White House Travel Office.

(d) **NO INFERENCE OF LIABILITY.**—Liability of the United States shall not be inferred from enactment of or payment under this section.

#### SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON FILING OF CLAIMS.

The Secretary of the Treasury shall not pay any claim filed under this Act that is

filed later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

#### SEC. 3. REDUCTION.

The amount paid pursuant to this Act to an individual for attorney fees and costs described in section 1 shall be reduced by any amount received before the date of the enactment of this Act, without obligation for repayment by the individual, for payment of such attorney fees and costs (including any amount received from the funds appropriated for the individual in the matter relating to the "Office of the General Counsel" under the heading "Office of the Secretary" in title I of the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1994).

#### SEC. 4. PAYMENT IN FULL SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

Payment under this Act, when accepted by an individual described in section 1, shall be in full satisfaction of all claims of, or on behalf of, the individual against the United States that arose out of the termination of the White House Travel Office employment of that individual on May 19, 1993.

This section shall become effective 4 days after the date of enactment.

### DOLE AMENDMENT NO. 3956

Mr. DOLE proposed an amendment to amendment No. 3955 proposed by him to the bill H.R. 2937, *supra*; as follows:

Strike all after the word "section" and insert the following:

#### 1. REIMBURSEMENT OF CERTAIN ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of the Treasury shall pay, from amounts in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as are necessary to reimburse former employees of the White House Travel Office whose employment in that Office was terminated on May 19, 1993, for any attorney fees and costs they incurred with respect to that termination.

(b) **VERIFICATION REQUIRED.**—The Secretary shall pay an individual in full under subsection (a) upon submission by the individual of documentation verifying the attorney fees and costs.

(c) **LIMITATION.**—Payments under subsection (a) shall not include attorney fees or costs incurred with respect to any Congressional hearing or investigation into the termination of employment of the former employees of the White House Travel Office.

(d) **NO INFERENCE OF LIABILITY.**—Liability of the United States shall not be inferred from enactment of or payment under this section.

#### SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON FILING OF CLAIMS.

The Secretary of the Treasury shall not pay any claim filed under this Act that is filed later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

#### SEC. 3. REDUCTION.

The amount paid pursuant to this Act to an individual for attorney fees and costs described in section 1 shall be reduced by any amount received before the date of the enactment of this Act, without obligation for repayment by the individual, for payment of such attorney fees and costs (including any amount received from the funds appropriated for the individual in the matter relating to the "Office of the General Counsel" under the heading "Office of the Secretary" in title I of the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1994).

#### SEC. 4. PAYMENT IN FULL SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

Payment under this Act, when accepted by an individual described in section 1, shall be

in full satisfaction of all claims of, or on behalf of, the individual against the United States that arose out of the termination of the White House Travel Office employment of that individual on May 19, 1993.

This section shall become effective 3 days after the date of enactment.

### THE AMAGANSETT NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1996

#### MOYNIHAN (AND D'AMATO) AMENDMENT NO. 3957

Mr. COHEN (for Mr. MOYNIHAN, himself and Mr. D'AMATO) proposed an amendment to the bill (H.R. 1836) to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to acquire property in the town of East Hampton, Suffolk County, NY, for inclusion in the Amagansett National Wildlife Refuge; as follows:

At the end of the bill, add the following:

#### SEC. 2. CORRECTIONS TO COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES MAP.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior shall make such corrections to the map described in subsection (b) as are necessary—

(1) to move the eastern boundary of the excluded area covering Ocean Beach, Seaview, Ocean Bay Park, and part of Point O'Woods to the western boundary of the Sunken Forest Preserve; and

(2) ensure that the depiction of areas as "otherwise protected areas" does not include any area that is owned by the Point O'Woods Association (a privately held corporation under the laws of the State of New York).

(b) **MAP DESCRIBED.**—The map described in this subsection is the map that is included in a set of maps entitled "Coastal Barrier Resources System", dated October 24, 1990, that relates to the unit of the Coastal Barrier Resources System entitled "Fire Island Unit NY-59P".

### AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

#### COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

Mr. CRAIG, Mr. President, the Finance Committee requests unanimous consent for the full committee to conduct a hearing on Friday, May 3, 1996, beginning at 10 a.m. in room SD-215.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Mr. CRAIG, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Friday, May 3, 1996, at 10 a.m. to hold a closed hearing on intelligence matters.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

#### MEXICO AND DRUGS

• Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. President, next week Secretary Christopher will attend the Annual Bi-National Commission

meeting in Mexico City. Secretary Christopher should use this meeting to convey the United States' deep concern over the pervasive and consistent flow of narcotics from Mexico into the United States. The administration must insist that the Mexican Government make real and substantial efforts to stop the flow of illegal drugs into our country.

Yesterday, the Administrator of the DEA, Thomas Constantine and Attorney General Janet Reno announced the successful completion of law-enforcement operation Zorro II which resulted in the arrest of members of a major Mexican drug cartel. In Zorro II, 130 individuals were arrested for their involvement in a cocaine smuggling and distribution network that had been operating, and flourishing, in the United States. This successful law enforcement initiative is a major victory in the war against the drugs and narcotics-related crimes which are ravaging our cities.

Mr. President, there are daily news reports of rampant corruption and abuse within the Mexican Government involving members of its law enforcement. I will ask to have printed in the RECORD an article from last Sunday's Washington Post, entitled "The Drug Fiefdom of Northern Mexico." According to this April 28 article, "The four main Mexican drug mafias—all headquartered along the 2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border—now supply more than 70% of the cocaine and half of all the marijuana sold in the U.S. The drugs funnel as much as \$30 billion a year in illegal proceeds back into Mexico—more than the country's top two legitimate exports combined."

Maybe the administration and the Mexican Government are finally willing to acknowledge the severity and impact of the drug problem. According to other news reports, Mexican narcotics organizations rely on protection from members of the government, police, and judiciary for their continued success and growth. These drug syndicates then turn to the Mexican banks and exchange houses to launder their dirty money. This incredible expansion of the Mexican narcotics trade and the alleged corruption of Mexican Government officials and business leaders is unprecedented. Unfortunately, Mexico's drug problems are not confined to the south side of our shared border.

Mr. President, I was encouraged to learn that the Mexican Government finally took a long-overdue first step with its enactment earlier this week of an anti-money-laundering bill, but this is only the first step. The true test will be whether, and how, the law is actually enforced. One thing is certain, the defensiveness and reluctance of Mexican officials to acknowledge the severity of the money laundering problem is very disturbing. I am in full support of the recent, and valid, statements made by Thomas Constantine, Administrator for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency regarding this money laundering epi-

demio. Mr. Constantine's leadership in this war on drugs is exemplified by Operation Zorro II's success.

Mr. President, I sincerely hope that strong and decisive action against Mexican drug traffickers is a fundamental part of the administration's recently released 1996 National Drug Control Strategy. On behalf of the administration, and with the support of this Senator, Secretary Christopher should forcefully urge the Mexican Government to cooperate with United States requests for extraditions of Mexican narcotics traffickers and other criminals who have committed heinous acts of violence in the United States. It is a fact that to date, Mexico still has not extradited a single Mexican national convicted of drug trafficking in the United States.

At the Banking Committee's recent hearing, perhaps the most compelling, and disturbing testimony came from T. J. Bonner, a border patrol agent. Mr. Bonner testified about his first hand views of life on the firing lines in this war on drugs. He also provided a disturbing account of the January 1996 killing of Border Patrol Agent Jefferson Barr. Mr. Barr was shot and killed while intercepting a group of Mexican drug smugglers in Eagle Pass, TX. One of Mr. Barr's murderers was identified and located by the FBI in a hospital in Mexico. This killer was charged with murder and the United States is seeking his extradition. But the Government of Mexico has failed to honor this request. This is an outrage and a tragedy. The United States administration must get tough with the Mexican Government and demand their full cooperation in dealing with these criminals.

Mr. President, the flood of narcotics being sent from Mexico to the United States is tearing apart the social fabric of our country. Senator FEINSTEIN and I recently introduced a bill, S. 1547, which would prevent the administration from wasting more taxpayer dollars on the Mexican bailout unless concerted measures are taken to stop the massive flow of narcotics from Mexico into the United States. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. President, the administration must continue to open their eyes to these problems. We cannot pretend as if they do not exist and simply hope they will disappear. As a result of the administration's past neglect and unwillingness to confront the drug problem, the narcotics crisis in this country has escalated in the last 3 years. The administration's charade in declaring Mexico as "fully cooperative" under the Foreign Assistance Act must end. If the Mexican Government wants to pretend there are no problems and feign indignation when confronted with these issues, then they should not expect United States financial support in any form. The future of our country and our children is at stake.

Mr. President, Secretary Christopher should take a strong antidrug message

to Mexico. We must employ every weapon in our arsenal in this war on drugs—diplomatic, financial, enforcement, and education. Every high-level U.S. official must be recruited in our battle with the drug epidemic waging war on this country.

I ask that the Washington Post article, to which I earlier referred, be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 28, 1996]

THE DRUG FIEFDOM OF NORTHERN MEXICO

(By Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson)

NUEVA CASAS GRANDES, MEXICO.—The only sign of prosperity in this bleak desert city, 75 miles south of El Paso, is a gigantic, fake medieval castle rising like a strange mirage above cactus and scrub brush, abandoned houses and closed shops.

Camelot, as the ostentatious, slate-blue disco and concert hall is known, stands as a stark reminder of how the culture of narcotics trafficking can ravage cities as well as people. Bountiful narco-dollars—brought in by drug lords who used clandestine airstrips outside of town for cocaine shipments to the United States—built the castle and fueled an economic boom in the city.

Then, as quickly as the narco-dollars poured in, they suddenly evaporated when the new boss of Mexico's most powerful drug mafia started using Boeing 727 cargo planes to bypass Nueva Casas Grandes and similar cities, transforming their narco booms into recessionary busts.

"The drug dealers brought shoes in by the boxes, but now the money is not coming this way," complained Ricardo Contreras, 24, who shines shoes in the town square.

His is not the only ruined city along the U.S.-Mexican border. The rise and demise of Nueva Casas Grandes reflects how drug trafficking has reshaped the economic, social and political landscape of northern Mexico in the last five years. Shifting dynamics in the international drug trade, as well as growing pressure on traffickers in Colombia, where cocaine largely is produced, have turned this region known for its booming manufacturing industry, burgeoning consumer class and progressive politics into a land of laundered drug money, riddled with corruption and violence.

Northern Mexico's slide toward becoming a new Latin fiefdom for the movement of drugs is a major problem for the United States, long accustomed to viewing the region as a model of development. The four main Mexican drug mafias—all headquartered along the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border—now supply more than 70 percent of the cocaine and half of all the marijuana sold in the United States, in addition to large quantities of heroin and methamphetamine. The drugs funnel as much as \$30 billion a year in illegal proceeds back into Mexico—more than the country's top two legitimate exports combined.

For a decade, northern Mexico has been the embodiment of American hopes about where its southern neighbor was going. It has been the region where private enterprise and export-oriented manufacturing flourishes, where peasants move up from poverty, where the North American Free Trade Agreement is gospel, and where pluralism and the beginnings of real democracy in Mexico have taken root. Now it is threatening to become an enormous menace—an empire of drug lords who smuggle cocaine and weapons across the border, corrupt officials on both sides of the border and terrorize border cities with assassinations.

Here, where the money first arrives from the United States in car trunks, by wire

transfers and—in recent months—through huge third-party check-buying networks, the influence of billions of narco-dollars has become embedded in the culture of the frontier, transcending the usual symbols of drug trafficking: the ostentatious pink mansions of the newly wealthy, the crude graffiti of the multiplying street gangs in border slums, the frequent shootouts between feuding drug factions and the wars between corrupt police units.

The money is financing the businesses where residents eat, play, work, shop and invest. It is altering the lives and health of their children and families, leading to skyrocketing homicide and overdose rates. It is greasing the governments that run the cities, states and nation.

"It is part of everyday life in northern Mexico," said Luis Astorga, a sociologist who has written extensively about the social and cultural impact of the drug trade in his native frontier region. "It cannot be separated from the legitimate economy or the authorities in power."

Northern Mexico has been a major smuggling route since early in this century, when cattle rustler-turned-guerrilla Pancho Villa stormed across the desert frontier fomenting the revolutionary fervor of 1917. It is a vast territory of dry lake beds ideal for landing cocaine-packed jets, scrub desert perfect for eluding border guards, industrial areas with numerous warehouses for stockpiling tons of illegal drugs and border stations where customs officials check barely 5 percent of the 87 million vehicles that cross each year.

The cities of northern Mexico have diverse economies, developed from decades of legitimate cross-border trade and tourism with their richer northern neighbor. The border was crossed last year by about 232 million people, making it the world's busiest international boundary.

It is Mexico's most prosperous and industrialized region, stretching from Tijuana—the country's most visited tourist destination—through dusty desert villages, past grimy Ciudad Juarez on the border and eastward toward the high-rises and belching industries of Monterrey, dubbed the Pittsburgh of Mexico. Despite the country's deepest economic recession in 60 years, northern Mexico's border cities continue to boom, adding jobs in a year of record unemployment nationally and building new industries during a period of unprecedented bankruptcies and collapsing businesses.

But now the underground economy built from decades of smuggling contraband, people and drugs to the United States has become so intertwined with the region's legitimate wealth that the two are almost indistinguishable, according to investigators. The constantly flowing river of people and money—magnified by the North American Free Trade Agreement among the United States, Mexico and Canada—is a perfect disguise for moving drugs in a narco-dollars out of the United States, investigators say.

One highly audible indication of how drug culture has penetrated the north of Mexico is found on the radio airwaves, where the most popular songs are "narco-ballads" about daring trafficking escapades with drug lords as the heroes and police as the bad guys. The songs belt out the tales of mafia rivalries and hapless U.S. drug agents with extraordinarily accurate details of the constantly changing drug world. "Mess with the mafia and pay with your hide," one warns.

While the exact amount of narcotics money flowing back to Mexico is impossible to calculate, Mexican Assistant Attorney General Moises Moreno Hernandez, speaking at a conference last August, estimated that \$30 billion was returned to Mexico in 1994. The U.S. Treasury's Financial Crime En-

forcement Network estimates it at \$10 billion to \$30 billion.

Nowhere are the effects of the drug trade more evident than in booming border cities such as Ciudad Juarez, a roiling metropolis of 1.3 million that is joined by five bridges to El Paso, Tex. Authorities say it is the home of Mexico's most powerful drug cartel.

Despite the nationwide recession, Juarez—along with many of its sister cities along the border—is growing, if not prospering. Employment is up, glitzy new office buildings are under construction, and its bars and restaurants are packed. While much of the city's economic success is the result of legitimate business, a strong industrial base and cross-border tourism from El Paso, city residents from all walks of life say drug money has become so entwined in their local economy that above-board businesses and those financed by narco-dollars are difficult to separate.

The influx of drug money has helped shape the city, from seedy discos and bars that run along the underbelly of downtown Juarez to ritzy country club estates clustered around a green oasis of golf courses in newly developing suburbs.

The Juarez Cartel and the many local organizations that are its subcontractors for transporting the drugs have bought heavily into trucking businesses and car dealerships for their operations. One major trafficking family owns a petroleum company and is said to use its tanker trucks for smuggling drugs, according to U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials. And the boss of the Juarez cartel, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, allegedly owns several small airlines.

In Tijuana, the Arellano-Felix brothers—leaders of the violent Tijuana Cartel—are suspected of using a local racetrack to launder their drug money. Juan Garcia Abrego, the recently arrested head of the Gulf Cartel, reportedly owned more than a dozen used-car and automotive parts stores along the south Texas-Mexican border.

But law enforcement officials and local business leaders say it has become difficult to track the investments of the cartels and their associates. "They're getting much smarter," said a Juarez businessman. "You can't drive down the street anymore and say that and that and that was built by the drug lords. Now they're using middlemen to buy buildings."

For many residents, the map of northern Mexico is determined not by highways and state lines but by the frequently changing territories controlled by drug-trafficking organizations. The areas shift each time a kingpin is assassinated or jailed.

Today, two mafias dominate the region—the Juarez and the Tijuana cartels—and two other powerful groups, the Sonora and Gulf cartels, operate variously at odds or in concert with them. The major trafficking organizations are known by several names, but generally are associated with their areas of geographic control. They, in turn, subcontract the logistics of transporting their drugs among an estimated 250 families and gangs that work specific smuggling routes across the frontier.

The Juarez Cartel, headed by Carrillo, today is undisputedly the most powerful mafia, controlling the central trafficking corridor between Juarez and El Paso. In recent months Carrillo also has begun expanding east into the territory of the Gulf Cartel, which is in disarray after the arrest earlier this year of its alleged kingpin, Garcia Abrego.

Carrillo, who took over the Juarez Cartel after his rival for the leadership was gunned down on a Cancun beach three years ago, is considered the pioneer of the new breed of shrewder, more corporate cartel bosses who shun the limelight.

With many more billions of dollars at risk, Carrillo and his competitors are seldom seen in the restaurants and discos they have built across northern Mexico. They have not given up their lavish lifestyles, but now they entertain in private while threatening local newspaper editors to keep away their photographers. Often traffickers invite well-known music stars to sing for select guests inside well-guarded ranches near their northern Mexico headquarters and lavish compounds in more glamorous parts of the country, such as Guadalajara, Acapulco and other resort areas.

But Carrillo and his counterparts are no less brutal than those before them. Shootouts between rival groups often occur along the border; in some major cities, drug assassinations are nearly a daily occurrence. The victims' bodies are left with the telltale mafia signatures: hands tied and a single bullet in the head.

Last year, the largest cities along the border recorded more than 1,000 slayings, more than half of them drug-related and unsolved. In Tijuana, for example, there were 121 homicides in the last six months, and officials say at least half involved drugs.

Last year in Juarez, homicides were up 25 percent to 295, of which police estimate 70 percent were drug-related. Two years ago, the tortured bodies of the city's newly retired police chief and two of his sons were found in the trunk of their car, which had been parked on one of the busy bridges connecting Juarez and El Paso. Family members said they believed the three were murdered by drug lords who suspected the 26-year veteran policeman of being an informant for U.S. law enforcement officials.

City officials say much of the sharp rise in homicides and other crimes in Juarez is a side effect of the Juarez Cartel's practice of subcontracting its transportation and distribution needs to numerous smaller organizations along the border. Those groups in turn often hire local smuggling families on street gang members to carry the drugs into the United States in the trunks of cars, on the backs of mules in more remote desert areas, or hidden in boxes of tennis shoes, tomatoes or other legitimate commercial items hauled by 18-wheel trucks.

As a result, hundreds of newly created gangs—put at 450 today, up from 120 five years ago—are battling for control of the street sale of drugs in Juarez. In many parts of downtown Juarez, gangs with names such as Los Gatos (The Cats) or El Puente Negro (The Black Bridge gang), the city's most notorious, rule the night and mark their territory with bold spray-painted graffiti.

With so much cocaine entering northern Mexico, an increasing amount never leaves. The Mexican drug cartels often take payment from their Colombian cocaine suppliers in the form of drugs rather than cash—a portion of which they sell locally. Juarez last year reported that drug "shooting galleries" multiplied faster than police could track them.

So while Mexico's national leaders are fond of saying drugs merely pass through Mexico en route to the world's largest consumer market of illegal narcotics, the outspoken mayor of Juarez, Ramon Galindo Noriega, says that is no longer the case. Last year, 90 people died of overdoses—up from four or five the previous year, according to the mayor.

According to court testimony in the United States and U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials, the cartels pay as much as \$500 million a year in protection money to Mexican police, politicians and government officials—from the lowest border guard to the highest reaches of the federal government. Just this month, the governor of the

border state of Nuevo Leon was forced to resign following accusations of mismanagement and drug-related corruption.

In some respects, northern Mexico should have had the best chance of any region of the nation to shake off decades of political corruption and offer tough resistance to the rise of the drug kingpins.

It was the first region of the country where members of the conservative opposition National Action Party (PAN) broke the stranglehold of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), winning governorships, mayoralties and municipal seats with promises of fighting entrenched corruption.

Instead, the drug cartels are more powerful than ever.

One of the first PAN governors in the north, Ernesto Ruffo Appel, former governor of Baja California, said he found drug-based corruption too institutionalized to clean up from the governor's office.

"The system doesn't work," said Ruffo, who works at the national party level. "Everybody's on the take. There's just too much money."

According to many law enforcement officials and political specialists, the institutionalization of corruption is a key milestone in northern Mexico's journey toward becoming a drug fiefdom.

"In the past, you had specific protection rackets that were between particular people," said a U.S. law enforcement official who monitors drug trafficking on the border. "Now you increasingly have protection [for the cartels] regardless of who sits in a particular law enforcement job."

At the low end, police, because of their poor pay, traditionally have been thoroughly corrupted by drug cartels. Police frequently act as bodyguards and assassins for the kingpins, and raging gun battles among local, state and federal police units—some in the pay of the cartels, the others trying to arrest them—are commonplace.

Late one night a few weeks ago, a Wild West-style shootout exploded on the streets of Juarez—police were fighting it out with police.

Carloads of federal police surrounded city police headquarters and within minutes shooting broke out, leaving one federal officer dead on the bloodied pavement and several city police wounded in what many officials described as an outgrowth of simmering tensions between rival drug protection rackets.

"I know I have policemen who are paid by the drug dealers," said Mayor Galindo. "I pay 2,200 pesos [\$297] a month. A drug dealer can give \$1,000 a week for protection. I can't compete. When I listen to the politicians in Mexico City talk about the drug struggle, they don't know what they're talking about. Where can I hire police I can trust?"

A few months before the shootout, Juarez city police—frustrated that their federal counterparts, charged with enforcing drug laws, were taking no action to stop the proliferation of drug shooting galleries in the city—leaked the addresses of 90 known drug houses to a local newspaper. The paper published the list and confronted the federal police, who said they had never been given the list. "We published the list as proof that they'd received it," said an editor. "And they did nothing."

Ruffo and others say even the judicial system has become co-opted, by money or fear. "Judges are afraid they might be killed. It's very risky to confront this," Ruffo said. On that, he shares the pessimism of many in northern Mexico: "If we can't even trust the judicial system, we have nothing."

#### THE MEXICAN FEDERATION

Four organizations dominate the international drug trade in northern Mexico. To-

gether with about a dozen smaller groups, they have been dubbed The Mexican Federation by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and gross an estimated \$10 billion to \$30 billion annually in narcotics sales in the United States. Family ties are important to the groups, most of which can trace their lineage back decades to the cross-border smuggling of contraband such as stolen cars.

#### THE TIJUANA CARTEL

Currently the second most powerful cartel. Considered the most violent of the Mexican organizations. Best known for the ambush of Catholic Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo at Guadalajara Airport in May 1993.

Leaders: Arellano-Felix brothers—Benjamin, Ramon, Javier and Francisco (currently jailed in Mexico)—who are the nephews of Guadalajara Cartel co-founder Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo.

Activities: Controls most of drug smuggling across the California border; has recently diversified to become one of the main suppliers of methamphetamine, consolidating its position through a violent turf war in San Diego.

#### THE SONORA CARTEL

Also known as the Caro Quintero organization; made up of remnants of the old Guadalajara Cartel, best known for the brutal 1985 torture and killing of DEA agent Enrique Camarena.

Leaders/co-founders: Rafael Caro Quintero, under arrest. Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, arrested in 1989, remains a major player from prison.

Acting leader: Miguel Caro Quintero, brother of Rafael.

Activities: Among the first Mexican organizations to transport drugs for the Colombian kingpins. Main trafficking routes through Arizona border area known as "co-caine alley" with movements also coordinated through the Juarez Cartel in the territory controlled by that organization.

#### THE JUAREZ CARTEL

Currently the most powerful of the Mexican cartels.

Leader: Amado Carrillo Fuentes, about 40; took over in 1993. Shuns flamboyant lifestyle of his competitors, and is said to represent a new breed of kingpin who believes in compromising with rivals.

Activities: Carrillo Fuentes pioneered the use of Boeing 727s for bulk shipments of as much as 15 tons of cocaine between South America and northern Mexico. Cartel operates primarily through Juarez-El Paso and surrounding desert along the west Texas and New Mexico borders.

#### THE GULF CARTEL

Once undisputed champ of the Mexican organizations. Cartel's fortunes began to fade about a year ago after its alleged kingpin, Juan Garcia Abrego, 51, had to go underground. He was arrested in January and deported to the United States, where he is standing trial in Houston.

Leader: Oscar Malherve, one of Abrego's top lieutenants and money-launderers.

Activities: Moves drugs primarily through the Texas border region, particularly Matamoros-Brownsville, and along the Gulf coastal shores.●

#### CITY OF MUNISING'S 100TH ANNIVERSARY

● Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise today to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the incorporation of the city of Munising, MI. In the Chippewa language, Munising means Place of the Great Island.

Munising was first founded in 1850 when the Munising Co. bought 87,000 acres of land on the eastern shore of Munising Bay. The land changed hands for the next 20 years as businesses opened and closed in the area.

In 1870, the beginnings of a thriving town were seen. The village of 30 homes was centered around the blast furnace which had just begun producing iron. The village had a blacksmith shop, sawmill, dock, and a government light-house. The village continued to thrive until 1877, when a fire destroyed the whole community.

By 1895, the lumber baron Timothy Nester had acquired 184,000 acres in Munising Bay. He quickly began work on a railroad to connect Munising to South Shore. A town was planned and several buildings were built from the nearby lumber. In January 1896, a post office was opened to serve the town's 500 residents. In March 1896, the village was incorporated and Nester was named president. The new town expanded rapidly and after a year its residents numbered 3,500. The lumber industry would continue to drive the expansion of the village for many years to come.

Today, Munising is a small and vibrant community. Many people from Michigan and around the country come to Munising to experience the many activities its natural beauty has to offer. I know that my Senate colleagues join me in congratulating the city of Munising on its 100th anniversary.●

#### RISE IN DRUG USE

● Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, earlier this week I and several of my colleagues—Mr. COVERDELL, Mr. KYL, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. GRAMM, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. FRIST, and Mr. CRAIG—came to this floor to discuss the disturbing rise in drug use in this country since the beginning of the Clinton administration. Yesterday, the Wall Street Journal editorialized on the same subject. I ask that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

The editorial follows:

#### WAITING TO EXHALE

Now, in April 1996, with eight months left on a four-year term, Bill Clinton flies the press into Miami so he can be seen standing shoulder to shoulder with General Barry McCaffrey, a decorated war hero he's enlisted to lead a war on drugs. Standing among schoolchildren Monday, the President poured his great rhetorical heart onto the drug war. Along the way came these key words: "Make no mistake about it, this has got to be a bipartisan, American, nonpolitical effort." Translation: Don't blame me for this problem, especially during an election campaign.

In fact, Bill Clinton's retreat in the drug war is among the worst sins for which his Administration should be held accountable. After years of decline in drug use, recent surveys make it clear that a younger generation of Americans is again at risk. The number of 12-to-17-year-olds using marijuana increased to 2.9 million in 1994 from 1.6 million in 1992. Marijuana use increased 200% among 14-to-15-year-olds during the same period. Since 1992, according to