

change in consciousness concerning established ones, with government officials approving and even advocating not only larger payouts but a war on shame."

To Olasky, American social-welfare policy has always reflected the dominant theology of the day. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, theology emphasized a merciful but just God and a sinful human nature that only God's grace could cure. This produced a hardheaded approach to social policy: aid to the poor was given in kind, but not in cash; charity, understood as "suffering with" the needy, was personal and paternalistic; material aid was considered secondary to, and dependent upon, saving souls; aid was for the "deserving," not the "undeserving," poor.

But this Calvinist theology lost out in the late 19th century to a universalistic, liberalized view that "emphasized God's love but not God's holiness," that jettisoned belief in original sin for a Rousseau-like belief in the natural goodness of man, and that essentially secularized a whole range of Christian beliefs. The effects on social policy were dramatic and devastating—and, in Olasky's opinion, completely predictable. The state took over the care of the poor, crowding out private charity. Shame and the work ethic were supplanted by the attitude that the poor have a constitutional right—that is, an entitlement—to welfare. Emphasis shifted from improving the spiritual conditions of the poor to improving their material conditions. As Owen Lovejoy, president of the National Conference of Social Work, put it in 1920, the goal would no longer be private salvation but rather the creation of "a divine order on earth as it is in heaven."

Olasky's history describes, in short, a descent, a fall from grace. As a nation, he claims sweepingly, we have been making war not on poverty but on God, and "the corruption is general." Therefore, although he too, like Murray, would tear down the welfare state, he does not expect any sudden alteration in behavior. Rather, he sees in the end of the welfare state an opportunity for private charities, and in particular private religious charities, to take over some of the responsibilities of caring for the poor, especially in the (for him) primary arena of their spiritual needs.

After all, writes Olasky, it was the federal government's entry into the welfare arena that "crowded out" private religious charities in the first place. Remove the government, and the charities will come surging back. Yet he is honest enough to admit that the historical record is not entirely clear on this point: which came first, the increasing involvement of professionals and the government in the lives of the poor, or a decline in voluntarism and religiosity? This is a crucial question, for if something in the culture led to a decline in voluntarism prior to the federal government's takeover of welfare, then a simple withdrawal of the latter will not necessarily lead to an increase in the former.

"In the end," predicts Olasky, "not much will be accomplished without a spiritual revival that transforms the everyday advice people give and receive, and the way we lead our lives." If that were really so, it would be reasonable to conclude that public-welfare programs should not be scrapped at all, but rather kept in place until the hoped-for spiritual revival occurs, lest the poor be left without God and without material support at once. Be that as it may, however, there is much else in Olasky's thinking, particularly about the role of private "compassion," that reformers can make use of in the months and years to come.

This brings us to the third current. Unlike the first two, both of which see big government as the principal culprit in the welfare mess, this one envisions a role for government in its solution.

Perhaps the principal figure here is Lawrence Mead of New York University. In his book, *The New Politics of Poverty*, Mead argues, against Murray, that the marginal economic disincentives created by welfare do not explain the really staggering extent of non-work and family dissolution in the welfare population. Moreover, having a baby out of wedlock in order to receive a welfare check is not really "rational," in Mead's judgment. Rather, this and other aspects of the behavior of the underclass are the results of a certain personality profile. The non-working poor, says Mead, are defeatist, passive, and psychologically resistant to taking low-skilled jobs. A "culture of poverty" exists that cannot be fully explained by the rationalist model.

What to do? The answer, according to Mead, is workfare, an approach that would require able-bodied recipients of welfare to enter the labor market. By forcing the poor to be like the rest of us, workfare seeks to manage and even (in the words of Congressman Bill Archer) to "transform" them.

The thinking of Mead and others who favor workfare—Mickey Kaus of the *New Republic* is another well-known proponent of such schemes—is evident in the various versions of the Republican welfare-reform bill. All include the basic requirement that for any aid poor people receive from the government, they must work, in the private sphere if possible but in the public sector if not. According to the bill, 50 percent of welfare recipients must be working by 2002; even single mothers with children (over the age of one) should be required to work; and families receiving benefits will be cut off after five years.

Mead argues that workfare represents, in effect, a "new paternalism," a "tutelary regime." And indeed his ideas have alarmed more than a few conservatives, especially those of a libertarian bent. Many believe that any attempt by the government to mold behavior, even that of the poor, marks a break from the American tradition of limited government. Such fears are in Mead's view well-founded. But the appearance of the contemporary underclass itself marks, he believes, a watershed development in our national life, if not "the end . . . of an entire political tradition." That tradition—the tradition of the Founders, and of such classical liberals as Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu—"took self-reliance for granted." It assumes that people are, by nature, rational maximizers of their economic interests. But now it appears that many are not; and so a "new tradition," a "new political theory," even a "new political language" is needed.

All this seems somewhat overheated. For some reason, many of those who propose work as a solution to the welfare problem cannot resist militaristic metaphors. (Thus Mickey Kaus, in *The End of Equality*, urges Americans to build a "Work Ethic State.") But we need not really move beyond our own liberal tradition in order to enforce the norm of work. The Founders themselves recognized that humans are frequently irrational, indeed even lazy. And Adam Smith, the classical liberal *par excellence*, was not mincing words when he observed that among the "inferior ranks" of society there was a surfeit of "gross ignorance and stupidity." Rather than positing rational self-interest as a universal human trait, Smith and other classical liberals thought that through persuasion and law, it would be possible to turn men away from their former pursuits of military glory and religious enthusiasm toward "small savings and small gains." A little bit of workfare for those still unmindful of their economic self-interest thus need hardly spell the end of the American political tradition.

What is especially interesting about the three conservative strands of thought about welfare is that despite the theoretical differences among them, together they provide a coherent guide as to how to fix a broken system. As men are not angels, Charles Murray's negative incentives have their place. But neither are men brutes, and hence something more is needed than a "technology" of behavioral change. As Marvin Olasky reminds us, a rebirth of the spirit of religious charity would change many lives for the better. And as Lawrence Mead reminds us, in a commercial republic such as ours, work is the proper condition for all who are able.

Indeed, the politicians have seen the big picture in a way that this perhaps not so easy for the lone social thinker to do. The Republican welfare-reform bills in Congress, along with the many state plans being put into effect by Republican governors, makes use of Murray's incentives, Olasky's religious charities, and Mead's workfare. If there are theoretical and practical difficulties with each of these approaches, it is precisely the combination that may make conservative welfare reform politically palatable and even, in the end, effective.

CONSERVATION AND GRAZING

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise today to express my strong opposition to President Clinton's actions to open our conservation reserve lands to cattle grazing. As someone who is concerned about the environment, I am disappointed by his decision.

The conservation program pays ranchers to take ecologically fragile land out of grazing.

It has been a very successful program and has put away some 36 million acres away as a nature preserve. By removing these acres of land from cattle grazing and creating areas of undisturbed vegetative cover, the program has created habitat for many types of wildlife across the Great Plains and the Midwest, including waterfowl, pheasants, prairie grouse, raptors, and migratory songbirds. These species need undisturbed cover to nest and raise young successfully.

But good green grass is hard to come by. The price of feed is up and the price of cattle is down. For some, the solution to higher beef prices may be to open up restricted land to grazing.

But as Richard Cohen quickly pointed out in today's *Washington Post*, "First the oil reserves, then the conservation reserves and next—maybe—the Federal Reserve."

In the name of environmental protection, this Congress fought off any attempts to allow grazing on ecologically sensitive land.

In fact, in last month's farm bill we provided significant funding for the Conservation Reserve Program and made sure that wildlife habitat was a primary objective of the reserve program.

By opening all 36 million CRP acres nationwide to grazing and haying with few constraints and little apparent consideration for the scope of the emergency, the Clinton administration has eliminated much of the wildlife value of the Conservation Program.

In the Great Plains, it is now nesting season, and if cattle are allowed on the land, ducks and grassland songbirds are going to get trampled.

Grass is growing where it has not grown in years and species that were once threatened are making a comeback. Unfortunately, President Clinton's action probably has negated all that progress this year.

I am also disappointed that the Clinton administration made this decision without consulting the environmental and sportsmen communities. The conservation community, the Agriculture Department, even the environmentalist were surprised, and, frankly, I am surprised.

I keep asking myself how can someone who calls himself an environmentalist justify opening up some of our most fragile and protected areas to cattle grazing?

I believe that President Clinton's actions directly contradicts the belief that the Clinton administration truly cares about the environment.

This situation demonstrates that, once again, the interests of sportsmen, conservationists, and the public still rank far below those of subsidized commodity agriculture.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the Washington Post article to which I earlier referred.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

POLITICS, PRICES

(By Richard Cohen)

What's the most dangerous place in the world? Bosnia? Liberia? Chechnya? Anywhere in Montana? No. The answer is any place between Bill Clinton and reelection. It is a no-man's land where principle is sacrificed to politics and consistency is given scant regard. That explains why the administration moved this week to sell federal oil reserves and open restricted lands to cattle grazing. It wants to lower the price of gas and raise the price of beef.

The average voter, which is to say me, is confused. If I drive a little less but eat more meat, will that balance out? If I drive a lot less and eat more steak, will that be better for the country? If I drive down to see Alan Greenspan, will I get even richer? After all, I sense a pattern: First the oil reserves, then the conservation reserves and next—maybe—the Federal Reserve. Will Uncle Sam be giving away money?

Silly me, it already has. The federal government paid an average of \$27 a barrel for the 587 million barrels of oil now in storage. Since Alaskan crude, the oil that most approximates what Uncle Sam has in the cellar, is now selling at about \$20 a barrel, you don't have to be a regular Laura D'Andrea Tyson to figure out that you would be taking a \$7 loss on each barrel. Since the government plans to sell 12 million barrels, that amounts to an anti-profit (I thought I'd coin yet another stupid economic term) of \$84 million. I'd say offhand that the per-capita cost to the average American is anyone's guess.

But it is not anyone's guess that Clinton is pursuing a political, not economic, agenda. The price of gas became a problem only when the networks started reporting on the story and Bob Dole recommended repealing a 4.3-

cent gas tax increase that Clinton pushed through Congress in 1993. With that, the White House rolled out its Big Bertha fax machines and bombarded Washington with press releases noting that Dole, in his reckless youth, had at one time supported a gas tax increase. Next, the president announced he would sell federal oil to drive down the price at the pump. But check the pump. Nothing's happened.

And nothing much will. Despite some Capitol Hill sound bites to the contrary, the price of gas has increased for sound economic reasons. The conspiracy to which some politicians allude happens to include consumers who are driving faster in heavier cars, a brutal winter and a miscalculation on the availability of Iraqi oil. Prices will go down eventually—but not, probably, before they go up some more.

In a sense, Clinton's response to Dole has been truly impressive. As an exercise in cynical politics, it's a masterpiece—a regular Mona Lisa or, if you will, a Jackie Kennedy bauble. Opening up restricted grazing land is a different story altogether. This is an appalling tale in which, for a few votes, a conservation program has been endangered without much thought at all.

The program in question pays ranchers to take ecologically fragile land out of grazing. In this way, some 36 million acres (about the size of Iowa) has become a sort of nature preserve. But the Great Plains are parched, and good grazing land is hard to come by. As a result, the price of feed is up and the price of cattle is down. (Ranchers have been selling off their herds.) Understandably, ranchers have been eyeing the acres in the Conservation Reserve Program. The grass there is tall—yummy for cattle.

But that land is also good for birds, and ducks. Now is the nesting season, and if cattle are allowed on the land, a lot of eggs and ducklings are going to get trampled. The program is hardly perfect—too much acreage in some areas, not enough in others—nor is it cheap. (Over a 10-year period, the average payment has been a total of \$52,800 for 97 acres.) But grass is now growing where it has not grown in years.

Maybe, after due deliberation, opening the land was the best way to go. But there was no deliberation, due or otherwise. The conservation community, even Department of Agriculture officials, was taken by surprise at how fast this decision was made. Clinton would barbecue Smokey the Bear to win reelection.

The administration is at odds with itself. If everything works as planned, you could drive to McDonald's for less—and pay more for a burger when you get there. The one consistency is the fervid White House desire to put politics above everything else. In that area, it has shown true leadership.

Mr. ROTH. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ABRAHAM). The Chair recognizes the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the Presiding Officer.

NEWBORNS' AND MOTHERS' HEALTH PROTECTION ACT OF 1996

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I want to follow on the comments that were made by Senator BRADLEY with respect to the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996. I think it is an absolutely classic example of what it is the American people do ex-

pect us to do in Congress and what they would like us to take on. It is a very real problem. As he indicated, they are very real families, very real people and they are in this situation, very helpless.

I also join Senator BRADLEY in urging the majority leader, Senator DOLE, to bring this bill to the floor as soon as possible. It did pass Labor and Human Resources by 14 to 2. That is not a close vote. That is virtually a unanimous vote. We are approaching Mother's Day. It would be nice to have this bill debated at that time.

The legislation is absolutely vital in the turmoil which is now our health care system. It shifts the decision-making power of when a mother and her baby would be leaving a hospital, discharged home, so to speak, from an insurance company or an HMO, which has interesting missions in all of this, and then send it back to the doctor and to the patient. That is, the decision when to leave. That is why I signed on to this bill and became a cosponsor very, very early.

Many large insurers are refusing to pay for more than 24 hours of maternity care. I do not know where managed care is going to take this country. I can tell you this, I am extremely worried about it, and I am even more worried about for-profit HMOs and managed care. Some HMOs even require discharge within 8 hours of delivery. I cannot imagine such a thing. I am sure that can happen from time to time, but I just cannot imagine that happening very often.

These quick discharge practices can, in fact, enormously endanger the life of the mother and endanger greatly the life of the child. Newborns are prone to problems such as dehydration. They are prone to problems like jaundice that are not even detectable until they have been alive for 24 hours. So, by definition, how are doctors going to be able to determine infants' condition if they are already at home?

New mothers are themselves very susceptible to pelvic infections, to breast infections. A new mom may be, probably is in most cases, too fatigued, just too tired, has been through too much in the delivery to properly care for an infant 24 hours after a normal but nonetheless exhausting delivery problem or experience.

Quick discharges can result in devastating medical consequences, in devastating human consequences and, yes, they can result, and have resulted, in death, because new mothers and fathers are sometimes unable to detect these early symptoms of potentially life-threatening conditions. This is not ideological talk, this is medical talk.

Right now, insurance companies start the 24-hour clock, or even the 8-hour clock or the 12-hour clock ticking the minute the child is born. The minute the child emerges, the minute of the first cry, the clock begins.

The insurance companies do not distinguish between those mothers who