

That we must drastically cut back the reach of the Voice of America and the size of our Fulbright and International Visitor programs, all of them important vehicles for influencing foreign opinion about the United States;

That we will have insufficient funds to respond to aid requirements in Bosnia, Haiti, the Middle East, the former Communist countries and in any new crises where our national interests are at stake;

That we will have fewer and smaller offices to respond to the 2 million requests we receive each year for assistance to Americans overseas and to safeguard our borders through the visa process.

And that we will be unable to maintain a world-class diplomatic establishment as the delivery vehicle for our foreign policy.

A final word on this critical last point. The money which Congress makes available to maintain the State Department and our overseas embassies and consulates is now down to about \$2.5 billion a year. As the international affairs account continues to go down, we face the prospect of further cuts. The budget crunch has been exacerbated by the need to find money to pay for our new embassies in the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union.

In our major European embassies, we have already reduced State Department positions by 25 percent since Fiscal Year 1995. We have been told to prepare for cuts of 40 percent or more from the 1995 base over the next two or three years.

In our Madrid embassy, to take an example, this will leave us with something like three political and three economic officers besides the ambassador and deputy chief of mission to perform our essential daily diplomatic work of advocacy, representation and reporting in the broad range of vitally important areas I have enumerated. Our other embassies face similarly devastating reductions.

I have to tell you that cuts of this magnitude will gravely undermine our ability to influence foreign governments and will severely diminish our leadership role in world affairs. They will also have detrimental consequences for our intelligence capabilities since embassy reporting is the critical overt components of U.S. intelligence collection. In expressing these concerns I believe I am representing the views of the overwhelming majority of our career and non-career ambassadors.

I know this conclusion will be greeted with incredulity by people who see hundreds of people in each of our major embassies overseas. What is not generally realized is that 80 percent of more of these people are from agencies other than the State Department. They are from the Department of Defense, Commerce and Agriculture, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the FBI, the IRS and the Social Security Administration, and so forth. And most of the 20 percent that is the reduced State Department component of the embassies is performing either consular work or administrative tasks in support of the largely non-State diplomatic mission.

Do not misunderstand me. The non-State component of an embassy is very important to our overseas interests. But the agendas of the non-State agencies are narrow and specialized. As the State Department component is slashed in relation to other agencies, it inevitably eviscerates our core diplomatic mission and diminishes the capacity of an ambassador to direct and coordinate the varied elements of his embassy in pursuit of a coherent foreign policy. Moreover, the drastic reduction in foreign service positions discourages the entry of talented young people and forces the selection out of many senior

officers with experience and skills we can ill afford to lose.

Under the pressure of Congressional budget cuts, the State Department is eliminating 13 diplomatic posts, including consulates in such important European cities as Stuttgart, Zurich, Bilbao and Bordeaux. The Bordeaux Consulate dated back to the time of George Washington. Try explaining to the French that we cannot afford a consulate there now when we were able to afford one then when we were a nation of 3 million people.

The consulates I have mentioned not only provided important services to American residents and tourists, they were political lookout posts, export promotion platforms, and centers for interaction with regional leaders in a Europe where regions are assuming growing importance. Now they will all be gone.

Closing the 13 posts is estimated to save about \$9 million a year, one quarter of the cost of an F-16 fighter plane. Bilbao, for example, cost \$200,000 a year. A B-2 bomber costs about \$2,000 million. I remind you that \$2 billion pays nearly all the salaries and expenses of running the State Department—including our foreign embassies—for a year.

Let us be clear about what is going on. The commendable desire to balance our national budget, the acute allergy of the American people to tax increases (indeed, their desire for tax reductions), the explosion of entitlement costs with our aging population, and the need to maintain a strong national defense, all combine to force a drastic curtailment of the civilian discretionary spending which is the principal public vehicle for domestic and international investments essential to our country's future.

Having no effective constituency, spending on international affairs is taking a particularly severe hit within the civilian discretionary account and with it the money needed for our diplomatic establishment. The President and the Secretary of State are doing their best to correct this state of affairs, but they will need greater support from the Congress and the general public than has been manifest so far if this problem is to be properly resolved.

I submit that it will not be resolved until there is a recognition that the international affairs budget is in a very real sense a national security budget—because diplomacy is our first line of national defense. The failure to build solid international relationships and treat the causes of conflict today will surely mean costly military interventions tomorrow.

As a unique fraternity of international lawyers you know all this. I'm restating the obvious tonight because what is obvious to us does not seem obvious to our body politic. And let's not forget that you can't advance the cause of international law without international diplomacy.

Along with other constituencies adversely affected by the hollowing out of our foreign affairs capability—businessmen, arms controllers, environmentalists, citizen groups concerned about human rights, disease, poverty, crime, drugs and terrorism—you must make your voices heard in the Congress and the mass media.

I close this lugubrious discourse with a story. Danielle and I recently invited two bright third graders from the American School of Madrid to be overnight guests in our residence. During dinner Danielle asked one of them, a precocious little boy of 8, if he knew what ambassadors do.

The little boy looked puzzled for a moment, then smiled and said, "Save the world."

As you can imagine, I was pleased by that answer. But then the little boy thought some more and asked: "Just how do you save the world?"

I don't claim that ambassadors save the world. But until our country can answer the question "Who needs ambassadors?"—and who needs embassies—we will be heading for big trouble.

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE

At 6:01 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Mr. Hays, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following joint resolution, without amendment:

S.J. Res. 53. Joint resolution making corrections to Public Law 104-134.

EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, which were referred as indicated:

EC-2361. A communication from the Executive Director of the National Capital Planning Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the annual report of the Inspector General for fiscal year 1995; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2362. A communication from the Executive Director of the National Capital Planning Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the internal controls and financial systems in effect during fiscal year 1995; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2363. A communication from the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Freedom of Information Act for calendar year 1995; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2364. A communication from the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the budget summary for International Narcotics Control Program for fiscal year 1996; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2365. A communication from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2366. A communication from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2367. A communication from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2369. A communication from the Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Freedom of Information Act for calendar year 1995; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2370. A communication from the President of the Foundation of the Federal Bar Association, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of the audit for fiscal year 1995; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2371. A communication from the Secretary of Veterans' Affairs, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the Montgomery GI Bill for fiscal year 1995; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

EC-2372. A communication from the Chief of the Drug and Chemical Evaluation Section of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, transmitting,

pursuant to law, a notice of final rule regarding Manufacturer Reporting; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2373. A communication from the Director of Communications and Legislative Affairs of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the annual report for fiscal year 1994; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

EC-2374. A communication from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report under the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

EC-2375. A communication from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act for fiscal year 1994; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

EC-2376. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Regulations, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the notice of final funding priorities for Jacob K. Javits Gifted and Talented Students Education Program; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

EC-2377. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Regulations, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on a notice relative to the Challenge Grants for Technology in Education; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

EC-2378. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Regulations, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on the notice of final funding priorities for Fund for the Improvement of Education Program; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

EC-2379. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Regulations, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on a notice relative to the Consortium Incentive Grants for fiscal year 1996; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

EC-2380. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Regulations, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report on a notice relative to the Vending Facility Program for the Blind on Federal and Other Property; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted.

By Mr. SPECTER, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, without amendment:

S. 1718. An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability system, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 104-258).

EXECUTIVE REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

The following executive report of a committee was reported on April 30, 1996:

By Mr. HELMS, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Treaty Doc. 103-21 Treaty Convention on Conventional Weapons.

TEXT OF THE COMMITTEE-RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION OF ADVICE AND CONSENT

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That (a) the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature and signed by the United States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the following annexes and associated documents, all such documents being integral parts of and collectively referred to in this resolution as the "Convention" (contained in Treaty Document 103-21), subject to the conditions of subsection (b) and the declarations of subsection (c):

(1) The Annex on Chemicals.

(2) The Annex on Implementation and Verification (also known as the "Verification Annex").

(3) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information (also known as the "Confidentiality Annex").

(4) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

(5) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission.

(b) CONDITIONS.—The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Convention is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:

(1) AMENDMENT CONFERENCES.—The United States will be present and participate fully in all Amendment Conferences and will cast its vote, either affirmatively or negatively, on all proposed amendments made at such conferences, to ensure that—

(A) the United States has an opportunity to consider any and all amendments in accordance with its Constitutional processes; and

(B) no amendment to the Convention enters into force without the approval of the United States.

(2) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION ON DATA DECLARATIONS.—(A) Not later than 10 days after the Convention enters into force, or not later than 10 days after the deposit of the Russian instrument of ratification of the Convention, whichever is later, the President shall either—

(i) certify to the Senate that Russia has complied satisfactorily with the data declaration requirements of the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding; or

(ii) submit to the Senate a report on apparent discrepancies in Russia's data under the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and the results of any bilateral discussions regarding those discrepancies.

(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding" means the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.

(3) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION ON THE BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT.—Before the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification of the Convention, the President shall certify in writing to the Senate that—

(A) a United States-Russian agreement on implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has been or will shortly be concluded, and that the verification procedures under that agreement will meet or exceed those mandated by the Convention, or

(B) the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons will be prepared, when the Convention enters into force, to submit a plan for meeting the Organization's full monitoring responsibilities that will include United States and Russian facilities as well as those of other parties to the Convention.

(4) NONCOMPLIANCE.—If the President determines that a party to the Convention is in violation of the Convention and that the actions of such party threaten the national security interests of the United States, the President shall—

(A) consult with, and promptly submit a report to, the Senate detailing the effect of such actions on the Convention;

(B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (in this resolution referred to as the "Organization") and the noncompliant party with the objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;

(C) in the event that a party to the Convention is determined not to be in compliance with the Convention, request consultations with the Organization on whether to—

(i) restrict or suspend the noncompliant party's rights and privileges under the Convention until the party complies with its obligations;

(ii) recommend collective measures in conformity with international law; or

(iii) bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council; and

(D) in the event that noncompliance continues, determine whether or not continued adherence to the Convention is in the national security interests of the United States and so inform the Senate.

(5) FINANCING IMPLEMENTATION.—The United States understands that in order to ensure the commitment of Russia to destroy its chemical stockpiles, in the event that Russia ratifies the Convention, Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the implementation of the Convention. The costs of implementing the Convention should be borne by all parties to the Convention. The deposit of the United States instrument of ratification of the Convention shall not be contingent upon the United States providing financial guarantees to pay for implementation of commitments by Russia or any other party to the Convention.

(6) IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS.—If the Convention does not enter into force or if the Convention comes into force with the United States having ratified the Convention but with Russia having taken no action to ratify or accede to the Convention, then the President shall, if he plans to implement reductions of United States chemical forces as a matter of national policy or in a manner consistent with the Convention—

(A) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such reductions on the national security of the United States; and

(B) take no action to reduce the United States chemical stockpile at a pace faster than that currently planned and consistent with the Convention until the President submits to the Senate his determination that such reductions are in the national security interests of the United States.

(7) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION AND REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.—Not later than 90 days after the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification of the Convention, the President shall certify that the United States National Technical Means and the provisions of the Convention on verification of compliance, when viewed together, are sufficient to ensure effective verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention. This certification shall be accompanied by a report, which may