

[From the New York Times]

PENTAGON REPORT PREDICTS BOSNIA WILL
FRAGMENT WITHOUT VAST AID
(By Philip Shenon)

WASHINGTON, March 19—The Pentagon has offered its grimmest assessment of the prospects for peace in Bosnia to date, warning that without an enormous international aid program to rebuild its economy and political institutions, the country will probably fragment after the withdrawal of NATO peace-keeping troops late this year.

The assessment for the Senate Intelligence Committee was prepared by the Pentagon's senior intelligence analyst, Lieut. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes, and it could signal an effort by the Defense Department to distance itself from blame if the civil war resumes shortly after the NATO withdrawal.

General Hughes, the director the Defense Intelligence Agency, offered reassuring words in his report for American troops stationed in Bosnia, suggesting that NATO forces face no organized military threat. If the war resumes, he said, it will not be until after the American peacekeepers and their NATO allies have pulled out.

But the report, dated Feb. 22, offered no similar solace for the people of Bosnia. General Hughes said that the "prospects for the existence of a viable, unitary Bosnia beyond the life" of the NATO deployment are "dim" without a large international program to revive Bosnia's war-shattered economy.

If his assessment is accurate, the peace effort in Bosnia could well be doomed, since the civilian reconstruction effort there is barely under way, its economy and physical infrastructure—roads, water and electricity lines, telephones—still in ruins. The last American soldiers are scheduled to withdraw from Bosnia in December.

General Hughes said that the strategic goals of the warring factions in the region "have not fundamentally changed" since the days of the civil war and that tensions among them would probably grow in the months leading up to the NATO pullout.

If that is true, the Clinton Administration might come under intense pressure from its NATO allies not to withdraw American troops by the end of December—a deadline that the Administration insists it will hold to.

The Pentagon assessment also implicitly questions basic elements of the American-brokered Dayton peace agreement, which laid out what critics in Congress called unrealistic deadlines for political and economic reconstruction in Bosnia and for the withdrawal of peace-keeping troops.

"There's only so much our soldiers can accomplish," said another senior Defense Department official, echoing the report's central findings. "The military forces agreed to keep the peace for a year, and that's what we're doing. But this peace will not hold without an effort to rebuild the country. That's not being done yet. And that's not our job."

The job of organizing the economic and political reconstruction of Bosnia has been left to a European delegation led by Carl Bildt, a former Swedish Prime Minister.

But Mr. Bildt has complained repeatedly in recent months that foreign governments have been slow to make available the billions of dollars needed for civilian reconstruction—everything from building bridges to printing election ballots—and that the political component of the peace effort is lagging far behind its military component. In a meeting this month with donor countries, he pleaded that the donors "do more to honor the pledges we have made."

While questioning whether Bosnia was about to dissolve once again into civil war,

General Hughes said in his report that "in the short term, we are optimistic" about the situation faced by the 18,400 American soldiers stationed there as part of the peace-keeping force.

"We believe that the former warring factions will continue to generally comply with the military aspects" of the peace accord, the report said. "We do not expect U.S. or allied forces to be confronted by organized military resistance."

The threat faced by the American forces would come instead from land mines "and from various forms of random, sporadic low-level violence," the report said. "This could include high-profile attacks by rogue elements or terrorists." So far only one American soldier has been killed in Bosnia, an Army sergeant who was killed in an explosion on Feb. 3 as he tried to defuse a land mine.

The report suggested that if the civil war resumes, it will flare up only after the NATO forces have pulled out, removing the buffer that has kept the factions at peace for most of the last four months.

"The overall strategic political goals of the former warring factions have not fundamentally changed," General Hughes said. "Without a concerted effort by the international community, including substantial progress in the civil sector to restore economic viability and to provide for conditions in which national (federation) political stability can be achieved, the prospects for the existence of a viable, unitary Bosnia beyond the life of IFOR are dim." The NATO forces in Bosnia are known as the Implementation Force, or IFOR.

General Hughes suggested that all of the fragile alliances created by the peace accord might collapse—with tensions between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats threatening their federation, with the Bosnian Croats working toward "de facto integration" with Croatia, and with elections and the resettlement of refugees "delayed or stymied."

He said that the Bosnian Serbs were likely to consolidate their hold on their own territory, seeking "some form of political confederation" with Serbia.

Questions about whether any peace in Bosnia would outlast the presence of NATO troops—and whether American troops would be stuck there as a result—were at the heart of the debate in Congress that preceded votes to authorize the American military deployment. Senator Bob Dole, the front-runner for the Republican Presidential nomination, demanded and won an Administration pledge to play a role in arming and training the Bosnian Government's army.

The assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency is only slightly more pessimistic than remarks heard elsewhere in the Pentagon. Senior Defense Department officials have long warned that the peace would fail without a huge effort to rebuild Bosnia and to give the people some hope of economic and political stability after years of slaughter.

"Ultimately I think the bigger problem is not the military implementation of the peace agreement," Gen. John Shalikasvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House National Security Committee this month. "We need to make sure we understand that it is equally important to the overall effort—and also the safety of the troops—that we get on with the civilian functions that need to be performed."

"And when I say 'we,' I don't mean the military, but the nations that are involved in this effort," he added.

"The elections have to go forward, the refugees have to begin to return, reconstruction has to start, the infrastructure has to be re-

built so that the people in the country can see an advantage to not fighting."

MEASURE PLACED ON
CALENDAR—H.R. 2337

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that H.R. 2337, which was just received from the House, be placed on the calendar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDERS FOR THURSDAY, APRIL
18, 1996

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, on behalf of the leader, Senator DOLE, that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until the hour of 9:30 a.m., on Thursday, April 18; further, that immediately following the prayer, the Journal of the proceedings be deemed approved to date, no resolutions come over under the rule, the call of the calendar be dispensed with, the morning hour be deemed to have expired, and the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then begin consideration of S. 1028, the Health Insurance Reform Act of 1996.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator DOLE, for the information of all Senators, the Senate will begin the health insurance reform bill tomorrow morning. Amendments are expected to be offered to that legislation. Therefore, Senators can expect rollcall votes throughout the day, and a late session is anticipated. The Senate may be asked to turn to any other legislative items that can be cleared for action.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order following the conclusion of the remarks that I shall make as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I seek recognition to comment on a number of subjects. The Senate has been in session for the last 2 days continuously on the terrorism bill, and there are a number of subjects that I have sought recognition to speak about at this time.

As we say, the Senate is on "automatic pilot," so when I conclude my remarks, the Senate will be in adjournment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following remarks appear under a caption of "Foreign Travel, April 2 through April 5, 1996."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FOREIGN TRAVEL, APRIL 2
THROUGH APRIL 5, 1996

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on April 2, on behalf of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I traveled to Paris and then to The Hague, where I consulted with the prosecution teams of the war crimes tribunal to assess their progress. Then, on April 3, on to Belgrade April 4, then to Tuzla, and back to Paris on the evening of April 4.

While in Paris, I had the opportunity to observe the operation of the Paris Embassy, under the direction of Ambassador Pamela Harriman. I was very much impressed with what I saw of the operation there. Ambassador Harriman conducts a large Embassy. Really, Paris is the crossroads of the European continent. There are many complex issues that confront the Embassy involving security matters with NATO, involving commercial matters, involving activities that touch upon the operation of the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency. I was very much impressed with those operations.

During the course of my discussions with Ambassador Harriman, I discussed with her the cuts in the budget of the State Department in the so-called 150 Account. And from the work I have done on the Appropriations Committee, and in the past having been on the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Department of State, it is my sense that the cuts that have been imposed are excessive.

I asked Ambassador Harriman to prepare for me a list of specifics, which she has done, entitled "Disinvesting in Diplomacy," pointing out how hard hit large Embassies will be, like the Embassy in Paris, and with the specification of the cuts and the impact of those cuts on her operation. I was especially impressed with one of her offices, from which 17 officers had been cut, under last year's reduction, to 12, and if the anticipated cuts are put into effect for next year, down to 7.

Mr. President, at the conclusion of my remarks, I ask unanimous consent that the specification under the caption "Divesting in Diplomacy" be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ASHCROFT). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, while in Paris, and at the Embassy on the evening of April 2, I visited with Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown for whom a reception was held in his honor along with the Secretary of Labor Robert Reich.

As we all know, on the very next day Secretary Brown and his company met their untimely deaths with the crash of their plane making a landing approach into Sarajevo.

When Secretary Brown and I spoke on the evening of April 2 at about 6:45

he was robust, enthusiastic, and very anxious to carry out his responsibilities as Secretary of Commerce. He had brought with him a group of United States businessmen who could be instrumental in the rebuilding and the revitalization of Bosnia.

It is well accepted that, if the peace in Bosnia is to stay and is to hold, there will have to be a buildup of the infrastructure there, and Secretary Brown was there in connection with those duties. He and I talked about meeting in Sarajevo or Zagreb. But that meeting unfortunately did not take place. The next morning I departed for Serbia, was in Belgrade, and had a plane on April 3 to travel to Sarajevo. That plane was canceled because of weather. We did not go to Sarajevo, and the same weather conditions resulted in the fatal crash of Secretary Brown and his company.

I traveled the next day to Tuzla, arrived there early in the morning, was met by General Cherry, and we immediately talked about Secretary Brown's visit the preceding day. Secretary Brown had arrived at 6:40 a.m. on April 3 and visited the United States military establishment in Tuzla, and departed at 1:58 p.m. And then, as we know, shortly thereafter the fatal crash occurred on the approach to the landing in Dubrovnik.

Secretary Brown was certainly a stalwart advocate of U.S. interests, and his loss will be deeply felt by the U.S. Government. On behalf of my wife Joan, I want to convey our deepest sympathies and condolences to Ron's wife, Alma, and their two children, Michael and Tracey, and the rest of their family.

EXHIBIT 1

DISINVESTING IN DIPLOMACY

Large projected cuts in the 150 account will hamper our ability to attain U.S. economic, security and political objectives worldwide for many years to come.

Among the hardest-hit will be our large embassies in Western Europe. These Embassies protect and promote vital U.S. interests. Western Europe is home to most of our biggest and most powerful trading and investment partners. NATO is our most important military alliance.

Our European allies share our democratic ideals and are willing to join us in coalitions to promote global stability. A few, such as France, have global military, economic, technological and commercial interests which parallel our own. In France, our diplomacy reaches well beyond bilateral relations to include cooperation and burdensharing on a broad range of global issues.

Embassy Paris, like most other major Embassies, is cutting back sharply its operations while trying to economize. The consulate in Lyon was closed in 1992. In 1996, the Bordeaux consulate also had to be closed. The latter had been in operation since George Washington's Presidency.

In 1996, the Embassy was required to close its travel and tourism office. Its ten person staff, which was handling 100,000 requests for information annually from potential foreign visitors to the U.S., was eliminated. The calls will have to be absorbed or redirected with no increase in staff.

In the past two years, Embassy Paris has cut the operating hours of its communica-

tion center by 65 percent. A hiring freeze has been in place for four years, and the Embassy's French work force has not received a pay increase in three years. Twenty-five French employee positions have been marked for elimination. The list of other reductions is long.

In view of these reduced resources, Embassy Paris is making a concerted effort to "work smarter" with fewer resources. It has formed "teams" to pool interagency assets more effectively. It has negotiated savings of \$3,000,000 over five years in local service contracts. It instituted a new interactive automated telephone service for visa applicants which generates \$8,000 to \$10,000/month in revenues. A consolidation of warehouses is saving \$400,000 per year. A new computerized pass and ID system allowed the Embassy to cut 10 Marine guards.

This kind of innovation has allowed cuts to be distributed and absorbed within the Embassy without drastic cutbacks in services thus far. However, this is now likely to change.

The State Department is calling for another round of deep personnel cuts. For Paris, this would entail a 43 percent drop in core diplomatic personnel in the 1995 to 1998 period. Reductions this large will impact heavily on core diplomatic strengths and the Embassy's effectiveness. Some of the effects will be:

Advocacy for U.S. trade and business interests will be reduced in frequency and effectiveness (recent investment problems handled by the Embassy included U.S. firms in the food processing, pharmaceutical and information industries).

The loss of the Embassy's ability to monitor the Paris Club, the organization which negotiates debt rescheduling affecting billions owed the USG by developing countries.

A 50 percent reduction in contacts with the key French officials we must reach if we are to influence French policy and advocate U.S. positions on questions of vital interest to us.

Closure of the Science office at a time when our cooperative exchanges with France on nuclear, space and health technology matters (to mention only three) should be growing rapidly.

Significant cutbacks and slowdowns in passport and welfare services to U.S. citizens. Passport issuance will take 3 to 5 days instead of one. Prison visits will be cut to one per year. Consuls will no longer attend trials of U.S. citizens. The consulate will be open to the public for only two hours per day.

A 60 percent reduction in State Department reporting from Paris, including the political and economic analysis we need on France's activities in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, and Asia.

These trends are disturbing and merit closer attention. The Administration and Congress must work together to assess carefully how budgetary and personnel cutbacks affect our core diplomatic capabilities in Western Europe and elsewhere. This is especially true at a moment when business and information is globalizing and our national interests dictate that we be even more intensively engaged with our key allies than in the past.

(The remarks of Mr. SPECTER pertaining to the submission of Senate Resolution 247 are printed in today's RECORD under "Submission of Concurrent and Senate Resolutions.")

(The remarks of Mr. SPECTER pertaining to the introduction of S. 1681 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.