

the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction.

49. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.

The decommissioning process should be mutual.

50. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organisations. This offers the parties another opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations.

VII. FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

51. It is important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many urged that certain actions other than decommissioning be taken to build confidence. We make no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit, but we believe it appropriate to comment on some since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the decommissioning of arms.

52. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.

53. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So would early implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.

54. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held by paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those held by security forces. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsible measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."

55. We share the hope, expressed by many on all sides, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the security situation permits. A review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons and the use of plastic bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced representation in the police force would contribute to the building of trust.

56. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Elections held in accordance with democratic principles express and reflect the popular will. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-strand structure, an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.

57. Finally, the importance of further progress in the social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its communities was emphasised time and again in our meetings, in the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting peace.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

58. Last week we stood in Belfast and looked at a thirty foot high wall and at barriers topped with iron and barbed wire. The wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangible symbol of the division of the people of Northern Ireland into two hostile communities. To the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselves they are fearful and antagonistic.

59. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. There is a powerful desire for peace in Northern Ireland. It is that desire which creates the present opportunity.

60. This is critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. The peace process will move forward or this society could slip back to the horror of the past quarter century.

61. Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions will simply continue the stalemate which has already lasted too long. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching across the "peace line" requires a willingness to take risks for peace.

62. The risk may seem high but the reward is great: a future of peace, equality and prosperity for all the people of Northern Ireland.

CHINA—TAIWAN DEVELOPMENTS

Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to take a moment to read a story in today's New York Times on proposed military actions by the People's Republic of China [PRC] against the Republic of China on Taiwan. I ask unanimous consent that this article appear in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. PRESSLER. According to the story, the People's Republic of China has finished plans for a limited missile attack on Taiwan—an attack that could come following Taiwan's first Presidential election, which is scheduled for March 23.

This revelation is the latest in a series of intimidating tactics that work to threaten Taiwan and destabilize East Asia. Between July 21 and July 26, the PRC conducted a series of ballistic missile test firings 85 miles off the coast of Taiwan. All the missiles were modern, mobile and nuclear capable. No country ever has held this level of field tests for nuclear capable missiles before.

The results of that action were predictable—the stock market and the local currency in Taiwan plunged. These ballistic missile exercises resumed on August 15, and continued through the fall leading up to last December's elections in Taiwan for the 164-seat Legislature.

Now comes word that the PRC has done more than just test its military capability. It has matched its hardware testing with military planning—a plan that calls for one ballistic missile to be launched each day for 30 days.

As was the case with the missile tests, this recent report can be seen as a blatant attempt to influence the outcome of the upcoming Presidential elections in Taiwan. There could be more to this story. I believe this is an attempt to intimidate the Clinton administration and test our Nation's resolve in the Taiwan Straits. The fact that the PRC has advanced a limited but sustained missile attack plan indicates that it believes the Clinton administration may do nothing to strengthen Taiwan's defenses or come to its aid in the event of an attack.

It is not hard to understand why the PRC has come to this conclusion. The Clinton administration's policy with respect to the Taiwan-Mainland China issue is nothing short of confusing. The administration claims to be advancing a policy of deliberate ambiguity. For example, high level administration officials recently have been asked if the United States would come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack from the PRC. Their responses were consistently and ominously vague.

The administration seems to believe that this ambiguity will be enough to deter Beijing. Today's report indicates that the exact opposite has occurred. I believe this policy of strategic ambiguity is wrong and has failed. It is not just dangerous for the people of Taiwan, it is potentially destabilizing for the entire East Asia region. It is an approach that clearly advances the PRC's interests and not our own. The administration's ambiguity policy has fueled the belief within the PRC that the United States will look the other way if PRC missiles are launched. Because of our ambiguity, the PRC believes that it can achieve its policy goals at the very least through intimidation and military posturing. Even if the PRC privately has no intention for a direct military confrontation against Taiwan, our ambiguity gives the PRC's military maneuvers greater credibility. It sends a signal of weakness. It fosters a belief that we can be pushed around by the PRC. It is a belief shared by many in Taiwan as well. Indeed, this ambiguity has troubled other Asian democracies in the region, compelling many—from Japan to the Philippines—to increase their defense budgets.

Mr. President, as I said last August, in response to the PRC's first ballistic missile exercise, the United States is faced with three choices: First, we can do nothing, which appears to be the present course. I believe that is not in the national security interest of the United States. We must not allow Asia—a region of many thriving free market, democratic societies—to be dominated by an aggressive, nondemocratic power.

Second, at the other extreme, we could intervene should the moment of conflict become imminent by interposing the United States Pacific fleet in the Taiwan straits. President Truman did so in 1950. This, again, is an extreme course and thus, should only be

considered as a last resort. It is a course that could result in a direct military confrontation with the People's Republic of China.

Finally, we can take what I believe is the wisest course, which is a clear and unambiguous demonstration of political and military support so that Asian democracies, including Taiwan can resist aggression. In short, a clear statement of U.S. policy goals and conditions in the region will promote peace and stability far better than the administration's deliberate vagueness. Both houses of Congress have come to this conclusion as well. Both the House and Senate versions of the State Department authorization bill contain identical language that would amend the Taiwan Relations Act [TRA] to supersede restrictions on United States arm sales to Taiwan. These restrictions were imposed in a August 1982 communiqué between the People's Republic of China and the United States. The amendments to the TRA represent a clear statement by Congress that the TRA requires the United States to provide Taiwan with the appropriate means to defend itself.

This latter course achieves a number of important policy goals. First, it demonstrates to all democracies in Asia that the United States intends to work with them to ensure peace and stability in the region. Second, it demonstrates support for the continued political liberalization in Taiwan. Third, it sends a clear signal to the People's Republic of China that the United States will not accept the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland by force.

This latter point is important. Since President Nixon's overtures to Communist China, this Nation has taken a one China policy. The advent of that policy, coupled with the passage of the TRA, was designed to foster a strong diplomatic and economic relationship with the People's Republic of China, while sending a clear signal that our Nation would defend against any forced reunification of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China. Reunification, if it is to occur, must be done through diplomatic means.

I have said before on the Senate floor that our relationship with Taiwan is one of the ironies of history. Taiwan is a democracy and a growing economic power. The United States is Taiwan's primary foreign investor and trader. About 25 percent of Taiwan's exports go to United States markets. Many of Taiwan's business, academic and cultural leaders have studied in the United States. Yet, we do not have diplomatic ties with Taipei.

We must not add tragedy to this irony. In the midst of all its posturing, the People's Republic of China's real intentions are not clear. Most experts are divided on the question of whether or not the People's Republic of China actually will put its military plans into action. We must leave nothing to chance. Regardless of the People's Republic of China's intentions or its

goals, the Clinton Administration has to recognize that its current policy of strategic ambiguity has failed. The United States needs to maintain a positive, constructive relationship with both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. It is time we recognize that this triangular relationship can only be furthered if all sides of this triangle understood United States policy goals in the region.

It is time this Nation make very clear that we will not ignore direct or indirect intimidation against an Asian democracy. It is time that the administration not engage in any sales of advanced telecommunications technology that could be used to further the People's Republic of China's military capability. It is time that the administration came to the conclusion that any military attack by the People's Republic of China against any Asian democracy directly threatens the crucial regional and national security interests of the United States. It is time that we reassert that any reunification of Taiwan with the mainland must not be done through military aggression.

Mr. President, when Congress returns next month, it is my hope that Congress will take the opportunity to take a step toward a clear definition of United States policy in the region, and demonstrate its clear support for the democratic process underway in Taiwan. Given the strong support for amending the Taiwan Relations Act, we may want to consider making these changes through legislation independent of the State Department authorization bill, and to pass this legislation before the upcoming March 23 elections. That's one possible option. Wherever democracy may emerge, the United States should demonstrate its support for such efforts. I believe we should do so, hopefully with the administration's cooperation, but if necessary, without it.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Times, Jan. 24, 1996]

AS CHINA THREATENS TAIWAN, IT MAKES SURE U.S. LISTENS

(By Patrick E. Tyler)

BEIJING, January 23.—The Chinese leadership has sent unusually explicit warnings to the Clinton Administration that China has completed plans for a limited attack on Taiwan that could be mounted in the weeks after Taiwan's President, Lee Tenghui, wins the first democratic balloting for the presidency in March.

The purpose of this saber-rattling is apparently to prod the United States to rein in Taiwan and President Lee, whose push for greater international recognition for the island of 21 million people, has been condemned here as a drive for independence.

While no one familiar with the threats thinks China is on the verge of risking a catastrophic war against Taiwan, some China experts fear that the Taiwan issue has become such a test of national pride for Chinese leaders that the danger of war should be taken seriously.

A senior American official said the Administration has "no independent confirmation or even credible evidence" that the Chinese are contemplating an attack, and spoke almost dismissively of the prospect.

"They can fire missiles, but Taiwan has some teeth of its own," the official said. "And does China want to risk that and the international effects?"

The most pointed of the Chinese warnings was conveyed recently through a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Chas. W. Freeman Jr., who traveled to China this winter for discussions with senior Chinese officials. On Jan. 4, after returning to Washington, Mr. Freeman informed President Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake, that the People's Liberation Army had prepared plans for a missile attack against Taiwan consisting of one conventional missile strike a day for 30 days.

This warning followed similar statements relayed to Administration officials by John W. Lewis, a Stanford University political scientist who meets frequently with senior Chinese military figures here.

These warnings do not mean that an attack on Taiwan is certain or imminent. Instead, a number of China specialists say that China, through "credible preparations" for an attack, hopes to intimidate the Taiwanese and to influence American policy toward Taiwan. The goal, these experts say, is to force Taiwan to abandon the campaign initiated by President Lee, including his effort to have Taiwan seated at the United Nations, and to end high-profile visits by President Lee to the United States and to other countries.

If the threats fail to rein in Mr. Lee, however, a number of experts now express the view that China could resort to force, despite the enormous consequences for its economy and for political stability in Asia.

Since last summer, when the White House allowed Mr. Lee to visit the United States, the Chinese leadership has escalated its attacks on the Taiwan leader, accusing him of seeking to "split the motherland" and undermine the "one China" policy that had been the bedrock of relations between Beijing and its estranged province since 1949.

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, asked to comment on reports that the Chinese military has prepared plans for military action against Taiwan, said he was awaiting a response from his superiors. Last month, a senior ministry official said privately that China's obvious preparations for military action have been intended to head off an unwanted conflict.

"We have been trying to do all we can to avoid a scenario in which we are confronted in the end with no other option but a military one," the official said. He said that if China does not succeed in changing Taiwan's course, "then I am afraid there is going to be a war."

Mr. Freeman described the most recent warning during a meeting Mr. Lake had called with nongovernmental China specialists.

Participants said that Mr. Freeman's presentation was arresting as he described being told by a Chinese official of the advanced state of military planning. Preparations for a missile attack on Taiwan, he said, and the target selection to carry it out, have been completed and await a final decision by the Politburo in Beijing.

One of the most dramatic moments came when Mr. Freeman quoted a Chinese official as asserting that China could act militarily against Taiwan without fear of intervention by the United States because American leaders "care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan," a statement that Mr. Freeman characterized as an indirect threat by China to use nuclear weapons against the United States.

An account of the White House meeting was provided by some of the participants. Mr. Freeman, reached by telephone, confirmed the gist of his remarks, reiterating

that he believes that while "Beijing clearly prefers negotiation to combat," there is a new sense of urgency in Beijing to end Taiwan's quest for "independent international status."

Mr. Freeman said that President's Lee's behavior "in the weeks following his re-election will determine" whether Beijing's Communist Party leaders feel they must act "by direct military means" to change his behavior.

In recent months, Mr. Freeman said he has relayed a number of warnings to United States Government officials. "I have quoted senior Chinese who told me" that China "would sacrifice 'millions of men' and 'entire cities' to assure the unity of China and who opined that the United States would not make comparable sacrifices."

He also asserted that "some in Beijing may be prepared to engage in nuclear blackmail against the U.S. to insure that Americans do not obstruct" efforts by the People's Liberation Army "to defend the principles of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and Chinese national unity."

Some specialists at the meeting wondered if Mr. Freeman's presentation was too alarmist and suggested that parliamentary elections on Taiwan in December had resulted in losses for the ruling Nationalist Party and that President Lee appeared to be moderating his behavior to avoid a crisis.

"I am not alarmist at this point," said one specialist, who would not comment on the substance of the White House meeting. "I don't think the evidence is developing in that direction."

Other participants in the White House meeting, who said they would not violate the confidentiality pledge of the private session, separately expressed their concern that a potential military crisis is building in the Taiwan Strait.

"I think there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese are creating at least the option to apply military pressure to Taiwan if they feel that Taiwan is effectively moving out of China's orbit politically," said Kenneth Lieberthal, a China scholar at the University of Michigan and an informal adviser to the Administration.

Mr. Lieberthal, who also has traveled to China in recent months, said Beijing has re-deployed forces from other parts of the country to the coastal areas facing Taiwan and set up new command structures "for various kinds of military action against Taiwan."

"They have done all this in a fashion they know Taiwan can monitor," he said, "so as to become credible on the use of force."

"I believe there has been no decision to use military force" he continued, "and they recognize that it would be a policy failure for them to have to resort to force; but they have set up the option, they have communicated that in the most credible fashion and, I believe, the danger is that they would exercise it in certain circumstances."

Several experts cited their concern that actions by Congress in the aftermath of President Lee's expected election could be a critical factor contributing to a military confrontation. If President Lee perceives that he has a strong base of support in the United States Congress and presses forward with his campaign to raise Taiwan's status, the risk of a military crisis is greater, they said. A chief concern is that Congress would seek to invite the Taiwan leader back to the United States as a gesture of American support. A Chinese military leader warned in November that such a step could have "explosive" results.

In recent months, American statements on whether United States forces would come to the defense of Taiwan if it came under attack have been deliberately vague so as to

deter Beijing through a posture of what the Pentagon calls "strategic ambiguity."

Some members of Congress assert that the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 includes an implicit pledge to defend Taiwan if attacked, but Administration officials say that, in the end, the decision would depend on the timing, pretext and nature of Chinese aggression.

THE BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the Federal Government is, as the saying goes, living on borrowed time, not to mention borrowed money—nearly \$5 trillion of it. As of the close of business yesterday, Tuesday, January 23, the Federal debt stood at \$4,987,963,203,048.04. On a per capita basis, every man, woman, and child in America owes \$18,932.74 as his or her share of the Federal debt.

MARY BRENNAN'S PUBLIC SERVICE

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise to share with my colleagues the wonderful example of Mary P. Brennan, an extraordinary woman who combined the best qualities of politics and public service.

Mary Brennan, who retired last month as marketing director for Green State Airport after an extraordinary career in politics and public service, lost her battle with breast cancer earlier this month.

In a time when politicians and public servants are the targets of unusually harsh criticism, Mary was a sterling example of how some people were created to ennoble both politics and public service.

If you knew Mary, you felt special. It did not matter if your station were high or low, you received the warmth of her charm, the depth of her compassion and the inspiration of her "can do" spirit.

When she retired after 11 years as marketing director at Green State Airport, it was noted that often she would take 30 minutes to make her way across the airport terminal because she would bump into so many people she knew.

All who knew her, whether in her earlier job as executive aide to former Gov. J. Joseph Garrahy or her most recent job as marketing director, knew that she would put in 150 percent effort.

When asked why she worked so hard for so many people, Mary replied: "If you care about people, you want to service them to the utmost. You start something right, you finish it right."

She was loyal to public service and she valued loyalty above all other virtues. "When you make a commitment to someone," she said, "you keep it."

Mr. President, we will miss Mary tremendously in Rhode Island. I will think of her when I fly into Rhode Island. It also is easy to hark back to an earlier decade and picture her hard at work in the Rhode Island State House.

Governor Garrahy delivered a heartfelt eulogy that I would like to share with my colleagues. I ask unanimous consent that his remarks and obituaries from the Providence, RI, Journal and the Woonsocket, RI, Call be printed in the RECORD as if read.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS BY FORMER RHODE ISLAND GOV. J. JOSEPH GARRAHY

Mary Brennan—say her name and you are guaranteed to smile. That's because her warmth, her care, her enthusiastic approach to life was contagious. She touched us all.

I can think of no higher honor than to have been asked to speak about my friend, our friend, Mary. My single regret is that I have to do this so soon, so early.

Like all of you, I have a special place in my heart reserved for Mary. She caught my attention 30 years ago and will forever hold it.

To know Mary was to know all the Brennans and the Partingtons, because special above everyone was her family. She came from such solid stock—Bumpsie and Mumsie. At the wonderful age of 91, it was Mumsie who cared for the daughter who loved her so. And boy if there were ever two peas in a pod, it was Mary and Mumsy. We admire your strength Mumsy and your faith. A faith that Mary carried with her throughout her life.

And Mary had a special sisterly bond with her brothers Bill and John. She would defend and care for them and they for her.

Her pride and joy were her two sons—Brian and Sean. She used to say how much like John, Brian was. And boy was she beaming last April at his and Sally's wedding. Sean was with her every step of the way—she was so proud of his work in Alaska and Hawaii and encouraged him to follow his dream. Typical Mary—always selfless.

They were blessed to have her. And, we were all blessed because Mary made us part of her extended family. She adopted each of us and we were better for it. A special thanks to Little Lynne who adopted Mary and was a great comfort in her final days.

All of us could easily be overwhelmed by grief of our great loss. Or we can proceed as Mary would have us—remembering our special times together and understanding what a special woman she was.

Mary has affected more lives than any newspaper report can ever catalogue. Each of us carries memories and stories of how Mary affected us. Every one of my days as Governor could be footnoted with a Mary Brennan story. Whether it was the difficult days of the oil crisis or celebrating RI's true ethnic diversity at one heritage celebration or another, or planning a President's visit, welcoming the most needy citizen in the State Room or working hour after hour during the Blizzard to get food and heat to the stranded, Mary was always there. She could even convince a group of angry voters that I was good, even if I wasn't right!

And I am convinced that were it not for Mary's wise counsel to Lynne Ryan—she and Michael would not be raising a family today. I can hear her words of advice, "Lynne, be patient. He's Irish!"

Service to others was Mary's hallmark. An honorable devoted, and selfless public servant. From her early days running her own travel agency to the Heritage years and nearly a decade in the Governor's Office to her airport, travel and tourism time, Mary continuously served others. She would say "if you care about people, you want to service them to the utmost." We all have a story of how Mary extended herself to each of us.