

some form of intrusion or other unauthorized use of computer systems within the previous 12 months. Over 15 percent of these attacks involved the unauthorized altering of data.

We have already observed anecdotal evidence of this threat. Last year two London residents penetrated the Rome Air Development Center computers at Griffiss Air Force Base in New York. Earlier this year an Argentinean national attacked NASA and other DOD computer systems from his living room in Buenos Aires. Recently, a computer gang based in St. Petersburg, Russia, launched a computer attack against Citibank and were discovered only after they were able to steal millions. Though disturbing, these incidents involved the least competent and immature attacker. The more sophisticated and structured attack likely occurs without detection or apprehension.

Fortunately, we have not suffered serious breakdowns in our information infrastructure. Americans have not had to endure an unexpected, prolonged, and widespread interruption of power, the indefinite grounding of air traffic, or the loss of banking and financial services and records. We should not, however, wait for an "electronic Pearl Harbor" to spur us into rethinking the speed and nature of our entry into some of these information technologies.

Our intelligence agencies have already acknowledged that potential adversaries throughout the world are developing a body of knowledge about Defense Department and other government computer networks. According to DOD officials, these potential adversaries are developing attack methods that include sophisticated computer viruses and automated attack routines which allow them to launch anonymous attacks from anywhere in the world.

In testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations this year, CIA Director John Deutch explained that both hostile nations and terrorist organizations can, with relative ease, acquire the techniques to penetrate information systems. Indeed, in response to a question as to where he would place the threat of cyber-based attacks in terms of overall threats to the United States, Director Deutch stated as follows:

I would say it is very, very close to the top, especially if you ask me to look 10 years down the road. I would say that after the threats from weapons of mass destruction . . . nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, this would fall right under it; it is right next in priority, and it is a subject that is going to be with us for a long time.

A DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR GOVERNMENT

Who is the enemy and what does he or she want? Is it a lone anarchist trying to create chaos, or a well-organized group sponsored by a foreign government? Is the motive of the bad actor greed, espionage, or vandalism? Notwithstanding Director Deutch's admonitions, the staff of the subcommittee found that the collection and analysis

of data that would help provide the nature and extent of the threat posed to our information infrastructure is not presently enough of a priority of our intelligence community. The Brown Commission Report on Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community similarly observed that the activity that was occurring did "not appear well coordinated or responsive to an overall strategy."

Likewise, the law enforcement community has been unable to provide reliable threat assessment in this area, perhaps because so little is ever reported to law enforcement. According to an FBI survey, only 17 percent of those responding indicated that they would advise law enforcement if attacked.

Without reliable threat assessment data we can neither conduct meaningful risk management, nor structure a coherent national response to this issue. This is one area where we cannot afford to be operating in the dark. Too many parts of our society have come to rely on the information infrastructure for us to remain ignorant of the extent of our vulnerabilities and the nature of the threat facing us.

This issue poses problems for our Government that are not easily addressed within the framework of our traditional national security strategies. Historically, our Government's security threats have been defined geographically: a foreign threat versus domestic. And the type of threat would inspire a different response from the appropriate agency; whether enforcement, military or intelligence. When we move from the physical world into cyberspace, traditional divisions of responsibility, and assignment of roles and missions become confusing. Is the bad actor a 16 year old, a foreign agent, an anarchist, or a combination thereof? Furthermore, the Internet exists in a "border less" world. How do you ascertain the nature of a threat if you don't know the motive of your adversary? Which agency is used if you can't tell until the end of the investigation the origin of the attack?

CONNECTION, PROTECTION AND A CULTURE OF SECURITY

I believe if we fail to recognize and address the potential vulnerabilities of our information infrastructure today, we may find ourselves victims to very costly scenarios tomorrow. Security must be imbedded into not only the technology of the computer age, but its culture as well. Computer users, systems administrators and software and hardware manufacturers must emphasize security on the front-end, not as an afterthought.

Many critical elements of our infrastructure—power, communications, financial, transportation—are largely in the hands of the private sector. As these critical elements become more reliant upon open computer networks, government will have to partner with industry to ensure the reliability of the systems they support. Our intelligence

and law enforcement agencies must develop reliable threat estimates that will not only help secure government and military systems, but provide data to the private sector so that they can manage their own attendant risks. Pivotal to this challenge will be fostering trust between industry and government in this arena.

Finally, we must be willing to reconsider our previously defined notions of national security. The threat from cyberspace, because it can emanate from a borderless world that transcends national boundaries, eludes many of our traditional national security assets. We cannot permit this problem to get lost in the seams of our intelligence, enforcement and defense communities. We will undoubtedly require the types of international alliances that has served us well in our defense of our physical perimeters.

This year the minority staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations completed a lengthy investigation into these issues that included a report entitled "*Security in Cyberspace*." The report set forth numerous recommendations intended to improve our Nation's cyber defenses. Those recommendations include some key proposals:

(1) Formulate a national policy that promotes the security of our information infrastructure;

(2) Create a National Information Infrastructure Threat Center that includes the law enforcement, intelligence, and the defense communities as well as liaison with the private sector;

(3) Complete an intelligence estimate of the threats to our information infrastructure, that includes an unclassified version that can be made available to the private sector;

(4) Promote the creation of an international computer crime bureau with emergency response capability;

(5) Maintain a better and qualified pool of computer security professionals and, generally, improve the security consciousness of our government's users and managers;

(6) Promote regular computer vulnerability assessments, or "red teaming" of government agencies, especially agencies outside of the Defense Department; and

(7) Encourage better reporting of computer incidents within private industry while creating a mechanism within which industry can report intrusions without fear of inciting customer insecurity.

Ultimately, there is no question that the information age will bring us to new plateaus that will greatly benefit our citizens and our world. We must make sure, however, that in our rush to connect, we do not lose sight of the more mundane but equally important need to protect.●

TERRORISM MEETS PROLIFERATION: THE CONVERGENCE OF THREATS IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

WHEN FICTION BECOMES REALITY

● Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, last year, I spoke to a group about the changes that have occurred since the demise of

the former Soviet Union. In my remarks, I offered a Tom Clancy-like hypothetical, set in 1998, that was intended to illustrate the possible nightmares that we might face in an age of proliferation. In my scenario, Libyan terrorists used a drone aircraft filled with anthrax to attack the Capital during the President's State of the Union Address. Seventy-two hours later, the Government is stunned as Washington hospitals are overwhelmed with fatalities, including many of our elected and appointed leaders. In my scenario, there were few survivors except for those few visionary Senators who had retired in 1996.

Today I will offer another scenario, perhaps even more unbelievable. Imagine that a group of religious zealots led by a charismatic, half-blind yoga instructor assembles an international following of nearly 50,000 members and collects over \$1 billion in assets. Further imagine, this group recruits physicists and scientists from all over the world, and finds a large number of converts among the scientific and professional communities in Russia and Japan. Believing it is their destiny to destroy the world, they begin work on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons right under the noses of their governments and go completely unnoticed by foreign intelligence services. They purchase sophisticated dual-use technology along with many of the precursors needed to develop their lethal weapons. They send their members worldwide: looking for the Ebola virus in Zaire; mining for uranium in Australia; seeking protein databases for biological weapons and laser instruments in the United States; and obtaining helicopters and drone aircraft, as well as other weapons delivery systems, from the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. They then conduct macabre experiments on sheep and humans.

They are only caught after an attempted sarin nerve gas attack on a major subway system goes awry. A mistake in crafting their delivery system reduces the possible fatalities from tens of thousands, to 12 people, although 5,000 are injured including scores with severe nerve damage.

Of course, this is not a Tom Clancy novel, it is fact. If I had used this same scenario before March 20, 1995, the date of the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack, people would have said, "impossible." The world has learned much since then about the Aum Shinrikyo attack. Much of what we know stems from hearings held by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations last year. Those hearings revealed that the Aum and their doomsday weapons were simply not on anybody's radar screen.

The initial response to the subcommittee's revelations was astonishment and disbelief. It sounded unbelievable. Subsequent hearings focused on another previously unthinkable event, the frightening prospect of nuclear chaos in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Aum, we

now know, was not alone in trying to exploit instability in Russia to buy unconventional weapons and materials—the Iranians and others have been shopping around the former Soviet Union in search of materials, technology, and know-how.

The seizure of 2.7 kilograms of weapon grade uranium in the Czech capital of Prague and other smaller amounts of plutonium elsewhere in Europe prove that nuclear smuggling is a reality. These shipments were intercepted by law enforcement authorities, but is it possible that other shipments may have gone undetected? Last spring I participated in a CSIS study of the nuclear black market headed by former FBI and CIA Director, William Webster. The CSIS panel, which included top intelligence and nuclear specialists, concluded that this was a problem we cannot ignore. It is simply unrealistic to assume that the tons of nuclear materials that are improperly secured, along with thousands of out-of-work Soviet weapons scientists and their equipment will never end up in the wrong hands. Add to this new proliferation problem evidence of possible organized crime involvement in weapons smuggling and you have the ingredients of a full blown disaster looming on the horizon.

Unfortunately, nuclear smuggling is only part of the problem, and perhaps even the least likely one to threaten our security.

UNTHINKABLE POWER WITHIN THE GRASP OF THE UNTHINKING

Weapons of mass destruction are increasingly within the grasp of a growing number of developing countries, sub-national groups, terrorist groups and even individuals. The borderless world of cyberspace expands access to information about terrorist techniques and unconventional weapons even further. Various violence-prone groups now share recipes for making weapons of mass destruction on the Internet and offer their trade secrets on how to make and use unconventional weapons for sale through catalogs. This situation is, as observed by Alvin Toffler, "The ultimate devolution of power, the demassification of mass-destruction weapons."

Proliferation and terrorism are not new threats. However, changes in the international situation, in access to technology, and in terrorist motivation require us to think anew about the potential use of unconventional weapons against the United States.

In August I attended a meeting of the Aspen Strategy Group that examined these post-cold-war security threats. The Aspen Strategy Group is a bipartisan committee sponsored by the Aspen Institute that examines critical issues affecting U.S. national security. Secretary of Defense William Perry and other top officials also attended the meeting.

The consensus of the meeting was that the convergence of proliferation, terrorism, and organized crime makes

the post-cold-war period a uniquely dangerous time for our country. Although the risk of nuclear war is vastly reduced and the overall outlook for our security is greatly improved, the risk of chemical, biological or some form of nuclear terrorism has increased. This new threat does not put our civilization at risk in the way that nuclear confrontation did, but it is much harder to deter. The familiar balance of nuclear terror has yielded to a much unpredictable situation, where adversaries may not be dissuaded by threats of retaliation. Our massive retaliatory forces are useless against terrorists who hide among civilian populations. Our biggest threats of the future may well be people who do not have a return address.

At the same time that most of the world has turned its back on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, a few desperate nations, terrorist groups, ideologically driven cults, ethnic minorities, disaffected political groups and even individuals may view weapons of mass destruction as the only way to wield power over world events. And if battlefield-usable weapons are not available, crude bombs or dispersal systems may suffice to produce mass terror. The Aspen group and other assess the risk of chemical and biological terrorism as higher than nuclear, with the caveat that radiological weapons could produce massive terror even without posing a major health hazard.

The trend lines in the last several years are not encouraging. In our own country, survivalist and militia-type groups have been charged with attempting to acquire bubonic plague and ricin, a deadly substance derived from the castor bean. A small amount of ricin can kill in minutes if ingested, inhaled, or absorbed through the skin. Two individuals associated with a group called the Minnesota Patriots Council were convicted of planning to use ricin to assassinate IRS officials and other Government employees. A former member of the Aryan Nation ordered the plague, saying he needed it for research purposes. And it is useful to recall that in May 1994, the sentencing judge in the World Trade Center case said the defendants had placed sodium cyanide in their explosives package with the intent of creating a poisonous cyanide gas but fortunately the gas burned during the explosion. If true, we have already had the first attempted chemical terrorist attack here at home.

PREPARING FOR THE UNTHINKABLE

Add to these events the bombings in Oklahoma and Dharhan, the plans of the World Trade Center bombers to blow up tunnels during New York City rush hour and another plot to kill thousands by downing commercial aircraft and the challenge is clear. The moral, political, military, and technical factors that made WMD terrorism unthinkable may not last forever. The nuclear strategist Herman Kahn warned over thirty years ago that we

must think about the unthinkable in order to avoid it. We need to think about the unthinkable possibility of a terrorist WMD attack against our country.

These indicators of terrorism's future take place against a background of proliferation, which also continues after the cold war. We learned in 1995, after four years of unprecedented inspections, the true extent of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Before the gulf war, Saddam Hussein possessed bombs and missiles deployed with anthrax, botulinum, sarin and VX, the most lethal form of nerve gas. Saddam also planned to seize the safeguarded enriched uranium from Iraq's civilian nuclear program and quickly make it into a nuclear bomb. Iran is developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; and Libya continues its drive for weapons of mass destruction. North Korea still possesses an unknown quantity of plutonium and continues to sell missiles despite the freeze on its nuclear construction projects; China may be selling nuclear missile technology despite its pledges not to do so. In South Asia, we see India and Pakistan embarking on a nuclear arms race. The list of countries actively pursuing chemical and biological weapons and missiles continues to grow. There are some bright spots on the proliferation front—not least of which is the fact that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan are giving up the Soviet weapons on their territory. The new twist is that terrorists may join the ranks of the proliferators. Some proliferators such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria are also sponsors of terrorism. Would a government supply WMD capabilities to terrorists, or help terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet Union?

This possibility poses a clear challenge to our intelligence and law enforcement efforts against this threat. We cannot keep track of every cult and every disaffected group or individual. While we can and must improve our intelligence capabilities, this is one area in which an ounce of prevention is worth more than a pound of cure. Job number one is to make sure the actual weapons materials are safe from diversion at the source. The cooperative threat reduction programs do just that, and we have just passed legislation to beef up our efforts to improve the security of Russian and FSU nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons materials. That legislation also included support for detection and interdiction of smuggling of these lethal materials, and increased penalties for those who are caught.

Our intelligence and law enforcement efforts also benefit from international cooperation. We need to strengthen the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to make certain that nuclear materials can all be accounted for, and that suspicious nuclear programs are carefully scrutinized. The

Chemical Weapons Convention is not a cure-all, but it is a step in the right direction and will provide additional technical and political barriers to deter and detect covert chemical weapons programs. As for those who cheat on their international commitments or shun the norms of international behavior, we must be willing to hold them accountable.

Proliferation and terrorism are not new threats. Each will continue to be a threat in its own right and neither shows signs of disappearing any time soon. What is new is the degree of overlap between them. A new breed of terrorism appears willing to take even more extreme measures in pursuit of even more extreme objectives.

A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY

We need to address the threat posed by the convergence of proliferation and terrorism in a comprehensive way. Unfortunately, the task is even more difficult than negotiating with an ideologically hostile, aggressive, and nuclear-armed superpower. For certain religiously or ideologically driven terrorists, self-preservation may not even be a priority, as it was for the Soviets. The traditional tools of statecraft—the careful blending of force and diplomacy—may have little relevance where the goals of mass destruction and retribution, or supposed divine inspiration, are concerned. The explosive mix of age-old zealotry and new-age weaponry has brought instruments of unthinkable destructive power within the grasp of those willing to commit the unthinkable.

A new strategy to combat the convergence of proliferation and terrorism should consist of several aspects adapted from our current defense posture. The three main components should be deterrence, interdiction and consequence mitigation.

With respect to deterrence, our enemies should never doubt our willingness to respond to any attack, with overwhelming force, whether or not weapons of mass destruction are involved. At the same time, it should also be clear that the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States would guarantee a retaliation that would far exceed any attacker's ability to withstand. In light of our conventional weapons superiority, overwhelming retaliation can be carried out under most circumstances without resort to nuclear weapons, although nuclear deterrence should remain an option. For the present, ambiguity regarding our response may inspire caution in the minds of any potential attacker.

The threat of overwhelming retaliation, however, is not effective against terrorists, unless they can be traced to a state sponsor. Terrorists typically hide among civilian populations, thus ruling out certain retaliatory options. Of course, military force can still be directed against terrorists where they hide, and we have the capability to conduct special operations, but law en-

forcement agencies will also be on the forefront of our counter-terrorism efforts. Nation that sponsor WMD terrorism should not feel safe from retaliation. Moreover, terrorists of all types should know with certainty that the United States will vigilantly track down and punish them for their criminal acts. In the case of WMD terrorism, the world will not be a big enough place to hide, and any person, group or state associated with such terrorists will be held equally responsible. Fortunately, there is broad consensus throughout the world on extradition and hot-pursuit of terrorists—that consensus is even more solid where WMD are concerned.

Interdiction is the second part of the strategy—to detect and stop illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, both at our borders and those of cooperating countries. This task will require the accelerated development of improved detection technologies for chemical, biological, and radiological materials as well as training of foreign customs inspectors and law enforcement officials. We have taken some steps toward improving our interdiction capabilities and training foreign customs officials, but we have a long ways yet to go. I am confident that there are promising technologies and innovative methods out there if we are willing to properly fund and support them. My colleagues DICK LUGAR and PETE DOMENICI, and I have called for a new Manhattan Project to solve this problem, and the national laboratories at Livermore, Los Alamos and elsewhere are doing some promising work in this area. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act which we sponsored provides \$27 million to begin this effort.

The third part of our strategy is preparedness to face the threat if prevention fails. We need to rethink and then rebuild our domestic preparedness and planning. Some important improvements have been made recently but, again, much remains to be done. Some agencies, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] have updated their Cold War mission. Others, like the Departments of Defense and Energy, possess specialized equipment and expertise that must be available if a WMD incident occurs. Managing these efforts during a crisis is the job of law enforcement, although their mission to apprehend suspects and collect evidence may sometimes have to take a back seat to public safety.

This is just on the Federal level. We heard during our hearings the concerns of the first responders—the fire, medical, police, public works, and other local officials who would be the first on the scene in the event of a chemical, biological, or nuclear incident. We owe it to those public servants and the citizens they protect to make available the training, equipment, and expertise needed to prevent them from joining the ranks of the first victims of an attack. Our strategy must consolidate

our scattershot efforts to focus on this problem.

The legislation I sponsored with Senators LUGAR and DOMENICI contained a key section on domestic preparedness. We provided the authority and funding to begin to establish special chemical and biological emergency response teams and to train local officials. We also included a provision to improve coordination of all the relevant agencies and departments by establishing a special coordinator at the White House. The Coordinator would oversee the Government's nonproliferation, counterproliferation, counterterrorism, intelligence, and law enforcement activities that are directly relevant to this problem, but are spread far and wide throughout the various departments, and pull them together in a coherent policy.

The change in the nature of the threat requires a change in the way we organize our resources to provide for our defense. We should be willing to rethink and reshape the cold war bureaucracy and adjust our institutions to respond dynamically to a dynamic threat. We will need new doctrine and innovative technologies, improved intelligence and law enforcement, and cooperation with foreign governments to address this threat. The three-pronged strategy I have described is within our reach and within our budget. Of course we will need to shift priorities and more funding will be required. But the threat of terrorist attack on American cities involving radiological, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons has reached a point where a new effort is required. We should not wait to take action in the wake of an incident. This is a clear and present danger that requires a timely response.●

RETIREMENT OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL CHARLES A. BOWSHER

● Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, next Monday the Comptroller General of the United States, Charles A. Bowsheer, will retire after 15 years in that position. At the time of his appointment in 1981, President Reagan said "this is one of the most important appointments that I shall make as President, adding that "it's obvious that in this post, a strong and effective leader can have an enduring impact on our political institutions." As chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I have had the privilege of working with Mr. Bowsheer and his able staff as they assist the Congress in its oversight function. I believe his efforts have made an enduring impact on our Government, making it more responsible, efficient and accountable to our citizens.

During his tenure, Mr. Bowsheer has overseen a tremendous growth in the amount of reports produced by GAO as well as the amount of official testimony given to Congressional commit-

tees. GAO is now producing over 1,000 reports per year, and provides expert testimony before congressional committees over 300 times per year, doubling their productivity since 1983. Despite reductions of 25 percent in their audit and staffing budget since fiscal year 1992, Mr. Bowsheer made sure the quality of GAO's report and services remained uncompromised.

Under their mandate to evaluate and audit all Government programs and activities, GAO has consistently produced reports that are on the cutting edge of research, analysis, and investigation. Mr. Bowsheer continually pressed for strengthened and revised budget and accounting systems. As a result of GAO's recommendations, over \$100 billion in savings and benefits have been realized through budget reductions, cost avoidances, appropriations deferrals, and revenue enhancements.

As chairman and ranking member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I came to rely on the work produced by GAO through their high risk series. These reports documented programs where the potential for billions of dollars in waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement existed. Their expertise in identifying problem areas didn't end here. Through their work for the subcommittee, they identified innumerable areas for improvement. In the last few years alone, their work for the subcommittee has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in documented savings to the Federal Government.

In the Armed Services Committee, we relied on GAO's work on many occasions, especially in areas such as financial management and acquisition policy, and on their investigative abilities in cases where the committee needed to find out exactly what the facts were.

GAO's fine work under Mr. Bowsheer's leadership goes well beyond measurable cost savings. Although the benefits are less quantifiable than dollar savings, they are just as significant. Their work has repeatedly alerted Congress and the executive branch to weaknesses in Federal regulations, law enforcement, and issues related to our Armed Forces. Some examples include:

Identifying problems in requirements for reporting currency transactions at banks and other financial institutions to strengthen the ability to detect money laundering to prevent billions of dollars of drug and criminal proceeds to escape taxation, forfeiture and seizure;

Highlighting the shortcomings of State insurance regulation of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans that exposed thousands of subscribers to loss of health care benefits through insurer default;

Identifying differences and weaknesses in state insurance regulations that permit fraudulent insurance schemes to sell worthless policies to unsuspecting consumers;

Identifying loopholes in Department of Education procedures that regulate

the Federal Student Loan and Pell Grant Programs to protect the quality of postsecondary education; and

Prodding the Defense Department to improve its troubled financial management systems, providing continued oversight of DOD's progress, and continuing to press for further improvements in DOD's oversight of the Defense business operations fund and other systems required to ensure that the taxpayer's money has been correctly accounted for.

Mr. Bowsheer has also demonstrated great vision as our Government prepares for the next millennium. Under his leadership, GAO greatly enhanced its focus on issues related to information management and technology, and they have produced cutting edge analysis of the challenges our Government will face in the information age. GAO recently issued a report on the extent to which Defense computer systems are being attacked, the actual and potential damage to its information and systems, and the challenges the Defense Department is facing in securing its sensitive but unclassified information systems. This report and their resulting testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations was some of the most professional and skillful I have seen.

This Congress and the American people owe a great debt to Charles Bowsheer for his fine work. I congratulate him on his 15 years of service, and wish him well in his future endeavors.●

EXPLANATION OF VOTES ON THE SENATE ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS ACT

● Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, recently, the Senate passed the conference report to the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. I would like to take a moment to comment on the amendments to the original bill that was passed out of this Chamber.

The first vote during consideration of this act was on a McCain amendment to eliminate the advanced light water reactor [ALWR] program. Started in 1993, the ALWR represents a joint commitment by Government and industry to develop a new generation of standardized, advanced reactors. I opposed the McCain amendment for several reasons: First, 1997 is the final year of a 5-year program that, once complete, will result in an estimated \$1 billion in U.S. revenue. Congress originally agreed to fund this program for 5 years, and it was important that this commitment be upheld. Perhaps more importantly, the committee estimated that the cost to eliminate the program was actually greater than the 1997 funding amount. Finally, once complete, a major portion of the DOE contributions to this project will be repaid as royalties from the sale of the powerplants. A bipartisan majority of Senators agreed with me and voted to fund the ALWR in its final year on a 53-to-45 vote.