

be no question of a veto override. Hence, the judgment of Robert Pear of the New York Times that "The President's action concludes a 4-year drama that began when Mr. Clinton, as a Presidential candidate in 1992, promised to 'end welfare as we know it.'"

Last September 19, essentially the same bill, indeed H.R. 4, passed the Senate 87-12, with only 11 Democrats opposed. In the interval Elizabeth Shogren of the Los Angeles Times and Judith Havemann and Ann Devroy of the Washington Post reported that the Department of Health and Human Services had submitted an analysis of the bill to the White House. Owing largely to the 5-year time limit, it would throw some 1.5 million children into poverty. No one could have wished this, and Democrats were especially bound to take into account this assessment of a Democratic administration. And so, in the end, 45 of 46 Democrats voted against the measure, Republican Senators CAMPBELL and HATFIELD joined us.

On the day of the final Senate vote, the 11 Democratic Senators who had been opposed from the first, wrote President Clinton to warn against including any "broad welfare measure * * * in the end of session budget agreement." This was not something, we judged, to be concluded in a matter of days by a small group under great pressure.

However, we now learn that on Saturday, January 6, as part of a balanced budget proposal offered by the President in those talks, a section "Welfare Reform Savings"—\$46 billion over 7 years—includes this:

Cash Assistance: AFDC would be terminated and replaced by a new conditional entitlement of limited duration. There would be a 5-year maximum time limit with a state option for vouchers at the end of that period to assist children.

Thus, the administration seemingly proposes to deliver the same 1.5 million children into poverty.

Why is this happening? I can think of two partial explanations.

First, it is widely assumed that AFDC is a Federal entitlement that the Federal Government can restrain without relinquishing. It is not. There is no Federal entitlement to welfare for individuals. Each State devises its own program. The Federal Government provides a matching grant. Abolish the matching grant and you can reasonably expect a race to the bottom.

Second, even as we deplore welfare dependency, we do not seem to grasp just how serious it really is. A quarter—24 percent—of American youth just turned 18 have been on AFDC. Half—46 percent—of the children in Chicago will be on AFDC in the course of a single year. Of children on AFDC, three-quarters are there for more than 5 years. Hence, a 5-year limit invites chaos and ruin.

In particular, liberal-minded persons must proceed with care. For decades now there has been a liberal tendency

to understate, even to deny the welfare problem. Now, of a sudden, a liberal administration proposes a repeal measure that would have been unthinkable just a few years back. Both positions have the common fault of underestimating how serious and dangerous this problem really is.

Even so, let us all be ready for a careful, bipartisan exploration of the issue in the 105th Congress. It was, I think, a close call. But as Churchill remarked, there is nothing so exhilarating as to be shot at and missed.

Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

THE BUDGET NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I compliment the distinguished majority leader, Senator DOLE, and all parties to the budget negotiations and urge them to continue their talks after hopefully only a brief suspension. It seems to me likely that an agreement can be reached since the parties are reportedly \$100 billion apart. While that is a large sum of money in absolute terms, it is relatively a small percentage of the more than \$12 trillion of a 7-year budget. It is eight-tenths of 1 percent. If an agreement cannot be reached, it is my strong view that the Government should not be closed because of gridlock. We should not try to run Government by blackmail. If an agreement cannot be reached, I suggest, as strongly as I can, that we should keep the Government running and crystallize the issues and present them to the American people for their decision in the 1996 Presidential and congressional elections.

During the first week of the shutdown—actually, on the second day, back on November 14 of last year, I urged this course of action. It is a fundamental principle of U.S. constitutional government that the Congress and the President are partners, really equal partners, unless each House of Congress has a two-thirds majority to override a Presidential veto. And if we can get a two-thirds majority by appealing to the centrists on both sides of the aisle, then we can structure a budget agreement without the President and without closing the Government. But, absent that, it is my strong view that we ought to keep the Government running and crystallize the issue for the 1996 election.

I understand those in my party who seek to enact our agenda through the political pressure of gridlock and shutdown. I agree with the majority leader, Senator DOLE, who has rejected that approach. I remain totally committed to a balanced budget within 7 years with genuine Congressional Budget Office figures. Since my first vote for the balanced budget amendment in 1983, I have stood fast for this important principle. But it is time to acknowledge that it is a failure with the American people to try political pressure through

gridlock and shutdown. It is like Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart said about obscenity, that he could not define it, but he knew it when he saw it. The American people, similarly, know the difference between Government by blackmail and legitimate political pressure.

Had there been any doubt about the difference, it was reduced to plain arithmetic by last night's NBC poll, which showed that 50 percent of the American people approved the President's handling of the budget crisis with 46 percent against, compared with 22 percent who support the Republican handling of the budget crisis with some 78 percent against.

One further word on blackmail versus legitimate political pressure. I urge my colleagues not to try to use the debt ceiling to bludgeon the settlement on the budget dispute. I personally have grave legal reservations about the procedures currently being used by the administration to avoid exceeding the debt limit, and I have said that directly to the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. If they have violated the law by keeping the Government running without raising the debt limit, let them be impeached or subjected to other appropriate legal procedures.

When Treasury Secretary Jim Baker borrowed from the Social Security trust fund in the mid-1980's, I spoke up on this floor and objected to the conversion of trust funds for an unintended purpose. If any other person violated the trust fund, they would be subjected to criminal prosecution for fraudulent conversion. But I suggest that is a fundamentally different proposition for Congress to use that kind of a nuclear weapon in the budget battle. It is not proportionate and I suggest it is not proper.

The full faith and credit of the United States would be damaged worldwide. So I hope my colleagues will reject that approach.

EXTENSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the period for morning business be extended until the hour of 1:30 p.m. with Senators permitted to speak therein for not more than 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. FORD. Reserving the right to object. At 1:30, do you intend on going out?

Mr. LOTT. It is the leader's intent to go out at that time.

Mr. FORD. I have no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, with the time extended, I ask consent to speak for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SOUTH AFRICA AND MIDEAST TRIP

Mr. SPECTER. In accordance with my practice to report on foreign travel, this floor statement summarizes a trip which Senator SHELBY and I took from December 28, 1995, through January 4, 1996, to South Africa and the Mideast, focusing on Intelligence Committee matters and the Mideast peace process with a stop at the International Criminal Court in The Hague en route back to Washington. Our itinerary was condensed and our trip was cut short to be able to return to Washington on January 4 in anticipation of possible Senate votes.

A key purpose was to evaluate the PLO's compliance with the provisions of the Specter-Shelby amendment, enacted in 1994, conditioning United States aid on a change in the PLO charter striking language calling for the destruction of Israel and requiring ending of terrorism by the PLO.

We met with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in Gaza on January 2, 1996, for approximately 1 hour. He explained his lateness saying he was out campaigning for other candidates. When we commented that he must have felt secure in his own election to be campaigning for others, he responded: "Who Knows?"

We were told the PLO election procedure had been modified because the number of seats had been expanded from 83 to 88 to accommodate late candidacies of members of Hamas. We then heard that the Hamas candidacies had been withdrawn due to pressure from Hamas leaders abroad.

We urged Arafat not to change election procedures at the last minute which looked like rigging the election.

When we asked about changing the PLO charter, Arafat said that would be accomplished within 2 months after the election scheduled for January 20, 1996. We emphasized the importance of eliminating the charter language calling for the destruction of Israel.

Later on January 2, when we met with Prime Minister Peres, we asked him what he thought of the United States conditioning aid to the PLO on changes in the PLO charter and curtailing terrorism. Mr. Peres responded positively saying those provisions of United States law were supportive of Israeli interests. After our meeting with Mr. Peres, we told Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu of Arafat's promise to change the charter. Mr. Netanyahu said it was good that United States law had such a requirement, because Israeli law did not.

Referring back to the Arafat meeting, we asked him what had happened to the Arabs wanted by Israel on charges of terrorism. The Israeli-PLO agreement required the PLO to turn over such Arabs to Israeli authorities. We had pressed Chairman Arafat on

that subject last August 31 when Senator HANK BROWN and I met with him in Gaza. Arafat said some such terrorists had been prosecuted in PLO courts and some had been turned over to Israel. Finding that answer insufficient, we urged Arafat to do more on that subject.

It was generally agreed by our Embassy that there had been marked improvement on terrorism in Israel during the past several months.

Arafat talked at some length about his warnings to Prime Minister Rabin on the assassination risks Mr. Rabin faced.

Arafat spoke about his efforts to aid in the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. He referred to a letter he had written to President Assad whom he described as a friend since 1963 when Assad was an Air Force officer. Arafat said he urged Assad to cooperate in the peace process.

When asked about Iran, Arafat responded that he thought dialog was possible. He said he had complained to Rafsanjani about Iranian interference in the Israeli-PLO peace process and had told Rafsanjani that he—Arafat—would make internal trouble for Iran if Iranian interference continued.

We also questioned Arafat about the PLO's hassling the Palestinian press about unfavorable new coverage. The PLO had detained an editor in custody. Arafat said the press had to respect the Government. We commented that Arafat couldn't get away with that in the United States. Arafat responded that he wasn't in the United States. He added that if he didn't take forceful actions, he would be undercut like the Government was in Algiers.

Arafat complained that some donor nations had not fulfilled their commitments to aid the PLO. When asked, "who?", he replied that he preferred not to say, but "instead to thank those who had not given as well as those who had given."

Arafat appeared poised, in good humor, and in good health.

Our meeting later the same day with Prime Minister Peres and Likud leader Netanyahu presented a sharp contrast in style, content, and perspectives. The 1996 Israeli election, the first with the Prime Minister elected separately from the Knesset, will present diametrically opposed approaches to this nation's future. It would be hard to conceive of a more important election historically for any nation—especially a nation where survival is jeopardized by a single mistake.

Mr. Peres articulated a vision for the future: peace, while facing substantial risks, with economic development and prospective prosperity as the glue to hold the region together. He said he was more value in 100 hotels than 100 weapons.

Mr. Netanyahu said he and his party were firmly opposed to expanded PLO authority which would lead to sovereignty and a Trojan Horse threat within Israeli borders. He decried any

deal with Syria and President Assad, saying the Syria keeps only those commitments it cannot get away with breaking.

Prime Minister Peres had a different approach saying that it was hard to make a deal with Syria, but once made, Syria kept its commitments. He approached the peace process with ideas as opposed to a concrete plan. He looked to building up rapport with the discussion of ideas before either side could defeat the process by seeing a proposal it felt compelled to reject.

It is obvious that the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin has had more than a sobering effect on the region. Chairman Arafat's condolence call on Mrs. Leah Rabin was a symbolic statement that Israel has suffered too much from terrorism—although the ultimate blow came, not from the hand of an Arab, but a Jew. Whatever doubt President Assad had about a real division in Israel, no other proof could have been more persuasive.

So, the currently visible battle lines being drawn in Israel are for its 1996 election. My view is the outcome will be determined more by events than personalities, policies, or programs.

Throughout our trip, we assessed intelligence missions and capabilities. Terrorism was a dominant topic of conversation. In one African city, we were told of a plan to locate an Iraqi rocket launcher on a hotel roof in 1991 to take out the United States Embassy and our Ambassador. As we looked out the conference room window in the Embassy we could see the hotel roof, the proposed launching site. A vigilant intelligence operation produced information which prevented the attack.

We were told that the 1986 U.S. Terrorist Protection Act has provided needed protection for U.S. personnel overseas. That legislation provided extra-territorial U.S. jurisdiction to provide for indictment in our courts for anyone who assaults, murders, or maims a U.S. citizen anywhere in the world.

In another African capital, we discussed the recent reign of terror in Nigeria. We discussed the pending legislative proposals to impose sanctions on Nigeria with the consensus that such action would be successful only if supported by united international action.

In Cape Town we met with Parliamentarians from the newly formed South African Intelligence Committee. They had many tough questions on the interaction between the Executive and Congress on legislative oversight. They asked bluntly if the CIA had too much power because of the perception that the CIA controlled the world. We responded by detailing our specific oversight actions to curtail excesses without unduly interfering with intelligence initiatives.

When our turn came for questions, we asked the opinion of the South African parliamentarians on whether the Government of South Africa would cooperate by imposing sanctions against buying Nigerian oil. They