

water regulation under this paragraph, the Administrator shall publish a determination as to whether the benefits of the maximum contaminant level justify, or do not justify, the costs based on the analysis conducted under paragraph (3)(C)."

We will now be able to see how each of these proposals works in real life. I look forward to seeing and analyzing the results.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I join with my colleague and friend from Michigan, Senator LEVIN, in saying that I can support this legislation with respect to this issue. I am also happy to support the inclusion of added language to protect the public's right to participate in the development and approval of the risk management demonstration projects provided under this bill.

I was concerned that as initially drafted, communities affected by these projects might not have a voice in commenting on the proposals made by pipeline owners and operators for alternative methods of complying with the law. The sponsors of the legislation agreed to add statutory language to protect that right to public participation. With that addition, as well as the statement of the sponsors as to the scope of the bill, I will support this legislation.

Mr. STEVENS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MARITIME SECURITY ACT

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate temporarily set aside Senate bill 1505 and that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 262, House bill 1350, the maritime security bill.

I further ask unanimous consent that no amendment relative to the tuna-dolphin issue on the Panama declaration issue be in order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 1350) to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 to revitalize the United States-flag merchant marine, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the Senate will soon consider House bill 1350, the Maritime Security Act of 1995.

This is the companion legislation to Senate bill 1139, the maritime reform legislation approved by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation earlier this year.

This historic legislation is the culmination of over two decades of work by the Senate Commerce Committee. I said two decades.

For most of the 1980's the senior Senator from Hawaii and myself spent hundreds of hours in congressional hearings, consultation with administration officials, and discussions with affected industry in seeking to find a way to stabilize and reform the Federal maritime programs.

We became involved in this debate in large part because of our responsibility to the Senate and the Nation to find methods of improving our military support capabilities for the Department of Defense.

The Navy and the Marines deploy the Maritime Prepositioning Force, which is our core capability to respond in an emergency to hostile actions worldwide which threaten the security interests of the United States.

We have known for many years that advance military capability must be combined with the ability to provide both surge sealift capability and sustainment sealift capability.

Without both surge and sustainment, we expose our fighting men and women to the dangers inherent in any military involvement far from our shores.

The Congress has appropriated billions of dollars over the last 15 years to improve our surge sealift transportation capability.

We have procured Fast Sealift Ships, Large Roll-On, Roll-Off ships, Ready Reserve Force vessels, and strategic lift aircraft to support our military forces in the initial days and months of battle.

We now have the most technologically advanced surge sealift capability in the history of the world, and are approaching a maximum state of initial readiness.

Military capability and surge sealift capability are, however, only two legs of the three legged stool for our advance deployed military force.

The third leg is the ability to sustain these forces over extended periods of time, after we place them in foreign territory, far from home. The maritime security program in H.R. 1350 provides that third leg.

Why is it necessary for the Federal Government to provide supplemental payments to U.S. companies to keep their ships under U.S.-flag?

The answer is simple. We hold our U.S.-flag carriers to operating, safety, and labor standards far superior and far more costly than those imposed on foreign-flag carriers by their governments.

Operators of U.S.-flag vessels must meet payroll taxes, including social security, unemployment insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid. U.S. carriers pay income taxes and a 50 percent penalty for repairing their ships overseas.

These ships must be in compliance with more restrictive Coast Guard and OSHA safety regulations. In short, our Federal laws build in economic disincentives for U.S. companies to keep their vessels under the national flag.

What is the national interest in keeping these ships under U.S.-flag? Opponents of the bill have pointed to Desert Shield/Desert Storm as evidence that commercial sealift can be procured in times of emergency.

My questions to the Senate are twofold: At what price, and in what state of readiness? Let me reemphasize to my colleagues in the Senate that there are no free meals in the real world.

There will always be a price for an immediately available sustainment sealift capability in a trained and effective state of readiness.

As chairman of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee responsible for managing the long-term costs of the Defense Department, I have come away with a much different lesson learned from Desert Storm.

The costs of contracting with the private sector in an emergency come at a high premium and the state of readiness is inadequate.

Logistical support is like an athlete's muscle—you must exercise these muscles early and often if you are going to compete and win in the field.

The first lesson we learned from Desert Shield/Desert Storm is that foreign shipping companies can easily gauge the needs of the U.S. military and the availability of tonnage to meet these needs.

The average cost to the United States for procuring U.S.-flag ships for sustainment sealift during Desert Shield was \$122 per ton. Foreign-flag shipping, in contrast, charged rates averaging \$174 per ton of cargo.

Norwegian and Italian shipping companies, for example, extracted premiums in excess of 50 percent higher than their normal charter price and, in some cases, doubled their charter price.

The second lesson from Desert Shield/Desert Storm is that the callup and coordination of civilian private sector operations to meet military surge requirements takes time.

At the height of Desert Shield, we had over 120 U.S.-flag vessels called up and in service in the supply line to the Persian Gulf.

Fifty-one of these ships were immediately available to the Department of Defense pursuant to their subsidy contracts with the Department of Transportation, and sixty ships were called up from the Ready Reserve Force [RRF] to supplement the commercial fleet.

We also chartered over a dozen large roll-on, roll-off vessels from foreign shipping companies to carry heavy equipment and inventories.

The RRF callup was painful in its early stages. The ships were being operated in a reduced state of readiness, and many were required to undergo extensive repair work in our shipyards before they could accept cargo.

We experienced serious short-term manning problems as our maritime labor force scrambled to bring people out of retirement or other sectors of the economy to fill the berths in a national emergency.

We had to wipe the cobwebs off the RRF and scrape for anybody who had ever sailed the high seas with a mariner's license.

At the end, we had an active force of U.S. flag ships with 3000 civilian, volunteer merchant mariners crewing the RRF ships and 100 U.S.-flag private sector ships time chartered to the Military Sealift Command.

It was the U.S.-flag fleet which stepped into the gap and provided the sustainment sealift during the initial months of Desert Storm.

These ships were fully crewed and ready to serve because they were operating in regular commercial service in the foreign waterborne commerce. These companies and mariners were ready when our Nation called, and they honored their contractual commitments to the Federal Government.

The United States was not treated the same way by the foreign shipping community.

We had foreign ships refuse to enter the war zone and saw foreign crews desert their ships rather than carry cargo to the Persian Gulf.

In many instances the promise of double pay was not sufficient to keep these crews recruited and in active service during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm period.

When we were able to get the foreign ships under contract, we paid the premium.

It is my message to the Senate that we must not repeat the mistakes of the past. The Congress owes an obligation to this Nation to properly sustain our fighting men and women when the U.S. asks them to risk their lives in protecting America's security interests abroad.

I do not stand before the Senate today to defend an old and obsolete subsidy program.

With my good friend from Hawaii, I know the current system is dysfunctional and in need of a comprehensive overhaul.

The task that began in the 1970's and ends today is simple: How do we ensure an adequate U.S.-flag, U.S.-crewed private sector fleet to provide sustained sealift in a cost-effective and logistically efficient manner?

This Bill, H.R. 1350, is the answer to that question.

There are two cornerstones of this proposed revision of our sustainment strategy: reform of the maritime program itself and inclusion of a new, state-of-the-art commercial fleet into the Emergency Preparedness Program.

The first removes the inefficiencies that have crept into the old maritime programs over the last 50 years.

The second acts as our Nation's insurance policy on the costs of sealift and provides the link between those

water-borne assets and the Department of Defense mobility structure.

When I served as chairman of the Senate Merchant Marine Subcommittee in the 1980's, the existing operating differential subsidy—the ODS program—was costing the Federal Government well over \$350 million per year. U.S. companies were receiving differential payments for crew costs, insurance, vessel maintenance, and other associated ship costs.

The per ship costs ranged between \$4 and \$5 million annually. We had no effective fiscal controls over this program because ODS was a contract entitlement.

Today, the administration has the authority to enter into new subsidy contracts without the approval of the Congress or any prior appropriation of funds.

We first started the discussion about substitution for the system of contract entitlement with a system of annual appropriations in 1986. This bill, H.R. 1350, would finally accomplish this objective, which is what the Senator from Hawaii and I started out to achieve.

This bill would authorize only \$100 million annually for the new sustainment sealift program, \$250 million less than the funded levels in the 1980's and \$150 million less than the costs of the existing program as it stands today.

We are proposing a firm fixed price system rather than a differential cost program. Participating companies are to receive roughly \$2 million per ship per year, half the amount these companies receive under the current entitlement program.

U.S. companies will be forced to continue their improvements in productivity, capital and labor cost reductions, and intermodal transportation capability in order to remain competitive in the foreign water-borne commerce.

In order to assist them in this goal, this bill would eliminate unnecessary trade route regulation and allow them to better adjust to the changing trends in international cargo movements.

We would also be procuring participation in the Emergency Preparedness Program.

There has been surprisingly little discussion about one of the more important features of the proposed reform effort in this bill.

A major requirement of the new Maritime Security Program is enrollment in the Emergency Preparedness Program. This program is currently being tested as a pilot called the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, or the VISA program. The United States Transportation Company, in consultation with the Maritime Administration, developed VISA in response to lessons learned in the Persian Gulf war.

The objective of VISA is to tie U.S. carrier sustainment commercial sealift and their worldwide intermodal transportation and management networks into the DOD sealift program.

Mr. President, worldwide water-borne transportation is no longer just a port-to-port movement of goods. It now involves multibillion-dollar intermodal transportation networks, including ships, the rail industry, the trucking industry, and aviation links.

The industry's capital base includes sophisticated marine terminal and port facilities, worldwide computerization of cargo movements, and new age management systems.

The VISA program accesses this multibillion-dollar shipping network. The objective of VISA is to promote and facilitate Department of Defense use of these existing systems.

It would literally break the bank if Congress were forced to replicate, operate, and maintain a similar system.

The Government costs for such a transportation system ranges from \$800 million per year and up, we are told, and we simply cannot afford those costs in this time of budget control.

An essential feature of the Maritime Security Program envisioned by this bill, H.R. 1350, is advance rate-setting through the Emergency Preparedness Program.

As a precondition for a fixed price MSP contract, the participating company must agree to rates established in advance for the chartering of its ships to DOD in the event of a call-up.

The MSP contract price paid to the carriers is, in its essential form, an insurance premium being paid for access to the multibillion dollar intermodal transportation network. This is clearly, in my judgment, the most cost-effective method yet proposed to allow for DOD access to sophisticated sustainment capability.

Finally, the Emergency Preparedness Program will also require periodic training exercises with the commercial fleet.

The United States Transportation Command is already conducting training exercises with select carriers on a voluntary basis as part of the VISA pilot program.

As part of the Maritime Security Program, training exercises through simulated call-ups will become an integral part of the Department of Defense's Sealift Readiness Program.

We will begin to exercise our sustained commercial sealift muscles on a regular basis. The next time an international incident, such as the Persian Gulf, arises, God forbid, the United States should be and will be ready under this bill.

As we debate this bill today, I ask my colleagues in the Senate to look at the large picture now and avoid getting caught up in issues and subissues that are being raised as reasons to block the passage of the House bill, H.R. 1350, today.

I believe that if we do not act on this bill today, there will be no U.S. flag sustainment fleet in the immediate future. The loss of our private commercial sealift will, in turn, result in huge defense costs and a gaping hole in our national sealift strategy.

Mr. President, the Senate has the opportunity to close the book on an issue that has been ongoing for decades and, I believe, may and should act in a manner which strengthens our national security.

I commend this bill to the Senate on the basis of the many hours I have spent with my colleague from Hawaii in trying to find a solution to the problems which beset our sealift capability.

Mr. INOUE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I wish to congratulate Senator LOTT, the distinguished former chairman of the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, for his commitment to the cause of reformulating our maritime policies, and also welcome Senator HUTCHISON, who was recently appointed chairman of the subcommittee.

I also wish to commend my colleague from Alaska for once again coming to the front and distinguishing himself in managing this bill before us.

Mr. President, the measure before us truly represents a bipartisan effort, and I urge all of the Members of this body to support this bill.

In recent years, we have spent a great deal of time and effort in evaluating and discussing maritime policy. Unfortunately, to date, this evaluation and discussion has not resulted in action. It is time to step forward and to ensure the continuing presence of U.S.-flag vessels.

This country, the sole remaining superpower, cannot be put in a position of relying on the goodwill of foreign nations to transport vital military cargo. And, we cannot rely on the goodwill of foreign nations to achieve the transportation of cargoes vital to our economic interests. It is not an acceptable or prudent national policy.

One of the issues that the Department of Defense [DOD] was forced to confront in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf conflict was the inadequacy of U.S. sealift assets.

While the logistical efforts put forth by the military in the gulf war were truly astounding, including the sealift of more than 10 million tons of surge and sustainment materiel by sea, it was evident that U.S. forces could not have accomplished this sealift alone without the support of foreign nations.

While the Persian Gulf conflict unified international opposition to the actions of the Iraqi government, and allowed for the international coordination of sealift, we cannot expect international support for every conflict.

We must be able to ensure that U.S.-flag shipping is available to bring materiel and ammunition to soldiers who are defending our interests on foreign soil.

One only has to look as far as the recent developments in Iraq. Our allies were less than forthcoming in efforts to provide assistance. If we need to proceed on a unilateral basis we must have the requisite sealift.

We must also remember that the United States is a maritime nation.

As a Senator from the only island State in the United States, I appreciate the importance of ocean shipping. The continued disintegration of the U.S.-flag transportation fleet greatly concerns me. I fear the possibility of being completely reliant on foreign corporations and foreign nations for transportation service.

A study of history will reveal the cyclical patterns of U.S. maritime development. Historically, the U.S.-flag fleet has suffered through long periods of neglect and disregard, only to reemerge. Reemergence usually occurs in times of national emergency, and usually only after the Government has spent considerable sums in reestablishing our fleet. Today we cannot afford to repeat this cycle again. Once more we are approaching a precipice. But this time it is one from which we may not be able to turn back. We are facing the total elimination of the international presence of U.S.-flag carriage.

After the end of the Civil War, interest in maritime activities waned, leaving waterborne commerce and shipbuilding mainly in the hands of foreign countries. In 1914, with the onset of World War I, ocean shipping rates rose 300 to 400 percent. In 1916, the U.S. Government realized the need for a strong U.S.-flag merchant fleet and began a massive shipbuilding campaign.

However, most of these ships were not complete by the end of the war and throughout the war, the United States depended largely on foreign shipping to support American soldiers. Unfortunately, little was learned from this, and most of these ships were allowed to fall into disuse within only a few years.

In 1936, Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act which would revolutionize American shipping. It provided a workable basis for building and maintaining a strong U.S.-flag merchant marine. This act came at precisely the right time—with the onset of World War II just a few years later.

In this war, once again, one of the most critical shortages was merchant shipping, but the United States was prepared and able to construct many vessels. By the end of the war, the United States had used over 4,000 war-built merchant ships. The U.S.-flag merchant marine was vital to war efforts and suffered great casualties.

At the end of the war more than 700 U.S.-flag vessels had been sunk and more than 6,000 civilian merchant mariners had lost their lives. Their casualty rate was second only to the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1950, the private U.S.-flag merchant marine was comprised of 1,170 ships totaling 14.1 million deadweight tonnage. With this surplus of ships, once again, the merchant marine was allowed to become stagnant and shipbuilding was greatly reduced.

In 1970, the U.S.-flag merchant marine comprised 793 ships totaling 14.4

million deadweight tons. The number of ships had been greatly reduced, but, because of new, larger vessels, tonnage was increased by 300,000 tons. The United States was then ranked No. 8 in the world in deadweight tonnage. As we all know, in 1945, at the end of the Great War, we were No. 1. It may interest you to know we are at this moment No. 14. The superpower of this planet is No. 14 when it comes to shipping.

Today our merchant fleet has fewer than 350 vessels, although our tonnage capacity is over 20 million deadweight tons as U.S. operators use larger, more efficient vessels.

Although the United States has many of the most innovative ships in the world in its fleet, it still is increasingly difficult for American vessels to compete in the international trades against foreign subsidies, state-owned fleets, and the tax advantages and lack of meaningful foreign regulation of foreign vessels.

In addition, we have seen the promulgation of the operation of vessels under flags of convenience. Flag-of-convenience vessels have nominal connection to the country whose flag it flies. They sail under the Liberian flag, Panamanian flag and, believe it or not, under the Swiss flag. There are no harbors in Switzerland, but they have a fleet which, incidentally is larger than ours. They do not pay taxes, nor do their workers pay tax to the nation whose law they operate under. In fact, they do not even employ citizens from the host nation, and they may never even visit that nation.

In the last decade many U.S. shipping companies have begun placing their vessels under flag-of-convenience registries. The high cost of doing business under the American flag—paying full U.S. taxes, abiding by all U.S. laws and the numerous rules and regulations imposed by the Federal Government—have contributed greatly to this movement.

The simple fact is that today, if these trends continue, the U.S.-flag fleet will disappear from the sealanes of the world in less than 10 years. We cannot allow this to happen. This is why we must act now.

In the early 1990's, the Persian Gulf war once again proved the importance of a strong, vital U.S.-flag merchant marine. This conflict proved that the only reliable choice is to use American vessels with American crews. Too often during the Persian Gulf war, foreign-flag ships with foreign crews refused to enter the war zone.

We did not see this on our front pages, but on 16 different occasions foreign-flag vessels with our cargo declined to provide transportation service into the Persian Gulf. But we were fortunate in the Persian Gulf war. Saddam Hussein did not attack Saudi Arabia. Why he hesitated we have no idea. We had the time to get the job done with a unified coalition. We may not be so lucky in the future.

We must, therefore, have in place a modern, capable, and reliable U.S.-flag

fleet with the same loyal Americans to crew them whose predecessors have never let us down in the more than 200 years of our Nation's history.

The Maritime Security Act of 1995 is essential to the military security of our Nation.

Specifically, this legislation will do the following: It will guarantee a pool of American citizen crews and a 50-ship fleet of militarily useful U.S.-flag commercial sealift vessels for our national security; it will also provide that the companies' entire intermodal logistical support systems—containers, rail cars, computer tracking, port operations, and management—will be available to the DOD when needed; it will guarantee the availability of American mariners to crew the DOD's sealift fleet of fast sealift ships, prepositioned ships and Ready Reserve Force vessels; and it will ensure that military supplies are on reliable U.S.-flag ships with patriotic, dependable American citizen crews. Many people are unaware that even our DOD reserve fleet vessels are operated by civilian merchant marines, because they cost less to operate than vessels directly controlled by the Navy.

This Maritime Security Act will cut costs by more than 50 percent compared to today's program. It will reduce burdensome Government regulations that hamstring U.S.-flag operators which give competitive advantage to foreign-flag companies.

And it will save the Defense Department billions of dollars—because the DOD will be able to use modern, state-of-the-art commercial assets rather than buying and maintaining this capability on their own. It is eight times cheaper to have the private sector perform this vital national security task—and this point alone makes the Maritime Security Act a commonsense bargain for America.

My fellow colleagues, in the past we have often taken for granted the role of the merchant marine in the economy and security of the United States. We cannot afford to do so today—nor can we suddenly rebuild a maritime capability in the future if we need it urgently.

It is simply not economically feasible or realistic to repeat the mistakes—the ups and downs of maritime support—we have made in the past.

We need a merchant marine in place that is strong and reliable in both peacetime and wartime. The new maritime security program will help our Nation reach this goal in a cost-effective, more efficient and more competitive manner. So I urge all my colleagues to support this program, and to enact it into law.

I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I think the Senate will note my partner across the aisle and I have been involved in a lot of issues together, particularly defense issues. With regard to these

issues, at times the Senator from Hawaii has been chairman of the subcommittee. At other times, I have, depending upon the political winds of our country. But the Senator from Hawaii and I, as I have said in my opening statement, spent many hours over the last two decades trying to find a way to solve this problem.

At one time when I was both chairman of the subcommittee of Appropriations and the subcommittee of Commerce, I secured the approval of the Senate, not once but twice, of a special program, the Eisenhower Build and Lease program. We tried to put it back into effect. We actually had the Congress appropriate more than \$1 billion in a reserve to start that program. It was not possible to get it started because of the various conflicts within our merchant marine industry.

We are now in a position of, really, suggesting to the Senate what amounts to a proposal like the Civil Air Reserve Fleet that we use in the event of emergency, where we have preexisting contracts with airlines that enable us to, really, commandeer our civilian airline fleet in order to meet our emergency needs. That is what we are talking about.

We have now switched over to a concept of relying upon the private sector to build and we will lease. The Eisenhower program was building and then leasing. That went on for a period of time, but it just did not work because of the problem within the industry of subsidizing one line and not subsidizing another. It led to, really, problems within the merchant marine fleet.

This answer that has come to us from the House, I think, is the most worthwhile approach that I have seen. It has taken a long time to work out. I am hopeful we will see approval of it today.

Does the Senator from Iowa seek the floor at this time?

Mr. GRASSLEY. Shortly.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THOMPSON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I have checked with the participants in this piece of legislation. It may be some time before they will be able to start their deliberation. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that I might proceed for up to 10 minutes, as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT TO THE FISCAL YEAR 1997 INTERIOR APPROPRIATIONS BILL

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, when the Senate returns to the consideration of

the Interior appropriations bill, I intend to offer an amendment that would redirect the bill's earmark of \$3 million to create a 20,000 acre national wildlife refuge in western Kentucky.

On Monday, the Senate approved the energy and water appropriations bill that, due to budget constraints imposed by this Congress, will not adequately fund an important, existing environmental project in western Kentucky called the Land Between the Lakes. LBL is a 170,000-acre preserve located just 15 miles east of the Interior bill's proposed wildlife refuge.

I fail to see the logic of what some people are proposing here: inadequately fund one outdoor facility, the Land Between the Lakes, on Monday, and then, just days later, try to appropriate funding for a new facility just 15 miles away. In Marshall County, where most of the proposed refuge would be located, the judge/executive has asked me, "why don't we take care of what we've got before we open a new nature preserve?" I could not agree more. The fact of the matter is that we are not taking care of the Land Between the Lakes. Its appropriation has dropped by one-third since 1994 even as millions of dollars' worth of maintenance projects pile up.

The rider in the Interior appropriations bill will ensure that LBL and other wilderness projects continue to go begging in years to come. That is because the \$3 million earmarked in the Interior appropriations bill is just a fraction of the \$15-20 million it will cost to actually create the refuge. That is not just me talking. Those estimates are from the Congressional Budget Office and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. So, Mr. President, supporters of the earmark will be back next year, and the year after, looking for more money for this new project.

What is worse is that Kentuckians living in the surrounding counties do not even support the proposed wildlife refuge created by the bill. I have already mentioned the statement of the Marshall County Judge executive. Well, the Marshall County Soil and Water Conservation District has also gone on record, saying, "Our opposition to making a Federal Wildlife Refuge of the East Ford of Clark's River stems from the overwhelming opposition of land owners and tenants in the proposed area."

The sentiment if the same in Murray, KY, located in the adjacent county of Calloway. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an editorial from the Murray Ledger-Times.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Murray Ledger & Times, Feb. 8, 1996]

NATIONAL REFUGE AT ODDS WITH LBL DILEMMA

We're scratching our heads over the latest from Sen. Mitch McConnell.

What could McConnell be thinking?

We know it's an election year, but can his plan to create a national wildlife refuge just