

(3) Rule on motions and requests for appearance of witnesses and the production of records;

(4) Designate the date on which posthearing briefs, if any, shall be submitted;

(5) Determine all procedural matters concerning the hearing, including the length of sessions, conduct of persons in attendance, recesses, continuances, and adjournments; and take any other appropriate procedural action which, in the judgment of the designated representative, will promote the purpose and objectives of the hearing.

(b) A prehearing conference may be conducted by the designated representative of the Board in order to:

(1) Inform the parties of the purpose of the hearing and the procedures under which it will take place;

(2) Explore the possibilities of obtaining stipulations of fact;

(3) Clarify the positions of the parties with respect to the issues to be heard; and

(4) Discuss any other relevant matters which will assist the parties in the resolution of the dispute.

§2471.9 Report and recommendations

(a) When a report is issued after a hearing conducted pursuant to §2471.7 and 2471.8, it normally shall be in writing and, when authorized by the Board, shall contain recommendations.

(b) A report of the designated representative containing recommendations shall be submitted to the parties, with two (2) copies to the Executive Director, within a period normally not to exceed thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the transcript or briefs, if any.

(c) A report of the designated representative not containing recommendations shall be submitted to the Board with a copy to each party within a period normally not to exceed thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the transcript or briefs, if any. The Board shall then take whatever action it may consider appropriate or necessary to resolve the impasse.

§2471.10 Duties of each party following receipt of recommendations

(a) Within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of a report containing recommendations of the Board or its designated representative, each party shall, after conferring with the other, either:

(1) Accept the recommendations and so notify the Executive Director; or

(2) Reach a settlement of all unresolved issues and submit a written settlement statement to the Executive Director; or

(3) Submit a written statement to the Executive Director setting forth the reasons for not accepting the recommendations and for not reaching a settlement of all unresolved issues.

(b) A reasonable extension of time may be authorized by the Executive Director for good cause shown when requested in writing by either party prior to the expiration of the time limits.

§2471.11 Final action by the board

(a) If the parties do not arrive at a settlement as a result of or during actions taken under §2471.6(a)(2), 2471.7, 2471.8, 2471.9, and 2471.10, the Board may take whatever action is necessary and not inconsistent with 5 U.S.C. chapter 71, as applied by the CAA, to resolve the impasse, including but not limited to, methods and procedures which the Board considers appropriate, such as directing the parties to accept a factfinder's recommendations, ordering binding arbitration conducted according to whatever procedure the Board deems suitable, and rendering a binding decision.

(b) In preparation for taking such final action, the Board may hold hearings, administer oaths, and take the testimony or deposition of any person under oath, or it may appoint or designate one or more individuals pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7119(c)(4), as applied by the CAA, to exercise such authority on its behalf.

(c) When the exercise of authority under this section requires the holding of a hearing, the procedure contained in §2471.8 shall apply.

(d) Notice of any final action of the Board shall be promptly served upon the parties, and the action shall be binding on such parties during the term of the agreement, unless they agree otherwise.

§2471.12 Inconsistent labor agreement provisions

Any provisions of the parties' labor agreements relating to impasse resolution which are inconsistent with the provisions of either 5 U.S.C. 7119, as applied by the CAA, or the procedures of the Board shall be deemed to be superseded.

A JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

Mr. PELL. Madam President, the recent shooting of two young Greek Cypriots and a Turkish Cypriot soldier have raised tension on Cyprus to a higher level than has been experienced in many years. These events demonstrate that the status quo of foreign occupation and forcible division of the island is unacceptable and dangerous to peace and stability in the area.

Above all, the recent killings highlight the need to demilitarize Cyprus as a first step toward achieving a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. Last fall, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a resolution calling for demilitarization and it was subsequently approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The need for demilitarization is even greater now than it was last year.

Neither demilitarization nor a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem will occur, however, unless Turkey demonstrates the political will and flexibility to arrive at a compromise solution to the division of Cyprus. In order for that to happen, the United States and its European allies must make a concerted effort to convince Turkey that an end to the division of Cyprus is in everyone's security interest.

The Ambassador of Cyprus in Washington, Andrew J. Jacovides, has very persuasively laid out the case for such an effort in a letter to the editor of the Washington Post that was published on September 9. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of his letter be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CYPRUS: THE PROBLEM IS SOLVABLE

The editorial "Cyprus: Try Everything" [Aug. 26], though well intended and timely, particularly in the wake of the recent brutal murders of two unarmed young Greek Cypriots who were peacefully demonstrating their justifiable feelings against Turkish occupation, miscasts some of the main relevant issues.

The recent events demonstrate that the status quo of occupation and forcible division is unacceptable and is indeed a source of tension and instability as well as the cause of grave injustice and much human suffering. In fact, there is much more in common that can unite Greek and Turkish Cypriots than the differences that at present divide them (though, of course, this does not hold true for the Anatolian settlers or the "Grey Wolves" imported from Turkey).

The Cyprus problem is solvable, and the basis for its solution lies within the parameters defined by U.N. resolutions, voted for also by the United States. In addition to the prospect of Cyprus's accession to the European Union highlighted in The Post's editorial, the demilitarization of Cyprus is a key element. In a resolution overwhelmingly adopted by the House of Representatives last September, Congress "considers that ultimate, total demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus would meet the security concerns of all parties involved, would enhance prospects for a peaceful and lasting resolution of the dispute regarding Cyprus, would benefit all of the people of Cyprus, and merits international support."

There has been no lack of prominent diplomats engaged in the search for a Cyprus settlement, including Richard Holbrooke, Richard Beattie and, most recently, U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright. We certainly welcome such engagement. What is lacking, however, is the political will and the flexibility necessary to make a breakthrough toward a compromise solution on the part of Ankara, which has long held the key to such a solution through its military, economic and political dominance of the occupied northern part of Cyprus since 1974. Regrettably, the current regime in Turkey does not hold much promise that this will happen soon, unless there is a concerted international effort directed toward Ankara.

A just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem is to the benefit of all parties concerned and is in fact crucial to improved relations between Greece and Turkey. For the United States, which has excellent relations with Cyprus as highlighted during the recent visit of President Glafcos Clerides to Washington, such a solution enjoys bipartisan support and is in the national interest. It can be achieved with active U.S. engagement and will be a foreign policy success for the United States and indeed for any administration.

The issue is not to just "try everything" but to take all appropriate and effective steps to end the division of the island and safeguard the security and human rights of all its people in a demilitarized, federal Cyprus within the European Union.

ANDREW J. JACOVIDES,
Ambassador.

DEFERRAL OF ACTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Mr. PELL. Madam President, earlier today the majority and minority cooperated in the vitiation of a unanimous-consent agreement under which a landmark international agreement, the Chemical Weapons Convention, was to have been considered. I hope very much that the Senate will be able to return to that treaty under more favorable circumstances.

It is important to understand that the treaty had been subjected to a barrage of criticism in recent weeks—some of it apparently motivated by a simple desire to kill the treaty. As a result the treaty's merits were somewhat obscured.

The Senate's former majority leader, former Senator Robert Dole, the Republican Party's current candidate for President, expressed certain reservations yesterday. Mr. Dole indicated that he would only support the treaty if we had high confidence that our intelligence community would detect violations and that the treaty will be truly global and include such parties as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea.

In the context of the Dole comments it became clear that the Senate would probably have to consider two amendments offered by the majority as provided for in the unanimous-consent agreement. The first amendment appeared likely to prohibit the President from depositing the U.S. instrument of ratification unless the Director of Central Intelligence certified to the Senate that the intelligence community could monitor the treaty with high confidence. The second amendment would have prevented the President from depositing the instrument of ratification until he certified that such so-called rogue states as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria had ratified the treaty.

The first amendment would have established an impossible standard, since no Director of Central Intelligence could ever make such a certification with regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

It is the very nature of chemical weapons that they can be made with very simple equipment and in small spaces. Nations or terrorist groups could certainly succeed in manufacturing quantities of lethal chemicals. Certainly no Director of Central Intelligence could ever express high confidence about abilities to detect all such activities.

Most of those familiar with the treaty understand that it represents a departure from the high confidence of detection that could be applied in earlier accords dealing with strategic offensive arms, for instance. Silos can be counted and so can submarines and their missiles. Bombers at airfields are clearly visible.

We must understand now that we are entering new fields of arms control and that there are going to be fewer absolute certainties.

The important standard to be met with regard to verification of arms control agreements is that we would be able to detect any militarily significant illegal activity under the treaty and be able to respond to that activity before any damage to our national security interests could occur.

Mr. Dole tied the impossible demand for high confidence in verification to insistence that the convention be effectively verifiable. Effective verification alone is a standard most experts believe this convention should meet and has met. The need for effective verification has been a commonly accepted standard for years. Insistence on high confidence of the detection of

myriad violations moves the standard to the realm of impossibility, as Mr. Dole and treaty opponents know fully.

President George Bush concluded that the treaty was indeed effectively verifiable. In a July 18, 1994, letter to me, former President Bush wrote:

The United States worked hard to ensure that the Convention could be effectively verified. At the same time, we sought the means to protect both United States security interests and commercial capabilities. I am convinced that the Convention we signed served both objectives, effectively banning chemical weapons without creating an unnecessary burden on legitimate activities.

Our highest current military authority, General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in testimony prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations:

While no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, the CWC is effectively verifiable. It provides for complementary and overlapping verification requirements that help deter CW violations. The CWC does this through the most intrusive verification provisions of any arms control regime to date. This verification regime consists of declarations, routine inspections of declared facilities, and short notice challenge inspection of any facility. Of note, some of the convention's imperfection was intentional in order to protect our military interests. The regime allows military commanders to protect classified information, equipment, and facilities unrelated to the Convention.

In response to concerns regarding clandestine programs, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry argued,

While we recognize that detecting illicit production of small quantities of chemical weapons will be extremely difficult, we also recognize that that would be even more difficult without a Chemical Weapons Convention. In fact, the Chemical Weapons Convention verification regime, through its declaration, routine inspection, fact-finding, consultation and challenge inspections, should prove effective in providing a wealth of information on possible chemical weapons programs that simply would not be available without the convention.

Mr. John Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stated:

While no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, the CWC will increase the risk of detection and therefore help deter illicit chemical weapons activities. Its declaration and inspection provisions will help build a web of deterrence, detection, and possible sanctions that reduces the incentives for states to build chemical weapons.

The then-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. R. James Woolsey stated:

The Chemical Weapons Convention provides the intelligence community with a new tool to add to our collection tool kit. It is an instrument with broad applicability, which can help resolve a wide variety of problems. Moreover, it is a universal tool which can be used by diplomats and politicians, as well as intelligence specialists, to further a common goal: elimination of the threat of chemical weapons.

Mr. Woolsey also added:

The isolation and adverse attention that nonsignatories will draw upon themselves may spur greater multinational cooperation in attempting to halt offensive chemical weapons programs.

Secretary of State Christopher argued:

No treaty is 100 percent verifiable, but the Convention is carefully structured so that Parties tempted to cheat will never be sure they can evade detection and sanctions. The sooner the Convention enters into force, the sooner those countries possessing or seeking chemical weapons will have to make a choice: abide by its provisions or suffer the weight of penalties and sanctions imposed by the international community.

Secretary of Defense Perry stated:

The Chemical Weapons Convention contains the most extensive verification provisions of any arms control regime. It consists of detailed declarations, routine inspections of declared sites and short notice challenge inspections. With its complementary and overlapping verification requirements, the Chemical Weapons Convention's regime provides the means to help deter a state party from violating the provisions of the Convention. Therefore, we are confident that activities such as the destruction of declared chemical weapons stocks and production facilities can be verified. We are confident that we will be able to detect large-scale production, filling and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

With regard to the desire that the convention be truly global, I would point out that history demonstrates that well-conceived treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention is, pick up parties over time and become worldwide in scope. That was certainly true of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If we were to wait to join until all nations that caused us concern had joined, there is no question in my mind that the convention would be hobbled by our absence over a number of years.

It is no threat to Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea to say that we will not join the treaty until they do. Rather than our applying pressure on them, it is more likely that such a stance would be used by the rogue states to apply pressure to us. It makes far more sense to start out, as envisaged by the treaty, with a minimum of 65 states parties and build from that point and be in a position to apply effective international pressure upon rogue states to behave themselves and get into the treaty.

Madam President, The Chemical Weapons Convention, if successful, will ban the production, acquisition, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons.

In it each State Party undertakes never, under any circumstances, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;

Use chemical weapons;

Engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and

Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this convention.

In addition each State Party undertakes, all in accordance with the provisions of the convention to destroy the chemical weapons it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under

its jurisdiction or control;

Destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party; and

Destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

Finally, each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.

The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for both routine and challenge inspections to assist in the verification of compliance with the convention.

Madam President, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I held six public hearings and three closed sessions of the committee in 1994. In those hearings, witnesses included Secretary of State Warren Christopher; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John Shalikashvili; the Director of the United States Arms Control Association, John D. Holum; the U.S. negotiator for the convention, Ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar; the Director of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey; and other senior officers of the national security and foreign policy agencies of the executive branch. In addition, the committee received extensive testimony from a number of nongovernmental witnesses. We were very careful to receive testimony from critics, as well as supporters, of the treaty so that the committee and the Senate would be assured the opportunity to receive a balanced and reasoned judgment on the merits of the convention.

Earlier this year, the committee held wrap-up hearings on the convention before marking up the treaty this spring. Both critics and supporters were heard. I and other supporters concluded following these final hearings that the United States would clearly benefit and could not suffer significant harm through joining the treaty and helping to ensure its success.

On April 25, the committee voted by a 2-to-1 margin, 12 to 6, to approve a substitute resolution of ratification I offered with the Senator from Indiana, [Mr. LUGAR] we were joined as co-sponsors in this venture by Senators KASSEBAUM, BIDEN, DODD, and KERRY.

In our resolution, which was fully supported by the executive branch, we made every effort to identify areas of legitimate concern and to deal effectively with them.

Madam President, I would hope that the resolution adopted by the committee with strong bipartisan support will help the Senate when it returns to consideration of this vitally important venture.

Madam President, a number of concerns have been expressed regarding the possible effects on business of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Some fear that the convention would pose a new and onerous burden on businesses throughout the country. It is important to understand that industry representatives were involved throughout

the course of the negotiation and worked carefully to ensure that the chemical weapons ban would be effective and that it would be quite manageable from the standpoint of business. Government officials also have been involved in efforts to ensure that implementation of the convention would constitute the smallest inconveniences possible.

In that connection, I received a very informative letter today from the Honorable Michael Kantor, Secretary of Commerce, and Mr. Philip Lauder, the Administrator of the Small Business Administration dealing with a number of misconceptions regarding the impact of the convention on small business. Also today, I received additional information in a letter from Mr. Frederick L. Webber, president and chief executive officer of the Chemical Manufacturers Association. I ask that the letter be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. PELL. Earlier I drew to my fellow Senators, attention a letter signed by 53 senior executives of the chemical industry in support of the convention. I ask unanimous consent that that August 29 letter be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. PELL. Lastly, I would like to make a matter of public record the widespread support the convention enjoys in the arms control community. I ask unanimous consent that a September 3 letter to me and my fellow Members urging approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention also be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. PELL. We cannot ignore now the fact that the Chemical Weapons Convention is an integral part of a continuum of arms control agreements that developed in the period since the Second World War. In that period we have embarked on undertakings that ban nuclear weapons in outer space, on the ocean floor, that limit nuclear weapons elsewhere in the world and have resulted in the removal, following deployment, of a whole class of nuclear missiles from Europe. The nations of the world have joined together in a truly global effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and they took advantage of the opportunity last year to extend the non-proliferation treaty indefinitely, without condition. We and the former Soviet Union forged ahead with a series of agreements limiting strategic offensive and defensive missiles and those agreements have now been broadened to include other successor states of the former Soviet Union. More than 2 decades ago the nations of the world agreed to ban biological weapons. With this agreement

we are attempting to ban chemical weapons.

The result of all this is certainly not a perfect world and all of our efforts are not completely successful. We know, for instance, that there are biological weapons in the world. We know that there will be chemical weapons in the world—even under this convention when ratified. We know that we cannot solve the world's woes immediately through such accords, but we can change the goals of the world and we can change the direction of the body of nations. With the Chemical Weapons Convention we will move away from a situation which those who wish to have chemical weapons are free to have them, if not to use them, to a new situation in which the responsible nations of the world will be doing their best to banish this class of weapons from the face of the Earth.

The failure to take this could prove most unfortunate. A U.S. decision not to join the Chemical Weapons Convention would not stop it from entering into force, but would surely undermine the effectiveness of the treaty and would be harmful to critically important U.S. interests in identifying and dealing with chemical weapons threats in various parts of the world. It is not in our interest to be on the outside looking in as the Chemical Weapons Convention is set up.

Madam President, this convention enjoys the support of a number of Republican Senators and has virtually unanimous Senate Democratic support. I hope that the Senate will wisely return to consideration of this convention at an opportune and early moment. There is no question in my mind that we will pay a price for today's regrettably necessary decision. We can hope that the opportunity will return to get the United States back on track with regard to a chemical weapons ban.

EXHIBIT 1

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
Washington, DC, September 12, 1996.

Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Ranking Minority Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR PELL: We are writing to clarify a number of misconceptions regarding the impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on small business. Contrary to a number of allegations, the CWC will not impose a burdensome reporting requirement on small businesses nor will it subject them to a frequent and intrusive regime of international inspections.

The Administration estimates that about 2000 firms will be required to submit a data declaration. The reporting burden on smaller chemical companies will focus mainly on producers of "Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals" (carbon compounds). The vast majority of these—some 1800-1900—firms, many of which are smaller companies, will only be required to submit annual reports that identify aggregate production ranges (e.g., this plant site produced over 10,000 metric tons of Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals last year.) They will not be required to identify the specific chemicals that were produced.

Previously, the Administration had estimated that more companies would be required to submit a data declaration. However, additional analysis indicated that many did not cross the CWC production threshold for reporting. Further, administrative exemptions at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] will be crafted to exclude entire industries from reporting—biomediated processes (such as certain beverages) and polymers (such as plastics used in football helmets). In addition, plant sites that exclusively produce hydrocarbons (e.g. propane and ethylene) are completely excluded from any reporting requirements.

This "Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals" data declaration does not require any information regarding imports, exports, usage or processing. We estimate that it will take a few hours to complete this "Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical" form the first time. Subsequent annual reporting should be much more simple and take less time.

No manufacturer of "Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals" will be subject to a routine inspection during the first three years. After three years, OPCW will address the issue of inspections for manufacturers of "Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals". It is unlikely that many of these producers would ever be inspected.

We anticipate that there will be very few challenge inspections and the prospect for a challenge inspection of a small producer of "Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals" is remote indeed. It is likely that whatever challenge inspection requests are issued will be directed at military facilities. These facilities are well prepared to protect classified and other sensitive information.

In this regard, we want to make it clear that the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA) and its 260 members support ratification of the CWC. SOCMA's member companies are typically small businesses with fewer than 50 employees and less than \$50 million in annual sales. Further, in a joint statement issued on September 10, 1996, SOCMA, the Chemical Manufacturers Association [CMA] and the Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers Association [PHARMA] noted that "We urge the Senate to support this historic arms control agreement, and the prompt passage of the accompanying implementing legislation."

In short, the industry that will be affected by the CWC has taken a strong position in support of Senate ratification. We urge you to listen to their advice and ratify this important treaty.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL KANTOR,
Secretary of Commerce.

PHILIP LADER,
Administrator, Small Business Administration.

EXHIBIT 2

CHEMICAL
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,
Arlington, VA, September 9, 1996.

Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR PELL: As the Senate prepares to consider the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), questions have been raised about the impact of the treaty on the commercial chemical industry in the United States. I want to reassure you that the U.S. chemical industry unequivocally supports this Convention.

As I stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on numerous occasions, the

Chemical Manufacturers Association [CMA] has carefully reviewed the impact of the CWC on industry. We tested the CWC's reporting and inspections obligations. We balanced the costs and benefits of this treaty, and found that the benefits far outweigh the costs.

The CWC will require approximately 2,000 commercial facilities in the United States to report on their activities. More than 90 percent of those facilities will only need to file a simple two-page form, once a year with the government. A second, smaller group of 200 facilities will have more detailed reporting requirements, and may be subject to on-site inspections. CMA's members worked closely with the government in drafting the reporting forms, and in two separate "road tests" of the reporting system, reported that the system was indeed reasonable. CMA members also helped craft the inspection procedures under the Convention. Those procedures have been tested in commercial facilities in the United States, to favorable reviews.

The second category of affected facilities are those that produce commercial chemicals that can be diverted into weapons production. It is important to note that even these facilities have significant protections under the CWC, such as the ability to negotiate how inspections are conducted, and the ability to protect sensitive trade secrets. Companies affected by these provisions have tested the draft U.S. reporting forms, and even offered their facilities to test inspection procedures. They reported to CMA that the CWC's benefits far outweighed the comparatively smaller cost of implementation.

We are confident that between CMA and the other national trade associations with whom we have worked (including the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, among others), the overwhelming majority of companies that have possible CWC-related obligations know and understand their responsibilities.

The Senate should not learn belatedly about the implications of the Convention for business, and business should not learn belatedly about its obligations under the Convention. That is why education and outreach has been one of our major goals on the CWC. That is why we have worked closely with the U.S. and other governments to focus the Convention on those facilities that may pose a risk to the goal of a world free from chemical weapons.

For your further information, I have enclosed a copy of my May 9, 1996 letter that was sent to all senators, which details the commercial impact of the CWC.

The American chemical industry fully supports this treaty. Senator, I urge you to vote in favor of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

If you have any questions concerning the chemical industry's support for the CWC, please have your staff contact me or Claude Boudrias, Legislative Representative for Trade & Tax at 703/741-5915

Sincerely,

FREDERICK L. WEBBER,
President & CEO.

EXHIBIT 3

AUGUST 29, 1996.

Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR PELL: The undersigned senior executives of chemical companies urge your vote in support of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC], and quick Senate action on legislation to implement this important treaty.

The chemical industry has long supported the CWC. Our industry participated in negotiating the agreement, and in U.S. and international implementation efforts. The treaty contains substantial protections for confidential business information [CBI]. We know, because industry helped to draft the CBI provisions. Chemical companies also help test the draft CWC reporting system, and we tested the on-site inspection procedures that will help verify compliance with the treaty. In short, our industry has thoroughly examined and tested this Convention. We have concluded that the benefits of the CWC far outweigh the costs.

Indeed, the real price to pay would come from not ratifying the CWC. The treaty calls for strict restrictions on trade with nations which are not party to the Convention. The chemical industry is America's largest export industry, posting \$60 billion in export sales last year. But our industry's status as the world's preferred supplier of chemical products may be jeopardized if the U.S. does not ratify the Convention. If the Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC, we stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of good-paying American jobs.

The U.S. chemical industry has spent more than 15 years working on this agreement, and we long ago decided that ratifying the CWC is the right thing to do.

We urge you to vote in support of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Sincerely,

J. Lawrence Wilson, Chairman & CEO, Rohm and Haas Company, Chairman, Board of Directors, Chemical Manufacturers Association.

Alan R. Hirsig, President & CEO, ARCO Chemical Company, Chairman, Executive Committee, Chemical Manufacturers Association.

H.A. Wagner, Chairman, President & CEO, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.

D.J. D'Antoni, President, Ashland Chemical Company.

Helge H. Wehmeier, President & CEO, Bayer Corporation.

John D. Ong, Chairman & CEO, The BFGoodrich Company.

Robert R. Mesel, President, BP Chemicals, Inc.

Charles M. Donohue, Vice President, Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Inc.

J. Dieter Stein, Chairman & CEO, BASF Corporation.

W.R. Cook, Chairman, President & CEO, Betz Dearborn, Inc.

Joseph M. Saggese, President & CEO, Borden Chemicals & Plastics, LP.

Dr. Aziz I. Asphahani, President & CEO, Carus Chemical Company.

Vincent A. Calarco, Chairman, President & CEO, Crompton & Knowles Corporation.

Richard A. Hazleton, Chairman & CEO, Dow Corning Corporation.

Howard J. Rudge, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company.

Richard G. Fanelli, President & CEO, Enthone-OMI Inc.

J.E. Akitt, Executive Vice President, Exxon Chemical Company.

William S. Stavropoulos, President & CEO, The Dow Chemical Company.

Earnest W. Deavenport, Jr., Chairman of the Board & CEO, Eastman Chemical Company.

Bernard Azoulay, President & CEO, Elf Atochem North America.

Bruce C. Gottwald, CEO, Ethyl Corporation.

Ron W. Haddock, President & CEO, FINA, Inc.

Robert N. Burt, Chairman & CEO, FMC Corporation.

Otto Furuta, V.P. Global Logistics & Materials, Management, Great Lakes Chemical Corporation.

R. Keith Elliott, President & COO, Hercules, Inc.

Hans C. Noetzli, President & CEO, Lonza Inc.

Robert G. Potter, Executive Vice President, Monsanto Company.

Dr. William L. Orton, Senior Vice President, Chemical Operations, Givaudan-Roure Corporation.

Michael R. Boyce, President & COO, Harris Chemical Group.

Thomas F. Kennedy, President & CEO, Hoechst Celanese Corporation.

Mack G. Nichols, President & COO, Mallinckrodt Group, Inc.

S. Jay Stewart, Chairman & CEO, Morton International, Inc.

E.J. Mooney, Chairman & CEO, Nalco Chemical Company.

Jeffrey M. Lipton, President, NOVA Corporation.

Donald W. Griffin, Chairman, President & CEO, Olin Corporation.

Peter R. Heinze, Senior Vice President, Chemicals, PPG Industries, Inc.

Phillip D. Ashkettle, President & CEO, Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.

Ronald L. Spratz, V.P., External Affairs & Quality, National Starch & Chemical Company.

J. Roger Hirl, President & CEO, Occidental Chemical Corporation.

David Wolf, President, Perstorp Polyols, Inc.

Ronald H. Yocum, Chairman, President & CEO, Quantum Chemical Company.

Thomas E. Reilly, Jr., Chairman, Reilly Industries, Inc.

Peter J. Neff, President & CEO, Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.

Nicholas P. Trainer, President, Sartomer Company.

J. Virgil Waggoner, President & CEO, Sterling Chemicals, Inc.

W.H. Joyce, Chairman, President & CEO, Union Carbide Corporation.

Arthur R. Sigel, President & CEO, Velsicol Chemical Corporation.

Roger K. Price, Senior V.P., Mining & Manufacturing, R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc.

F. Quinn Stepan, Chairman & President, Stepan Company.

William H. Barlow, Vice President, Business Development, Texas Brine Corporation.

Robert J. Mayaika, President, CEO & Chairman, Uniroyal Chemical Company, Inc.

John Wilkinson, Director of Government Affairs, Vulcan Chemicals.

Albert J. Costello, Chairman, President & CEO, W.R. Grace & Company.

EXHIBIT 4

APPROVE THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION,

Washington, DC, September 3, 1996.

DEAR SENATOR: We urge the Senate to approve the Chemical Weapons Convention when it comes to a vote in September.

The Convention, negotiated and signed by former President George Bush, is one of the most significant treaties in the history of arms control. It will ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, including production, possession, transfer or use of chemical weapons. It will require all parties to destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities and to open their chemical industries to international inspection.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is a valuable instrument for combating the spread of weapons of terror and mass destruction. The treaty's destruction and verification provision can build confidence

among potential rivals that they can avoid a chemical arms race. It will also help keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists.

The United States chemical industry strongly supports the Convention. The Pentagon strongly supports the agreement as well. It is most certainly in both the national and international interest to achieve the global elimination of a class of weapons that have proved more dangerous to innocent civilians than to military forces.

By its terms, the Convention enters into force 180 days after the 65th state has deposited its instruments of ratification with the U.N. Secretary General. Sixty-one countries have ratified the Convention at this point. Timely action by the Senate will send a clear signal of strong U.S. support, allowing the United States to exert its full leadership in persuading other countries to ratify.

We urge the Senate to approve as quickly as possible the Chemical Weapons Convention, to oppose crippling reservations or amendments, and at the same time move ahead with elimination of these heinous weapons from our arsenal.

Yours sincerely,

John B. Anderson, President, World Federalist Association.

Fr. Robert J. Brooks, Director of Government Relations, The Episcopal Church.

Mark B. Brown, Assistant Director for Advocacy, Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.

J. Daryl Byler, Director, Washington Office, Mennonite Central Committee.

Robin Caiola, Co-Director, 20/20 Vision National Project.

Becky Cain, President, League of Women Voters.

Rev. Drew Christiansen, S.J., Director of the Office of International Peace and Justice, United States Catholic Conference.

Nancy Chupp, Legislative Director, Church Women United.

Gordon Clark, Executive Director, Peace Action.

Tom Clements, Senior Campaigner, International Nuclear Campaign, Greenpeace.

Thomas B. Cochran, Senior Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council.

David Culp, Legislative Correspondent, Plutonium Challenge.

Johathan Dean, Adviser for International Security, Union of Concerned Scientists.

Ralph DeGennaro, Co-Director, Taxpayers for Common Sense.

Dr. Thom White Wolf Fassett, General Secretary, United Methodist Board of Church and Society.

Jerry Genesio, Executive Director, Veterans for Peace.

Stephen Goose, Program Director, Human Rights Watch, Arms Project.

Bruce Hall, Nuclear Disarmament Campaigner, Greenpeace, USA.

Howard W. Hallman, Chair, Methodists United for Peace With Justice.

John Isaacs, President, Council for a Livable World.

Amy Isaacs, National Director, Americans for Democratic Action.

Elenora Giddings Ivory, Director, Washington Office, Presbyterian Church (USA).

Wayne Jaquith, President, Public Education Center.

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., President, Arms Control Association.

Michael Krepon, President, Stimson Center.

Ambassador James Leonard, Former U.S. Disarmament Negotiator.

Jay Lintner, Director, Washington Office, United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society.

James Matlack, Director, Washington Office, American Friends Service Committee.

Lindsay Mattison, Executive Director, International Center.

Timothy A. McElwee, Director, Church of the Brethren, Washington Office.

Matthew Meselson, Professor of Molecular Biology, Harvard University.

Terence W. Miller, Director, Maryknoll Justice & Peace Office.

Bobby Muller, President, Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.

Robert K. Musil, Executive Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility.

Maurice Paprin, President, Fund for New Priorities in America.

Albert M. Pennybacker, Director, Washington Office National Council of Churches.

Ann Rhee, Office of Public Policy, United Methodist Church, Women's Division.

Rev. Meg Riley, Director, Washington Office for Faith in Action, Unitarian Universalist Association.

Caleb Rossiter, Director, Demilitarization for Democracy.

Rabbi David Saperstein, Director, Religious Action Center for Reform Judaism.

Mark P. Schlefer, President, Lawyers Alliance for World Security, Committee for National Security.

Vice Admiral John Shanahan, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Director, Center for Defense Information.

Susan Shaer, Executive Director, Women's Action for New Directions.

Alice Slater, Executive Director, Economists Allied for Arms Reductions.

Amy E. Smithson, Senior Associate, CWC Implementation Project, The Henry L. Stimson Center.

Jeremy J. Stone, President, Federation of American Scientists.

Kathy Thorton, RSM, National Coordinator, Network: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby.

Kay van der Horst, Director, CTA/Bellona Foundation USA.

Edith Villastrigo, Legislative Director, Women Strike for Peace.

Ross Vincent, Chair, Environmental Quality Strategy Team, Sierra Club.

Joe Volk, Executive Secretary, Friends Committee on National Legislation.

Frank Von Hippel, Princeton University.

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE

At 10:44 a.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Ms. Goetz, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following bill, without amendment

S. 1669. An act to name the Department of Veterans Affairs medical center in Jackson, Mississippi, as the "G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery Department of Veterans' Affairs Medical Center.

The message also announced that the House has passed the following bills, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 3539. An act to amend title 49, United States Code, to reauthorize programs of the Federal Aviation Administration, and for other purposes.

H.R. 3863. An act to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to permit lenders under the unsubsidized Federal Family Education Loan program to pay origination fee on behalf of borrowers.

The Message further announced that the House disagrees to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 3666) making appropriations for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and for sundry independent agencies, boards, commissions, corporations, and offices for