

sacrifices and bravery of the members of the Council of the Belarusian Democratic Republic, who in 1918 liberated their country from the harsh and oppressive Czarist and Soviet rule. Representatives of the United Councils of the First Belarusian Convention, meeting in Miensk (Minsk), on March 25, 1918, issued a proclamation of independence of the Belarusian National Republic, adopted a national flag with three horizontal stripes of white, red and white, and subsequently received widespread international recognition.

Whereas, the Russian Duma in March 1996 has voted to declare void the 1991 agreement dissolving the Soviet Union;

Whereas, the Government of President Lukashenka has monopolized the mass media, undermined the constitutional foundation for the separation of powers, suppressed the freedom of the press, defamed the national culture, narrowed the educational basis for patriotic upbringing of youth, maligned the Belarusian language, and undercut the ground for all-Belarusian unity.

Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives, That it is the Sense of the House of Representatives that, March 25 be recognized as the anniversary of the declaration of an Independent Belarusian State;

Be it further resolved, That the United States press the Government of President Lukashenka to abide by the provisions of the Helsinki Accords and the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus and guarantee freedom of the press, allow for the flowering of Belarusian culture and enforce the separation of powers;

Be it further resolved, That the Congress of the United States join with the people of Belarus and Belarusians throughout the world in the defending the statehood and democracy of Belarus, sustaining the country's Constitution and preventing the loss by Belarus of its hard-won nationhood and its opportunity to survive as an equal and full-fledged member-state among the sovereign nations of the world.

COMMEMORATING THE ACCESSION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE PROTOCOLS OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from American Samoa [Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, I have just returned to Washington from the South Pacific, where I was privileged to be part of the U.S. delegation to the signing ceremonies for the Treaty of Rarotonga. I want to take this opportunity to inform our colleagues in Congress and the people of our great Nation of the historic event that took place this past Monday, March 25, 1996, in Suva, Fiji.

Mr. Speaker, on Monday, the Government of the United States of America signed the protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone [SPNFZ] Treaty, also known as the Rarotonga Treaty, formally evidencing America's unequivocal support for the nuclear free zone in the South Pacific.

Mr. Speaker, this action by our Government constitutes a great and momentous development in the history of relations between the United States

and the nations of the Pacific region. At the Suva ceremonies, the Governments of France and Great Britain joined us in signing the protocols of the SPNFZ Treaty.

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With this development, Mr. Speaker, all of the world's nuclear powers are now signatories to the South Pacific Nuclear Treaty.

I want to express my deepest heartfelt appreciation to the House Committee on International Relations chairman, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] and the committee's ranking Democrat, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON], for authorizing me to represent the Committee on International Relations and the U.S. Congress in this historic milestone achievement for the people of the Pacific. Coming from the Pacific, Mr. Speaker, I was deeply honored to have been extended this great privilege.

Mr. Speaker, for decades, the island nations have strived for U.S. accession to the SONFZ protocols, which symbolizes America's support of and respect for the South Pacific people's dream of a homeland free of nuclear weapons. To have played a small role in Washington over the past 8 years in bringing about the realization of these aspirations for the people of the Pacific has been a long and hard struggle, but indeed, a very worthy one.

At this time of celebration in the Pacific, I want to recognize and thank those who have contributed greatly over the years in a bipartisan spirit to this week's historic event. In particular, the following individuals must be recognized for their leadership, the former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian-Pacific Affairs, the gentleman from New York and former Congressman, the Honorable Stephen Solarz; former Congressman and revered champion of Pacific interests, the gentleman from California and my very good friend, the Honorable Robert Lagomarsino; and the greatly respected member of the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from Iowa, currently chairman of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, the Honorable JIM LEACH.

I also want to express appreciation to my colleagues and Members of this great institution—Congressmen BEN GILMAN, LEE HAMILTON, CHRIS SMITH, HOWARD BERMAN, Congresswoman CONNIE MORELLA, Congressmen GARY ACKERMAN, RON DELLUMS, DOUG BEREUTER, TOM LANTOS, PETE STARK, MATTHEW MARTINEZ, BOB UNDERWOOD, and the distinguished delegation from the State of Hawaii, Senators DANIEL INOUE and DANIEL AKAKA, Congresswoman PATSY MINK, and my good friend, Congressman NEIL ABERCROMBIE—for supporting my efforts over the years for U.S. accession to the SPNFZ Treaty.

Mr. Speaker, I also want to recognize the tremendous leadership role that

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] has played in urging, since the Reagan administration, for U.S. support of the SPNFZ Treaty. ACDA has long been a crucial and vital part of several administrations' efforts to stop nuclear proliferation around the globe. While ACDA's mission is growing with greater importance—Start II implementation, chemical weapons convention ratification, and completion of the comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations and implementation—I find it an unfathomable tragedy that ACDA's funding is being butchered. Stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must clearly be a top priority of our Government, and steps must be taken to ensure that ACDA will be given the resources necessary to accomplish this most urgent of missions.

Mr. Speaker, although we were not able to stop France from resuming their recent nuclear bomb detonations in the South Pacific, we should welcome the fact that Paris' irresponsible actions ignited worldwide protests and served as a catalyst for France to join the SPNFZ Treaty protocols.

Mr. Speaker, although we were not able to stop France from resuming their recent nuclear bomb detonations in the South Pacific, we should welcome the fact that Paris' irresponsible actions ignited worldwide protests and served as a catalyst for France to join the SPNFZ Treaty protocols in an attempt to defuse international condemnation.

Mr. Speaker, the international community's strong and visceral opposition to French nuclear testing sent a strong message that we have entered into a new post-cold-war era where nuclear testing and nuclear weapons development are increasingly viewed around the world as an unnecessary evil for preserving peace, stability, and freedom. Perhaps this is a lesson we can all take to heart on the eve of the 21st century.

Mr. Speaker, it is about time that the three remaining nuclear powers have finally joined Russia and China, who ironically supported SPNFZ years ago, by acceding to the SPNFZ Treaty. The fact that all of the world's declared nuclear powers are now signatories to the treaty, establishing the South Pacific's vast nuclear-free zone, cannot but be perceived positively in Geneva, Switzerland, where the United Nations-sponsored Conference on Disarmament is under way. Joining the SPNFZ Treaty is proof of the nuclear powers' good faith commitment to progress on nuclear disarmament, that should bolster efforts to negotiate a genuine "zero-yield" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty before the end of this year.

Mr. Speaker, a couple of observations, as I have followed the question of nuclear testing for the past 8 years and diligently pursued this issue with my colleagues while serving as a member of the House Committee on International Relations. We proved in World

War II the devastating effect of nuclear weapons and their impact on human beings. The bomb the United States dropped on Hiroshima some 50 years ago killed and vaporized over 150,000 men, women, and children, and points to the stark reality of the devastation that nuclear weapons can wreak upon mankind.

Mr. Speaker, I am not one to quibble with the fact that we were at the height of a world war or that the axis powers were on the verge of oppressing all of the free people of the world and that our country was in the midst of this great war for democracy and freedom, but what basic lessons have we learned, Mr. Speaker, in perfecting how to destroy multitudes of fellow human beings by the creation of this great weapon, the atomic bomb? I wonder when we detonated what was known then in 1954 as the "Bravo Shot," where the United States was the first nation to explode a thermonuclear device, which was then known as the hydrogen bomb, what was gained for mankind while the people of the Marshall Islands suffered from these hydro tests in their homeland?

I also wonder, Mr. Speaker, at this point in time in our history whether nuclear weapons really provide security for the American people as well as the other nations of the world. I am concerned, Mr. Speaker, about the fact that we have perfected the use of nuclear weapons and their destructive powers, just as we have made, I am sure, earnest efforts to harness peaceful uses of nuclear energy to improve living conditions for mankind.

At the same time, Mr. Speaker, we are now capable of exploding a thermonuclear device 1,000 times more powerful than the atom bomb that we dropped on Hiroshima. What does that mean, Mr. Speaker? It means that we have perfected a device to hand down to generations to come so that we can kill other human beings by the destructive nature of the atom and hydrogen bomb.

I am concerned, Mr. Speaker, about the fact that the Western nuclear powers condemn China now for continuing its efforts to perfect its nuclear devices, while the United States, for example, allocates a tremendous amount of our military budget to maintain our distinct and unchallenged nuclear technology supremacy. I find this hypocritical, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, while we harnessed nuclear energy for the benefit of our citizens to provide electricity for our homes, our Government also has to deal with the reality that it is going to take approximately \$350 billion of the American taxpayers' money to clean up and store the spent nuclear waste that is in our own country. This is just in our own country. It does not even address the issue of other nations currently using nuclear energy for electrical production.

So we seem to be at a crossroad now, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, where is it going to end, or when is it ever going to end? We need to bring the nuclear nightmare to an end and regain some sense of morality among nations of the world, so that peace can be attained in a constructive fashion. We cannot continue with this idea that we are going to win and they are going to lose if we press that nuclear button first.

Mr. Speaker, I submit whoever presses that nuclear button, it is going to be a lose/lose situation for all of the nations of the world. I sincerely hope that perhaps having nuclear-free zones, like the South Pacific nuclear-free zone, throughout the world will be a positive step for peace and stability in the world. We should all take a minute and say to ourselves, let us hold back, let us have a sense of better control of what we are doing, especially since we have already proven the destructive nature of nuclear weapons. We do not need to prove this again, as we did in World War II among the people that lived in Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

I pray, Mr. Speaker, that my colleagues will help in our efforts to see that perhaps the five nuclear nations and the other undetected nations who have the capability for nuclear destruction, will provide a very strong and binding commitment that we will not spread this evil cold danger to other nations of the world.

Mr. Speaker, I include the following material for the RECORD:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, May 27, 1993.

Hon. WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, DC

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We write to recommend an early review of U.S. policy toward signature of the Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty.

Such a review would appear to be appropriate not only in the context of non-proliferation policy but also because of the relevance of SPNFZ to U.S. relations with the South Pacific. SPNFZ is a significant non-proliferation measure and any support the U.S. can lend to it would strengthen the cause of non-proliferation in the region. It would also contribute to support for the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. Given the importance of SPNFZ to South Pacific Forum members, U.S. accession to the Protocols would enhance U.S. influence and credibility in the South Pacific.

As we understand them, the provisions of the SPNFZ Treaty and its three Protocols do not appear to be inconsistent with U.S. national interests. The Treaty specifically respects states' rights under international law to freedom of the seas and leaves it up to individual signatories to decide whether to allow foreign ships and aircraft to visit or transit their territory.

We note that, at the hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 May, you said the U.S. was not at odds with the basic thrust of SPNFZ. You did, however, express concern about the Treaty's possible impact on the U.S.'s operational flexibility and freedom in the South Pacific.

We would be interested in understanding the nature of the Administration's concerns about operational flexibility for U.S. forces in the South Pacific, and are interested in working with you in support of a policy re-

garding the SPNFZ Protocols that protects and promotes U.S. interests in the South Pacific and enhances U.S. non-proliferation objectives.

We are writing a similar letter to the Secretary of Defense.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN.
JIM LEACH.
LEE H. HAMILTON.
GARY L. ACKERMAN.
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, April 24, 1995.

Ambassador RALPH EARLE II,
Head of Delegation, U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference,
New York City, NY.

DEAR AMBASSADOR EARLE: It is my understanding that, in conjunction with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference proceedings being held in New York, there shall be convened a working group focussing on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

As a member of the House International Relations Committee, I am writing to urge that the U.S. delegation take an active role in those discussions and strongly support the use of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a non-proliferation tool.

Treaty-based nuclear-weapon-free zones with adequate verification safeguards have already proven effective in preventing spread of nuclear weapons and serve to assist efforts "rolling back" existing proliferation.

As you know, the U.S. has supported establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world, including those in Antarctica, the seabed and outer space. We are also a signatory to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America. The White House has recently lauded the Latin America Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as a critical building block of peace and stability throughout the Western Hemisphere which reinforces the worldwide non-proliferation regime.

I have long urged that our government should also join the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone created by our allies through the Treaty of Rarotonga. The protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty are substantially identical to our commitments under the Latin America Treaty. In the post-Cold War era, the Soviet nuclear threat in the Pacific no longer exists, overcoming past justification for not joining the Treaty of Rarotonga.

At a time when it is crucial that the U.S. utilize all resources to forge a majority for indefinite extension of the NPT, joining the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty would materially enhance U.S. credibility, gain international goodwill and act as visible proof of America's commitment to nuclear arms controls.

Ambassador Earle, I wish you the very best in your discussions regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones and the benefits of their formation around the world, in particular in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the South Asia Subcontinent. I further commend you and the delegation for your efforts leading to permanent establishment of the NPT, a mission of utmost urgency and importance to our nation and the world.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA,
Member of Congress.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, September 20, 1995.
Hon. WILLIAM J. CLINTON,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We write to recommend that the long-pending review of U.S. policy toward the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty be brought to a close, and would strongly urge that our nation sign the Protocols to the SPNFZ Treaty.

The review was appropriate due to our non-proliferation policy and the relevance of SPNFZ to U.S. relations with the South Pacific. We feel SPNFZ is a significant non-proliferation measure and any support the U.S. can lend to it would strengthen the cause of non-proliferation in the region.

The provisions of the SPNFZ Treaty and its three Protocols are not inconsistent with U.S. national interests or present security practices. The Treaty specifically respects states' rights under international law to freedom of the seas and leaves it up to individual signatories to decide whether to allow foreign ships and aircraft to visit or transit their territory.

While the U.S. has yet to act on the SPNFZ Protocols, ironically, both China and Russia are signatories. The U.S. is, however, a signatory to the Protocols of the Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, substantially the same as SPNFZ, which your administration has lauded as a critical building block for peace and stability in our backyard, the Western Hemisphere.

Given the importance of SPNFZ to South Pacific Forum nations, U.S. accession to the Protocols would enhance U.S. influence and credibility in the Pacific. Moreover, U.S. accession to SPNFZ would bolster progress on global non-proliferation measures, including the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and negotiation of a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In light of France's decision to support a zero-yield CTBT, the time is particularly right for the U.S. to accede to SPNFZ.

We thank you for your consideration of this request and urge timely action.

Sincerely,

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA,
LEE H. HAMILTON,
JAMES A. LEACH,
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH,
ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD.
Members of Congress.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 7, 1995.

Hon. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR ENI: Thank you for your letter regarding the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty.

On October 20, 1995, the United States, France and the United Kingdom jointly announced our intention to sign the relevant protocols of the SPNFZ Treaty in the first half of 1996. This announcement reflects a number of positive developments that have occurred recently, such as the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty indefinitely and without condition and progress on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

I appreciate your efforts in support of SPNFZ and look forward to working with Congress to achieve ratification of the SPNFZ protocols.

Sincerely,

BILL.

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
Washington, DC, December 8, 1995.

Hon. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA,
Committee on International Relations,
U.S. House of Representatives.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN FALEOMAVAEGA: I wanted to convey my admiration for and congratulations upon your tireless efforts to achieve formal U.S. adherence to the Protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga. As you know, the U.S. was able to declare its intention on October 20, 1995 along with the United Kingdom and France, to sign the Protocols in the first half of 1996.

The United States has always respected the goals and the spirit of Rarotonga. As we stated in 1987, our activities in the region were not inconsistent with the Treaty. That is, however, a long way from assuming the legal obligations of the Protocols and thereby conferring the full legal and political support of the United States. Now, the U.S., U.K. and France will sign the Protocols together, and at a stroke bring all five nuclear weapon states in accord with the solemn commitments and obligations undertaken by the states of the region.

I am extremely gratified that the United States of America can formally adhere to this important regional denuclearization treaty, and am pleased that my Agency was able to play a crucial role in this decision. Your efforts have contributed greatly to this momentous decision, and I again offer my congratulations.

Sincerely,

JOHN D. HOLUM.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 24, 1996.

Hon. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR ENI: Last fall I promised to keep you informed of developments regarding the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty. I am pleased to advise you that on March 25 the United States will join France and the United Kingdom in signing the relevant protocols to this Treaty at a tripartite ceremony in Fiji.

Last year's NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed that internationally recognized nuclear free zones, based on arrangements fully arrived at among the states of the region concerned, enhance international peace and security. The Conference also agreed that the cooperation of all the nuclear weapon states and their respect and support for the relevant protocols are necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such zones.

Our decision to sign the SPNFZ protocols demonstrates our clear support for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the South Pacific, our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and our determination to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty mandating a permanent end to nuclear testing throughout the world.

I appreciate your strong support for the important step we will be taking on March 25.

Sincerely,

BILL.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COM-
MITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS,
Washington, DC, March 28, 1996.

Hon. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA,
Washington, DC.

DEAR ENI: I am writing to congratulate you for the superb work you have done over the years on behalf of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty—work whose culmination we witnessed earlier this week when the United States joined France and

Great Britain in signing the three SPNFZ protocols.

It was only fitting that you should have been in Suva to participate in this ceremony.

You have been an eloquent and impassioned voice on this issue, and all of us are very much in your debt.

So please accept my hearty congratulations for a splendid job and a successful conclusion to your labors.

I look forward to your leadership on many other issues in the days ahead.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

LEE H. HAMILTON,
Ranking Democratic Member.

H. CON. RES. 111

Whereas the nations of the South Pacific, which share with the United States a strong interest in nuclear non-proliferation, have negotiated and signed the Treaty of Rarotonga, establishing a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;

Whereas the Treaty of Rarotonga came into force on December 11, 1986, and has been ratified by 11 nations;

Whereas the Treaty of Rarotonga prohibits the testing, manufacture, acquisition, and stationing of nuclear weapons in the territory of parties to the treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea;

Whereas the 3 protocols to that treaty, which are open for ratification by nuclear-weapon states, require that those nuclear weapon states that ratify those protocols abide by the treaty's provisions in their territories in the region, not contribute to violations of the treaty or threaten to use nuclear weapons against its parties, and refrain from testing nuclear devices in the zone;

Whereas the Treaty of Rarotonga does not prejudice or in any way affect the rights of all nations to freedom of the seas under international law and leaves to each party policy decisions on visits or passage through its territory by foreign ships and aircraft;

Whereas the establishment of verified nuclear-weapon-free zones can reinforce the international norm of nuclear nonproliferation and build consensus for long-term extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) when reviewed for extension by its members in 1995;

Whereas the United States leadership to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would be further enhanced if United States signature and ratification of the protocols were part of an overall nonproliferation policy that included negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban;

Whereas Article VII of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty affirms "the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories," and state parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga have implemented a safeguards agreement for the region with the International Atomic Energy Agency;

Whereas it has been the policy of the United States to favor the establishment of effective nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions of nonproliferation concern and where such zones would enhance international stability and security;

Whereas the United States has set forth 7 criteria whereby the effectiveness of proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones will be judged, as follows: (1) the initiative is from the nations in the region, (2) all nations whose participation is deemed important participate, (3) adequate verification of compliance is provided, (4) it does not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security, (5) all parties are barred from developing or possessing any nuclear device for any

purpose, (6) it imposes no restrictions on international legal maritime and serial navigation rights and freedoms, and (7) it does not affect the international legal rights of parties to grant or deny others transit privileges, including port calls and overflights;

Whereas the United States has signed and ratified the protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, whereby the United States committed itself not to test, manufacture, acquire, or store nuclear weapons in its territories in the region (namely Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands), not to contribute to any violation of the treaty, and not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties;

Whereas the United States is also a party to the Antarctic Treaty, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which preclude nuclear weapons from these regions;

Whereas support for these nuclear-weapon-free zones does not prejudice United States policy with respect to other proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones, each of which must be judged on its individual merits in accordance with United States national interests;

Whereas in order to maintain the security of United States military forces and their ability to contribute to nuclear deterrence, the United States must preserve the principle of neither confirming nor denying whether particular United States naval vessels or other military forces possess nuclear weapons;

Whereas the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga do not conflict with the United States policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on United States vessels or aircraft and do not prohibit any current or anticipated activities in United States territories in the South Pacific or elsewhere in the region; and

Whereas past administrations have stated that while the United States could not, under circumstances prior to the cessation of the Cold War, sign the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, United States practices and activities in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone region, then and now, are consistent with the treaty and its protocols: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That (a) it is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the Treaty of Rarotonga is consistent with United States security commitments in the South Pacific since it does not prohibit port calls by naval vessels which are nuclear powered or may be carrying nuclear weapons and does not create other impediments to United States military operations in support of the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS Treaty);

(2) the Treaty of Rarotonga satisfies the 7 criteria, set forth in the preamble of this resolution, which have been established by the United States Government for judging the effectiveness of proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones;

(3) signature and ratification of the protocols to that treaty would be in the national interest of the United States by contributing to a comprehensive United States nonproliferation policy that would enhance prospects for extending the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1995, particularly if such a policy were to include negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement; and

(4) signature and ratification of the protocols would not prejudice United States policy

with respect to proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, such as those in which the presence of an effective nuclear deterrent has contributed to United States national security by enhancing stability.

(b) Noting that the executive branch has indicated that United States practices and activities in the region are consistent with the Treaty of Rarotonga and its protocols, it is therefore the sense of the Congress that the United States should sign and ratify the protocols to that treaty.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 11, 1994]

ENSURING STABILITY IN THE PACIFIC

(By Eni F.H. Faleomavaega)

In the afterglow of the recently concluded Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings and the North American Free Trade Agreement, a new era of increased trade and economic growth is dawning. But the vision of Pacific prosperity is impossible to realize unless a foundation of peace and stability can be ensured. For half a century, the United States has provided this crucial element of security in the Asia-Pacific region, directly aiding the dynamic growth of Asia's economies. The US should build on this legacy by supporting the security arrangements necessary for economic prosperity.

Nuclear proliferation is a major threat to Pacific and US security, as exemplified by the crisis over North Korea. The Clinton administration has urged the indefinite renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. To bolster US nonproliferation policy, the president also should build support for nuclear-weapon-free zones and join the existing nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.

Eleven Pacific island nations are members of the Rarotonga Treaty, establishing the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ), which bans the testing, stationing, or use of nuclear weapons in the zone. The treaty, a symbol for the peoples of the South Pacific, expresses their repudiation over nuclear weapons and the possibility of a nuclear holocaust in the region. With France and the US having detonated more than 100 nuclear bombs in the South Pacific, the nations there have gained a firsthand appreciation of the hazards of nuclear weapons.

Since the treaty took effect, the island nations have eagerly sought US support for a nuclear-weapon-free South Pacific. By refusing to sign the treaty, the US is increasingly perceived as indifferent to the aspirations and concerns of its South Pacific allies—many of whom fought at our side during World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, and supported America in the cold war. Ironically, Russia and China have signed the treaty.

The treaty would advance US nonproliferation objectives without undermining US security policy in the South Pacific, as past administrations have conceded when testifying before Congress. It was carefully drafted to accommodate US interests, including our policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on US warships or aircraft; and it protects free transit through the zone by US vessels and planes carrying nuclear weapons.

The US already supports nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world, and has signed treaties prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America, the Antarctic, the ocean floor, and outer space. Furthermore, the US supports creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. With the end of the cold war, justification for much of America's reluctance to join the SPNFZ has evaporated. The Soviet nuclear

threat in the Pacific no longer exists. Instead, the US and Russia are committed to keep reductions in their nuclear arsenals, the US has removed tactical nuclear weapons from its surface fleet, and all nuclear-weapon states except China are observing a nuclear-testing moratorium.

If the US is serious about promoting nonproliferation and free trade, then it should make use of nuclear-weapon-free zones that enhance the security that makes economic prosperity possible. Signing the Rarotonga Treaty would be an important step toward realizing the promise of a secure and prosperous "New Pacific Community."

PROTECT OUR AMERICAN TROOPS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me adjust my gig line here for this prestigious well of the world's greatest legislature, straighten my First Armored Division pin, still thinking about bringing the men and women home from Bosnia, where European men and women should be doing the miserable ground duty while we do everything else, like air power, sea power, all the airlift, 99 percent of it, 99 percent of the ships at sea, most of the hospital supplies, the food, the fuel, most of the munitions, and of course 100 percent of the intelligence from our satellite architecture down to unmanned aerial vehicles like the fantastic predator program.

□ 1600

Why do American men and women have to be on the ground missing Easter with their families as they missed Christmas? So I guess we can free up European young people to work on the assembly line at places like Ferrari and Fiat, Jaguar, Rover, Rolls Royce, and the big-five in Germany, Mercedes, Audi, BMW, Volkswagen, and who am I forgetting? Porsche. We do not want to take people from those assembly lines, shipping products over here.

Let us just bankrupt the American people and pour our money into Haiti. The money we sent to Rwanda, they are back killing one another. Somalia, the fighting goes on without the BBC or the CNN cameras. And in Bosnia, 19 young people have died, two of them Americans, one from an accident, one a hero, Sergeant Donald Dugan of—his initials are D-A-D, dad. He left four sons behind. Donald A. Dugan. First Sergeant of the First Squadron of the First Battalion of the First Cavalry of the First Brigade of the First Armored Division, and he was an A troop to boot and was one of the first Bradleys. A picture of him in the turret crossing the Sava River right after Christmas.

Mr. Speaker, his last words—I learned this in Bosnia about a few weeks ago. His last words were to some children. He did not know whether they were Muslim heritage children, who are really Serbians who adopted the Islamic faith so that the Turkish