

Jeremy and dedicate ourselves to creating a safe world for all of our children.

We dedicate ourselves to taking that walk with Jeremy, and accepting his simple challenge: Are we leaving this place that we visit better than the way we found it?

Our children need not lose their voices while we stand by, overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem.

There is much we can do. We can tell the media we will not be consumers of glorified violence. We can direct our children toward nonviolent entertainment and help them find acceptable ways to express anger and resolve conflict. We can extend the boundaries of our families to include caring about and caring for the children of our community.

And when we become discouraged, we must rededicate ourselves by straining our ears, to hear the empty void left behind. Listen for the voice of eleven-year-old Jeremy Bullock, and listen for the voices of others that have been silenced. For the pain in remembering is little compared to the pain in realizing that others may soon forget.

Mr. President, April 12 is the first anniversary of this tragedy. And on that day, the Bullocks will join the Margaret Leary School and the whole Butte family in dedicating a soccer field to the memory of Jeremy Bullock.

Every so often, people in Washington—and, I suppose, people anywhere—lose sight of what really counts. We get wrapped up in policy arguments, debates over bills and so on. People like the Bullocks can remind us of what is truly important—our families, our communities, our children.

I hope all of us—here on the floor, up in the galleries, watching on C-SPAN—will listen to this courageous family.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I am going to offer an amendment. I am going to take about 15 seconds.

Mr. HATFIELD. Will the Senator yield for just a moment, please?

Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes.

Mr. HATFIELD. We are in a situation where we really have the D'Amato amendment as the pending business.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Can I ask to set that aside?

Mr. HATFIELD. For how long?

Mr. GRASSLEY. For about 60 seconds.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside temporarily the D'Amato amendment in order for the Senator from Iowa to offer a 60-second amendment.

Mr. DODD. Reserving the right to object, I have no objection. You are not

going to offer your amendment at this point but just to make a statement?

Mr. GRASSLEY. It has been accepted, and I want to offer it.

Mr. HATFIELD. It is noncontroversial.

Mr. DODD. I have no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

AMENDMENT NO. 430 TO AMENDMENT NO. 420

(Purpose: To prohibit the use of funds by the Secretary of Agriculture to delineate new agricultural wetlands, except under certain circumstances)

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator DORGAN and myself, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Iowa [Mr. GRASSLEY], for himself and Mr. DORGAN, proposes an amendment numbered 430.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. . PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO DELINEATE NEW AGRICULTURAL WETLANDS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), during the period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 1995, none of the funds made available by this or any other Act may be used by the Secretary of Agriculture to delineate wetlands for the purpose of certification under section 1222(a) of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3822(a)).

(b) EXCEPTION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to land if the owner or operator of the land requests a determination as to whether the land is considered a wetland under subtitle C of title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3821 et seq.) or any other provision of law.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, my amendment prohibits the Secretary of Agriculture from expending funds to continue the wetland certification and delineation process on agricultural land, unless requested by the landowner.

It is my understanding that the amendment has been cleared by both the Agriculture Committee and the Environment and Public Works Committee and will be accepted by the managers of the bill.

My amendment safeguards the property rights of our Nation's farmers by prohibiting the Secretary of Agriculture from expending funds to delineate new wetlands on agriculture land until the end of the year. This rescission will allow Congress the opportunity to reform wetlands policy through new legislation. It will also allow the public to have input into the process. Thus far, the landowners have been shut out of the process.

As you know, no less than four Federal agencies claim jurisdiction over the regulation of wetlands. Just think of how impossible it must be for the

family farmer to understand what four different Federal agencies want him to do in regard to wetlands on his private property.

Last year, these agencies entered into a memorandum of agreement. Although the MOA was intended to streamline the regulatory process and clarify the role of each agency, it has increased the level of confusion and frustration among those farmers affected by it.

The delineation of wetlands on agricultural land has been a confusing proposition for some time. On the other hand, the consequences of the delineations are very clear. A farmer who alters a wetland without authorization from the Federal Government faces potential civil penalties, criminal action, and loss of farm programs benefits. Because the stakes are so high, we must ensure that the delineation process is accurate and reasonable. And we must ensure that the voice of the farmer is allowed to be heard when the process is put into place.

As I speak, new wetland delineations are being conducted in the State of Iowa pursuant to the MOA. It will soon cover every other State affected by agricultural wetlands. So farmers in all States will soon be deprived of the right to farm their land or improve their property because a Federal bureaucrat decides that such activity interferes with a protected wetland.

This process is being done in a laboratory, by people unknown to the farmers, who take soil surveys and aerial photography and try to find evidence of wetlands, in order to get more farmers under their regulatory umbrella. This process disturbs me greatly.

The old Soil Conservation Service worked alongside farmers for the past 60 or 70 years. There was a close relationship between the farmer and SCS officials. They shared a common goal of promoting conservation of the land. That sort of cooperation has resulted in more benefit to the environment than any other USDA program. But I am afraid that this cooperative spirit has been lost.

The current process has shut out the farmer. The bureaucrats are making decisions without consultation with farmers. We have gone through this process before—with the passage of the swampbuster and sodbuster provisions of the 1985 farm bill. For the most part, farmers did not complain about the process then—because there was an open effort on the part of the bureaucracy to work with the farmers, to educate them on the process and to solicit the farmers' input. But that is not the case this time around.

Mr. President, I want to make it very clear that I am not opposed to protecting valuable wetlands. My vote for the antisodbuster and antiswampbuster provisions in the 1985 farm bill is proof of that. And I am making no attempt

to roll back the provisions of that bill. However, I am opposed to changing the rules every few years so that farmers can never be certain if their conduct is allowed under the current regulatory scheme. I am also opposed to the promulgation of an MOA that will significantly affect the ability of private property owners to improve their land, without the benefit of input from the people affected by the agreement.

My amendment will allow for this input through congressional hearings on wetlands policy. At the very least, Congress should ensure that the concerns of private property owners are heard before they are deprived of the use of their land.

The amendment will also stop the bureaucracy from acting based on the flawed memorandum of agreement. I believe that this Congress is committed to reforming Federal wetlands policy. This policy should be based on sound science, recognize the constitutionally protected rights of private property and, above all, institute a large dose of common sense into the program. This amendment stops the Government from finding new wetlands on farm land until this reform can be put in place.

Mr. President, in closing I want to make sure that my colleagues understand the scope and the intent of this amendment. The amendment will in no way affect the regulation of wetlands currently listed on the wetlands inventory. Furthermore, it will not interfere with a landowner's ability to obtain a section 404 permit or a swampbuster determination.

What the amendment does, simply stated, is this: The amendment prohibits the Natural Resource Conservation Service from conducting its certification process and adding new wetlands to the inventory until 1996.

Opponents may argue that it was the agricultural interests that wanted the NRCS to be the lead agency in determining wetlands on agricultural lands. This is accurate, however, the agricultural community believes that the MOA is a flawed document and they overwhelmingly support this amendment. In fact when I introduced this moratorium as a free-standing bill, 14 farm groups from across the political spectrum signed a letter to President Clinton supporting the bill. These groups range from the conservative-leaning American Farm Bureau Federation to the bipartisan Association of State Departments of Agriculture to the more-liberal National Farmers Union. I would also note that the bill is cosponsored by 18 other Senators from both sides of the aisle. All of us involved in agriculture want to relieve the regulatory burden placed on farmers by Federal wetlands policy. This amendment will allow Congress some time to do just that. I urge my colleagues to accept this amendment.

(At the request of Mr. GRASSLEY, the following statement was printed in the RECORD.)

• Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I have cosponsored this amendment with the Senator from Iowa and ask this body's approval. I will be unable to come to the floor today because I must be in North Dakota to testify before the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

We sought this amendment so the Federal agencies who implement the Swampbuster law will avoid creating unnecessary confusion for farmers who are subject to the regulations and rules on management of wetlands.

In the 1990 farm bill, we made some improvements on wetland regulations, including provisions that assign the Department of Agriculture as lead agency for implementing swampbuster regulations on farmland. To fulfill the intent of the 1990 farm bill, the Federal agencies have proposed some changes in rules and operating procedures for mapping, or delineating, wetlands on farmland. Those new procedures are expected to be implemented this year.

Our amendment will hold up implementation of those new procedures and mapping conventions until Congress reviews the swampbuster law as part of the farm bill this year. Congress may, in fact, change its approach to the small, temporary wetlands, called type I wetlands, and many of us in Congress want to see some changes in that area. It only makes sense to avoid implementation of changes in wetlands rules this year if more are to be made in the farm bill.

In consideration of farmers who must try to understand and conform to Federal wetlands requirements, we simply must not change the rules every year. •

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, as I understand this amendment, it prohibits the Secretary of Agriculture from conducting new wetland delineations or certifications on agricultural lands, except at the request of a landowner or operator, for the purposes of carrying out wetland conservation programs under title XII of the 1985 Food Security Act. The amendment does not apply to the wetlands regulatory program under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. Therefore, the Grassley amendment in no way restricts the Secretary of Agriculture, through the National Resources Conservation Service, from delineating wetlands on agricultural lands for the purposes of carrying out section 404 of the Clean Water Act.

Mr. GRASSLEY. The Senator from Rhode Island is correct.

Mr. CHAFEE. I thank the Senator from Iowa for clarifying that point. It follows then that the January 1994 memorandum of agreement among the Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Army concerning the delineation of wetlands for purposes of section 404 of the Clean Water Act and subtitle B of the Food Security Act is not suspended by this amendment. And, in accordance with that memo-

randum of agreement, the Natural Resources Conservation Service will make wetland delineations on agricultural lands for the purposes of determining section 404 jurisdiction.

Mr. GRASSLEY. That is correct. My amendment does not suspend the general terms and procedures of the inter-agency memorandum of agreement on wetland delineations with the exception of the terms of that agreement relating to new delineations and new certifications of wetlands on agricultural lands under section 1222(a) of the Food Security Act of 1985.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?

Mr. HATFIELD. I understand that a copy of that amendment is available.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes. Senator DORGAN cleared it on the Democratic side, and I have cleared it on our side.

Mr. HATFIELD. I understand. The Senator is correct. But there is a Senator who has asked to see a copy of it.

Mr. GRASSLEY. I am sorry if it has not been cleared.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator LEAHY wishes to see the amendment.

Mr. GRASSLEY. We cleared it with him.

Mr. BYRD. That is the word I am receiving.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the Grassley amendment temporarily.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. BUMPERS. Reserving the right to object, what was the request?

Mr. HATFIELD. I was asking unanimous consent to temporarily lay aside the Grassley amendment until the Senator can read it and others can read it who are interested.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment will be set aside.

AMENDMENT NO. 427 TO AMENDMENT NO. 420

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now recurs on amendment No. 427 offered by the Senator from New York.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I understand my colleague from Arizona wants some time on this amendment.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JEFFORDS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, back on my amendment, we have now been able to clear it with the necessary Members who had some doubt, although I was correct in my first statement that it had been cleared. But there was some question about which version. We have that all settled now.

Mr. President, I ask that we take final action on my amendment.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, the Senator is correct. It has now been completely cleared on both sides. I urge its adoption.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 430) was agreed to.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. HATFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the D'Amato amendment be laid aside temporarily.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, may I inquire of my friend from North Carolina?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I will say to the Senator, I think maybe we ought to do something around here except sit around in quorum call with the threat of being here all night. I have two or three amendments I would like to offer. So I would go ahead with my amendment if the Senator from Connecticut and others on his side will permit me to do so.

Mr. DODD. May I say, Mr. President, to my good friend from North Carolina, I think an effort is being made here to see if we cannot come up with some resolution of the issue. I respect immensely the desire to move along. The Senator from North Carolina is aware this has only occurred because an amendment was offered. Certainly I am anxious to see us move along at this point.

With all due respect to my colleague, at this juncture I think we are fairly close to striking an agreement. I am going to object.

Mr. HELMS. Before the Senator objects, I was going to say if, as, and when an agreement is reached, the Helms amendment could be laid aside.

Mr. DODD. I think at this point here I just would like to see if—we are fairly close, I say to my colleague. I have several colleagues over here who have been holding up for the last hour, sitting here at my request not to go forward until we get a resolution. The Senator from California, the Senator from Nebraska—there is one other one, I think—had amendments pending. The Senator from Arizona. They agreed. With all due respect, in fairness to them, I object to going forward.

Mr. HELMS. If the Senator would yield, let me suggest we do something, just not sit here—

Mr. DODD. We are right now, Senator.

Mr. HELMS. Under the quorum call rule, rolling on like Tennyson's brook.

Mr. DODD. I appreciate my colleague's concerns. But I did not create the situation we are in. I am just responding to the situation we are put in. I understand and I am sympathetic to his concerns. But with all due respect to my friend from North Carolina—and he is that—I respectfully object.

Mr. HELMS. As the saying goes, you probably will not love me in the morning.

Mr. D'AMATO addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, let me say that I am desirous of attempting to accommodate my colleagues, particularly the chairman of the Appropriations Committee and my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee, and those who are interested.

Mr. KERREY. Is the Senate in quorum call?

Mr. D'AMATO. Yes, the quorum call was called off. The quorum call was called off. The Senator yielded the floor and I am making a statement. I believe I have the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no quorum call.

The Senator from New York has the floor.

Mr. D'AMATO. In an attempt, Mr. President, to move the process, I have attempted to work out an agreement with my colleagues who share a concern as it relates to the inadequacy of time to debate this very important legislative proposal.

I must say to you, I have no disagreement with providing ample time. Yet, if we were to have more extensive debate—and we have had 3 hours plus—I recognize that would impede us from going forward on this important legislative initiative.

Therefore, it is in that spirit, that spirit with my colleagues, that I have indicated I am willing to withdraw this amendment at this time, to offer it as a freestanding resolution, to bring it up Monday at noon or anytime thereafter, to have extensive debate, to divide the time equally, and to have a time certain to vote—for a reasonable time, to put in 5 hours equally divided. But by no means am I suggesting that it should be limited to 5 hours if 6 hours is necessary or 7 hours or 8 or 10 hours or 12 hours or 24 hours. But at some point in time I want to be assured, because of the importance of this, that we have a vote, that my colleagues truly have an opportunity to vote.

Indeed, this may not carry. I have no illusions. I think probably it will be defeated. I have a sense that there are lots of my colleagues who would just as soon stay out of this situation. They will let the President do it, and if Mexico deteriorates, we did not do anything. That is what is taking place.

I think it is a question of our constitutional responsibility. We are talk-

ing about making billions—by the way, I did not have sufficient time to respond as it relates to the appropriateness of this measure. We are talking about rescissions of \$14 billion. Here is \$20 billion going to Mexico; \$5 billion has already gone down. Another \$5-billion-plus will go down in the next 2 or 3 weeks, or 4 weeks.

If you want to talk about aid, I want to give aid to the communities that need it. Orange County, I would rather give them a loan guarantee with this money. How about the District of Columbia? Let us help them. In my State, we have a \$4 billion deficit we inherited. Let us help them out. Then, after that—that only accounts for \$4 billion, \$2 billion, \$6 billion, \$7 billion—then let us give the other \$13 billion to deficit reduction, if you want to help. Talk about relevance.

I mean, if the Senators come and say they are concerned about the children, if you are concerned about the children, here is the opportunity to give them that money instead of shipping it away. I think it is very relevant why we are cutting back programs over here in this country. We are supposed to say no; we should not have the responsibility for voting on appropriations which is an appropriation as it relates to bailing out another country—unprecedented.

By the way, this fund has never been used for any countries that some of my colleagues—Israel has never been a beneficiary of this. The United Kingdom has never been a beneficiary of this. Only one country has ever gone up to \$1 billion: Mexico. They paid that back in 12 months.

When I hear people telling me, "Oh, my god. It will be the end of the world if we do not have this authority," unprecedented circumvention of the constitutional responsibilities of this Congress. Let me tell you, if you do not want to vote on it, but you will have to vote on it, do we say that this is the way to do business? By the way, I respect people who say, "Alfonse, we have to do something to help Mexico." Let us do it the right way. If it means we have to get a majority of our colleagues to vote to appropriate, then let us do it in that manner.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief question?

Mr. D'AMATO. Yes.

Mr. WARNER. I have been saying all along that this transaction with Mexico has serious faults and may well not be in our interest. When this was originally brought to us on that day, for example, when the Secretary of the Treasury and Alan Greenspan and others addressed Senators downstairs, right then I began to develop some serious concerns as to whether or not I would ever support it. Indeed, the leadership decided at that time to not bring it before the Congress.

But the question I have for the Senator is, Do we have a base of fact that would provide an ability for the Senate to better understand how this happens, who is responsible, who profited, who suffered losses, so that we can make an informed decision on the Senator's proposed legislation?

I frankly am inclined to support the Senator from New York. But I would want to do so only after the most careful analysis of positive facts on this issue. The Senator was to have had hearings in the committee. I just wondered what the status of the hearings were, and what is the body of fact that we have before this Senate today that we did not have at the time this was originally brought up?

Mr. D'AMATO. We finally have a plan that has been put forth as it relates to the utilization of these dollars. We know that Eurobonds, we know that tesobonos have been facilitated as a result of repurchasing them by the Government. We know that the loan programs, the Mexican Government has received and been the beneficiary of these dollars. And we also recognize that the economy, notwithstanding the claims that it has moved forward—as a matter of fact, the stock market yesterday in Mexico dropped 1.2 percent—we understand marginal movements up and down.

But the fact is that some of the so-called petroleum reserves that are going to be used as collateral—there is a very real question about whether or not during the lifetime of these loans, there will be sufficient collateral or revenues available.

We have learned that there is great civil unrest as it relates to the people of Mexico, and that they are angered at the United States for imposing these conditions in terms of raising interest rates, raising tax rates; a 50-percent consumer tax increase, from 10 to 15 percent. So we are aware of that.

We are also aware that we have not received the kind of information that foreign investment is returning, which is the cornerstone of this so-called economic recovery, if it is to take place. We have also learned that it is very doubtful that in the months ahead, they are going to be able to deal with short-term as well as long-term repayment schedules. We are talking about \$170-billion-plus which the Mexican Government owes; \$70 billion short term.

I say to my friend and colleague, \$50 billion worth of guarantees does not stop or is not sufficient as it relates to the repayment of \$70 billion worth of short-term Mexican debt this year. That we have learned.

We have also learned, unfortunately, in the tabloids, of the incredible unrest and, yes, the incredible instability of the institutions to be able to perform and to carry out any kind of meaningful transformation. We know, for example, that the oil monopoly, PEMEX, cannot and will not be producing at a rate today that it is in the future. That does

not portend good things. We know that capital will not be made available because the Mexican people, and indeed the Mexican Government, understands that you cannot look to the free enterprise system as it relates to the oil monopoly which does have vast value.

So the premise upon which these agreements were made—by the way, we do know that billions of dollars' worth of investments that were made have been paid. They have been paid by U.S. taxpayer dollars redeeming speculative investments.

Mr. WARNER. The question is, To whom was it paid? The fundamental question I have is, Will the Senate, in the course of the deliberation of the proposal of the Senator from New York, have a better understanding as to how this crisis happened, and who is benefiting from this cash-flow that has been described by the Senator such that we can act in an informed way on the proposal by the Senator from New York?

Mr. D'AMATO. No. Unfortunately, we will not learn for at least a year who the holders of these bearer bonds were, and only then maybe as it relates to those citizens of the United States. Obviously, we have no way to know. And this is one of the things that we brought up before this agreement was implemented. Who are the holders of these Eurobonds? Who are the holders of the tesobonos? We were told that we could not get that information.

Now, it seems to me that if we are going to make American dollars available we had a right, that our Treasury people had a right to say we want to see who they are and we want to negotiate with them. We want to see if we cannot restructure the repayment so that instead of paying it all plus 20 percent, we would restructure on the basis of maybe 60 cents on a dollar, 70 cents on a dollar, or maybe pay it over a period of time.

Now, that would have been—and that, by the way, was suggested by Bill Seidman, former head of RTC, the former head of the FDIC, who said it makes sense to restructure. Do not just shovel out American money dollar for dollar.

And my friend from Virginia touched exactly on it. To date, when we have asked for the records, when we have asked how this money has been used, we are told, "We don't know." As it relates to who received it; they were bearer bonds, "We don't know." They knew the Congress wanted this information.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, when the Senator asked, to whom did he place these questions? Was it the administration? And were they not forthcoming?

Mr. D'AMATO. It was the administration. It has been as high as the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary and others in the Treasury Department. And it is because we were told that they just went along on the basis that it cannot be done, you cannot ascertain who the people are.

Well, let me tell you something. That is nonsense. They never made that a priority. So you can say well, why are you complaining now? We complained before they started the repurchase of these agreements, we complained about it while they were doing it, and we are complaining about it now. And now \$5 billion have been expended. How much more before we say we do question the adequacy of the manner in which these dollars were being used?

I do not question for one moment the good intentions, indeed, of congressional leadership, Republicans, Democrats. This Senator said certainly we have a special obligation as it relates to Mexico and its stability. But, my gosh, we have an obligation to be realistic and to see that these funds are being used appropriately, that we are getting the most for our money.

How does repaying a Eurobond or how does the repurchasing of a tesobono from someone from Germany or Japan or from the United States dollar for dollar plus 20-percent interest in some cases, 25 percent interest in other cases, how does that benefit the Mexican worker, the Mexican economy? Do we really think that as a result of our purchasing these agreements people are now going to rush to Mexico and put money back in there? I think you have to be rather naive to think so.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to know whether or not it has been the American taxpayer who is responsible for the very funds that the Senator refers to as now being the principal cash flow? Am I not correct?

Mr. D'AMATO. We are. We are the principal casualty as it relates to the cash flow. And let me assure the Senator where we were initially told in briefings which the Senator attended that there would be no risk, that we would not have to put up any money, now we are hearing, well, certainly there is some risk, and now we are hearing, yes, there is \$5 billion.

I remember when the head of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, said—and I respect him tremendously—if you have to start a drawdown on these funds the program is not working. Well, we have drawn down \$5 billion, in addition to the money from the IMF.

Mr. MCCAIN. Will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. D'AMATO. Certainly. Let me complete this.

In addition to the money that has come from the World Bank, and I believe that we will be getting ready, from what I understand, to draw down on billions more from the United States.

Now, this is an unprecedented use of the fund, and, yes, Senator DOLE and Speaker Gingrich have indicated that they wanted to help and they were supportive. Let me remind my colleagues in fairness to Senator DOLE—

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to withdraw from the colloquy. My questions have been answered. It would seem to me, in a sense of fairness, indeed, the Senate would want to know what would be the views of Mr. Greenspan, perhaps the Secretary of Treasury, and others specifically addressing the Senator's proposal. Will those responses be available or have they been solicited?

Mr. D'AMATO. Well, they have been solicited. Indeed, the Secretary of the Treasury is adamantly opposed to this legislation. But let me say I am adamantly distressed, deeply distressed at the manner in which taxpayers' funds have been used to date. The lack of accountability—and I am not suggesting bad faith, but just as the process has evolved, the lack of accountability, and the accountability that we do have, leaves me very, very distressed.

I would like to know how it is that we can justify, when we are here making these cuts, that we are going to send more money down while the Mexican Government keeps printing pesos, they keep printing them and we think that we are going to help the economy and we are going to help the Mexican people by just shoveling money out in a manner that lacks business prudence.

I will tell you, you can have all the highfalutin people in the world to say this is important, this is good; they are not signing the notes. They are not making this their own business deal. They would never enter into a situation like this. There is no real collateral. There is no lien against that oil. As one of my colleagues said, you would have to send in the 82d Airborne if you wanted to try to exercise that. We know that is ridiculous.

So while it sounds good and while it may be well-intentioned—and I do not question the motivation for a minute—two things strike me.

No. 1, it has not been carried out in a businesslike, prudent manner. No. 2, we have the constitutional obligation that we cannot and should not delegate to the administration as it relates to the expenditure of these sums.

The legalistics that have been turned around to give us this so-called jurisdiction and the opinions that came from the Assistant Attorney General of the Justice Department and the counsel of the Treasury are mind-boggling: You would really have to say that this is not a foreign aid package. Of course, it is a foreign aid package; you would really have to say that this loan is so collateralized that there is no chance that it will fail. Nobody can tell you that, even the administration. They say, "Well, we don't think it will." And that itself flies in the face of the underlying legal opinion that says you can do this.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will withdraw. I will undertake myself to solicit the views of Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve.

Mr. D'AMATO. They have been supportive of this, as I have indicated to

you, in terms of this program, in terms of calling it essential, and I disagree respectfully.

Mr. WARNER. Fine.

Mr. President, I associate myself with many of the concerns of the Senator from New York, and I will address this, as will others, in a very responsible way when it is brought up. But I think it is important that we do solicit the current views, the current thinking of the chairman of the Federal Reserve and I will undertake to do so.

I thank the Chair, and I thank the distinguished Senator.

Mr. D'AMATO. Let me conclude, and I know my colleague has been patient—he wants to ask a question or make a statement—and I am going to sit down or be available to answer his question.

Let me conclude by saying this. I am very willing to withdraw this amendment, if we can agree to a time certain so that we can have a full debate. And if we want more than 5 hours or 10 hours or 15 or 20 hours or 24 hours, I have no problem with that. But I think it is fair and I think it is our responsibility to the American people that we have a time certain for a vote, otherwise I can assure my colleagues that there will be a piece of legislation that will be moving through the administration will want. If I am placed in the position that this is the only way that I can get a vote, that the American people who are my constituents from Rochester and Syracuse and Buffalo and Long Island, the people who I represent, the people who say they are opposed to this, there will be another time.

Now, I am willing to set up a time. I am willing to withdraw, because it is fact of life. We have to get this important business through. Let us set it aside for Monday. Let us set it aside for Tuesday. Let us pick out an appropriate length of time and come to a vote. I have no illusions. My colleagues who are concerned do not want to be blamed for the collapse. I understand that. And I say Mexico has collapsed already. You will have an opportunity to vote for or against my bill. I will do that. There are a number of Senators who have said it is inappropriate to bring it up here. Fine. I will be willing—and I leave this to my colleagues on the other side—to work out a time when we can bring it up and have a vote, and I will not say anything more on that. I thank my colleagues for giving me the courtesy of this response.

Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator from New York.

Mr. MCCAIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator from Arizona yield to me for just 30 seconds?

Mr. MCCAIN. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. SARBANES. The Senator from New York asserted only a few moments ago in the debate that the Mexicans have been printing money throughout

this period. That, in fact, is not the case. They have upheld a tight money policy.

Through March 15, the nominal money supply has shrunk by 13 percent since the beginning of the year and the real money supply has shrunk by 23 percent.

Now, we may differ over the policy, but at least let us get the right facts out before us. To stand here and assert that they have been following a very loose policy in printing money does not square with what the reality is. The reality is that the money supply, since the beginning of the year until the 15th of March, in Mexico has shrunk—shrunk—by 13 percent.

I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, first of all, I want to thank the Senator from New York for his commitment on this issue and his willingness to agree to a vote. I do not have any role in those negotiations.

But I am deeply concerned about this amendment, its impact on American foreign policy and, very frankly, this amendment in its relation to the Constitution of the United States and the inherent powers of the Chief Executive.

I have always supported the foreign policy prerogatives of the President of the United States. Frankly, I think that is what this debate should be about.

I would refer my colleagues back to the language of the amendment, which says:

Except as authorized by an act of Congress, the Secretary may not take any action under this subsection with respect to a single foreign government, including agencies or other entities of that government, or with respect to the current of a single foreign currency that would result in expenditures and obligations, including contingent obligations, aggregating more than \$5 billion with respect to that foreign country during any 12-month period.

What we are saying, Mr. President, is that the authority of the President of the United States is substantially circumscribed by this amendment.

I point out that the President's action was not taken without consultation with the leaders of Congress. I think that the President of the United States, very appropriately, consulted with the leaders of Congress. In fact, on January 31, 1995, there was a statement issued by President Clinton, Speaker GINGRICH, Minority Leader GEPHARDT, Majority Leader DOLE, and Minority Leader DASCHLE. I will not quote from the whole statement, Mr. President, but I think it is important to remember that this was what our elected leaders here in Congress said on that day.

We agree that, in order to ensure orderly exchange arrangements in a stable system of exchange rates, the United States should immediately use the Exchange Stabilization Fund to provide appropriate financial assistance for Mexico.

And they go on in the final paragraph to say:

This is an important undertaking, and we believe that the risks of inaction vastly exceed any risks associated with this action. We fully support this effort, and we will work to ensure that its purposes are met.

Mr. President, it is my view that that is the way the relationship between the executive and legislative branches should function on issues such as these.

I think it is also important to remember a little background before this agreement was reached on January 31. The reality is that for a period of approximately 3 weeks, if I remember correctly, before this agreement was reached, there was no agreement, there was no agreement between the Congress of the United States and the executive branch.

The leaders of the Congress came out of a meeting at the White House and said we must act, we must act together, we must act on a package. That was their view at the time.

Now, there were many of us, including Senators who are on this floor right now, that had deep concern about what fundamental changes Mexico would make in the way that they conduct their financial affairs. And there were deep concerns as to whether the fundamental reforms in their monetary system were being taken. But there was no doubt about the urgency of this problem in the minds of the majority of Congress. Meeting after meeting was held to find a solution.

Now, with all due respect to all of my colleagues who participated in this effort, many of our colleagues wanted to condition loan guarantees on Mexican relations with Cuba, on labor rights, on domestic reforms, on environmental cleanup, on demands that Mexico essentially militarize our borders. It became almost a vehicle for every pet cause or every pet peeve that any Member of Congress had about our relationship with Mexico.

We have had many differences with Mexico at least during this century. We have certainly had a rocky relationship, certainly from their view point; some of them feel very strongly that the State in which I reside should be part of their country.

But the fact is that there was an inability on the part of the Congress of the United States and the executive branch to agree. But, more importantly than that, there was an inability for Congress to agree amongst themselves. Congress could not agree on a package with which to attempt to agree with the executive branch.

Finally, either rightly or wrongly, history will show, history will show whether it was a correct action on the part of the President of the United States or not, with the agreement of the leaders of Congress, to take the following action which called for an immediate use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund to provide appropriate financial assistance for Mexico.

Mr. President, I have deep and sincere concerns about the Mexican economy. It is declining. We started a slide

to 7 pesos to the dollar, instead of 3.5 pesos to the dollar.

The economy in my State is devastated along the border. Literally, towns are shutting down; not just businesses, but towns are shutting down. There is no tourism up from Mexico. The normal shopper that comes up from Mexico is not there. The Safeway in Nogales has shut down. It had been in operation through all of the downturns and all of the problems we have had in the past 30 years in our relations with Mexico. And it is going to be many, many years before that economy is restored.

I do not know what is going to happen in the Mexican economy, Mr. President. I do not know if this \$20 billion is going to disappear like that. I do not know. And the experts are divided dramatically on this issue as to what the viability of the Mexican economy is.

But that is not the question here, Mr. President. The question here is, are we going to circumscribe the authority of the President of the United States, especially in light of the fact that the Congress was unable to come to agreement, the President and the Congress were unable to make an agreement?

And so the President, with the total endorsement of the leaders of Congress, made a decision. Now, I say again, history will show whether that decision was right or wrong. Obviously, it will be related to the success or failure of the Mexican economy, which I cannot predict.

But I know this. If this legislation is passed, I know this right now, if this legislation is passed, first, there is a serious constitutional problem that I have already described, in my view. And it would send a signal, in my view, that if the leaders of the Congress and the President of the United States make an agreement, then at some later date the Congress can come back, and say, "Sorry, we didn't like that agreement. We're going to have to take the following action." I am not sure that is a very good precedent to set.

But, also, Mr. President, I think we should look at the immediate effect of passage of this amendment on the Mexican economy that all of us, no matter where we stand on this issue, want to save. We want the Mexican economy to survive. And I repeat for probably the fifth time, I do not know whether it will or not.

But I know what this amendment would do. It would doom the Mexican economy to failure. Because I do not believe that any degree of confidence would be maintained in the Mexican economy, Mexican market, and the Mexican currency if this amendment were passed, because we know full well what the effect would be if a review of each \$5 billion in this \$20 billion were passed.

Now, Mr. President, I would also like to point out—and I do not like to embarrass anyone, including myself. But on the day that the President of the

United States and Speaker of the House and the minority leader, and the majority leader and the minority leader here made this announcement on January 31, I did not hear a single Member of Congress stand up and say, "No, wait a minute. Wait a minute. You have to get the approval of Congress."

In fact, the silence was deafening. The silence was deafening because we could not come to an agreement in the Congress, as I mentioned, for a whole variety of reasons.

So I say, with all due respect to the author of the amendment, where were we the day that this agreement was announced? Where were we then? Are we now finding that our expectations or our hopes for the performance of the Mexican economy was such that we now feel that it is necessary to require additional involvement on the part of Congress on this issue?

I say again, if this amendment had been proposed on January 31 rather than today, I think that it might have had a significant degree more resonance.

Mr. D'AMATO. Will my colleague yield for an observation?

Mr. MCCAIN. Yes, but first I observe that my colleague would not yield to me when I asked him to yield, but I will be glad to yield to him.

Mr. D'AMATO. I thank my friend and colleague. Just so that we understand, and I know every utterance that we make we like sometimes for people to pick up—usually they pick up the ones we do not want them to pick up—but on the 31st, I did have a hearing. And at that hearing, I indicated my very strong concern about this. I indicated that I did not think we were doing the right thing. I indicated that I would withhold saying anything further until we can get more facts, in terms of the implementation. That was on the 31st.

On the 8th, I came out about 8, 9 days thereafter raising very strong positions and concerns in regard to the manner in which we were moving forward. I just share that with my friend and colleague because this Senator did not want to be an obstructionist, yet I was not afraid to express my concerns. I just share that.

Mr. MCCAIN. Let me say to my friend from New York, I expressed my concerns, too. I still have grave concerns. I still am worried whether the nation of Mexico has implemented the fundamental reforms in their monetary system, in fact, in their political system, that would lead to the kind of confidence that would allow that economy to be restored before it sinks even further into a terrible, terrible depression which, obviously, has afflicted the poor people in Mexico in a most horrible way.

But I also suggest to my friend from New York that many people expressed those reservations. No one that I know of during the intervening time, nearly 2 months, brought forth an amendment like this for consideration on the floor

when we had many pieces of legislation under consideration to which this amendment would have been equally as relevant.

I want to say again, I appreciate very much the involvement of the Senator from New York in this issue, the fact that he has both the authority and the commitment to hold hearings and for us to ventilate this entire issue. I do not underestimate, in any way, his dire concern and warning about what is at stake. But I question, as I said, the vehicle and the language which is in the amendment.

Mr. President, I do not want to take much longer. I will just suggest that there is a great deal at stake on this issue. I urge my colleague from New York to continue the hearings that he has scheduled to seek the information that sometimes has not been readily forthcoming to him about the process that was utilized in coming forth with the decisions that were made about Mexico.

But at the same time, I suggest that if this amendment is adopted by both Houses of the Congress, it would have constitutional problems, which is sort of an academic argument. But I also think that it would probably doom the Mexican economy to a very, very difficult period, which sooner or later has effects on this country in the form of lack of trade, increase in illegal immigration, et cetera, et cetera.

Try as we might, we cannot sever Mexico from the United States. It is geographically impossible. And I have never believed that we could build sufficient walls to separate our two countries, not to mention the kind of fundamental Judeo-Christian principle that is involved here about helping neighbors who are very much less fortunate than we.

I do not mean to wax sentimental here, but when I see little children crawling through a tunnel that is filled with sewage in order to get into Nogales, AZ, where they are forced to engage in theft in order to eke out a meager existence—and I see that increasing exponentially—I am deeply concerned about the future of our neighbors. I do not pretend to know that this is the right solution, but I do believe that if we adopt this amendment, we might see a lot more of that for a very long period of time.

Again, I want to thank my friend from New York for his commitment and interest in this issue. I also want to thank my friend from Connecticut for his deep knowledge and involvement in these affairs for many years.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority manager is recognized.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut, without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank my colleague, the ranking manager of the underlying bill.

I want to commend my colleague from Arizona. We have dealt with these issues in the Western Hemisphere for many years together. He is very complimentary, and I appreciate it. But there are very few people who are as knowledgeable about Mexico as is my colleague from Arizona.

I think he has appropriately and properly identified the concerns incorporated in the amendment of the Senator from New York. All of us have had concerns about this. If it were without concern, I suspect it would have gone through under a unanimous-consent request in the House and Senate back in January.

Anytime there is a potential exposure, there are some issues that need to be raised. No one is questioning that. The President certainly outlined that when he made the decision to go with the Exchange Stabilization Fund. But the Senator from Arizona has very properly pointed out the implications if we do not try to make a difference, not only in Mexico but ourselves as well in this country, given the implications of the border and elsewhere.

Others may have already printed this in the RECORD. There is a letter that has been distributed, addressed to the distinguished chairman of the Banking Committee dated today, signed by Robert Rubin, the Secretary of the Treasury. I will print the entire letter in the RECORD, but there is one paragraph that if it has not been quoted already needs to be quoted. In the letter, the Secretary of the Treasury says to the chairman:

I am deeply concerned that the actions you are taking will have the potential to undermine market confidence in international support for Mexico and thereby reduce the likelihood of success. By limiting the American response to the Mexican crisis, your amendment could threaten the credibility of the stabilization program and undermine the confidence Mexico is trying to restore among investors. These consequences could, in turn, have a negative impact on jobs, wages and prospects of American workers here at home.

I hope my colleagues will read this letter. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, DC, March 30, 1995.
Hon. ALFONSE D'AMATO,
Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Wash-
ington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to express my very serious concerns regarding your current efforts to amend H.R. 1158 to require Congressional approval of aggregate annual assistance to any foreign entity using the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) in an amount that exceeds \$5 billion. Your amendment would have the immediate practical effect of curtailing any further use of the ESF consistent with the Administration's package of financial support for Mexico. I would strongly urge that you reconsider your decision to proceed on this course.

I am deeply concerned that the actions you are taking will have the potential to undermine market confidence in international support for Mexico and thereby reduce the likelihood of success. By limiting the American response to the Mexican crisis, your amendment could threaten the credibility of the stabilization program and undermine the confidence Mexico is trying to restore among investors. These consequences could, in turn, have a negative impact on jobs, wages and prospects of American workers here at home.

The Mexican government has taken courageous action in directly confronting its financial imbalances and implementing a disciplined economic recovery program. Seeking to attract foreign capital, strengthen the peso and minimize inflation, Mexico has adopted strong remedial policies including fiscal measures that will result in a budget surplus in 1995 reductions in government spending, strict monetary policy, accelerated structural reforms and important enhancements to the transparency of its economic institutions.

Let me emphasize, however, that the process of restoring market confidence is an arduous one and we need to incorporate this fact into our thinking as we look for signs of progress in Mexico. As such, the success of this effort cannot be judged from day-to-day market movements. This stabilization package that Mexico has adopted is a strong one and seems to be starting to have the desired effect.

The Mexican government has upheld tight money policy and we are seeing results—through March 15, the nominal money supply has shrunk by 13% since the beginning of the year and the real money supply has shrunk by 23%. The Bolsa in Mexico City is up 15% since last week, representing a 21% gain in dollar terms. Prices on par Brady bonds has risen by 11% from their recent low on March 16.

Signs of declining volatility in peso trading have emerged, with the peso closing below NP 7 since March 23 and now trading within a narrower range. Demand for government securities rose in this week's primary auctions to 2.4 times the amount offered.

To reiterate, for its recovery program to succeed over the long term, Mexico is relying upon the U.S. commitment to the agreement signed on February 21. It appears that negative sentiment may be bottoming out and if Mexico holds the course, confidence should return. Any indication that the commitment of the U.S. to those agreements is weakening could threaten to jeopardize the best possible outcome in Mexico.

There is an additional concern regarding this amendment which relates more generally to U.S. diplomacy. On January 31, President Clinton and four Congressional leaders from both parties declared in a joint statement their support of the U.S. financial package for Mexico and recognized that the President has full authority to use the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) to that end. This became U.S. policy, and the executive branch negotiated appropriately with foreign governments to implement that policy.

Now the Senate is considering a measure that could impede that policy. Your amendment would effectively end the ability of the United States to carry out the February 21 agreements and thereby impair the confidence that other nations have in the ability of the executive branch to negotiate agreements with them.

I hope that we can continue to move forward in the spirit of bi-partisan cooperation,

and not invite confrontation by consideration or passage of legislation that could ultimately disable the implementation of American support for Mexico.

In closing, let me assure you that the Treasury has been complying with all Congressional requests for documents. I am using my full authority to ensure that the Treasury continues to supply timely, appropriate information to the Congress. I look forward to continuing my work with you and your colleagues in our shared commitment to support Mexico's recovery and thus to protect American jobs and interests.

Sincerely,

ROBERT E. RUBIN,
Secretary.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, last, I want to address an issue I heard raised repeatedly all afternoon. It has to do with the so-called corruption in Mexico.

President Zedillo and his administration, but for the fact that they have conducted significant investigations, we would not know what we know already. I think it is unfair to this new

administration which was saddled with a lot of problems not of their own choosing that is making very difficult decisions, asking his constituency to make very difficult decisions in order to get out of this crisis and, in fact, have pointed to a lot of the problems that existed in the past is an overstatement, to put it mildly.

Second, again, there have been a lot of criticisms raised about President Salinas. I got to know President Salinas fairly well during his tenure in office. Obviously, the jury is still out on some other matters unrelated to him personally, but I want to say that had he not taken the steps beginning 5 or 6 years ago to inject strong market economy principles and to deal with those issues, we would not be in the position at least of offering real opportunity for Mexico in these coming years. And so while it has become popular to indict President Salinas in many quarters, I happen to feel he did a great deal of good. I also believe that his successor

is doing even better in many ways. I would like to see us give him that opportunity to succeed.

What we are doing here is in our interest. It makes sense to be supportive of it. It is not just a largess. These programs, through the economic exchange stabilization fund, have been very successful. In years past, Mr. President, I will submit for the RECORD a series of countries to whom we have provided assistance under the ESF Program. Six times Mexico has been the recipient of ESF funds. On all occasions they have paid the money back. There have been suggestions on the floor today that we are never going to get the money back. In almost every instance, the money has been returned as a result of this program.

I ask unanimous consent that this list be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE 1.—EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND FINANCING AGREEMENTS, 1980 TO JUNE 1994

| Country | Year | Amount agreed (dollars in mil- lions) | Drew | | Repaid in full by |
|-------------|------|---|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------------|
| | | | Amount (dollars in millions) | Date(s) | |
| Mexico | 1982 | 1,000.0 | 825.0 | 8-14-82 | 8-24-82 |
| Do | 1982 | 600.0 | 600.0 | 9-82—2-83 | 8-23-83 |
| Do | 1986 | 273.0 | 273.0 | 8-86—12-86 | 2-13-87 |
| Do | 1988 | 300.0 | 300.0 | 8-1-88 | 9-15-88 |
| Do | 1989 | 425.0 | 384.1 | 9-25-89 | 2-15-90 |
| Do | 1990 | 600.0 | 600.0 | 3-28-90 | 7-90 |
| Brazil | 1982 | 500.0 | 500.0 | 10-82—11-82 | 12-28-82 |
| Do | 1982 | 280.0 | 280.0 | 11-82 | 2-1-83 |
| Do | 1982 | 450.0 | 450.0 | 11-82 | 3-3-83 |
| Do | 1982 | 250.0 | 250.0 | 12-82 | 1-83 |
| Do | 1983 | 200.0 | 200.0 | 2-28-83 | 3-11-83 |
| Do | 1983 | 200.0 | 200.0 | 3-3-83 | 3-11-83 |
| Do | 1988 | 250.0 | 232.5 | 7-29-88 | 8-26-88 |
| Argentina | 1984 | 300.0 | 0.0 | | |
| Do | 1984 | 500.0 | 500.0 | 12-28-84 | 1-15-85 |
| Do | 1985 | 150.0 | 143.0 | 6-85 | 9-30-85 |
| Do | 1987 | 225.0 | 225.0 | 3-9-87 | 7-15-87 |
| Do | 1987 | 200.0 | 190.0 | 11-12-87 | 12-30-87 |
| Do | 1988 | 550.0 | 550.0 | 2-88—3-88 | 5-31-88 |
| Do | 1988 | 265.0 | 79.5 | 11-22-88 | 2-28-89 |
| Jamaica | 1984 | 50.0 | 10.0 | 12-29-84 | 3-2-85 |
| Philippines | 1984 | 45.0 | 45.0 | 11-7-84 | 12-28-84 |
| Ecuador | 1986 | 150.0 | 75.0 | 5-16-86 | 8-14-86 |
| Do | 1987 | 31.0 | 31.0 | 12-4-87 | 1-26-88 |
| Nigeria | 1986 | 37.0 | 22.2 | 10-31-86 | 12-10-86 |
| Yugoslavia | 1988 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 6-15-88 | 9-30-88 |
| Do | 1989 | 450.0 | 450.0 | 3-15-89 | 4-3-89 |
| Do | 1990 | 104.0 | 25.0 | 3-30-90 | 4-30-90 |
| Bolivia | 1986 | 100.0 | 0.0 | | |
| Do | 1989 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 7-89 | 9-15-89 |
| Do | 1989 | 100.0 | 75.0 | 9-22-89 | 12-29-89 |
| Do | 1989 | 75.0 | 75.0 | 12-29-89 | 1-2-90 |
| Poland | 1989 | 200.0 | 86.0 | 12-28-89 | 2-9-90 |
| Guyana | 1990 | 31.8 | 31.8 | 6-20-90 | 9-90 |
| Honduras | 1990 | 82.3 | 82.3 | 6-28-90 | 11-20-90 |
| Hungary | 1990 | 20.0 | 20.0 | 6-90—7-90 | 9-5-90 |
| Costa Rica | 1990 | 27.5 | 27.5 | 5-21-90 | 5-21-90 |
| Romania | 1991 | 40.0 | 40.0 | 3-7-91 | 3-21-91 |
| Panama | 1992 | 143.0 | 143.0 | 1-31-92 | 3-92 |
| Peru | 1993 | 470.0 | 470.0 | 3-18-93 | 3-18-93 |

Mr. DODD. I know my colleague from Oregon would like to engage in a unanimous-consent request to consider another amendment. I am prepared to yield for that purpose.

Mr. HATFIELD. Rather than to ask for just a half-hour, I would like to expand that to an hour to take care of two amendments, one on the Democratic side and one on the Republican side, Mr. Kyl's amendment, each for a half-hour equally divided.

Mr. DODD. I am happy to accommodate. If there are going to be recorded votes, can they be done en bloc?

Mr. HATFIELD. It will be two one-half hours making 1 hour.

Mr. DODD. I am told that my colleague from California would like to be included for a half-hour on an amendment. So that would make it an hour and a half. Can we provide that at the conclusion of the consideration of the amendment offered by the Senator from California that we would vote on all three amendments, so our colleagues might have a window, if that is appropriate?

Mr. HATFIELD. I know the Senator from California has a number of them. What amendment would this be?

Mrs. BOXER. The Senator from California only has one amendment—the transfer amendment. That is the only

amendment I have. I am happy to agree to 30 minutes equally divided.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that three amendments in succession, one from the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. KERREY], one from the Senator from Arizona [Mr. KYL], one from the Senator from California [Mrs. BOXER], each of these amendments—by the way, let me mention that the one for Mr. KERREY is on the subject of Federal courthouses that are included