

happen when we get to the serious budget votes? Will some Senators say, "Oh, yes, we want a balanced budget, but we have a right to know what will happen for years into the future," which is what they said a week ago. Will they say again, "We must have some further guarantees on Social Security," or else they won't even vote for deficit reduction now.

I will venture a prediction. I predict that they will say, "Exempt this group from any cuts, and exempt that group." And when we get to the budget resolution, they will say, "Oh, yes, by all means cut spending, but not here. Not there. Somewhere else."

Where will their votes be when we get to the real deficit reduction effort? Will they be saying, "Exempt my State, or exempt my region, or exempt this special interest"? Or will they be willing to cast the tough votes so that we can stop the \$200 billion-a-year deficits that President Clinton has proposed, not just for this year, but for as far as the eye can see?

Today advocates of the balanced budget amendment lost. But within 2 months, the Senate will have to face tough choices about spending, tough choices about specific programs. The Nation will be watching to see the votes that will then be cast by those who today profess devotion to a balanced budget, while voting against the amendment that would have achieved it.

Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. JEFFORDS and Mr. LEAHY pertaining to the introduction of S. J. Res. 28 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

PEACE AND FREEDOM

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, yesterday the majority leader gave a very important speech at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom and outlined what he called the five global realities that affect our vital interest and dictate what it will take to maintain leadership throughout the world.

First, the golden age of capitalism. From India and Latin America to China and Russia, 4 billion people formerly under some form of socialism are striving to establish market economies. This offers great opportunities for America and American business, but requires American leadership to protect our interests and ensure adherence to the rules of the international trading system.

Second, the new world energy order. Senator DOLE correctly noted that the security of the world's oil and gas supplies will remain a vital national interest. At the same time, Iran and Iraq remain hostile threats in the oil-rich gulf, while other energy rich areas in Eurasia are subject to disorder. He makes the insightful observation that "in this new energy order, many of the most important geopolitical deci-

sions—ones on which a nation's sovereignty can depend—will deal with the location and routes for oil and gas pipelines." I would add that we are already seeing in the case of Azerbaijan, over which Moscow is trying to regain effective control in order to determine the route through which Azeri oil will flow. Senator DOLE concluded that "our strategy, our diplomacy and our forward military presence need readjusting" to meet this reality.

Third, the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The majority leader issued a clarion call yesterday that "we must prepare now for the future," in which weapons of mass destruction will become more widespread, greatly affecting our vital security interests. He wisely asked "what would we have done—or not done—if Iraq had one or two nuclear weapons in 1990? A chilling question and one which we could face in just a few years as a real, not a hypothetical question, with regard to Iran or North Korea. In response to this threat, Senator DOLE quite rightly focused on the possibility of preventive military action and the need for missile defenses to protect America and our allies.

Fourth, increase in extremist religious and ethnic movements. The majority leader highlighted the many areas in which religious or ethnic passions have led to conflicts and identified those that pose a threat to American interests. America cannot become complacent he wisely warned his audience.

Fifth, rivalry with Russia. In perhaps in most important observations, Senator DOLE warned that "geopolitical rivalry with Russia did not end with the demise of Soviet communism." Quoting Henry Kissinger, he noted that the Soviet threat was one of both communism and imperialism, and while communism was defeated the trend toward imperialism remains. While an early supporter of President Yeltsin, Senator DOLE warned against "the Clinton administration's misguided devotion to a "Russia First" policy, which has turned into a "Yeltsin First" policy, and he quoted President Nixon who told the Duma "when we have differences, we should not assume they will be overcome by a good personal relationship even at the highest level." To buttress his case, the majority leader listed numerous examples of how Moscow has taken actions in recent months that are in conflict with U.S. interests.

To address this situation, Senator DOLE prescribed a "new realism" about Russia. This would not mean a return to the cold war past, he noted, but would require "developing a more honest relationship, one that does not paper over important policy differences with an appeal to personal ties."

In conclusion, Senator DOLE reaffirmed the need for American leadership to secure peace and freedom for future generations of Americans.

In an article just published in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Sen-

ator DOLE builds on these themes and defines his vision for the future American role in the world and 10 principles to guide our international relations. He also provides an incisive critique of the Clinton administration's foreign policy and how and why it has, in Senator DOLE's view, failed in various respects.

I will merely quote the final paragraph of his article:

As the United States approaches the next century, two principles should remain constant: protecting American interests and providing American leadership. The end of the Cold War has provided us with a historic opportunity. Such an opportunity should not be forfeited in favor of the pursuit of utopian multilateralism or abandoned through intentional isolationism. We have seen the danger to America's interests, prestige, and influence posed by both of these approaches. Instead, we must look to the lessons of the Cold War to guide our future foreign policy: Put American interests first and lead the way. The future will not wait for America, but it can be shaped by an America second to none.

Mr. President, I think that in yesterday's speech and this new article with the majority leader has provided us with a clear vision and practical proposals for guiding American foreign policy. I would urge my colleagues to give the most careful attention to both these documents, and I would ask unanimous consent to insert them in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. COHEN. In his speech yesterday, President Clinton also reaffirmed that he gives very high priority to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Mr. President, there have been many supporters on this side of the aisle for efforts to control and ban chemical weapons—Senator DOLE, Senator KASSEBAUM, Senator HATFIELD, Senator MCCAIN and others come to mind, and I have been pleased to work with them on different measures to achieve that goal.

During the 1980's, I supported replacement of our aging chemical stocks with binary weapons, a necessary step to get Moscow to negotiate seriously.

EXHIBIT 1

FOREIGN POLICY—WINNING THE PEACE: AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND COMMITMENT

(By Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole)

I can't help but think back to the day in January of 1994, when President Nixon made his last visit to the United States Capitol.

The occasion was the 25th anniversary of his inauguration as President. And over 100 past and present Senators and Congressmen—Republicans and Democrats alike—attended a lunch honoring President Nixon that Bob Michel and I hosted.

At the conclusion of the lunch, President Nixon stood—and without a note in his hand—delivered one of the most compelling speeches many of us could remember.

As always, he talked politics, and he also shared some personal reflections on his life and career. But the majority of his remarks

were devoted to his life's passion—foreign policy.

President Nixon served as our guide, leading us on an around-the-world tour, offering his unique perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of our allies and adversaries, and on the future as he saw it.

In his remarks, he repeated a statement that he made again and again during the last year of his life. He said, "The Soviets have lost the Cold War, but the United States has not yet won it."

Those words were true then—and are just as true today. And while the title of this conference—"After Victory"—has a nice ring to it, I believe the declaration may be a bit premature. It is, after all, possible to win the war and lose the peace—as the years between World War I and World War II demonstrate.

WORLD STILL UNCERTAIN

Don't get me wrong. The stage is set. We are the world's only superpower. And the words spoken by Nikita Khrushchev in that famous "kitchen debate" were dead wrong. Not only will America's children never live under communism—neither will Russia's children. Still, there are far too many gains to consolidate, and far too many uncertainties in the world to say that a final peace has been won.

For example, there is a resurgent Russia, asserting its position around the globe. China has international ambitions of its own, and is in the midst of a leadership transition. There are international terrorists—often state-supported. There are global crime syndicates. There are extremist movements based on religion or ethnic origin. While none of these compare to the challenge of the Soviet empire, each of these can pose threats to important American interests.

FIVE GLOBAL REALITIES AFFECT AMERICA'S INTERESTS

It seems to me these multifaceted threats should be viewed in the context of five clear global realities which affect America's fundamental interests. Only by recognizing these realities—and dealing with them with the same commitment which led to the defeat of Soviet Communism—will America truly be able to claim victory.

REALITY NO. 1: THE "GOLDEN AGE OF CAPITALISM"

The first new reality is that the whole world is plunging headlong into what David Hale of the Kemper Organization in Chicago has termed a "new golden age of capitalism."

I remember when Lech Walesa told me that the definition of a communist economy was "100 workers standing around one shovel." Now, in places like Poland, Russia, India, Latin America, and even China—four billion people formerly under some form of socialism are now fighting with everything they can lay hands on to not just grab a shovel—but to build shovel factories.

There are now more than 30 stock markets in the developing world, and capitalization of the four-year-old Shanghai securities exchange has reached \$30 billion. Deng Xiaoping himself has said that no one cares any more what color the cat is, as long as it catches mice. The bottom line is that everyone wants to trade, and everyone wants to create and use capital on a world-wide basis.

While this new "golden age of capitalism" offers great opportunity for America, we must remember that many of the countries so eager to enjoy the benefits of membership in the world trading system may not fully understand or accept the rules and discipline that go with it.

A trade war was averted with China, but other threats to U.S. commercial interests

will surely arise in the coming months and years, and our continued vigilance and leadership will be required.

REALITY NO. 2: THE "NEW WORLD ENERGY ORDER"

The second inescapable reality of the post-20th century world is that the security of the world's oil and gas supplies will remain a vital national interest of the United States and of the other industrial powers.

The Persian Gulf—the heartland of world energy for half a century—is still a region of many uncertainties. Saudi Arabia has been weakened financially. Iran and Iraq continue to exhibit great hostility to the West and pose threats to their neighbors. And the boundaries of the oil and gas heartland are being redrawn to the north, to include the great hydrocarbon deposits of the Caucasus, Siberia, and Kazakhstan.

In this "new energy order," many of the most important geopolitical decisions—ones on which a nation's sovereignty can depend—will deal with the location and routes for oil and gas pipelines. In response, our strategy, our diplomacy and our forward military presence need readjusting.

REALITY NO. 3: SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The third inevitable reality for America—and for the world—is the fact that while the Berlin Wall may have crumbled, weapons of mass destruction haven't.

Listen to just a partial roll call of countries and groups that already possess nuclear, biological or chemical weapons: North Korea. Iraq. Iran. Libya.

Have any of these nations earned our trust? And given their past behavior, is it any surprise that there are startling signs that a world wide black market in nuclear weapons has emerged?

All this is taking place as talks to review the global treaty limiting the spread of nuclear weapons will soon begin. Even if the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is extended indefinitely, however, we must avoid falling into a false sense of security. We must prepare now for the future.

Iraq, Iran, and North Korea all illustrate the failures of traditional non-proliferation efforts, which depend largely on the cooperation of other states.

Only after Desert Storm did the West learn just how far Iraqi nuclear ambitions had progressed. And instead of announcing that the United States will veto any efforts to ease or end U.N. sanctions on Iraq, the administration dispatches an envoy to plead with the Europeans for cooperation. Where would such timidity have gotten us in the Cold War?

Iran also appears poised for a great leap forward in its nuclear program—thanks to a cash-hungry Russia doing for Iran what the Clinton Administration has done for North Korea.

And make no mistake about it, the Agreed Framework with North Korea has little prospect of successfully addressing the North Korean threat, and apparently, has already been violated by Pyongyang.

American leadership in addressing these non-proliferation challenges is essential if additional states are not to choose the nuclear option. It's worth asking: What would we have done—or not done—if Iraq had one or two nuclear weapons in 1990? Preventive military action as a non-proliferation policy tool cannot be ruled out.

There are defensive options, however, that could provide the United States and our allies with protection against accidental and limited ballistic missile strikes. Pursuing an effective ballistic missile defense capability should be a top priority for U.S. defense policy now and for the foreseeable future.

REALITY NO. 4: INCREASE IN EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MOVEMENTS

The fourth new global reality is the increase in violence due to extremist religious and ethnic movements in many parts of the globe.

Some of these movements, like the tribal warfare in Rwanda, or conflicts in Burma or West Africa have little direct impact on American interests.

However, some of the instability and turmoil due to ethnic and religious violence is important for American interests—and could lead to the disintegration of key states. Serbian genocidal aggression in the Balkans, for example, threatens to spill over to Macedonia, Albania, and beyond. American and European inaction in the face of that aggression cannot help but embolden other radical "ethno-nationalists" by giving them a green light for ethnic cleansing.

The Indian rebellion in Mexico coupled with financial uncertainty has resulted in genuine security concerns on our southern border—and make no mistake that illegal immigration is a security threat.

A key NATO ally in Turkey faces Islamic extremism and a separatist ethnic movement. Violent Islamic fundamentalists threaten the government in Algeria, and have launched an assault on Egypt. How long would the Camp David Treaty be honored if fundamentalists took power in Egypt?

Islamic terrorists seek to destroy the peace process between Israel and the PLO—and may be having some success. With support from Iran and others, Islamic terrorists also demonstrated at the World Trade Center that America is not immune from attack.

And ethnic turmoil in the former Soviet Union cannot be ignored, as warfare has occurred in five former republics. And the Chechens may be just one of many ethnic groups willing to use violence to alter boundaries originally set by Joseph Stalin.

In short, the list of world "hot spots" is far too lengthy for anyone to conclude that America can become complacent.

REALITY NO. 5: RIVALRY WITH RUSSIA

And this leads to the fifth global reality we must face: the fact that geopolitical rivalry with Russia did not end with the demise of Soviet Communism.

On his last trip abroad, President Nixon spoke before the Russian State Duma, and he foreshadowed a change in Russian-American relations, saying: "Russia is a great power, and Russia as a great power must chart its own course in foreign policy * * * When we have differences, we should not assume they will be overcome by a good personal relationship even at the highest level."

And as we have seen time and time again, the foreign policy course that Russia is charting, is one that is often in conflict with American interests.

For example:

Russia stepped in the middle of the North Korea agreement by offering to provide nuclear reactors—which would have the clear effect of killing the U.S. brokered deal.

Russia continues to threaten prospective NATO members over alliance expansion, thereby confirming the need to enlarge NATO sooner rather than later.

In December 1994, Russia vetoed a sanctions resolution on Serbia in the U.N. Security Council, its first substantive veto since the height of the Cold War in 1985.

Russia persists in supplying weapons and nuclear technology to the rogue regime in Iran.

Russia continues to maintain an intelligence facility and support personnel in Cuba, thereby prolonging Castro's oppression.

Russian pressure, subversion and intimidation of the sovereign states in the "Near Abroad" follows a historical pattern set long before the Bolsheviks took power in 1917.

As Dr. Kissinger said last month before the Senate Armed Services Committee, " * * * what we dealt with in the Cold War was both communism and imperialism, and while communism was defeated, the trend toward imperialism still exists."

Let me be clear in saying that no one has been more supportive of President Yeltsin than I. In June 1991, I went to Andrews Air Force Base to meet President Yeltsin virtually alone, since the United States State Department believed Gorbachev was the "only game in town."

But just as it was wrong to place too much focus on Gorbachev in 1991, it is wrong in 1995 to ignore that fact that President Yeltsin has made serious errors, has moved toward authoritarian rule, and has lost the political support of virtually all reform-minded Russians.

The Clinton Administration's misguided devotion to a "Russia First" policy—which has turned into a "Yeltsin first" policy—resulted in the loss of a tremendous opportunity to state American concerns forcefully before thousands were slaughtered in Chechnya.

NEW REALISM ABOUT RUSSIA

A "new realism" about Russia and its prospects for the future does not mean a return to the Cold War past. It does mean developing a more honest relationship, one that does not paper over important policy differences with an appeal to personal ties.

New realism means emphasizing the significance of Russia's 1996 elections, and of the pivotal importance of a peaceful, democratic transition of power.

And new realism means that developments like arms sales to Iran, violence in Chechnya, and U.N. vetoes on behalf of aggressors should not be excused, ignored and minimized. Our differences with Russia should be identified—they should be negotiated when possible and condemned when necessary. Such an approach would ultimately serve both the Russian and the American people better than defending, denying and rationalizing Russian misdeeds.

TESTS FOR AMERICAN LEADERSHIP

Let me conclude by sharing with you words that Richard Nixon spoke at the announcement of the creation of the Center for Peace and Freedom in January 1994.

"Some are tired of leadership. They say (America) carried that burden long enough. But if we do not provide leadership, who will? The Germans? The Japanese? The Russians? The Chinese? Only the United States has the potential . . . to lead in the era beyond peace. It is a great challenge for a great people."

Ladies and gentlemen, President Nixon was right. Leadership does come with a price tag. But it is a price worth paying.

Dealing with the five realities I have outlined will test America's resolve and her leadership. If we fail those tests—if we refuse the mantle of leadership—any declaration of victory will be a long time coming.

But I am an optimist. Like Richard Nixon, I believe in America and in American leadership. I believe we will pass our tests, and in doing so, we can claim the biggest victory of all—we will have secured the future of our great republic, and of peace and freedom, for generations to come.

SHAPING AMERICA'S GLOBAL FUTURE

(By Bob Dole)

It is now a cliché that America is the world's only superpower. But Americans would do well to reflect on how we got to

this point—and on how unprecedented our status is in American history. America has always been blessed with security, protected by two oceans, our two land borders safe from invasion since the mid-nineteenth century. Never before, however, has America been so alone at the pinnacle of global leadership.

It was not always this way. America fought three major wars in this century—World War I in Europe; World War II in Europe, Africa, and Asia; and the Cold War across the globe. In each of these conflicts, Americans were asked to give their blood and treasure in support of U.S. interests and ideals overseas. Three times this century, America rose to the occasion.

It is sometimes said that Americans win the war and lose the peace. Clearly that was true after World War I, when Wilsonian idealist ambitions overran American interests, and when protectionism, isolationism, and decline were the result. Yet after the defeat in 1945 of Nazism in Europe and Japanese militarism in Asia, we rose to the challenge of winning the peace through American leadership. New multilateral institutions were established: the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. They were important, but they were insufficient. What made the difference was American will and power as reflected in the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These and other related actions cemented the American commitment to Europe and signaled America's determination to oppose Soviet expansionism.

It was American leadership and commitment—supported by our allies throughout the world—that led to the overwhelming victories in the Cold War: the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. For more than four decades, the central purpose and chief objective of American national security policy was the containment of Soviet communism. Who can doubt that U.S. policy played a central role in the disintegration of Soviet communism? The great success of America and its democratic allies in the Cold War is something to be proud of, and the costs of the victory should not be forgotten. While historic event occurred barely three years ago, myths contradicting the facts of why and how the Cold War was won have already surfaced.

Myth #1: Foreign policy was easier during the Cold War. While a common enemy often did serve to unite the United States and its allies during the Cold War, it is difficult to argue that security policy was easier when the Soviet Union was ready, willing, and able to oppose American interests. A nuclear-armed superpower committed to undermining the West created more difficult and demanding foreign policy challenges than any faced since 1991. No current challenge, for example, rivals the magnitude of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 or the Yom Kippur War of 1973—either of which could have escalated to thermonuclear war.

Myth #2: The Cold War was supported by a great bipartisan consensus. In large part because of the historic partnership between President Harry Truman and Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the late 1940s saw considerable bipartisan cooperation in creating a new international security system. But "politics stopping at the water's edge" lasted only for two decades—until the Vietnam War. While there were partisan disagreements in the 1950s, for example over "who lost China," it was the war in Southeast Asia that shattered the bipartisan consensus on waging the Cold War. In the 1970s, even Republicans were divided over the wisdom of pursuing the Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente. Moreover, in the

later years of the Cold War, debates over the nuclear freeze, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), opposing communist aggression in Central America, or using force to defend U.S. interests reflected very little bipartisanship. Despite the broad bipartisan agreement at the beginning of the Cold War, precious few "Scoop Jackson Democrats" were around by its end.

Myth #3: The doves were right. Unlike the revisionist history written by some in the Clinton administration, the "doves" were wrong all along in the Cold War. Why?

The doves advocated spending less on defense and doing less with American armed forces. In the end, as former Soviet leaders now reveal, American defense spending and activism in Afghanistan, Poland, and elsewhere were critical to the Soviet demise.

The doves argued for toning down anti-Soviet rhetoric no matter how accurate it was (remember the shock at President Ronald Reagan's proper characterization of the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire"?). More significantly, they preferred the resignation of U.S. policy to the permanent existence of the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the doves' self-fulfilling prophecy was not heeded.

The doves opposed SDI and supported the nuclear freeze and other arms control measures, arguing that weapons, not ideology and intentions, posed the threat to the United States.

The doves opposed the Reagan Doctrine of supporting freedom fighters opposing communist regimes around the world.

The breakup of the Soviet empire in 1991 came faster and happened more completely than virtually anyone envisioned. If the doves' policies had prevailed, however, that day would have been delayed for years, if not decades—and may never have come. The fall of the Soviet empire was not inevitable, nor was it foreordained by impersonal forces of history; rather, it was the leadership, actions, and sacrifices of the West that brought victory in the Cold War.

Debunking the mythologies of the Cold War does not automatically lead to prescriptions for a post-Cold War foreign policy. Our Cold War victory allows the United States to be more selective in its involvement around the world, but it is not a license for America to withdraw from the world. Exhaustion after a great conflict is natural, but American withdrawal would jeopardize the gains of the last 40 years, and it would inevitably mean less prosperity and less security for the American people.

Nevertheless, in the wake of the Soviet Union's defeat, numerous observers have suggested America should withdraw from the world. First, some claim America cannot be involved in the world because we do not have the resources—the "declinist" school. We won the Cold War and remain the only global power but, in the perverse logic of the declinists, this adds up to weakness.

The declinists have multilateralist cousins who promote a view that America must work with and within international organizations because we do not have the resources to act on our own. Other multilateralists believe America does not have the legal or moral authority to act without the sanction of international organizations. The declinists—and their multilateralist kin—ignore the strength of America and underrate the power of American leadership. It is true that America must be strong domestically to be strong abroad, but America has the ability to do both if resources are used wisely and decisions are made soundly.

This is not necessarily the view in the current administration. The declinists and multilateralists are alive and well in the Clinton administration. First came the

"Tarnoff Doctrine" of May 1993, when the State Department's undersecretary for political affairs, Peter Tarnoff, argued for retrenchment because the United States lacked the resources, inclination, and will to lead. Then there was the "Halperin Doctrine" expressed in these pages in the Summer of 1993, in which a current National Security Council staff member, Morton Halperin, argued that the United States should use force to defend its interests in cases like Grenada and Panama only with prior multilateral approval.

There are also protectionists who argue that America should engage in trade with the world only on a one-way basis—shutting our doors to foreign products in the vain hope that foreign doors will remain open to American products. American industries do not need protection, they need competition. Where there is truly free trade, U.S. businesses have prospered and the U.S. economy has grown.

Finally, some argue that America should not get involved in the world. Historically, the isolationists have had adherents on the Left who believe America will corrupt the world, and on the Right who believe the world will corrupt America. There are no serious and immediate threats to vital American interests, the isolationists say. While that may be true now, retreat from the world is the surest way to invite the emergence of such threats in the future. The fact is that America must remain firmly engaged in the world. If we do not protect our interests, no one else—neither other countries nor international organizations—will do the job for us. The various approaches of the declinists, multilateralists, protectionists, and isolationists all would make a dangerous world even more so.

TWO FAILURES OF VISION

We have witnessed two efforts to "reinvent" American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War: President George Bush's New World Order and the Assertive Multilateralism, or Engagement and Enlargement, of President Bill Clinton. Unfortunately, neither effort has been successful.

The New World Order—whatever it was meant to be—rapidly became a new world disorder; instead of strengthened collective security, enhanced international organizations, and a new partnership of nations, there was expansion of violent ethnic and religious unrest, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international aggression, and civil war. The flaw of the New World Order approach was its assumption that the end of the Cold War meant the end of international tension that could lead to hot war. President Bush and his advisers may be excused for over-optimism in the wake of the stunning multilateral coalition they built—under the United Nations auspices—to defeat Saddam Hussein's aggression. In retrospect, however, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm may have been the high point of post-Cold War U.N. collective security efforts. Just as United Nations action in Korea in 1950 was possible only because the Soviet Union was absent for the crucial authorizing vote, United Nations action in the Persian Gulf was possible only because the Soviet Union was inclined to cooperate with the West in the final months of 1990. Such cooperation is rapidly becoming a thing of the past as Russia pursues its traditional objectives in the "near abroad" and around the globe. In this regard, the first substantive United Nations Security Council veto exercised by Russia since 1984 (during the height of the Cold War) came in December 1994 on the issue of tougher sanctions against Serbia and may be the beginning of a trend.

Despite the conceptual flaws of the New World Order, to hear the current administra-

tion complain about its foreign policy inheritance is surprising and often merely an excuse for poor performance. In my view, no administration has ever received a stronger foreign policy inheritance. The legacy of 12 years of Reagan-Bush foreign policy included millions liberated in Central and Eastern Europe, finally closing the book on the post-World War II era after four decades; 15 independent states to replace the Soviet empire, and no near-term threat from Russia; a defeated Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and a newly invigorated peace process in the Middle East; the dramatic expansion of democratic governments around the world—best illustrated in the Western Hemisphere (where only Cuba and Haiti were exceptions to the democratic tidal wave); free trade agreements negotiated with Canada and Mexico (the North American Free Trade Agreement), nearly negotiated with the world (the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and outlined for the Western Hemisphere (Enterprise for the Americas); and a growing Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum for U.S. relations with Asia and the Pacific Basin. All added up to an America more secure and stronger than at any time in our history, and the only global power on earth.

In the two years since the end of the Bush administration, much has changed. In the minds of many, U.S. foreign policy has been marked by inconsistency, incoherence, lack of purpose, and a reluctance to lead. American lives have been risked, and lost, in places with little or no connection to American interests. From Bosnia to China, from North Korea to Poland, our allies and our adversaries doubt our resolve and question our commitments.

FIRM PRINCIPLES

The failures of Assertive Multilateralism/Enlargement lie not just in its execution or communication—they lie in its very conception. The following 10 principles, which should guide American foreign policy, have been ignored or misapplied by the Clinton administration.

WHILE MUCH HAS CHANGED, MUCH REMAINS THE SAME

The successful end of the Cold War has not changed the core interests of America:

Preventing the domination of Europe by a single power.

Maintaining a balance of power in East Asia.

Promoting security and stability in our hemisphere.

Preserving access to natural resources, especially in the energy heartland of the Persian Gulf.

Strengthening international free trade and expanding U.S. access to global markets, and Protecting American citizens and property overseas.

These interests cannot be protected without American involvement in the world. Many states and many movements opposed to American interests are awaiting American withdrawal.

In addition to our interests, America has core ideals that we have supported throughout our history: freedom, democracy, the rule of law, observance of human rights, and deterring and responding to aggression. Too much has been made of the tensions between American interests and American ideals. Some went so far as to suggest that we should set aside our values during the Cold War to follow a policy of moral relativism. Nothing would have been more ill-conceived. The Cold War was won precisely because of the convergence of our interests and ideals. By preventing Soviet expansion into Europe, we stopped the domination of the continent by a hostile power and prevented the en-

slavement of millions more Europeans under communist rule.

Our interests and ideals converge in support for free-market economies and democratic pluralism as well. Capitalist democracies tend to make better trading partners and stronger allies, and also treat their own people and their neighbors better than authoritarian, closed societies. To retain the support of the American people and to protect the future of our children, American foreign policy must continue to combine the protection of American interests and the promotion of American ideals. That is our tradition.

AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IS ESSENTIAL

The United States, as the only global power, must lead. Europe—as individual states or as a collective—cannot. China, Russia, India, Brazil, and Japan are important regional powers, and some may be potential regional threats. But only the United States can lead on the full range of political, diplomatic, economic, and military issues confronting the world.

Leadership does not consist of posing questions for international debate; leadership consists of proposing and achieving solutions. The American attempt in May 1993 to discuss lifting the Bosnian arms embargo with NATO allies, for example, was simply wrong: It was a discussion, not a U.S. initiative, and was readily perceived by the Europeans as a half-hearted attempt lacking President Clinton's commitment. By comparison, if President Bush had followed a similar course after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam Hussein would still be in Kuwait today—if not in Saudi Arabia—and he would very possibly be armed with nuclear weapons.

Leadership is also saying what you mean, meaning what you say, and sticking to it. That includes a willingness to use American force when required. To state that North Korea "cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb" and then one year later to sign an agreement that ignores the issue of the existing arsenal is confusing to the American people and to our allies. To threaten to withdraw most-favored-nation trading status from China because of human rights violations and then to extend such status months later—despite no change in Chinese human rights practices—makes the world wonder why the linkage was made in the first place. To introduce a resolution in the U.N. Security Council to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, while top administration officials claim the war is over and the Serbs have won, severs any link between the words of U.S. policymakers and their deeds.

U.S. SOVEREIGNTY MUST BE DEFENDED, NOT DELEGATED

International organizations—whether the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or any others—will not protect American interests. Only America can do that. International organizations will, at best, practice policymaking at the lowest common denominator—finding a course that is the least objectionable to the most members. Too often, they reflect a consensus that opposes American interests or does not reflect American principles and ideals. Even gaining support for an American position can involve deals or tradeoffs that are not in America's long-term interests. Acquiescence in Russian activities in Georgia and other border states, for example, may be too high a price for Russian acceptance of U.S. positions.

The choices facing America are not, as some in the administration would like to portray, doing something multilaterally, doing it alone, or doing nothing. These are

false choices. The real choice is whether to allow international organizations to call the shots—as in Somalia or Bosnia—or to make multilateral groupings work for American interests—as in Operation Desert Storm. Subcontracting American foreign policy and subordinating American sovereignty encourage and strengthen isolationist forces at home—and embolden our adversaries abroad.

INTERNATIONAL BUREAUCRATS ARE NO
SUBSTITUTE FOR ALLIES

The United States should not look to the United Nations first, but to itself and its allies—preserving alliances inherited from the Cold War and leading to create new ones where necessary. Who could doubt that NATO has the power to address the tragic aggression against Bosnia? Instead, a misnamed “United Nations Protection Force” provides convenient “hostages” to the aggressors, thereby protecting them from NATO power. Substituting the judgment of international civil servants for NATO military professionals has severely damaged the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance.

Allies will not simply do our bidding in one area and ignore our policies in another. It was folly to pursue a policy of economic sanctions against North Korea while publicly criticizing China on human rights concerns and Japan on trade issues. And after proposing sanctions and gaining support from South Korea and Japan, allowing a freelance mission by a former president to reverse the policy suggests that America is not to be taken at its word. Alliances and allies require careful attention, not just episodic engagement.

DO NOT CONFUSE U.S. HOPES AND DESIRES WITH
U.S. INTERESTS

The core interests outlined above have been played down, and sometimes superseded, by the desires of Clinton administration policymakers. Pollution or overpopulation in West Africa or South Asia are problems, but their effect on American interests is peripheral, at best. Famine and disease in Somalia or Rwanda are tragic. America should help in humanitarian disasters, consistent with our resources, and in a manner that does not undermine our military readiness. But events in Rwanda or Somalia have a marginal—at most—impact on American interests.

The promotion of free markets and fostering of democratic institutions are in America's interest, but they are not absolute goals. When democratic institutions are manipulated by enemies of America—as in the case of radical Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria—our long-term interests must take precedence over the short-term ideal of enlarging democracy. Likewise, when deviations from free-market trading principles threaten a key strategic alliance in the Western Pacific, such a trade dispute must be handled more carefully than one with a trading partner that is not also a strategic ally.

ALLOCATE RESOURCES BASED ON INTERESTS

Just as hopes and desires about the world have clouded American attention, American resources have been misallocated. Sometimes dollars speak louder than words. For example, nearly \$2 billion will be spent on occupation and nation-building in Haiti, where American interests are marginal; yet only a small fraction of that amount has been spent supporting a free market and democratic transition in the strategically critical country of Ukraine. And defense dollars are spent on environmental projects and defense “conversion,” while military readiness, modernization, and personnel lack sufficient funding. Foreign aid and defense dollars should be instruments of national policy to enhance American security; they should not be squandered on nonessential programs.

USE ALL THE TOOLS OF STATECRAFT

Diplomacy without force is empty, and force without diplomacy is irresponsible. The fundamental relationship between diplomacy and force is not understood by the current administration. In Somalia and in Haiti (until saved by the Carter-Powell-Numm mission), we saw force without diplomacy. In Bosnia, we see a clear example of diplomacy without force: Hollow threats are followed by countless concessions to the aggressor.

This administration has displayed a basic discomfort with American military power—unless that power is exercised pursuant to United Nations authorization. In Haiti, the 1823 Monroe Doctrine has been replaced with the Halperin Doctrine—unilateral action only after multilateral approval. An unfortunate precedent has been set in seeking prior United Nations support for what an American president proclaimed was in America's interests—interests that should not be second-guessed, modified, or subject to the approval of international organizations.

Failure by the administration to appreciate military assistance as a tool of diplomacy has resulted in dramatic reductions in such programs. Despite presidential doctrines from Truman to Nixon to Reagan advocating help for victims of aggression who are willing to help themselves, and despite campaign promises to the contrary, President Clinton refuses to lift the illegal and immoral arms embargo on Bosnia. One need only contrast this refusal to the significant military and political impact of providing Stinger antiaircraft missiles to the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. Finally, covert and overt political action can also further U.S. interests, providing important options between diplomacy and sending to the Marines.

REBUILD AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

America does not need the same defense posture in 1995 that it had in 1985. But just because American defense spending is a bargain does not mean that defending America is free. U.S. defense spending has been cut too far, too fast. The current administration initially planned to cut \$60 billion in defense—but then added plans to slash \$127 billion over 5 years. Despite these deep cuts—and a recent conversion to supporting higher levels of defense spending—the Clinton administration's thirst to commit U.S. military forces abroad has not declined. As a result, for the first time since the “hollow Army” of the 1970s, three American divisions were not ready for combat in late 1994. Soldiers who expect and deserve 12 months in between overseas tours are given half that. My old unit from World War II, for example, the 10th Mountain Division, has spent three straight Christmases overseas: deployed to Somalia in December 1992 (only weeks after cleaning up from Hurricane Andrew), and deployed again in September 1994 to Haiti—just six short months after returning from their tragic encounter in Somalia.

Furthermore, we cannot keep asking our men and women in uniform to do more with less. It is nothing short of scandalous when American enlisted soldiers have to work second jobs or receive food stamps to meet the needs of their families. And we cannot keep undermining our military force posture for “humanitarian operations” that do nothing to enhance American security.

America must take both a short-term and a long-term view of its military readiness. Not only must we have the ability to fight and win today, we must constantly prepare to fight and win future wars. The Clinton cuts to the defense budget create the grave risk that we will not make the investment necessary to re-equip and reorient our forces toward tomorrow's challenges. During the Cold War, we concentrated on blocking a

Warsaw Pact invasion of Europe and deterring a nuclear attack on America, which meant that our doctrine, training, and equipment all were based on those threats.

In the future we will face new threats in places and under circumstances we cannot easily predict. To deal with them we will need unprecedented flexibility, agility, and mobility; no more gearing up for the central front in Europe with lavish prepositioning of equipment and a large permanent troop presence. In the future we will have to get to remote theaters of conflict quickly and with the most effective systems our technological prowess will enable us to field.

But the transition to a smaller, quicker, and more effective force will require a solid industrial base and will cost money; for a robust and well-targeted research and development program; for new weapons systems capable of breathtaking accuracy; for the capability to “stand off” and fire from safe distances, beyond the reach of enemy forces; and for training American troops to be the most powerful and best protected in history. If the money is not there, we will be forced to make do with what remains of our old Cold War force, even though it is the wrong force for the future.

Finally, we need to rely on our capabilities and not place our trust solely in multilateral regimes to ensure our security. For example, effective ballistic missile defenses would do more to enhance American and allied security by providing real protection against limited and accidental strikes than would nonproliferation policies, which rely on the goodwill and cooperation of others to halt the spread of nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction to rogue states.

AMERICANS LIVES SHOULD BE RISKED ONLY FOR
AMERICAN INTERESTS

Placing American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in harm's way is the gravest decision a president can make. After the disaster in Mogadishu on October 3-4, 1993, some observers concluded the American public will no longer tolerate casualties. In fact, the “Somalia syndrome” stems from the shock of seeing American bodies dragged through the dust when the American people thought that Operation Restore Hope was about feeding the hungry—not about nation-building or enforcing U.N. arrest warrants. American lives should not be risked—and lost—in places like Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda with marginal or no American interests at stake. Such actions make it more difficult to convince American mothers and fathers to send their sons and daughters to battle when vital interests are at stake. The American people will not tolerate American casualties for irresponsible internationalism. And like overreliance on the United Nations, such adventures ironically end up reinforcing isolationism and retreat.

BE CREATIVE: DO NOT CLING TO THE
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

In June 1991, I went to Andrews Air Force base to meet a Russian opposition politician arriving for an informal visit. The only “official” representative of the U.S. government there was a mid-level State Department official. The view of the foreign policy establishment and the Bush administration was that Mikhail Gorbachev was the “only game in town.” That Russian politician, Boris Yeltsin, later told me that he never forgot my willingness to see him.

Especially now that the certainties of the Cold War are gone, traditional views about foreign policy should be reexamined; some will remain valid while others may not. The conventional view of foreign aid, for example, is that it must be maintained in about

the same amounts in about the same programs to demonstrate that America is not retreating from the world. But it is hard to see how the billions of dollars of international aid spent in Rwanda or Somalia before their civil wars, for example, advanced any U.S. interest. Support for the peace process in the Middle East has paid great dividends, but much of the rest of the foreign aid program simply feathers the nests of old-boy contractors and further discredits "development" theories. Foreign aid should be transitional, to help an ally through a crisis or to help a developing country develop; it should not lead to a permanent state of dependency. Reform and reductions in the U.S. aid program are the overseas equivalent of welfare reform at home.

The world of 1995 and beyond is still a dangerous place. There are many new and emerging threats as we approach the millennium. A resurgent Russia filling a vacuum in Central Europe or looking for a foreign diversion from internal secessionist struggles; a revitalized Iraq threatening the oil fields of Saudi Arabia; a fundamentalist Iran seeking to dominate the Persian Gulf; a nuclear-armed North Korea threatening South Korea and Japan with ballistic missiles—all are scenarios that the United States could face in the near and medium terms. Islamic fundamentalism sweeping across North Africa could overwhelm the successes to date in achieving peace in the Middle East. A fourth conflict between India and Pakistan could escalate into the world's first nuclear war. Nuclear-armed terrorist states like Libya or Iran, emboldened by the North Korean example and armed with missiles from Pyongyang, could threaten allies in the Middle East or Europe. Economic competition between Japan and China could take a military turn. Radical "ethno-nationalists," religious militants, terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and international organized crime networks all pose threats to states in regions of the world where America has core interests. While the collapse of Somalia or Rwanda may not affect those interests, the disintegration of states like Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, or Pakistan would.

American leadership, however, can overcome the challenges of building a just and durable peace after the Cold War. The words of President Dwight Eisenhower's first inaugural address are as true today as they were in 1953:

To meet the challenge of our time, destiny has laid upon our country the responsibility of the free world's leadership. So it is proper that we assure our friends once again that, in the discharge of this responsibility, we Americans know and we observe the difference between world leadership and imperialism; between firmness and truculence; between a thoughtfully calculated goal and spasmodic reaction to the stimulus of emergencies.

As the United States approaches the next century, two principles should remain constant: protecting American interests and providing American leadership. The end of the Cold War has provided us with a historic opportunity. Such an opportunity should not be forfeited in favor of the pursuit of utopian multilateralism or abandoned through intentional isolationism. We have seen the danger to America's interests, prestige, and influence posed by both of these approaches. Instead, we must look to the lessons of the Cold War to guide our future foreign policy: Put American interests first and lead the way. The future will not wait for America, but it can be shaped by an America second to none.

THE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT

PROTECTION FROM BIG SPENDERS? THE PEOPLE LOST BY ONE VOTE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, there are two disappointing things to mention today. The first is my regular daily report on the latest available disclosure of the total Federal debt, this time as of the close of business yesterday, Wednesday, March 1, stood at \$4,848,389,816.26.

If this debt were to be paid off today, with every man, woman, and child in the country paying his or her proportionate share, each of us would have to fork over \$18,404.57. Of course, since millions of Americans pay no taxes at all, the average share of the Federal debt would be far greater than the per capita amount referred to above.

The other sad thing? It is, of course, the Senate's failure today to approve a constitutional amendment requiring Congress to balance the Federal budget. If just one more Senator had voted today in favor of the amendment, it would have been approved by 67 Senators, exactly enough to pass the amendment and send it to the 50 States for ratification.

Don't look for a balanced Federal budget anytime soon. But one day it will come. The American people will demand it.

REDUCE THE DEFICIT WITHOUT AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, over the course of the last 3 weeks, we have heard many arguments for and against the proposed balanced budget amendment to the Constitution. Those arguments were made in good faith, and I know they reflect a broad commitment by those on both sides of this question to bringing the deficit down to reasonable levels. But the balanced budget amendment is an empty promise, not a policy. It has little immediate political cost and very high poll ratings—hence its popularity. But enacting it would be a serious mistake. We should reject it in favor of a real, long-term deficit reduction program.

Since 1936, when Minnesota's own Harold Knutson revived the idea of a balanced budget constitutional amendment that has been originally rejected by the Constitution's Framers, Congress has debated various versions. The real question before us today, as it was 50 years ago, is whether we should weld onto the Founding document of our democracy, the U.S. Constitution, a budget gimmick that would do more harm than good to the economic well-being of our Nation, and our citizens.

As I have consistently argued, in my judgment we do not need to amend the U.S. Constitution to balance the Federal budget. Instead, we must continue to make tough choices on actual legislative proposals, as I have done, to cut wasteful and unnecessary post-cold-war defense spending, to continue to reduce low priority domestic spending, to completely restructure the way we fi-

nance and deliver health care in this country—in both the public and private sector—and to scale back special tax breaks for very wealthy interests in our society who have for a long time not been required to pay their fair share. That approach is the only responsible, fair way to bring our annual Federal deficits, and the much larger Federal debt, under control.

For the last 15 years or so, that is what the Congress has been unwilling to do, and that is the source of a lot of frustration in the country. Congress has been unable to muster and sustain a majority to make difficult budget choices. We have seen illustrated here in the Senate over and over again a central problem: The political gap between the promise to cut spending, and actual followthrough on that promise. I make this point because I want to underscore that many of those who have been beating their chests the hardest about a balanced budget amendment have often been among those who have consistently voted against these actual deficit reduction proposals. We cannot give over our budget-balancing responsibilities to a machine, a mechanism. That responsibility is ours.

Of course, I support balancing the Federal budget in a responsible, fair way. Despite all of the rhetoric today, we all at least agree on that basic goal. That's why some of us have voted consistently to reduce actual Federal spending when we've had the chance over the last few years on this floor. Not gimmicks, not smoke and mirrors, not deficit reduction formulas that never identify precise cuts, but actual reductions in Federal spending contained in actual amendments to appropriations bills. Votes on those proposed cuts have been important indicators of our willingness to make tough choices. This is where the budget rubber has met the road.

The President's \$500 billion deficit reduction package in the 103d Congress, which I supported and which was approved without a single Republican vote, was a major downpayment toward balancing the budget. But Democrats had to do it alone. When we cut, the Republicans ran. While we acted, they talked. Still, much more must be done.

But now, instead of real budget choices we are presented with a gimmick that I do not believe will work to balance the budget, and that if it does work as it's designed, could do serious harm to the U.S. economy. It will also serve to reduce pressure in the next few years to actually reduce the deficit further, allowing Members of Congress to declare a temporary victory without cutting significantly from the Federal deficit. And then the reckoning will come, when we are up against the wall at the end of this century and have to balance the budget in just a few short years with massive spending cuts in all Federal spending, including Social Security and Medicare.