

and the Senate, I might add. The House had the same language. It got the support of every Democratic Senator at one point in time.

So I do not think there is a dispute that these children who came in and got on SSI as a result of what were individual functional assessments, that those children should no longer be covered under SSI. In fact, there was never even an amendment offered to change that standard. So we can put that issue aside.

The other issue is a legitimate one, and that is that we have reduced payments to some children who are still considered disabled under SSI. Let me explain to you how that occurred.

In the Senate bill, all children who qualified for SSI received the full \$458 a month. That is an SSI benefit. That is an SSI benefit whether you are an adult or child. SSI was originally created to be a supplemental income program. That is what it is, supplemental security income. It was supposed to be a supplemental security income program for adults who are disabled and, obviously, not able to work. So we provided this money for them to be able to support themselves.

Children have been included in that but get the same amount of money as an adult who, with that money, must support themselves. Obviously, children do not have to support themselves. Many of the families of children who are on SSI are on AFDC and other government support programs. Some of them are working families, working poor, and qualify as poor and, therefore, their children are eligible for SSI. So that is not the sole source of income to support that child, yet they get the same amount of money as an adult who must use that as their sole means of support.

So what we said in looking at how we could compromise with the House—and what the House had done was take children who qualified for SSI and divided them into two categories: The first category being those who needed 24-hour care or care that if they did not get would have been institutionalized. They would continue to receive cash. Everyone else would get no cash. They would still be eligible for SSI, but they would get no cash. What they would get is they would be eligible for amounts of funds that were then going to be block granted to States, and the States could provide services to them to meet the needs of their disability.

Well, there are many Members on this side of the building who had problems with no cash for these less severely disabled children, and we did not like the idea of the block grant. A lot of disability advocates did not like the idea of a block grant. So what we did is—and Senator CHAFEE worked very hard on this, and I gave him credit for that last night when I talked—we fought very hard on this to keep the cash assistance for all disabled children. But we recognized—and this is the concession we gave to the House—

that there were varying degrees of disability, and a child with disabilities that did not require additional attention from the parents to be able to stay at home and live at home, obviously, did not need the kind of cash resources like the more severely disabled children. So we created a differentiation between those who need more constant home care from the parent, which would, in a sense, take the parent from the job market and require them to stay at home, and the children who were disabled but do not require that kind of constant attention, and that is therefore not as much of a drain on the parents to provide for them. So we created that very small difference, which is a 25-percent reduction in benefits. They still receive cash assistance, but they only receive 75 percent of the full SSI payment. We think that was a very reasonable compromise. I can understand how some Members would like to see the full 100 percent. But we think that was a reasonable compromise between what the House and the Senate had come up with.

The final point I wanted to make is in the area of child protection. There were comments made about how we are taking foster care and adoption and family protection services and slashing them under this bill. I will state for the RECORD, again, that under the House bill, this area was block granted completely. All of the services provided under that title were block granted and cut by \$2.3 billion over the next 7 years. In the Senate bill, we did not have any provision on this issue, except that we cut \$1.3 billion from this area to help finance the rest of the bill. We did not deal with any reforms in the area. We simply took some money out of one section of the child protection area; \$1.3 billion was the cut here.

In the conference report, we did not cut \$2.3 billion, we did not cut \$1.3 billion, we cut \$400 million. So the bill that Members voted for here—87 Members voted for it—actually cut the area of adoption and foster care and child protection more than the bill that they now objected to as cutting too much. So, again, I question whether all of that information really was sufficiently discussed and debated and gotten to Members on both sides of the aisle before their votes were cast.

The other point I wanted to make is that the entitlements to maintenance payments for adoption and foster care remained entitlements in the conference report. They were not in the House bill, but we negotiated and maintained the direct payments to children for adoption and foster care as an entitlement under this bill, which we think was very important, and was a step in the direction of those who had concerns about the block grant. The area we block granted, I say to Members, is that in the child protection area, 50 percent of all the money spent in that area is spent on administrative overhead expenses. Fifty percent does not get to the children. It is all very

overhead-intensive. What we have done is given the States the flexibility, through the block grant, to eliminate a lot of this overhead expense and get a lot more direct services to the children in need. We also allow for agencies like the police and the social service agency to communicate with each other, which is not allowed under current law.

We think we have taken dramatic steps forward in this area in which we have seen some miserable results in recent months, from the Chicago case to this horrible tragedy of this young girl, Alyssa, in New York, to other tragedies which we are all familiar with in our States. So we believe this is an area that is ripe for new developments and changes. We allow for that in this bill.

In conclusion, I want to say that I think the real differences between the Republicans and the Democrats on the welfare issue come down now to more tactical reasons for not supporting this bill than they do substantive reasons. Again, I am not questioning whether or not it is a legitimate reason to oppose the bill. In fact, I say it very may well be a legitimate reason to oppose this bill. All I am suggesting is that those who voted against this conference report examine it for the particulars that are in here, and look at it in terms of not saying that we have to scrap this and start all over again, when, in fact, I think we have substantial agreement here, and that if we can make some modifications in a couple of the areas that I suggested, and that, in fact, we can find a workable compromise that not only will many Members on the other side of the aisle and, hopefully, all our Members on this side, will be able to support enthusiastically, but one that the President could support and one that we can include in the Balanced Budget Act of, hopefully 1995—maybe 1996, the way things are going.

I thank the Senator from Georgia for his indulgence. I know he has been waiting.

I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.

#### THE WELFARE REFORM BILL

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his remarks. I had voted for the welfare reform bill when it first came through, not because I thought it was perfect, but I thought the system was so badly broken and that we must move in a different direction, even if we have to patch it up as we go.

However, the conference report had excesses and some provisions in it that I felt were simply going beyond the point that I could support. I appreciate the Senator's remarks today, both in explaining the conference report and also laying out some hostile areas, and the need for putting this back together if indeed it is vetoed.

I think it is important for the country that we get a welfare reform bill

signed into law, at least in the next session, and I appreciate very much his leadership in this area.

Mr. NUNN. I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## BOSNIA

### I. MISTAKES OF THE PAST

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, many mistakes have been made in Yugoslavia, the most tragic by the parties themselves. All of the mistakes made by the international community added together do not even register on the scale compared to what the parties have done to each other.

Nevertheless, we should learn from our mistakes. Such mistakes include premature international recognition of the separate states before any agreement on minority rights or before any basic test for state viability. Another mistake was the United States and European failure—primarily, at the first instance, European failure—to deal decisively with the first Serb aggression. Commitment of a lightly armed U.N. peacekeeping force in the middle of a civil war was another mistake. Dual-key arrangements required for military action with the United Nations in control was certainly a fundamental violation of any kind of a real effective command structure. And the United Nations constantly posed threats and deadlines with no followthrough, thereby steadily losing credibility. I could go on and on.

This is not, however, meant to denigrate in any way the efforts, often heroic, of the U.N. forces and the numerous international organizations that provided humanitarian assistance to the Bosnian people. Tens of thousands of lives were saved.

There are many lessons for Europe, the United Nations, for NATO, and for our own country in this tragedy that has caused so much hardship and cost so many lost lives.

Mr. President, the job now is to learn from the past and also face the reality of the future. United States and NATO forces face many obstacles and risks in Bosnia, but there is also a bright side based on events that have already occurred and also an opportunity for the future.

### II. POSITIVE SIDE

Let me start today with the positive side. On the positive side, the NATO allies finally seem to mean business. Just a few examples: French President Chirac led an effort to provide greater combat capability to the U.N. protection force, and he exercised leadership in firming up the allies' commitment. NATO, urged by the Clinton administration, sent a clear and unmistakable signal of its determination with its bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb command, control and communication facilities when they continued to flaunt their own obligations.

President Clinton seized the opportunity presented by the bombing campaign and the Federation ground campaign to launch an intensive diplomatic effort under the effective leadership of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke that resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement between the parties. The Croatian and the Federation ground campaign, together with the peace agreement, greatly improved the clarity of lines separating the parties making a peace enforcement mission more feasible and less dangerous.

Finally, strong leadership by President Clinton and the United States in this area is producing tangible and positive results in NATO. Just a few of those results in NATO, some of which are truly remarkable.

First of all, Germany is providing troops for this first time "out of area" NATO operation. Second, French troops will be operating under NATO command and control. France has announced its return to regular participation in the NATO military committee. This is a reversal, Mr. President, of 30 years of French policy. Russia has agreed to place its forces under the operational control of an American general. Russia will consult with NATO on a 16-nation to one-nation basis, but will not have a veto over NATO decisions.

These events have the potential to lead to future developments with Russia that could have a decidedly positive impact on European security in the years ahead. There are also, of course, potential downsides to this arrangement. There will be no substitute for constant high-level vigilance to this Russian military participation, both in Washington and in Moscow, as well as in the field. This one bears very careful and close nurturing and attention.

All NATO nations except Iceland, as well as many other nations, have committed forces to Bosnia. The United States forces will be primarily in the Tuzla area where the roads and terrain are difficult but not as severe as some other areas of Bosnia. The Nordic brigade comprised of Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and recently joined by Poland, that will be colocated with American forces, have operated in the area for some time. They have heavy equipment. They have not tolerated interference. They have been friendly with the people of the area, and they have been firm. They are helping our advance team immensely with their advice and their knowledge of the area and of the people.

The Turkish brigade will be near American troops, which should help to temper the more extreme elements of the Moslem communities. Turkey is a key NATO ally with strong influence in the moderate Muslim world.

All of our commanders who have testified before our committee or who have spoken to me privately believe that the rules of engagement are clear, they are robust, and they are appropriate. They authorize the use of force,

including deadly force, in response to both hostile acts as well as, in the judgment of the commander, hostile intent. These are the same rules of engagement as were utilized in Haiti. Most importantly, the mission and the military task are doable, according to all of our military witnesses.

### III. MILITARY MISSION

#### A. MISSION DEFINITION

The military mission is a subject of considerable importance in how it is defined. General Shalikashvili has defined our military mission as follows: "In an evenhanded manner, monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement."

General Shalikashvili has further listed the military tasks of the Dayton agreement as follows: Supervise selective marking of cease-fire line, inter-entity boundary line and zones of separation.

Monitor and, if necessary enforce, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within agreed periods as follows:

Ensure withdrawal of forces behind zones of separation within 30 days of transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to the Implementation Force;

Ensure redeployment of forces from areas to be transferred from one entity to the other within 45 days of transfer of authority;

Ensure no introduction of forces into transferred areas for an additional 45 days;

Establish and man a 4-kilometer zone of separation—2 kilometers on either side of cease fire/inter-entity boundary line;

Establish liaison with local military and civilian authorities; and

Create a Joint Military Commission and subordinate military commissions to resolve disputes between the Parties.

In order to accomplish these military tasks, the Military Annex to the General Framework Agreement provides that "the IFOR Commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the IFOR and to carry out the responsibilities" under the agreement. The peace agreement, thus, gives the NATO Implementation Force well defined responsibilities—basically to separate the parties and create a stable environment—and grants it broad authorities to carry out its mission and to protect itself. In many ways, NATO's clearly defined responsibility with very broad authority and robust capability is the opposite of what the U.N. forces evolved into: broad and ill-defined responsibility with narrow authority and limited capability. The worst kind of combination. General Shalikashvili has testified that the military mission and the military tasks are appropriate and executable.