

waited, it may be too late. Equally important, the law compels the sanctioned country to come forward to demonstrate that no violation actually took place.

This law, in short, broadens the President's authority to enforce non-proliferation policy. The conference report to H.R. 1655 goes in the opposite direction—it broadens the President's authority to weaken non-proliferation policy.

Mr. President, I recognize that the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and their related delivery systems takes place out of sight. I also very much respect that fact that intelligence sources and methods designed to monitor a nation's weapons activities are almost always, if not entirely, at risk of discovery. The consequences of such discovery certainly are life-threatening to say the least. Virtually all prosecutions and sanctions are developed from intelligence sources and methods. Therefore, I am very concerned that the conference report would provide the President with a very tempting waiver option—an option that would give the President the opportunity to make a political decision to forego prosecution or to avoid imposition of sanctions, but base it on "sources and methods." In other words, the President would have the opportunity to place political expediency or other factors above our nation's non-proliferation laws. I believe that kind of discretion is a serious mistake.

I raised these concerns to the distinguished Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator SPECTER. I know a number of my colleagues in the House and the Senate expressed similar views. Both the final bill language and the joint explanatory statement of the conference committee attempt to address these concerns. First, the conferees required that Title IX would be in effect for just one year. This limitation was placed to afford the Congress the opportunity to monitor closely the use of this new authority. Second, the conferees make clear that this authority is to be used for its stated purpose—to preserve sources and methods, as well as ongoing criminal investigations when seriously at risk—and "not as a pretext for some other reason not to impose sanctions such as economic or foreign policy reasons."

I appreciate the effort made by the conferees to restrict the President's ability to exercise this waiver authority to the purposes stated in the legislation. I also appreciate the conferees' insistence that this provision only be in effect for one year. Despite these efforts, I still believe we are setting a dangerous precedent and opening a Pandora's box that could be difficult to close.

Consider two facts: first, intelligence sources and methods are virtually the only means that allow a President to proceed with sanctions; and second, only the President is in the best position to determine whether or not a

source or method is at risk if sanctions are imposed.

These facts lead this senator to conclude that the new Title IX is based on a flawed premise—that Congress has the ability to ensure that the President will not abuse this new discretionary authority to waive sanctions. I say it is flawed because only the President is in a position to determine whether or not a source or method is at risk. This risk determination is subjective—a judgment call. And, again, given that the basis for sanctions comes from sources and methods, the President is given the latitude to consider numerous economic, political or foreign policy implications, but on paper base his conclusion on sources and methods. What methods and resources do we in Congress have to second guess the President should he make a "sources and methods" risk determination? Would the Congress even want to second guess the President, given the fact that doing so could be even more dangerous to that intelligence source or method?

The fact is our sources and methods are almost always at risk, to say the least, but until today, our priority always has been the enforcement of our non-proliferation laws.

I am hopeful that in the next year, Congress will closely monitor the President's use of this waiver authority. I urge my colleagues not just to consider the President's ability to comply with the conditions set by the conferees, but also our own ability to ensure that these conditions are in fact followed by the President.

As the world's sole superpower, all nations concerned with the threat of nuclear proliferation look to the United States to lead by example. Vigorous U.S. enforcement of nuclear non-proliferation laws and agreements is crucial to the security of all people. I am very concerned that the conference report sets a bad precedent that could undermine vigorous enforcement in the year ahead, and even beyond if Congress allows the law to continue. I intend to follow this matter very closely in the year ahead. It is my hope that tough, consistent enforcement of our non-proliferation laws will not be sacrificed.

Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the conference report be deemed agreed to; that the motion to reconsider be laid on the table; and that a statement on behalf of Senator SPECTER be placed at the appropriate place in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

So the conference was deemed agreed to.

COMMENDING THE CIA'S STATUTORY INSPECTOR GENERAL

Mr. SANTORUM. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Senate Resolution 201 submitted earlier today by Senator SPECTER and Senator

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 201) commending the CIA's statutory Inspector General on his 5-year anniversary in office.

The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I join my former colleagues on the Senate Intelligence Committee in co-sponsoring a resolution commending the fine work of the CIA's Inspector General, Fred Hitz, and congratulating Fred on his 5-year anniversary as the first Senate-confirmed Inspector General at the CIA. I had the honor of working with Fred's father many years ago, and I would like to say that Fred is admirably carrying on his family's very fine tradition of public service.

During the majority of my tenure on the Intelligence Committee and, in particular, during my service as Vice Chairman of the Committee from 1993 until January of this year, I enjoyed the benefit of Fred Hitz's wise counsel. Fred's integrity, objectivity, and fine investigative skills have served the CIA well as the Agency has confronted a number of serious problems in recent years.

Of special note, the Inspector General's comprehensive investigation of the Aldrich Ames spy case provided the Intelligence Committee, and indeed, the Nation, with the details of Ames 9-years of treachery, and insight into the problems at the CIA which allowed Ames' activities to go undetected for so long. The Committee relied heavily on the fine work performed by Fred Hitz's office in making its recommendations for how to correct the problems which the Ames case brought to light. Hopefully, the combined efforts of the CIA's IG and the Senate Intelligence Committee will serve to severely lessen the likelihood that this nation will be faced with another Ames case in the future.

Under Fred Hitz's leadership, the CIA's Inspector General's office has become an effective, objective and independent institution upon which the Members of Congress have come to rely.

I congratulate Fred on reaching this milestone in his illustrious career, and I look forward to many more years of working together on intelligence issues which are so vital to the national security of the United States.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I rise to introduce a resolution on behalf of myself, Senator KERREY of Nebraska, Senator GLENN, Senator BRYAN, Senator ROBB, Senator JOHNSTON, Senator CHAFEE, Senator BAUCUS, Senator WARNER, Senator KERRY of Massachusetts, Senator SHELBY, Senator GRAHAM of Florida, Senator KYL, Senator LUGAR, Senator INHOFE, Senator BYRD, and Senator DEWINE commending the Central Intelligence Agency's statutory Inspector General on his 5-year anniversary in office.

Mr. President, the CIA's statutory inspector general is an issue that is near and dear to me, particularly since it was at my initiative that this office was established. I, along with a good number of my Senate colleagues who served both on the Iran-Contra Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, had voiced concern with the need for objectivity, authority, and independence on the part of the CIA's Office of Inspector General. And, working in close collaboration with my colleague Senator GLENN, we crafted a provision that in 1989 was included in the Intelligence Authorization Act of fiscal year 1990—subsequently enacted into law—to establish an independent, Presidentially appointed statutory inspector general at the CIA. In November, 1990, the Honorable Frederick P. Hitz was formally sworn in as the CIA's first statutory inspector general.

As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am pleased to report to my colleagues that in the 5 years since Fred Hitz was sworn in as the CIA IG, the committee has noted a vast improvement in the effectiveness and objectivity of that office. This has been due in no small measure to the capable leadership of Fred Hitz. While the committee has not always agreed with the judgments of the CIA inspector general's office, the CIA IG has been fearless in taking on difficult and controversial issues such as BCCI, BNL, the Aldrich Ames case, and CIA activities in Guatemala—just to name a few. And the work of Fred Hitz's shop has been an invaluable supplement to our committee's intelligence oversight role.

Mr. President, there was fierce resistance to the creation of a statutory inspector general at the Central Intelligence Agency, and there continues to be strong resentment of an independent IG in certain quarters of the CIA to this day.

This should come as no surprise. It is hard to think of another Federal agency in the U.S. Government more institutionally resistant to having an independent inspector general than the CIA. Accordingly, I believe that any CIA IG worth his or her salt would be about as popular as Fred Hitz currently is with some of his present and former CIA colleagues. It is a mark of his tenacity and integrity that Fred and his office continue to tackle the IG's mission of serving as an independent fact-finder and, when necessary, a critic of CIA programs and operations.

Mr. President, the statutory CIA inspector general has made the Central Intelligence Agency more accountable to the American people. I and my Senate colleagues wish to acknowledge and commend the fine work of this office, and congratulate Fred Hitz on his 5-year anniversary as the first statutory CIA inspector general.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to join my distinguished chairman, Senator SPECTER, in introducing this reso-

lution to acknowledge the important role of the Central Intelligence Agency's statutory inspector general's office and noting the excellent work of Fred Hitz—the first CIA statutory IG who has recently celebrated his 5-year anniversary in this challenging position.

There was, to say the least, some skepticism about the wisdom of creating the statutory IG office at the CIA. Indeed, no one should be surprised that there was little support in the Agency for the creation of a statutory inspector general office. But fortunately, Senator SPECTER and Senator GLENN and others convinced the Senate to support this idea, and the office was created. Yet even after enactment, there was still resistance to an independent fact-finder within the Agency, and some of it persists even today.

The CIA has a proud but insular culture which tends to resist the scrutiny of an independent examiner. Also, because CIA operates in secret and undertakes—at the request and direction of policymakers—activities which the United States must deny, the additional oversight of an independent IG is essential. To perform this oversight effectively and honestly means to occasionally render strong criticism. Those who are criticized are sometimes offended. Their response to criticism ranges from the stoic silence we associate with CIA, to both attributable and anonymous counter-criticism of Mr. Hitz.

Mr. President, criticism of the IG by past and present CIA employees suggests to me that Mr. Hitz has been doing his job in the spirit Congress intended. I do not claim, nor would Mr. Hitz claim, that he has done his job perfectly. Few of us attain such a level of performance. I and some other members of the Intelligence Committee have not always agreed with his conclusions in particular investigations. But I would claim the CIA is a stronger, more effective organization today because he has been a strong, independent IG, as Congress envisioned.

Congress' own oversight of intelligence activities would be much more difficult without the insights provided by an independent IG. At the same time, an independent IG must not contribute to a climate in which CIA is afraid to take risks when vital U.S. interests are at stake. An independent IG must not create an internal empire of inspectors which has the same chilling effect on creative action in Government that excessive regulation has on business. Like the congressional oversight committees, a good IG must ensure that the Agency acts in accordance with U.S. law and U.S. values without inhibiting the Agency's ability to act boldly.

From what I see from the vantage point of the Intelligence Committee, Fred Hitz has been that kind of IG. I congratulate him on his completion of 5 years of service and I congratulate my colleagues who 5 years ago envi-

sioned what we now agree is a very necessary job.

Mr. SANTORUM. I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table and any statements be placed in the appropriate place in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 201) was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to.

The resolution, with its preamble, reads as follows:

S. RES. 201

Whereas, because of its concern with the need for objectivity, authority and independence on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Inspector General, the Senate in 1989 included in the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1990—subsequently enacted into law—a provision establishing an independent, Presidentially-appointed statutory Inspector General at the CIA;

Whereas in November, 1990, The Honorable Frederick P. Hitz was formally sworn in as the CIA's first statutory Inspector General;

Whereas the CIA's statutory Office of Inspector General, under the capable leadership of Frederick P. Hitz, has demonstrated its independence, tenacity, effectiveness and integrity; and

Whereas the work of the CIA Office of Inspector General under Mr. Hitz's leadership has contributed notably to the greater efficiency, effectiveness, integrity and accountability of the Central Intelligence Agency: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate expresses its congratulations to Frederick P. Hitz on his 5-year anniversary as the first statutory CIA Inspector General and expresses its support for the Office of the CIA Inspector General.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this resolution to Frederick P. Hitz.

MEASURES INDEFINITELY POSTPONED—S. 1315 AND S. 1388

Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Calendar No. 287, S. 1315, and Calendar No. 288, S. 1388, be indefinitely postponed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FARM CREDIT SYSTEM REFORM ACT OF 1996

Mr. SANTORUM. I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Agriculture be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 2029 and that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (H.R. 2029) to amend the Farm Credit Act of 1971 to provide regulatory relief.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

AMENDMENT NO. 3109

(Purpose: To provide a complete substitute.)

Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I send a substitute amendment to the