

I will vote against the bill. But if I wanted to defeat this conference report, if I felt that was the appropriate route—and I do not—I would certainly be engaged in extensive debate, thereby requiring 60 votes to pass it rather than 50. I do not intend to do that. If there is any kind of effort for extensive debate, it will not only be without my cooperation but it would be against my own advice and something being done by individual Senators.

So, I hope that whoever is spreading that message or making that report or seeing that article also will take into account the remarks I have made here on the floor, which happen to be factual and true.

WAR POWERS ACT

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to discuss the overall concept of war powers and the congressional role in making decisions to deploy United States forces abroad. There was not sufficient time in the debate on Bosnia during which I alluded to my frustration in this regard, but did not go into detail. Today I hope to lay out my views in a more complete fashion.

Mr. President, during Wednesday's debate on the Bosnia resolutions, I noted that when President Clinton publicly committed the United States to participate in implementing a peace agreement by putting U.S. forces on the ground in Bosnia, he did so without consulting with Congress prior to making that commitment, as far as I know. I was not consulted, and I do not know of others who were. I certainly do not know of any kind of formal consultation or any kind of leadership meeting before that commitment to deploy U.S. ground forces was made to the world and to our allies.

It was a very important commitment. At that time, we were not on the verge of a peace agreement, so it was not taken as being important by the news media or by those people in Congress in leadership positions; but it was important. And I think all of us need to understand that when Presidents make these kinds of commitments internationally, and when they do so without consulting Congress, then the cards are already dealt.

Those of us in the Congress who have certain constitutional responsibilities, if we do not do a better job ourselves, then this kind of pattern—it has not only been President Clinton, but it has been the same with other recent Presidents—will continue.

President Reagan made commitments and certainly took action in Panama and Grenada and Congress played almost no role.

President Bush, though he did, to his great credit, come to Congress before actually going to war, deployed hundreds of thousands of troops to Saudi Arabia without any congressional action. Congress did not take any action. I do not blame President Bush for that. Congress did not act. And President

Bush then virtually doubled the number of forces in Saudi Arabia, which prevented a troop rotation, which meant that the clock was ticking. There was no way to rotate those forces. Therefore, they either had to be used in some kind of conflict or it had to be resolved. So, the clock was ticking there. Then President Bush also made it clear that whatever Congress did, even though he sought congressional approval, he was going to go forward.

So, all of this leads me to think that it is time, way past time, probably 10 or 15 years past time, for Congress to rethink its own role. I think this is fundamentally a congressional responsibility. I do not think it is going to be solved by a President, whether it is a Republican President or Democratic President. It is not their job. I would hope that any President would cooperate if Congress takes its own initiative to exercise its own responsibility and authority. But, at this stage, I do not expect the President to solve our own problem.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, would the distinguished Senator from Georgia yield for just a moment?

Mr. NUNN. I would be pleased to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GORTON). The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. I wish to corroborate the fact that in February 1993, when President Clinton made this specific commitment, I did not have any knowledge nor did other members, senior members, of the Armed Services Committee, to my knowledge.

Likewise, I remember the commitment of that large number of troops by President Bush. I recall the Senator from Georgia was quite concerned when he learned about it through other sources than through the consultation process which, in some effect, was taking place during that period in the fall. But I remember the Senator specifically raised a point that at no time in that consultation process—and I was the ranking member then—was there any to the then-chairman of the committee, the Senator from Georgia. And the Senator called the President to task for failing to do that.

Last, Mr. President, I urge the Senator to look at a very erudite article on this subject written by Lloyd Cutler appearing in the Washington Post, I think about 2 weeks ago. I will put it in the RECORD, the exact date of that article. It lays out with detail the legal chronology of the War Powers Act.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1995]
OUR PIECE OF THE PEACE—SENDING TROOPS
TO BOSNIA: OUR DUTY, CLINTON'S CALL
(By Lloyd N. Cutler)

After months of sustained effort, the Clinton administration has succeeded in negotiating a peace agreement among the three

warring ethnic factions in Bosnia. The agreements initiated in Dayton would require us and our NATO allies to place peacekeeping units of our armed forces in Bosnia for a year or more. This raises once again the biggest unresolved issue under the U.S. system of separate executive and legislative departments: Is the constitutional authority to place our armed forces in harm's way vested in the president or in Congress, or does it require the joint approval of both?

President Clinton has said he would follow the precedent set by George Bush before the 1991 Desert Storm invasion and seek a congressional expression of support before committing American units to the enforcement of the Bosnian peace agreement. But he has also asserted the constitutional power to act on his own authority, just as Bush did. This time, it is Republican congressional leaders who are challenging a Democratic president's view that the president can lawfully act on his own, but, more typically it has been Democratic Congresses challenging presidents of either party.

During the coming debate, Congress would be wise to bear in mind, as it did five years ago, that the world will be watching how the one and only democratic superpower reaches its decisions, or whether it is so divided that it is incapable of deciding at all. Congress needs to recognize that we cannot have 535 commanders-in-chief in addition to the president and that some deference to presidential judgments on force deployments is in order. That is especially true when, as in Korea, Iraq and Bosnia, the president's proposed deployments are based on United Nations Security Council resolutions that we have sponsored and on joint decisions with our allies pursuant to treaties Congress has previously approved.

In the case of Bosnia, the argument for committing U.S. forces to carry out a peace agreement is a strong one. All of us are revolted by the ethnic cleansing and other human rights abuses that the various factions have committed. These abuses are likely to continue if the peace agreement is not formally signed in mid-December as now scheduled, or if it is signed but not carried out. If the war goes on or soon resumes, it may well spread to other parts of the former Yugoslavia and to the rest of the Balkans, still the most unstable region of Western and Central Europe. Any widening of the Balkan wars could well spread to Eastern Europe and the Middle East and pose a substantial potential threat to U.S. national security.

Some foreign forces are needed to separate the contending armies and to control the standing down of heavy weapons. Under our leadership, and only under our leadership, NATO is ready to supply the necessary forces. The stronger the forces, the better the chance that they will not be attacked and that they will accomplish their mission. All these reasons argue for a significant U.S. military commitment, now that a promising peace agreement has been reached.

In 1991, the Democratic Congress narrowly approved President Bush's decision to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, thus mooted the issue of whether the president could have acted alone. Today, the Republican congressional leadership, while sounding somewhat more conciliatory than in recent weeks, is challenging President Clinton to make his case for the proposed deployment. This war powers question has come up repeatedly since the 1950 outbreak of the Korean War, when President Truman committed our forces without first seeking congressional approval, but has never been resolved.

In foreign and national security policy, as in domestic policy, neither Congress nor the president can accomplish very much for very long without the cooperation of the other.

This is so for both constitutional and practical reasons. The Constitution gives Congress the power to "declare war," but both Congress and the president share the power to raise armies and navies and to raise and appropriate funds for their maintenance and deployment. Only Congress can enact such measures, but it needs the president's approval or a two-thirds majority of both houses to override his veto. Only the president can negotiate treaties, but he needs a two-thirds vote of the Senate to ratify them. The president's separate powers are limited to receiving ambassadors, serving as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and faithfully executing the laws. If as commander-in-chief he orders our armed forces into a combat situation, he still needs congressional approval to finance such a commitment over an extended period of time.

Before the United States became a superpower, disputes over the authority to commit our forces rarely arose. We had few occasions to deploy our military units abroad, much less commit them to conflict. Armies, navies and news of battle traveled very slowly. Air forces and long-range missiles did not exist. There was plenty of time after learning of a threatening event for the president to deliberate with Congress about the proper response. Occasionally, presidents committed us unilaterally, as in our attacks on the Barbary pirates in Tripoli in Jefferson's time, but it was rare for Congress to claim that its own prerogatives were being usurped by the president.

Since World War II, all this has changed. As commander-in-chief of the democratic superpower, presidents now deploy our armed forces all over the world. We can attack, or be attacked, within moments. On numerous occasions, presidents have committed our forces to armed conflict, sometimes of a sustained nature as in Korea and Vietnam, without asking Congress to declare war. In Vietnam, as it had in Korea, Congress initially supported the president's initiatives by appropriations and other measures. But as the duration and scope of our military actions in Indochina escalated, an increasingly restive Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon's veto. The resolution laid down a series of rules that require a president "in every possible instance" to "consult with Congress" before he commits our armed forces to combat or to places in which hostilities are "imminent." It also requires the withdrawal of those forces if Congress fails to adopt an approving resolution within 60 days.

President Nixon and all subsequent presidents have challenged the constitutionality of these prescriptions, but the Supreme Court has never accepted a case that would resolve this dispute and is unlikely to do so in the near future. When presidents "consult" with Congress before committing forces, they are careful to avoid saying they do so "pursuant to" the War Powers Resolution; they say they do so "consistent with" the resolution.

There are obviously situations where modern technology makes advance consultation with Congress impractical—most notably the case where our sensor equipment indicates that a missile attack has been launched on the United States or our NATO allies, or where speed and secrecy are key factors, as in the rescue of American hostages or reprisals against a terrorist act abroad.

But presidents have continued to commit our forces to armed conflict or situations where conflict was clearly "imminent," whether or not split-second timing was imperative. President Ford, for example responded forcefully to an attack on a U.S. vessel (the *Mayaguez*) off the Cambodia coast; President Carter launched a military

mission to rescue our hostages in Iran; President Reagan put our forces into Lebanon, the Sinai, Chad and Grenada and ordered bombing attacks on Libya; President Bush sent troops into Panama, Liberia, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.

As for President Clinton, he has already ordered our forces into Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Macedonia and has authorized our air units to enforce the U.N. no-fly zone over Bosnia itself.

Moreover, in the 22 years since the War Powers Resolution became law, Congress has never undermined these presidential uses of force by action (or inaction) in a way that would have blocked the mission or required withdrawal within 60 days.

All this does not mean that Congress must cede the power to make national security decisions to the president. Congress successfully forced Johnson and Nixon to limit and finally to terminate the undeclared Vietnam War. Congress successfully stopped Reagan's covert sales of weapons to Iran and his covert and overt military aid to the contras. As these examples show, presidents cannot effectively exercise their separate constitutional powers over national security and foreign policy over an extended period without the cooperation of Congress. That is why Clinton, like Bush in 1990, has invited Congress to express its views before our forces are committed to support the peace agreement in Bosnia.

A week ago Friday, while the Dayton negotiations were still going on, House Republicans passed a bill that would bar the expenditure of any funds to sustain U.S. forces in Bosnia. Fortunately, the Senate is unlikely to follow, and even if it did, a presidential veto would be difficult to override. But the House Republicans who launched this preemptive strike would do better to emulate former Republican congressman Dick Cheney.

In 1990, when we had a Republican president and Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, Cheney was the secretary of defense. As he said before we entered the Gulf War, "When the stakes have to do with the leadership of the Free World, we cannot afford to be paralyzed by an intramural stalemate." The decision to act, he noted, "finally belongs to the president. He is the one who bears the responsibility for sending young men and women to risk death. If the operation fails, it will be his fault. I have never heard one of my former [congressional] colleagues stand up after a failed operation to say, 'I share the blame for that one; I advised him to go forward.'"

This does not mean that Congress must approve the president's proposed commitments without change. For example, following the Lebanon precedent, Congress could require its further approval if the forces were not withdrawn within, say, 18 months, a period that expires after the next elections. The president and Congress have the shared responsibility of finding a solution that shows we can function as a decisive superpower and as a responsible democracy at the same time. The public expects no less.

It may be too late to help in the Bosnia debate, but there is one change in our process for making national security decisions that ought to be adopted. The National Security Council (NSC), the statutory body created to advise the president on national security affairs, consists entirely of officials in the executive branch. When the NSC takes up issues related to the potential commitment of our forces, the president could invite the attendance of the speaker, the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate and the chairman and ranking members of the national security and foreign policy committees of each house. Since the NSC

role is purely advisory, no separation-of-powers issues would arise. In this way Congress, in its own favorite phrase, would be effectively consulted before the takeoff, rather than at the time of the landing. The cooperation on national security issues that the nation wants and expects might still elude us, but the president would have done his part to carry out George Shultz's admonition that trust between the branches must be Washington's "coin of the realm."

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I think that is a very good article to place in the *RECORD*. I thank the Senator from Virginia, my friend from Virginia, for his recollection, which is entirely consistent with my own.

Mr. President, during the cold war—in a long period of nuclear confrontation—all of us and most Americans instinctively understood that the Commander in Chief had to make a quick and decisive decision with potentially fatal consequences if certain events took place.

In effect, every President of the United States from 1945 on has had the acknowledged authority and responsibility to respond to aggression by using nuclear weapons, which could result in the destruction of a large portion of mankind, including most of the United States.

With this awesome authority being accepted for so long, recognizing that, if the former Soviet Union attacked the United States, and certainly if they used nuclear weapons, there would not be time for 30 days of congressional debate or probably even 3 days. With that kind of reality having taken place for so long and that kind of assumed authority being vested in the Commander in Chief, how then, in 1995, in a totally different set of circumstances, does Congress exercise its constitutional responsibility to "declare war?" And even more relevant in my view, how do we exercise our responsibility in funding these operations?

That is the ultimate power of Congress. Senator BYRD reminds us of that frequently. The ultimate power of Congress is we pay the bills on behalf of the American people. We appropriate the money.

Mr. President, in Grenada, in Panama, Congress played almost no role in those military operations. In Lebanon, we heard President Reagan declare that our military commitment in Lebanon was vital—he used the word "vital" several times—to our national security interests. Congress approved the deployment of U.S. military forces with a time certain to perform an ill-defined and uncertain mission which I opposed.

It was almost the ultimate backward way of doing things. We put a time certain on completion of the mission but did not define the mission. So we ended up with a time certain to perform something that no one knew really what it was. That was, I think, a backward way of doing things.

To the credit of the Dole-McCain amendment—and I participated in helping draft the final version of that

amendment—I do think that the current approach is a much better approach than we have had in the past in the sense that, at least, we make it clear what the mission is and there is an effort to define an exit strategy.

We did neither of those things in the Lebanon situation. I voted against it. But, nevertheless, in Lebanon we witnessed the tragic death of hundreds of our marines, uncertain as to why they were there or what they were supposed to do. We saw President Reagan pull the troops out of this "vital" area overnight. Since then, we paid very little heed to events in this so-called vital country.

In the Persian Gulf, Congress, without speaking formally, acquiesced in the commitment of several hundred thousand ground troops to protect Saudi Arabia. We watched without taking any action as President Bush deployed such a large force in November of that year, that its rotation was infeasible, and made international commitments at the same time, or very shortly thereafter, to go to war against Iraq on a date certain. Those international commitments to go to war on a date certain were without congressional approval.

By a close vote on the eve of the war, Congress gave President Bush the authority to do what he had committed to do with or without congressional approval.

Mr. President, I do not blame the Presidents for acting and exercising leadership. They can make mistakes like anyone else. That is why we have three branches of Government. That is why the Founding Fathers very carefully separated the right to declare war from the Commander in Chief and placed it in the legislative branch of Government. That is also why all funds have to come from the Congress.

So, the President, whether President Bush or President Reagan or President Clinton, is, when making these decisions, exercising Executive leadership. And they are doing it too many times with a vacuum, a void, coming from the Congress in terms of a response.

So, it is our job to say what the congressional role is. We put up the money, and it is our job to say what we demand in terms of a role. And, so far, I do not think we have done it.

I believe this is the time for the Congress to acknowledge formally what is plain for all to see, and that is the War Powers Resolution does not work. Furthermore, it is not going to work. The longer this outmoded and unworkable legislation remains on the books in its present form, the longer we will continue the illusion—and it is an illusion—that Congress has a meaningful role in the commitment of U.S. military forces to these types of missions.

Certainly, we can come along and we can take an action after the mission is already well underway to cut off funds. That is always a very difficult, very painful way to do business. We have done that only on one or two occasions.

We did it in Somalia, in effect, and we do not think we should have to rely on that as the way we do business. We may have to do it again, but it is certainly not the desired way for this Government to function, certainly not in international affairs.

No President will allow U.S. forces to be withdrawn from a military mission because of congressional inaction, as set forth in the War Powers Resolution, nor, in my opinion, should they. The War Powers Resolution provides that if the President commits forces in a hostile area, then Congress, by its inaction, can require those forces be brought home by doing nothing.

That has never worked. I voted for the War Powers Resolution. I wish now I had not because it will never work. It is not sensible. It defies reason. Congress sitting on its hands requiring a President who has committed our military forces to a foreign area where they are in harm's way—maybe even in a war or conflict—and we do not do anything. And the War Powers Act presumes the President will then bring them home. That has never worked. It never will work. The longer we continue to keep this legislation on the books, the more impotent the Congress of the United States will be in exercising its real authority under the Constitution.

Mr. President, we should either amend the War Powers Act to make it workable or we should repeal it and replace it with legislation that is realistic and workable. That is long overdue.

In the post-cold-war world in which the United States is called on to intervene in ethnic, religious and other conflicts in areas that may be important but less than vital, we must find a way to create regular, frequent and comprehensive consultation between the President and the Congress before the President makes concrete commitments and before U.S. troops are committed to harm's way.

Such consultation can, in theory and in reality, take many forms. My preference is the formation of a Congressional Consultation Group, as was proposed almost 7 years ago, by myself, Senator BYRD, Senator MITCHELL, Senator COHEN, Senator WARNER, Senator BOREN and Senator DANFORTH in a bill to amend the War Powers Resolution. I believe Senator BIDEN from Delaware had a similar resolution which he sponsored.

Under that bill, the congressional leadership, including the chairmen and ranking members of the Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees would meet on a regular and frequent basis with the President to discuss real-world situations that could lead to the involvement of the United States forces. Some have suggested having that group meet on a regular basis with the National Security Council, chaired by the President. It seems to me that thought is worthy of pursuit. I certainly believe that would be one form that this could take.

But whatever the form of consultation, I believe there also needs to be an attempt to forge an executive-congressional consensus on a set of principles that will guide the use of United States forces in the future. This approach starts with the proposition that the United States is the world's only superpower and that we have certain responsibilities that no other nation on earth can fill.

Too many times, when we get into a Third World situation or a situation like Bosnia, or a humanitarian mission like Somalia, or a mission like Haiti, or a mission in other areas of the world, we forget—as our allies urge us to come in and play our role—we forget that we are the only country in the world that can do certain things. Too many times our allies forget that, too. They, of course, want us on the scene every time there is a problem.

But, Mr. President, we need to keep in mind that we are the only nation in the world that can deter the use of weapons of mass destruction. We are the only nation in the world that can lead and coordinate the worldwide effort to avoid the spread of weapons of mass destruction to the Third World and to terrorist groups. We are the only nation in the world that can help preserve the stability in Europe by the presence of American forces that, although dramatically reduced in number, are still very significant in terms of their psychological and their political impact.

We are the only nation in the world that, with our allies in South Korea, can deter and defeat the aggression of North Korea or come to the rescue of nations in the Middle East that are the world's primary source of oil.

We are the only nation that can perform those key and vital functions.

By our military presence, we are the only nation in the world that can give the Japanese the confidence to resist any urge they might have in the future to develop nuclear weapons and go on a real rearmament program that would have a profoundly destabilizing effect in northeast Asia and beyond.

And we are the only nation in the world that can keep open the sea lanes of communication on which not only our trade but also the trade of the world and the economy of the world depend.

Mr. President, these are all key functions. That does not mean we cannot perform other functions like Bosnia, but it does mean that, when we undertake this kind of mission, we and our allies should understand the United States should not be expected to continue a large ground force in an area like Bosnia for a prolonged period of time, because if something goes wrong in Korea, if something goes wrong in the Middle East, if something goes wrong elsewhere in the world, who is going to play the role of superpower? There is no one else on the block.

I believe we can divide America's interests into three broad categories: one

is humanitarian; two is important; and three I would call vital. There is other terminology that people might want to use, but I would like to stimulate at least some discussion and thought about the areas where the United States may be involved.

A humanitarian interest is an interest in which we want to see an alleviation of suffering, but where we do not have a significant strategic interest. This includes cases like Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Bangladesh, Sudan—places where people are going through tragic turmoil and, in many places, actually starving.

We see them on television. It brings tears to our eyes. We want to do something about it, but, in my view, this does not mean we should automatically think about sending military forces. In those cases where we want to alleviate suffering, I think our responsibility—again keeping in mind the other responsibilities we have as a superpower that no one else can perform—our responsibility, generally speaking and in most cases, is to say to our allies: we will help you with logistics, we will help you with airlift, we will help you with sealift, we will help you with intelligence, and we will help you with communications, but we want you to do your job by putting in ground forces where necessary for peacekeeping or peace enforcement purposes. Not only to our allies in the traditional sense, but also to nations in the region where the tragedy is occurring.

In other words, on most such occasions, we should do the things only we can do and let others do things they can do.

Mr. President, this probably does not meet the definition of a national security strategy, but I believe we need to start thinking along those lines.

America cannot deploy military forces in all of these humanitarian areas, and when we do, we can get into serious and severe difficulty. Somalia is the best example of that.

To me, a vital interest is one that we are willing to fight for and, if necessary, willing to send our young people off to die for. This is an awesome responsibility. There are not many of those interests in the world, by the very definition of that word, and we have to be very careful in designating an area as a place where we have a vital interest. That word ought to be used very carefully.

Korea is a place where we have vital interests. Without any doubt, we would fight in Korea, if necessary. We have already demonstrated that. We continue to demonstrate it with the presence of thousands of American military forces. We have already demonstrated we have a vital interest in the Middle East in the Persian Gulf war and by the deployment we had—a couple of deployments—just in the last 2 years when the Iraqis again started threatening Kuwait.

Mr. President, we also have had a vital interest in Europe since World

War II, and we continue to have a vital interest in Europe. We are a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for a collective defense in the case of an armed attack against one or more of the parties.

The United States also has entered into bilateral defense treaties with Japan, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea. We have entered into a multilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand—although in the latter case, our obligations under that treaty have been suspended with respect to New Zealand since September of 1986 because of differences on the question of port visits of nuclear-powered warships. Mr. President, under that treaty, we have committed to meet the common dangers of an armed attack on our treaty partners in accordance with our constitutional processes. That is the case in most of these treaties.

And, of course, the area Senator LUGAR and I have emphasized more than any other in the last 2 or 3 years, and where we have the most profound and difficult national security challenge in the next 10, 20 years, or even longer, is that we have a vital interest in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—not simply nuclear weapons, but chemical as well as biological weapons, which can literally kill tens of thousands of people in an instant. That is also a vital interest because it could be a direct threat to our Nation and to our friends in the world.

Now, the most difficult of all of these areas is the third category, the one that fits between vital and humanitarian, and the term that I use is “important interest.” An important interest is an interest that is more than a mere humanitarian interest, but does not rise to the level of a vital interest. There are overlaps between these categories. They no longer come in a neat package. The most difficult can be exemplified by Bosnia, where I have long believed we have had an important interest but not a vital interest. I do believe that we have a strategic and even a vital interest in preventing that conflict from spreading. If it spreads to other areas, then it could indeed become vital. When an important but not vital interest becomes a test of NATO solidarity—as has happened in the case of Bosnia—when an important interest becomes a test of United States leadership in NATO and of United States credibility and commitment in the world, it moves into a category beyond important. Such is the case in Bosnia.

We must also bear in mind when considering the deployment of our forces for other than a vital interest that the cumulative impact of such deployments may interfere with our responsibilities as the world's lone superpower in areas which are truly vital to U.S. security and the American people.

Returning, briefly, to the subject of Executive-Congressional consultation, I note that the majority leader, Sen-

ator DOLE, introduced S. 5, the Peace Powers Act of 1995 earlier this year, which, in part, would have repealed the War Powers Resolution but re-enacted the consultation and reporting provisions of the War Powers Resolution.

Mr. President, I also note that the May 1994 White Paper entitled “The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” stated that the administration would support legislation along the lines of that introduced by myself, Senators Mitchell, BYRD, WARNER, and COHEN, to amend the War Powers Resolution to introduce a consultative mechanism and to eliminate the 60-day withdrawal provisions.

Based upon these developments, Mr. President, I believe it is very important in the next year that we have a chance to forge a bipartisan approach that would meet the needs both of the Congress and of the administration and that would foster a more cooperative approach between the two branches on important national security decisions. When our military forces go into harm's way, they have every right to expect that both the executive branch and the legislative branch have been involved in the decisionmaking and are behind the mission. That is something we owe the military men and women who serve in our forces abroad.

Mr. President, I intend to introduce legislation early next year to address this very important issue. It has been delayed too long in terms of dealing with it. I repeat, the longer we pretend that we have on the books legislation that covers congressional responsibility in this important, crucial area, the longer we deal with an illusion which has no basis in reality. Mr. President, I solicit input from all Members of the Senate on both sides of the aisle on this issue. I hope we can address it before the next crisis arises.

I thank the Chair, and I yield back whatever time I have remaining.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SCHEDULE

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, we have had a number of inquiries about what the schedule will be for the remainder of the day. Frankly, I do not know. It depends on the meeting, which will take place here in a few moments with White House representatives and Members of the House and Senate, on the budget. It is my understanding that if a serious budget is proposed and presented by each side, then the House will be prepared to send us a short-term continuing resolution that would