

Second, we have a moral obligation in Bosnia. For nearly 50 years, we believed that we would never again see concentration camps in Europe. We would never again see men and boys made to dig their own mass graves and then be machine-gunned into them. We were wrong. This is happening in Bosnia, and our national conscience demands that we take a strong stand against it.

In 1948, 3 years after the end of World War II, the French writer and philosopher Albert Camus appealed to the monks of a French monastery to help the children who had been injured and orphaned in that war. "Perhaps we cannot prevent this world from being a world in which children are tortured," Camus said. "But we can reduce the number of children who are tortured. And if you don't help us, who else in the world can help us do it?"

That brings me to the third reason we must help implement this agreement. The United States must help bring peace to Bosnia because no one else in the world can. The leaders of all three factions—Serbs, Croats, and Moslems—have made it clear that they will not participate in the peace process unless we are involved.

I commend President Clinton and all the members of the negotiating team who worked so hard in Dayton to get us to this point. They accomplished what many said was impossible, and their leadership is already saving lives. Without the commitment of this President to peace in the Balkans, there would be no debate tonight, for we could not be on the verge of peace.

I also want to commend the distinguished majority leader, Senator McCAIN, Senator NUNN, and all the senators in our Bosnia working group for the leadership they have shown in negotiating a resolution that says unequivocally to our troops, "We support you."

That mission will give the Bosnian people an opportunity to build a democratic society. Bosnia-Herzegovina will be preserved as a single State with a unified capital of Sarajevo. The Bosnian people will be allowed to hold free elections, and those who have been driven from their homes through fighting and other forms of terrorism will be free to return.

Our mission is clear, limited, and achievable. We are sending our troops to maintain a ceasefire. They will take their orders from an American general. And they will have full authority to respond to threats to their safety with immediate and overwhelming force.

Again, the critical question is, are we going to give our troops our genuine support as they seek to carry out their mission? Or are we going to burden them with conflicting messages?

Mr. President, I believe the Hutchison amendment is gravely misguided and even dangerous. It claims to support our troops, but, in fact, it undermines them. How can we support our troops if we condemn the mission

for which they are risking their lives? Have we learned nothing from our own history?

Sending such a contradictory message would badly undermine the morale of our troops and jeopardize their safety.

It would also undermine U.S. credibility—our commitment to peace, and our commitment to our NATO allies.

Finally, sending such a conflicting and wrong-headed message would undermine the peace agreement itself, and efforts to implement it.

The responsible vote is a vote for the bipartisan resolution offered by the majority leader.

This resolution supports our troops unequivocally. It commends them for their professionalism and patriotism and bravery. It assures that they will have all the resources and authority they need to protect the peace—and protect themselves.

It recognizes the vital interests our Nation has in preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict and ending the bloodshed. It preserves America's leadership within NATO, and it preserves our credibility with our allies.

And it requires the President to certify two important conditions. First, that the NATO implementation force is limited to implementation of the peace agreement and protection of NATO troops. And second, that the United States objectives in Bosnia are to maintain the peace and establish a military balance that will allow the Bosnian Moslems to defend themselves when NATO withdraws.

As the Senator from Oklahoma noted earlier tonight, the Hutchison/Inhofe and Dole/McCain resolutions are contradictory. The Hutchison resolution, although it is non-binding, sends a dangerous and conflicting message that will undermine and endanger American troops.

The Dole/McCain resolution is binding legislation that asserts Congressional authority and responsibility and sends a clear message that we support our troops and the cause for which they are risking their lives. It is the right thing to do.

To echo the words of Camus, the United States cannot prevent all wars, everywhere. But we can reduce the number of children and adults killed in Bosnia. Our national security, and our national conscience, demand that we try.

Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WARNER). The majority leader is recognized.

DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I send my resolution to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A joint resolution (S.J. Res. 44) concerning the deployment of United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the joint resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution.

Mr. DOLE. That resolution will be the second vote. The first vote will be on the Hutchison resolution.

Mr. President, let me indicate at 10:05 p.m. our time, and 4:05 in the morning in Bosnia, where many Americans are now and where hundreds and thousands more will be on the way, I think we have to understand what we are about to vote on here. We are not voting on a decision to send American troops to Bosnia. That decision has been made. It was made 2 years ago by the President of the United States. Without consulting Congress, the President of the United States made that decision.

So we say to those soldiers who may be on early duty there at 4 a.m. in the morning, in the bitter cold—from those of us in the warmth of the U.S. Senate, free from any danger—we are about to cast a vote. We are about to cast a vote, Sergeant Jones or Private Smith, whoever it is, to indicate that we support your efforts there. They may have some misgivings about why they are there, and we may have some doubts. I listened to the eloquent statement of Senator McCAIN, and I listened last evening to the final speaker of the evening, Senator COHEN from Maine, but this is not about politics. This is not about a Democratic President and a Republican majority in the U.S. Senate. This is about a lot of frightened young Americans who are in Bosnia, or on their way to Bosnia. I assume they may not have thought of it directly, but I believe they will think of it one of these days; they are going to be looking back to see if they had the support of those who represented them in the Congress of the United States. They may not be thinking of that at 4:10 a.m.

So this is a very difficult debate for Members of Congress. It is a difficult debate because Congress was not part of the decisionmaking with respect to sending troops. Congress was not consulted. Congress was told of the President's commitment to send troops after the commitment was made. And then we were faced with the dilemma of undermining that commitment or acquiescing in a military mission with serious flaws. And make no mistake about it, the President has said he made this decision and he takes responsibility. It was his decision to send troops and his decision alone.

A lot of Members of Congress, some on both sides of the aisle—in fact, 69 of us voted the last time to lift the arms embargo to give the Bosnians an opportunity to defend themselves—which is precisely the reason we are here tonight—so that we would not be sending American troops or making that decision. But the President rejected that. That was bipartisan in the House and

in the Senate. We opposed the arms embargo. As I said, we repeatedly voted to lift it. Some of my colleagues were concerned about that.

We have two resolutions before us tonight. I understand that a number of Senators support the resolution offered by the Senator from Texas; the Senators from Oklahoma, Senator INHOFE and Senator NICKLES; and a number of others. That resolution emphasizes very clearly that we oppose the decision to deploy troops. No doubt about it. We disagree, we oppose. It is his decision, and he said as much as recently as, I think, Sunday on "60 Minutes."

However, a vote on this resolution does not provide our troops, who are now in Bosnia at 4:08 in the morning, and the other thousands who will be there tomorrow, or next week, or next month—I think it makes a point, but it does not make a policy. It does not effect a policy. It does not make the job our forces have to do any safer or any easier, nor does it provide a plan to achieve a military balance in Bosnia or increase the chances for successful completion of our mission.

I assume most of our colleagues will vote for that resolution. If they do, I wish they would follow up their signal to President Clinton by voting "yes" on the Dole-McCain-Nunn resolution. I want to be clear about what that resolution does and does not do. This resolution does not endorse the President's decision. It does not endorse the agreement reached in Dayton. It does support our men and women in uniform.

It does limit the mission to military tasks only and requires a realistic exit strategy based on the goal of Bosnian self-reliance. To put it simply, President Clinton has a plan to get us into Bosnia; this resolution shows us a way out.

It sets three conditions on the deployment of American forces: No. 1, it limits the mission to implementing military provisions of the accord. No Somalia-style nation building, for example. It insists on an exit strategy linked to military balance so Bosnia can defend itself. Somebody said that is bad policy because if they are armed and trained we may have to stay longer. I do not understand that argument. We have been debating on this floor for 2 years that we ought to arm and train the Bosnians and lift the arms embargo so they can defend themselves. That is precisely what we wish to do here. No. 3 also provides U.S. leadership on an immediate effort to provide Bosnia that means to defend itself. I think if these conditions are met they will help enhance the safety of our forces and assure that they can withdraw in a timely manner and without triggering a resumption of hostilities.

Let us be clear, setting a date is not an exit strategy. In fact, many will argue that if we set a date nothing will happen until that date expires, and then hostilities will recur.

I suggest that I think we have been able to perform a valuable service here

for our colleagues regardless of their feelings about the decision. I did not agree with it. You do not agree with it—maybe some do agree with the decision. The decision has been made. The deployment started. Our goal should be a Bosnia that is self-reliant, able to defend itself without depending on the United States or any outside force.

I want to emphasize just a few points on this critical issue. First, the word "lead" is essential. Without U.S. leadership, this will not happen. Leading does not mean going it alone but it does mean acting like the sole remaining superpower. Second, our language makes it clear that the efforts to arm and train will take place separate and apart from NATO, IFOR; no United States military forces in NATO operation will be involved enabling Bosnia to defend itself. Finally, this resolution states that the Bosnians should be provided with assistance of the highest possible quality—American where necessary—and that of other countries when sufficient.

I also point out this resolution requires the President report extensively on his plan to enable Bosnia to provide for its own defense and on all aspects of the military and civilian aspects of the operation.

I want to say a few words about Senator MCCAIN and his leadership on national security issues. From his sacrifice during Vietnam—and I know I was not standing here; I was not in leadership, I was standing back there somewhere. I was wearing a JOHN MCCAIN bracelet, proudly—a POW bracelet—and arguing with my Democratic colleagues on the other side not to cut off funding in the Vietnam war. I led debate on this floor for 7 weeks in an effort to derail those who would cut off funding while JOHN MCCAIN was in a little box over there in prison and there were thousands like him and thousands and thousands of Americans.

The theory was just cut off funding. The war will end. That is not the way it works.

So JOHN MCCAIN came back, others came back, and others did not come back as Senator MCCAIN said earlier. Then he became a freshman Congressman and opposed the deployment in Lebanon in 1983. It seems to me, not that I have any more insight than anybody else in this body, but there is something about a relationship that you build up in the service and you understand one thing: How important support is from America—whether it is your family, whether it is your little hometown, whether it is your State, whether it is the Congress of the United States.

I say to Senator MCCAIN and many others who were prisoners of war in Vietnam, no one works any harder on the issues of war and peace. I did not agree with Senator MCCAIN on normalizing relations with Vietnam, but he was there and I was not. No one takes his responsibility more seriously. We could not have reached this agreement

without his almost minute-by-minute involvement.

Let me say one other thing about leadership: It is not easy. The easiest vote is no, no, no. I recall being on the floor in this position in January 1991, the 10th, 11th, and 12th, when we had troops in the gulf. President Bush had decided to come to Congress and ask for support. I remember at the time we had a very good debate—3 days of it—Democrats and Republicans, and I do not question anybody's motives. The thing that struck me as I looked at it at the time and as I look back at it now, not a single member of the Democratic leadership in the House or the Senate would stand up on this floor or the House floor and support President Bush. They did not have to agree with President Bush. I do not agree with President Clinton. But the troops were there. I thought that was a tragic mistake. You pay a price for leadership. Some will have short-term political gain and some just truly feel we should not be doing anything and that the only vote is no.

I ask my colleagues, it is now 17 after 4 o'clock a.m. in Bosnia, and Americans are there, so if we cut off funding this morning, I do not know what would have happened. If we pass the Hutchison resolution, I do not know what will happen. I hope if we pass the Dole-McCain-Nunn, et al., resolution that we will have provided an exit strategy, a way to extricate Americans by arming and training Bosnians, so that they can be an independent force and so we can go home, so that those Americans who are there today at 18 after 4 o'clock a.m. in the morning will not be there next Christmas.

That is what this debate is all about. It is not easy. I have had a lot of mail, a lot of phone calls, from a lot of people, who I do not think understand the issue. The issue we are voting on tonight is not a decision to send American troops. Let me conclude with that. We can posture and complain about the President's decision. I do not like it. He knows I do not like it. I told him I do not like it. I said publicly I do not like it. If we had our way, we would have lifted the embargo and we would not be talking about sending troops. That is our argument. I think it would have been correct.

I guess our decision is whether we are going to send a message to all the families in America, to all the troops who are on the way to Bosnia, plus all the other American forces who someday may be engaged in some conflict, because we do have a responsibility from time to time. They will ask themselves, do we have the support of the American people, of our families and of our representatives? I think that is what this debate is all about. I hope that is how it is received by the people who watch or listen or read the RECORD or listen to each other.

I ask my colleagues to think very carefully. We are going to be debating this. I assume this is just the first debate. A month from now, 2 months

from now, 3 months from now, 4 months from now, something happens, there will be other debates and other efforts made. But this is the important, this is the first step. This is a signal to the American forces that we support you. We support you, as we should.

Finally, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an exchange I have had with the President on his assurances that the Bosnians will be provided with arms and the training they need. I think the letters are very important. It is part of the legislative history, because the President has given his word that that training will be provided and arms will be furnished. And, again, that is very important. It may be lost on someone now, but it is going to be very important not a year from now, as the Senator from Maine said last night, 9 months from now, 9 months from now is when it starts. If they are not trained, and if we have to wait 6 months, it may be lost.

So, it is up to us. If not now, when? This is the time to support American forces.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, DC., December 10, 1995.

DEAR MR. LEADER: I want to set forth for you the Administration's policy with respect to military stabilization measures in Bosnia.

The Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons relative to the defense capability of the Bosnian Federation has been a major reason for the fighting in Bosnia and remains a potential source of instability. We believe that establishing a stable military balance within Bosnia by the time IFOR leaves is important to preventing the war from resuming and to facilitate IFOR's departure.

The Dayton Agreement has strong arms control provisions which provide for a "build-down" of forces. We intend to pursue these vigorously. An arms restraint regime obviously can help contribute to a stable balance.

Even with arms control, we anticipate there will be a deficiency on the part of the Federation. Accordingly, we have made a commitment to the Bosnian Federation that we will coordinate an international effort to ensure that the Federation receives the assistance necessary to achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR leaves.

Because we want to assure the impartiality of IFOR, providing arms and training to Federation forces will not be done by either IFOR or U.S. military forces. The approach we intend to pursue is for the U.S. to coordinate the efforts of third countries.

Our efforts in this connection already have begun. An assessment team to evaluate the needs of the Federation has just returned from Bosnia. We will proceed with this effort in a manner that is consistent with the UN resolution lifting the arms embargo and the relevant Dayton Agreement provisions, which allow planning and training to proceed, but restrict actual transfers during the initial six months, in particular of all arms for 90 days, and heavy weapons for 180 days, after the Agreement enters into force.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC, December 12, 1995.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are writing to seek clarification on several critical issues raised in your December 10 letter regarding your administration's policy on arming and training Bosnian Federation forces. In our view, it is essential to clarify these matters—which are integral to the U.S. exit strategy—prior to moving forward with Senate consideration of your administration's decision to send U.S. ground forces to implement the Dayton agreement.

You acknowledge the Bosnian Serb military advantage and the need to establish a stable military balance within Bosnia by the time the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) leaves. In your address to the nation, you justified American participation in IFOR by stating the need for American leadership. However, your letter does not indicate that the United States will lead in the critical effort of ensuring the Bosnians can defend themselves. We are seeking your confirmation that the United States will lead in coordinating and providing the Bosnians with the means for self-defense. Without an American-led effort to rapidly provide the Bosnians with the best possible quality arms, equipment, and training, we believe that the Bosnians will not be able to adequately defend themselves within a year.

Also in this regard, while we understand that the arming and training program should be conducted separately from the IFOR peacekeeping operation, to state that no U.S. military forces will be involved—as your letter does—is a guarantee that such a program will be wholly ineffective and may not even occur. A strict prohibition on all U.S. military involvement outside the territory of Bosnia would severely cripple American efforts to ensure that the Bosnians are provided with the weapons and training they need. Military planning, coordination, information-sharing, or even Bosnian participation in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) could not occur under such a prohibition. It seems that so severely limiting our flexibility would not be in our national interest.

Finally, we urge you to focus on what the United States can do, rather than what we cannot do under the U.N. Security Council resolution lifting the arms embargo. For example, training can begin immediately—presumably outside of Bosnia. Also, an array of defensive weapons could be provided to Bosnian Federation forces on day 91 consistent with the U.N. resolution—as could any weapon not classified as "heavy" under the terms of the U.N. resolution.

We hope that you will clarify these matters as soon as possible so that we may proceed with consideration of the Dole-McCain resolution.

Sincerely,

BOB DOLE.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, DC, December 12, 1995.

DEAR MR. LEADER: I am writing in response to your December 12 letter on equip and train. You raise several questions to which I would like to respond.

First of all, the United States will take a leadership role in coordinating an international effort to ensure that the Bosnian Federation receives the assistance necessary to achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR leaves. As in all things related to our effort to bringing peace to the region, U.S. leadership has been critical.

As I stated in my December 10 letter to you, I want to assure the impartiality of

IFOR. In the view of my military advisors, this requires minimizing the involvement of U.S. military personnel. But we expect that some individual military officers, for example, working in OSD, DSAA or other agencies, will be involved in planning this effort. We also will offer the Bosnians participation in U.S. programs such as IMET. I agree that maintaining flexibility is important to the success of the effort to achieve a stable military balance within Bosnia. But I will do nothing that I believe will endanger the safety of American troops on the ground in Bosnia. I am sure you will agree that is my primary responsibility.

I want to assure you that I am focusing on what the United States can do. That is why I sent an assessment team to the region to properly evaluate the needs of the Federation. Training programs and provision of non-lethal assistance can begin immediately after the peace agreement enters into force; and provision of small arms can begin after three months. We intend to move expeditiously.

I have given you my word that we will make certain that the Bosnian Federation will receive the assistance necessary to achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR leaves. I intend to keep it.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.
EXPRESSING OPPOSITION OF CONGRESS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES IN BOSNIA

The Senate continued with the consideration of the concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on agreeing to Senate Concurrent Resolution 35.

The yeas and nays have not been ordered.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

The result was announced, yeas 47, nays 52, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 602 Leg.]

YEAS—47

Abraham	Feingold	McConnell
Ashcroft	Frist	Murkowski
Bennett	Gorton	Nickles
Bond	Gramm	Pressler
Brown	Grams	Santorum
Burns	Grassley	Shelby
Campbell	Gregg	Simpson
Coats	Hatch	Smith
Cochran	Hatfield	Snowe
Cohen	Helms	Specter
Coverdell	Hutchison	Stevens
Craig	Inhofe	Thomas
D'Amato	Kempthorne	Thompson
Dole	Kyl	Thurmond
Domenici	Lott	Warner
Faircloth	Mack	

NAYS—52

Akaka	Daschle	Inouye
Baucus	DeWine	Jeffords
Biden	Dodd	Johnston
Bingaman	Dorgan	Kassebaum
Boxer	Exon	Kennedy
Bradley	Feinstein	Kerry
Breaux	Ford	Kerry
Bryan	Glenn	Kohl
Bumpers	Graham	Lautenberg
Byrd	Harkin	Leahy
Chafee	Heflin	Levin
Conrad	Hollings	Lieberman

Lugar	Nunn	Roth
McCain	Pell	Sarbanes
Mikulski	Pryor	Simon
Moseley-Braun	Reid	Wellstone
Moynihan	Robb	
Murray	Rockefeller	

So the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 35) was rejected.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The Senate continued with the consideration of the joint resolution

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 44.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read the third time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The joint resolution having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass?

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 69, nays 30, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 603 Leg.]

YEAS—69

Abraham	Dorgan	Lieberman
Akaka	Exon	Lugar
Baucus	Feinstein	Mack
Bennett	Ford	McCain
Biden	Glenn	McConnell
Bingaman	Gorton	Mikulski
Bond	Graham	Moseley-Braun
Boxer	Harkin	Moynihan
Bradley	Hatch	Murkowski
Breaux	Heflin	Murray
Bryan	Hollings	Nunn
Bumpers	Inouye	Pell
Burns	Jeffords	Pryor
Byrd	Johnston	Reid
Campbell	Kassebaum	Robb
Chafee	Kempthorne	Rockefeller
Cochran	Kennedy	Roth
Cohen	Kerrey	Sarbanes
Conrad	Kerry	Simon
Daschle	Kohl	Simpson
DeWine	Lautenberg	Specter
Dodd	Leahy	Stevens
Dole	Levin	Wellstone

NAYS—30

Ashcroft	Gramm	Nickles
Brown	Grams	Pressler
Coats	Grassley	Santorum
Coverdell	Gregg	Shelby
Craig	Hatfield	Smith
D'Amato	Helms	Snowe
Domenici	Hutchison	Thomas
Faircloth	Inhofe	Thompson
Feingold	Kyl	Thurmond
Frist	Lott	Warner

So the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 44) was passed.

The preamble was agreed to.

The joint resolution, with its preamble, is as follows:

S.J. RES. 44

Whereas beginning on February 24, 1993, President Clinton committed the United

States to participate in implementing a peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina without prior consultation with Congress;

Whereas the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been unjustly denied the means to defend itself through the imposition of a United Nations arms embargo;

Whereas the United Nations Charter states the "the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense," a right denied the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina whose population has further suffered egregious violations of the international law of war including ethnic cleansing by Serbian aggressors, and the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to which the United States Senate gave its advice and consent in 1986;

Whereas the United States Congress has repeatedly voted to end the United States participation in the international arms embargo on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the best way to achieve a military balance and a just and stable peace without the deployment of United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

Whereas the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia initialed the General Framework Agreement and Associated Annexes on November 21, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, after repeated assurances that the United States would send troops to assist in implementing that agreement;

Whereas three dedicated American diplomats—Bob Frasure, Joe Kruzel, and Nelson Drew—lost their lives in the American-led diplomatic effort which culminated in the General Framework Agreement;

Whereas as part of the negotiations which led to the General Framework Agreement, the United States has made a commitment to ensure that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is armed and trained to provide for its own defense, and that commitment should be honored;

Whereas the mission of the NATO Implementation Force is to create a secure environment to provide Bosnia and Herzegovina an opportunity to begin to establish a durable peace, which requires the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be able to provide for its own defense;

Whereas the objective of the United States in deploying United States Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina can only be successful if the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is armed and trained to provide for its own defense after the withdrawal of the NATO Implementation Force and the United States Armed Forces; and

Whereas in deciding to participate in implementation of the General Framework Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, President Clinton has cited American interests including maintaining its leadership in NATO, preventing the spread of the conflict, stopping the tragic loss of life, and fulfilling American commitments;

Whereas on December 3, 1995, President Clinton approved Operation Joint Endeavor and deployment of United States Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina began immediately thereafter: Now therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

The Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of our Armed Forces who are carrying out their missions in support of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with professional excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery, and believes they must be given all necessary resources and support to carry out their mission and ensure their security.

SEC. 2. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) Notwithstanding reservations expressed about President Clinton's decision to deploy United States Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina and recognizing that:

(1) the President has decided to deploy United States Armed Forces to implement the General Framework Agreement in Operation Joint Endeavor citing American interests in preventing the spread of conflict, maintaining its leadership in NATO, stopping the tragic loss of life, and fulfilling American commitments;

(2) the deployment of United States Armed Forces has begun; and

(3) preserving United States credibility is a strategic interest, the President may only fulfill his commitment to deploy United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina for approximately one year to implement the General Framework Agreement and Military Annex, pursuant to this Resolution, subject to the conditions in subsection (b).

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION.—Before acting pursuant to this Resolution, the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, his determination that—

(1) the mission of the NATO Implementation Force and United States Armed Forces deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be limited to implementation of the military provisions of the Military Annex to the General Framework Agreement and measures deemed necessary to protect the safety of the NATO Implementation Force and United States Armed Forces;

(2) an integral part of the successful accomplishment of the U.S. objective in Bosnia and Herzegovina in deploying and withdrawing United States Armed Forces is the establishment of a military balance which enables the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide for its own defense without depending on U.S. or other outside forces; and

(3) the United States will lead an immediate international effort, separate and apart from the NATO Implementation Force and consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1021 and the General Framework Agreement and Associated Annexes, to provide equipment, arms, training and related logistics assistance of the highest possible quality to ensure the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina can provide for its own defense, including, as necessary, using existing military drawdown authorities and requesting such additional authority as may be necessary.

SEC. 3. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO ENABLE THE FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO PROVIDE FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE.

Within 30 days after enactment, the President shall submit a detailed report on his plan to assist the Federation of Bosnia to provide for its own defense, including the role of the United States and other countries in providing such assistance. Such report shall include an evaluation of the defense needs of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including, to the maximum extent possible:

(a) the types and quantities of arms, spare parts, and logistics support required to establish a stable military balance prior to the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces;

(b) the nature and scope of training to be provided;

(c) a detailed description of the past, present and future U.S. role in ensuring that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is provided as rapidly as possible with equipment, training, arms and related logistic assistance of the highest possible quality;