in a socialist approach to government and since being the President has refused to privatize a number of the state-controlled activities which it was understood he was going to privatize as part of getting the economy going again. And so not only were the jobs lost, and they have not been re-created, as a result of the sanctions, we are seeing an administration in Haiti which has accomplished very little in the effort to create a market force in Haiti. So all in all, it is not a great success story.

But what is really of significant concern—even I think should be of concern for the American people as we go down the road toward the Bosnian debate—is the gap between what was represented was going to happen and what was represented would be and what has occurred, the gap between how Mr. Aristide was defined by this administration and who he really is, which is dramatic, the gap between what then was told to us was going to cost us and what it eventually has cost us, the fact that we may have American soldiers on the ground there well past February when we are supposed to have them out, another example.

And so, as we move down the road on the decision on Bosnia, I think the American people have the right to ask the serious and difficult questions of this administration and to be a little suspicious of the answers and presentations as to what this administration's views and decisions are in Bosnia.

We just recently read—I did not read it, but we heard synopses of a book published by Robert McNamara, who was the Secretary of Defense under John Kennedy and under Lyndon Johnson, and who now states rather openly that he knew the war in Vietnam was wrong, that it was a mistake from a public policy standpoint, but that because of the need to protect, basically, the political position and ego of the Presidency, they continued to pursue the war in Vietnam—truly one of the more disconcerting revelations to come forward from a leader of this country, certainly in this half century, but I suspect a very accurate one.

Maybe we should put a new term in the American language called ''McNamaranism.'' That is when you pursue a policy which you know is substantively wrong but you pursue it because of the political need or the need of the ego or the need of the presentation of the Presidency to the people. You pursue it not because you know it is right substantively, not because you know it is going to correct a problem which you think is there, but because you know, as a member of the policymaker at the highest level in Government, that if you do not pursue it, you are going to put at risk the President's imprimatur of authority, his personal leadership role or his reelection efforts.

McNamaranism—I think that is a term that we should start with and we should identify. Clearly, McNamaranism occurred in the early sixties. I think a form of McNamaranism has occurred in Haiti. We pursued a policy in Haiti not because we knew we were going to correct that country. We knew that country was going to continue to have serious economic problems and serious political problems no matter what we did, because it has had those problems a long time and we do not have the wherewithal to change that culture unless we are willing to essentially take that country over and dominate it for years, something we tried to do from 1919 to 1935 and failed to do during that period. So we know it will take longer than that length of time, which is when we last occupied that country.

But we went into Haiti because this administration had a political need to go into Haiti, to be quite blunt. There were certain forces within the constituency which support this Presidency who demanded unequivocally that we go into Haiti, and they were effective in making their case. So it was a political decision to go into Haiti, even though substantively we knew we were not going to correct the situation, and we are now seeing the result of that.

McNamaranism struck us in Haiti. Let us hope that McNamaranism does not strike us in Bosnia.

Mr. President, I yield back my time.

Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

PEACE IN BOSNIA AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES TO IMPLEMENT THE PEACE

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on Tuesday, November 21, the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia initialed a peace plan to end the fighting in Bosnia. The peace plan, if implemented and enforced by the parties would result in Bosnia being governed by two entities, the Moslem-Croat Federation, which would have jurisdiction over 51 percent of the territory, and the Serb Republic, which would have jurisdiction over 49 percent of the territory. Sarajevo will remain a united capital, which would fall within the territory of the Moslem-Croat Federation, along with its Serbian-held suburbs.

On Wednesday, the U.N. Security Council voted to lift economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, and also to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and the other Yugoslavia Republics. The lifting of sanctions will only take place after the peace agreement is signed in Paris and Bosnian Serb military forces are redeployed behind a zone of separation.

The Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia followed up the initialing of the peace plan in Dayton by forwarding identical letters to President Clinton vowing the support of their governments to the implementation and enforcement of the peace agreement and guaranteeing the security of NATO peacekeeping troops.

However, not less than a week after Balkan leaders initialed this peace agreement, the Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic have demanded the renegotiation of the provisions regarding the future of Sarajevo. While in Sarajevo, Serbs residents are protesting the peace agreement that would place their neighborhoods under the control of the Moslem-Croat Federation. Along the Dalmation Coast, Croats are protesting the turnover of land in exchange for land along a Posavina corridor that would provide better security. Moslem-led Bosnian army soldiers entered a United Nations base in the Bihac enclave, manned by Bangladeshi peacekeepers and took equipment, including vehicles. There were also reports that Croat forces were burning and looting homes in northwestern Bosnia that is scheduled to be turned over to the Serb Republic.

Mr. President, on November 8, the House and Senate leadership met with President Clinton to discuss the situation in Bosnia and the status of the negotiations in Dayton. At that time, I advised the President that I felt he had not convinced the American public, nor the Congress, that it was in the national interests of the United States to deploy United States military forces to implement or enforce the Bosnia peace agreement. I also advised the President that convincing the American public and Congress rested on his shoulders—the President needs to come before the American public and make his case.

The President has not yet convinced the American public, nor the Congress, that the United States has an interest in securing, or ensuring, the implementation or enforcement of a peace agreement in Bosnia. He has not convinced the American public or Congress that European nations in the region where the fighting has taken place, and who would be directly affected if the fighting were to cross the borders of Yugoslavia, need the support of United States military forces.

As a world leader, the United States should exercise its leadership by asking the European Community why it does not view it to be their responsibility to secure, or ensure a lasting peace in Bosnia; if necessary, why they do not employ the necessary military forces, as President Clinton has pledged to do, to implement the peace agreement.

I respect the constitutional prerogatives of the President, as Commander in Chief, to exercise his authority to deploy U.S. military forces. However, the Congress has a constitutional responsibility to balance his check. As a Senator and the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have a responsibility to ensure that a thorough and public national debate takes place.

I support the North Atlantic Alliance and believe that the United States should remain engaged in, and show leadership in NATO. I believe that the

United States has obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. I also believe that the American public and Congress are willing to use U.S. military forces to defend U.S. national security interests.

In an effort to convince the American public and the Congress, President Clinton will address the Nation this evening to defend the United States-brokered Bosnia peace agreement and describe America's national or vital security interests which warrant the need to deploy United States military forces to Bosnia. In short, he needs to convince the public and Congress that it is the proper course of action for the United States to deploy troops to Bosnia.

Mr. President, it is imperative that President Clinton make the case for United States involvement in Bosnia to the American public and gain their support before any United States military forces are deployed to Bosnia. The President must be clear about United States objectives in Bosnia and the risks involved. The decision to deploy U.S. military forces and the length of time spent in the operation should not be based on Presidential politics. The decision to send U.S. military forces has to be based on clear and achievable objectives and goals, and a developed exit strategy.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS OF THE PHILIPPINES AT THE EAST WEST CENTER IN HONOLULU

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I wish to submit for the RECORD the statement of the distinguished President of the Philippines, Fidel V. Ramos, on the topic of ''Regional Cooperation and Economic Development in the Philippines.'' President Ramos delivered the statement last month as part of the First Hawaiian Lecture Series at the East West Center in Honolulu. The presentation was part of the ongoing efforts of the East West Center to provide a badly needed platform for prominent government and business leaders to comment on relations in the Asia-Pacific region. In this endeavor, the East West Center, Mr. President, has no equals. For the past 25 years it has been the nerve center for bringing together opinion leaders, as is evident from President Ramos' presence.

Mr. President, I offer President Ramos' speech as a matter of great interest to the Members of this body. We need to know what our best friends think of our foreign policy. Clearly, the Philippines, and President Ramos especially, are good friends, good partners, and strong allies of the United States.

In his statement, President Ramos makes an observation regarding the direction of U.S. foreign policy that should not be ignored. In a few words, he tells us not to trust old conventions or concepts that are out of place in the post-cold-war environment. Instead, he says, and I quote:

The United States must redefine its concept of national security in economic and cultural terms. Like the rest of us, America's place in the future world will be determined just as much by the creativity of its workpeople and the daring of its entrepreneurs as by the devastating power of its weapons.

Since virtually all of its trade deficit comes from its East Asian commerce, the United States is looking for a new sense of fairness in its economic relationships with the Asia-Pacific region. Over the past 30 years, the U.S. security umbrella—and the rich U.S. market—have enabled East Asia to prosper. Now American leaders argue that Americans must see their country as sharing in this prosperity—if American taxpayers are to continue supporting their country's continued security engagement in the region.

We of the Philippines have no problem at all with this proposition—particularly since we do not regard economic competition as a winner-take-all or zero-sum contest. In the economic competition, everybody wins—and even the relative ''loser'' ends up richer than when he started.

I have selected this passage from the text of the speech because it characterizes what I perceive to be the attitude of our Asian-Pacific partners toward expanded trade.

I agree with President Ramos: There is a new post-cold-war competition. We, the United States, cannot afford to distance ourselves from regional and global participation any more than we had assumed the heavy burden of regional and global security during the cold war. Economic competition, like trade, tightens relationships, fosters cultural understanding, and generally produces all winners, even though there may be short-term losses.

President Ramos knows what he's talking about. The trade ties between our countries are strong, with the Philippines ranking as our 26th largest export market. In addition, the U.S. stock of foreign investment in that country stands at nearly $2 billion. Although this investment has been in manufacturing and banking in the past, the restoration of such former United States military installations as Subic Bay to the Philippines has opened still newer, mutual trade opportunities. Today, U.S. cargo shippers are developing major staging and warehousing facilities there, contributing to our increased trade position in the region.

The Philippines is emerging as a reliable place for Americans to do business. In July 1991, the Government set in motion a major program for the reduction, restructuring, and simplification of tariffs. Its government procurement program does not discriminate against foreign bidders. The Philippines has excised from its books preferential rates for export financing for domestic companies and is a signatory to the GATT Subsidies Code. After some disagreements with the United States on intellectual property protection, the Philippines is drafting new legislation on trademarks, copyrights, and patents that promise to be world class. The importance of the Philippines intellectual property changes should not be underestimated. The country is largely dependent on imported technology. Today, much of that comes in the form of computer disks, tapes, and other media with embedded software. This software provides computer-based routines for manufacturing, education, medical, and other applications of technology essential to national growth. Indeed, much of this software comes from my own State of Utah. Without appropriate protection of their property, exporters of technology would be very reluctant to market it abroad.

While there are some deficiencies remaining in the country's trade statutes, we should commend the Philippines for their rate of progress in the past 5 years alone.

Clearly, the pace at which the Philippines is entering the world trade arena will establish it as a competitive and worthy partner of which all fair trade countries will want to take notice. For these and the reasons stated earlier, I commend the balance of President Ramos' remarks to the RECORD and ask unanimous consent that the entire speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMERICA'S ROLE IN EAST ASIA

(Address of H.E. President Fidel V. Ramos, before the East-West Center, October 16, 1995)

INTRODUCTION AND THEME STATEMENT

From your vantage point here on these lovely islands, even to doubt whether the United States will remain an Asia-Pacific power seems no less than ridiculous.

But perspectives shift with longitude—and I must tell you that concerns about America's staying power—specifically, concerns about the strength of the U.S. commitment to intervene in future regional crises—are beginning to preoccupy most countries in East Asia.

Over this past generation, the regional stability underwritten by the United States has given our countries the leisure to cultivate economic growth. Now the fear is widespread among them that the United States is turning inward—that it will revert to the isolationism which has characterized its foreign policy throughout much of its history.

I must add that we of the Philippines believe the United States will remain in the Asia-Pacific—and not out of altruism, but in its own interest.

You more than any others realize how the tilt of U.S. population away from its Atlantic Coast, the influx of Asian migrants, and the attraction of East Asian trade and investments have made your country a true Asia-Pacific power.

And so it cannot afford to leave the Asian Continent in the hands of a single dominant power—any more than it could tolerate Western Europe's being in the same situation.

America's role in East Asia is my topic here this afternoon. Let me summarize the four points I wish to make before I elaborate on them:

First—over the foreseeable future, the United States must continue to be the fulcrum of East Asia's balance of power.

Second—economic competition between the United States and East Asia is not ''winner-take-all'' but a game both sides can win.