

billion annually) and you are still talking about total UN personnel of just around 61,400 and a total UN system dollar cost of \$18.2 billion.

61,400 may sound like a lot of people, but not when you consider that more than this number—65,000 in fact—are employed by the three Disneylands in California, Florida and France. Three times as many people—183,000—sell McDonald's hamburgers around the world as work for the UN system.

And \$18.2 billion might be a lot of money, but just one major multinational corporation, Dow Chemical, which happens also to have 61,000 employees world-wide, has an annual revenue in excess of \$20 billion.

When you put the UN's financial problems into this kind of perspective, the solutions do not look quite so hard. Surely between us the 185 member states, with our combined defence expenditure alone of around \$767 billion (as calculated in the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report), can find that kind of money? But of course the problem of paying for the UN has now become critical because of the unwillingness, or inability, of so many of the member states (including the biggest of us all) to pay their assessed contributions—notwithstanding that the cost of these for the major developed country contributors works out at between \$7 and \$15 per head per year, the price of no more than one or two movie tickets in this city.

We have a short-term problem, which can and should be solved within the UN system by allowing the UN to borrow from the World Bank. But we also have a longer-term problem which, frankly, does not look as though it is going to be solved—however much we continue to work at adjusting assessment scales, and however much we exhort member states to pay up, and remind them of the consequences under Article 19 of the Charter if they fail to do so.

So what are we to do about all this? In my judgment, it is time to look again—this time very seriously indeed—at the options which do exist for supplementing member states' contributions by external sources of finance. The practicability of collecting a levy on every one of the \$300 thousand billion worth of foreign exchange transactions that now occur every year remains to be fully assessed, but simple arithmetic tells us that if we strike a rate for such a levy of just .001

per cent—which hardly seems likely to have any significant economic consequences—we could generate \$3 billion. And we know that if we could levy international airline passengers just \$10 for every international sector flown—which would be very easily collectable indeed—we could also raise \$3 billion, nearly the whole annual cost of UN peace operations.

There are as well other revenue options that have, to a greater or lesser extent, the same rational nexus with UN costs that these do, in the sense that they involve transactions which are international, which take place within a framework of law and co-operation provided by the United Nations, and can be harmed by a breakdown in international peace and security—precisely the areas in which the United Nations has a fundamental responsibility.

But traditionally a threshold objection of principle has been mounted against any such talk. Member states, it has been said, should themselves own the UN system; if the Secretariat had direct access to non-member state revenue, who knows what adventures it might be inclined to get up to. But ownership and control are totally separate issues. The UN operates on a sovereign equality principle which means that, for example, those six states which presently between them pay over 55 per cent of the UN's regular budget should under no circumstances have greater authority over how it is spent than the overwhelming majority of members who each pay much lesser proportions of the total.

Surely, whatever the funding sources involved, the crucial question is how and by whom the money is spent: it is absolutely crucial that there be appropriate control of funds by member states, with all the accountability mechanisms that implies, but that doesn't mean that those member states should themselves have to prove all the funds in the first place.

In talking to many of my foreign ministerial colleagues from a wide range of countries and across all continents on these issues over the last few days, I have found an almost unanimous reaction that the UN's present and likely continuing financial crisis demands that these issues be looked at again, without any pre-judgments of the questions of principle or practicability involved.

I would suggest, accordingly, that the time is right for the Secretary-General to convene once again a high-level advisory group, like the Volcker/Ogata group established in 1992, with a mandate explicitly to think through what has hitherto been more or less unthinkable—how to fund the UN system in a way that reaches out beyond the resources that member states are prepared to directly put into it. Such a group could report to, or work with, a committee of representatives of member states—one in existence already (like the High Level Working Group on the Financial Situation of the United Nations) or one newly created for the purpose.

A great deal of work has been already, or is being, done on many of these issues, and it should be possible for such a group to report within six months or so, and certainly within a year. The parameters of the debate have to be changed, and for that to happen we need an authoritative new statement of the art of the possible.

Here as elsewhere, we have to move forward. We have to look to new ideas. We have to encourage humankind's ingenuity to search for better ways for states to deal with each other as relationships take new shape, as new states emerge and as problems which could not have been conceived of a few years ago become the challenges of the day.

We will fail to meet those challenges if we adhere solely to the ideas and dogma of the past. The United Nations was itself founded on a mixture of idealism and pragmatism. Both were essential to build a new world fifty years ago, and in the past fifty years that idealism has not disappeared. It was an important force in bringing about the end of the Cold War, and more than anything else it was idealism that lay behind the process of decolonisation which shifted the tectonic plates of history.

To some, idealism will always be the enemy of practicality. But to others, it will always involve, more than anything else, the courage to take advantage of new opportunities, ensuring that at least some of today's ideals will become tomorrow's reality. Perhaps now, fifty years beyond San Francisco, we need to renew that idealism, and walk down some of the uncharted paths that idealists have always been prepared to tread.

WHAT THE UN SYSTEM COSTS

[1994: \$US million]

Elements of UN system	Assessed contributions	Voluntary contributions	Total budgets	Personnel
Core functions (Secretariat [New York, Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi], ICJ and regional Commissions)	1,182.9	315.4	1,498.3	10,743
Peace operations (UNFICYP, UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNIKOM, MINURSO, UNAVEM, UNOMIG, UNOMIL, UNAMIR, UNMIH, UNTAC, UNPROFOR, ONUOMOZ, UNOSOM II, ONUSAL, UNMILTIC)	3,234.9	0.0	3,234.9	[71,284]
Related programs and organs (UNCHS, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNITAR, UNRISD, UNRWA, WFP, International Drug Control, International Trade Centre and OPCW)	1,512.2	3,322.1	4,037.3	22,515
Independent specialized agencies (FAO, ICAO, ILO, IMO, ITU, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO and IAEA)	2,113.1	1,671.4	3,784.5	18,179
Bretton Woods Institutions (IBRD, IDA, IFC, IFAD and IMF)	444.1	4,436.9	4,881.0	9,991
Total	8,490.2	9,745.8	10,236.0	61,428

Notes.—Budget data: for core functions, derived from 1994–95 data in proposed budget for biennium 1996–97 (A/50/6), halved to produce annual figure; for peace operations, provided by the Peacekeeping Financing Division; for specialized agencies and IAEA, derived from relevant biennium budgets, halved to produce annual figure; for related organs and programs and Bretton Woods Institutions, derived from UN and World Bank sources and compiled by Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and ALISAID, Canberra. Personnel data: core function personnel include both established and extra-budgetary posts; peace operations figures as at 30 June 1994 from Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization in 1994 (A/48/1).

POLITICS AND THE DEAD ARTS OF COMPROMISE

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, when the New York Times "Week in Review" section had an article by Adam Clymer titled, "Politics and the Dead Arts of Compromise," I read it and cut it out for my future reference. I have just re-read the article, and it is such a significant insight into where we are and where we're going or where we're not

going, that I want to insert it into the RECORD.

We have become increasingly an excessively partisan body. I do not blame either party specifically for that. I have seen that grow over the years, and it has hurt our country, and it has hurt the two-party system.

What is essential is not that we win public relations battles, but that we work out practical compromises to govern. That's what Adam Clymer un-

derstands, and that's what we have to understand.

I ask unanimous consent that his observations be printed in the RECORD.

The observations follow:

[From the New York Times, Oct. 22, 1995]

POLITICS AND THE DEAD ARTS OF COMPROMISE
(By Adam Clymer)

WASHINGTON.—The most serious debate in at least three decades over the role of government in American life is being conducted in the nation's capital these days—with all the dignity of a 30-second spot.

Polls are used to consider timetables for possible negotiations, as each side ponders its moment of maximum advantage. Television spots about Medicare have employed slogans only minimally more civil than "liar, liar, pants on fire!"—which, of course, is their underlying message.

And focus groups scripted the debate that preceded the House's vote Thursday to curb \$270 billion in spending for Medicare and make wrenching changes in the centerpiece of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. Democrats may not have needed any research before accusing the Republicans of slighting the elderly to help the rich; that may be not be thoughtful, but it is instinctive. But when Republicans said "preserve and protect," over and over, they were following their pollsters' advice, not engaging in a serious discussion.

Even the most ordinary tasks of Congress are subordinated to political tactics. Only three of the 13 spending bills that Congress had promised to complete before the fiscal year began three weeks ago have gone to the White House. Some of those bills have real problems, and may be hard for even Republicans to agree on.

But a few days ago Speaker Newt Gingrich explained the delay in purely tactical terms. He said he thought President Clinton would try to make headlines by vetoing them, and snapped, "I'm not going to give his Presidential campaign new cheap-shot photocopies." (In past Congresses, the dynamics were only a little different: Democrats invited vetoes by passing bills they knew Presidents Reagan and Bush would reject, seeking campaign issues for the next election.)

ARRANGING SURRENDER

One reason that major legislation and national issues are being approached with the winner-take-all-quality of elections is that the normal process of getting things done in Washington, compromise, has become synonymous with capitulation. If compromise is evil, then who needs negotiations? All that's needed to arrange are the terms of surrender.

Kathleen Hall Jamieson, dean of the Annenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania and an expert on political language, suggests the problem is more than rhetorical. "The thing that the word 'compromise' was designed to describe—the process by which you forge consensus—is no longer an acceptable part of the political process," she said. That was especially true in the House, she said, where "institutional courtesies" like consideration for the minority and civility in debate have fallen into disuse.

Republicans, driven by a huge and unbending freshman class, offer no apologies. Representative David M. McIntosh, an Indiana freshman, explained last week: "When we went home in August, we all heard from the public, 'Don't back down, don't give in to the Senate or the President.' We came back and we told the leadership that we won't back down, and we haven't."

Mr. Gingrich knew what was coming, for right after the election last year he proclaimed himself "very prepared to cooperate with the Clinton Administration," but "not prepared to compromise." And even Senator Bob Dole, the majority leader, who has built a considerable legislative reputation on making deals, said last month, "This will not be an autumn of compromise, make no mistake about it."

Mr. Clinton does not always spurn compromise. But he has not given it a good name, either. Last week he even seemed to be trying to cut a deal with himself on the subject of taxes, first sounding contrite that he had raised taxes "too much" in 1993 and then pronouncing himself proud of that

year's budget. But he has been attacking many of the Republicans' spending cuts as "extremist," so he risks being accused of surrender if he reaches an agreement with them on next year's budget.

FEATS OF CLAY

House Democrats will oppose almost any deal that involves spending cuts; they don't believe in them. But Mr. Clinton also fears attacks from the press, which cannot believe that Mr. Clinton can give ground to help the country, but only because he is wishy-washy.

Compromise was once highly prized in American politics, at the Constitutional Convention, in the Republic's early days, and when Henry Clay, the dominant lawmaker of the first half of the 19th century, was hailed as the "Great Compromiser."

But in the years leading up to the Civil War, compromise lost its good name. Abolitionists held slavery to be a moral abomination, and Abraham Lincoln himself rejected a pre-inaugural effort to preserve the Union by guaranteeing slavery forever in the states where it then existed.

Joel Silbey, a Cornell University historian, noted that compromise again fell into disrepute just before the Progressive Era, when "government seemed to be forever compromising with evil power." Like the Civil War period, and like today, he said, that was a time when outsiders got involved in the political process and scorned its traditions.

An important House Republican leadership aide said the same circumstances prevailed today: "The American people think that politicians, once they get to Washington, are all too willing to give up their principles, wedded to a system of selling out."

Today's politicians find a lot of moral imperatives, like the difference between achieving a balanced budget in 2002 and, say, 2003. Not Mr. Clinton, who has said at various times that it would take five years, seven years, eight years or nine. But seven years is what the Republicans say they must have—or else.

There are Democrats who speak of cuts in Medicare in the apocalyptic terms they would use if faced with a bill completely repealing this greatest of the Great Society's programs. And there are Republicans, like Mr. McIntosh, who look in absolute terms on a pet project of his and Representative Ernest Istook's—an effort to prohibit groups that get any Federal money from lobbying the Federal Government, ever. They threaten to hold all other legislation hostage until they get that prohibition adopted.

Norman Ornstein, the Congressional scholar from the American Enterprise Institute, says there may be 100 House Republicans "who believe, deep down, that compromise is a bad thing." He said the leaders were giving themselves very little breathing room by leaving only three weeks to get major bills passed and then settle things before the debt limit expires Nov. 12. "It's a dangerous end game," he warns.

Earlier this month, it seemed both sides might negotiate. But the Clinton side thought the Congressional quest for Medicare cuts was hurting the Republicans and saw no reason to give ground. It may be only when both sides think the public will blame them for stubbornness that they may sit down together.

If so, politicians may be too busy testing attack phrases—like "tax cut for your wealthy contributors," or "a joke wrapped in fraud and shrouded by farce"—to judge the public clearly.

Peter D. Hart, a Washington pollster, said a recent poll conducted for NBC News and The Wall Street Journal showed that a majority of Democrats wanted the President "to make adjustments to reach compromise"

with Congressional Republicans on budget issues and that a majority of Republicans wanted their lawmakers to compromise with Mr. Clinton.

"Compromise may be a dirty word in Washington," he said. "But out among the public it is a very positive term." •

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is informed that, under the circumstances, morning business would have been closed. Does he ask consent to continue that for a time in excess of 5 minutes?

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak out of order for such time as I may consume.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, last Friday, in the early hours following midnight, the Senate passed S. 1357, the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995. Here it is; it is 1,949 pages. The passage of that bill was not one of the Senate's finest hours. It was the latest, and perhaps the most striking, example to date of the misuse of the Budget Act's reconciliation process to ram through the Senate a 1,949-page monstrosity—there it is—a gigantic monstrosity, which will permanently change a vast number of statutes in ways that no Senator can possibly understand.

The fast-track reconciliation procedures that were established in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 were never intended to be used as a method to enact omnibus legislative changes under expedited, non-filibusterable procedures. I know, because I helped to write the Congressional Budget Act in 1974, and it was never in my contemplation that the reconciliation legislation would be used in this fashion and for these purposes—never! I would not have supported it; I would have voted against it.

As a matter of fact, I would have left some loopholes in that legislation, which would have saved us, and which would continue to save us from stultifying ourselves by using such procedures to pass legislation which otherwise would be debated at great length, amended many times, and assure the American people that their representatives here knew what they were doing when they passed the legislation. So it was never intended to be used in that fashion. Yet, that is what has occurred under the reconciliation process.

Beginning in 1981, the Senate Budget Committee has piled together whatever changes the authorizing committees have recommended, and that is in accordance with the law. The Budget Committee has to do that. It has no alternative. It has no recourse. It cannot amend, substantively, measures that come to it from the authorizing committees. And the Budget Committee then must present this package to the Senate in the form of a reconciliation bill, often with little regard as to