

the Caucus during this 25th legislative forum weekend.

I would like to convey HHS' strong commitment to the participation of small businesses and small disadvantaged businesses in the work of our department. HHS has an outstanding record in this field, and has steadily increased the number of prime and subcontract awards being made to small businesses in general, and to small disadvantaged businesses in particular.

Our top staff who are here today, Ms. LaVarne Burton, our Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget Policy Initiatives, and Mr. Verl Zanders, the head of the Department's OSDDBU, made it a special point to insure that HHS maintains a strong commitment to the participation of small and disadvantaged businesses in the HHS federal acquisition process. Let me just give you a few highlights of our effort.

Our Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization establishes and maintains outreach programs to provide a flow of information about HHS' Small Business Programs to small, small disadvantaged, and women-owned businesses. OSDDBU staff provided personal counseling and marketing assistance to over 2,500 interested small businesses during Fiscal Year 1994.

OSDBU also developed and distributed 8,000 copies of various publications designed to assist individuals and organizations in understanding our mission and programs of HHS.

In Fiscal Year 1994, HHS awarded approximately 41 percent (over \$1.2 billion), of its total acquisition awards to small businesses; and of that amount approximately 13 percent (over \$390 million) was awarded to small disadvantaged businesses. We think this is particularly noteworthy.

In addition, small disadvantaged businesses received approximately 8.2 percent (\$31 million) of the total subcontracting dollars from prime contracts awarded by the Department.

Historically, HHS has exceeded all of the statutory goals for small business participation on a consistent basis.

These achievements are made possible because of broad institutional acceptance and support of these programs throughout the Department.

HHS remains committed to the development and expansion of acquisition opportunities which can, and will, encourage many more small businesses and small disadvantaged businesses to participate in our programs.

In short, we are proud to be a part of one of the best small and small disadvantaged business programs in government!

I would also like to remind everyone about the HHS exhibit table which is staffed by our Departmental small business experts who will have various printed materials and information on hand. Please take full advantage of this opportunity to learn "How to do Business With the Department of Health and Human Services."

Thank you.●

BETTING ON A LOSER

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, Kristina Ford, the executive director of the New Orleans City Planning Commission, had an op-ed piece in the New York Times about casino gambling in New Orleans. Because it touches on a subject that we have not seriously examined as a nation, I believe it merits the attention of my colleagues.

Let me remind you also that Senator LUGAR and I have a bill in to establish a commission to take an 18-month look

at where we are and where we should go in this whole question of legalized gambling.

I ask that the article be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

[From the New York Times, Oct. 18, 1995]

BETTING ON A LOSER

(By Kristina Ford)

NEW ORLEANS.—In New York State, opposition to gambling has crumbled in the face of a budget that apparently is to be balanced by windfalls from games of chance. Keno is trumpeted as a solution to the state's \$5 billion deficit, and both the tourist-hungry Catskills and Niagara Falls hope for casinos. Promises of prosperity have also paved the way for a casino in Bridgeport, Conn.

After the oil and gas industry largely abandoned the New Orleans area a decade ago, we heard similar stories, and we can offer advice to lawmakers who believe their fiscal problems can be solved by a roll of the dice.

This week, just five months after Harrah's opened a casino here, The New Orleans Times-Picayune characterized it as "beleaguered." It is bringing in only a third of the projected \$33 million monthly revenue.

The whole gaming experiment here has been disappointing. Two of our four riverboat gambling operations have failed and another is reported to be sinking. Casino operators are seeking waivers from city building regulations that were designed to preserve the historic French Quarter from gaudy marketing schemes more appropriate to the Las Vegas strip.

Two years ago, when the city planning commission asked casino operators what effects they predicted for New Orleans, they gave us revenue projections based on Harrah's experiences in Atlantic City, a city very different from ours in demographics and spirit. They also claimed there would be no limit to the demand for gambling, saying the proof was in the state of Mississippi, where riverboat profits were paying off their loans in 12 months and cities were reducing property taxes. (Seven of the Mississippi gambling boats have failed since then.)

Despite the assurances, we knew that legalized gambling is at best a crapshoot whose projected effects are most frequently stated in terms of anecdotes, cooked-up numbers and promises. The one clearly foreseeable result—families bankrupted by parents with uncontrollable urges to gamble—is often overlooked.

Public policy should not depend on who can fashion bigger promises but on how gambling will really effect a city. Yet as we debated the issue, it was impossible to get a clear picture of how it would transform civic life. Would it increase or decrease our considerable crime rate? What would be the effect on our poorest neighborhoods? How would it effect our essential tourist business?

So the city has instituted a five-year study to assess what gambling will do to our fiscal well-being and community life. We will study how the industry has affected other businesses, determine whether tourists perceive the city's attractions differently now and measure the consequences of gambling on families. Harrah's is paying for the research, but the work is being conducted by a consortium of local universities, which will make annual reports.

Arguments over casino regulation will dominate the City Council's agenda for years. Our study should give us reliable information for these debates. Should we permit restaurants in the casinos? Should we allow large billboards and flashing light dis-

plays in our downtown? With any luck, policy decisions will be based on something other than developers' promises and entrepreneurial baloney.

New York and Connecticut would be wise to pay attention to our experience and to establish their own commissions to measure performance against promises and to fight facts with facts.●

RETURN TO SOMALIA

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, the former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, Frank Crigler, had an op-ed piece in the Washington Post on Somalia.

The first few paragraphs may have been written tongue-in-cheek. I am not sure. If not, Ambassador Crigler is wrong.

But the remaining three-fourths of his op-ed piece are correct.

When he talks about "the Somalia disaster," if he is referring to what we did, there is no question that hundreds of thousands of lives were saved. I do not count that a disaster.

Some mistakes were made. We had a retired American military officer, acting for the United Nations, who made some decisions that probably looked correct from a military point of view, but would not have been made had he consulted with former Ambassador Robert Oakley. That decision resulted in the needless deaths of 19 American service personnel, 1 of whom we saw dragged through the streets on our television sets. The combination of this repulsive action, and our being there to help save lives, caused many in Congress to say that we should pull our troops out. In reality, in 1993, there were more cab drivers killed in New York City than American service personnel killed in Somalia.

Ambassador Crigler describes the Somalia action as "George Bush's embarrassing last hurrah," my own guess is that history will view it as his finest hour. George Bush made the right decision, a courageous decision. Without that decision, many lives would have been lost, and the attitude in the Moslem nations of the world, would have hardened against the United States. They would have rightly sensed that if Somalia had been a white, Christian, or Jewish nation, the United States would have responded. Ambassador Crigler says that the Somalia action "was Bill Clinton's first big foreign policy flop." There is some truth to that. It is difficult to move from Governor of Arkansas to become the most influential person in foreign policy, particularly if you have not been interested in foreign policy that much prior to this occasion. Had Bill Clinton been able to explain to the American people why we were there and that we were going to stay there for a while until some semblance of order was restored, the American people would have understood, and American leadership would have become more trusted in the world.

In terms of the three basic lessons that Ambassador Crigler mentions, he

is right on No. 1: "Overwhelming military force can help to halt fighting, end suffering and save lives. Hundreds of thousands of lives, in fact."

He is right on No. 2: "You cannot do peacemaking unless you swallow the risk, go where the fighting is and dirty your shoes." One of the difficulties of our foreign policy right now is that there has been a real reluctance to recognize that risk-taking is part of leadership. You cannot maintain stability in the city of Chicago without having the police take risks, and you cannot maintain stability in the world without those in the Armed Forces also taking risks.

Lesson No. 3 is: "Even overwhelming force cannot solve another people's political problems. They must do that for themselves."

I do not question that, if it is properly understood, but it could be used as a reason for not acting responsibly in Bosnia, for example. No. 3 needs to be rephrased in order to be universally applicable.

I ask that the article by Ambassador Frank Crigler be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 15, 1995]

RETURN TO SOMALIA—IN A LAND AMERICANS WANT TO FORGET, SOME MODEST SIGNS OF SUCCESS

(By Frank Crigler)

BAIDOA, SOMALIA.—Last month, far away from this forlorn "City of Death" where anarchy and hunger had once claimed tens of thousands of lives, Gen. Colin Powell said some remarkably upbeat things about our military misadventures in Somalia. That Powell was willing to talk about the subject at all was newsworthy. Most people would just as soon forget the Somalia disaster.

For Republicans, Somalia was George Bush's embarrassing last hurrah; for Democrats, it was Bill Clinton's first big foreign policy flop. And for the average American, it was one more example of foolish leaders getting our fine young troops killed in places they never should have been sent.

But for Colin Powell, Somalia had been this nation's first grand attempt at humanitarian military intervention, and it taught some lessons worth remembering—some we might want to review as we debate sending our troops to Bosnia on yet another rescue mission.

Powell's argument, in a nutshell, is that we were right to answer the 911 fire alarm when the Somalis' house was burning down. But we should not have hung around afterward pretending to solve domestic squabbles we didn't understand.

"Where things went wrong is when we decided, the U.N. decided, that somehow we could tell the Somalis how they should live with each other. At that point we lost the bubble," Powell said in an interview with The Washington Post, offering an odd but apt description of the tragic sequel to Operation Restore Hope.

It's now been six months since the last U.N. peacekeeping troops retreated in frustration from Somalia. Almost all civilian relief agencies and non-governmental personnel left with them or soon after. Almost everyone predicted that without their help, Somalia would quickly sink back into its nightmarish misery.

Little was left to show for the enormous investment in time, money and human lives

we and our allies had made trying to put this East African Humpty Dumpty back together. The country still lay in ruins, with no functioning government, no public services, no viable economy, no judicial system. The feuding clan warlords who had trashed it still ruled in their fiefdoms, unbowed and uncompromising, making and breaking alliances among themselves.

What surprised me when I returned here a few weeks ago, however, was that Somalia had refused to relapse into its earlier spasms of violence. Inexplicably, the truce U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley compelled the feuding warlords to sign back in December 1992 (with the robust backing of nearly 30,000 heavily armed allied troops) generally seemed to be holding. People were not starving again. As Powell himself noted, "There has been no image of swollen-bellied kids on our CNN screens [after all]."

Somalia Lesson No. 1: Overwhelming military force can help to halt fighting, end suffering and save lives. Hundreds of thousands of lives, in fact.

I wanted to see what was happening for myself, so when one of the warlords invited me to come take a look, I jumped at the chance. Five others—among them a respected U.S. historian, two clerical types looking for a responsible agency to distribute medical supplies from their parishioners and an American entrepreneur hoping to sell a telephone system—accepted his invitation as well, all of us willing to risk being "used" for public relations purposes in order to judge the state of things first-hand.

Our host was the most celebrated warlord of them all, a man with a PR problem to rival that of Attila the Hun: Gen. Mohamed Farah Aided. But his people told us that "President" Aided (his clan confederates had bestowed the title on him in June, shortly after the last U.N. peacekeepers fled) wanted to make a new start with Americans.

At the outset, anyway, Aided's new Somalia seemed a lot like his old one. When en route to Africa, we'd heard reports that his heavily armed militia forces had captured Baidoa as part of a major new military offensive. Trapped there as virtual hostages were said to be 23 foreign relief workers (including five Americans) loosely affiliated with U.N. aid agencies.

Unanimously, our group determined that we were not going to let our visit be used to sanction hostage-taking, and we sent word ahead that we wouldn't budge from Nairobi until the United Nations itself assured us the relief workers were safe and sound. Soon a reply came back via the United Nations that everything had been sorted out and the "hostages" were free to go where they pleased. So we proceeded directly to Baidoa, hoping to help evacuate those who wished to leave and then get on with our own visit.

But there were no grateful relief workers in sight when we landed, no welcoming committee, no explanation. Instead, armed militiamen trundled us off to the general's field headquarters and dumped us without ceremony in the middle of a presidential Cabinet meeting. It was instantly apparent that a high-level debate was raging over what to do with the unfortunate relief workers, our friends from the United Nations—and now ourselves.

On one side of the debate were ranged an assortment of senior "state security" agents whose type I knew well from my previous service in Somalia (I realized I had not missed them one bit). The agents, we learned, had discovered evidence that some of the foreigners were suspiciously cozy with trouble-making dissidents in Baidoa. This group was urging Aided not to release them until charges were thoroughly investigated.

Ranged on the other side were, let's say, an "internationalist" faction concerned about

the embarrassment of yet another incident with the United Nations, particularly in the eyes of the distinguished guests who had just arrived. This group was urging a more statesman-like approach on Aided, and we did what we could to reinforce their arguments.

With occasional concessions and much posturing, the debate ran on for two more days. In the end it was Aided who stepped forward with a grand face-saving compromise, dismissed the rumors, released the detainees and even apologized to the United Nation and to us for the "misunderstanding" his overzealous security agents had caused. Maybe we were going to see a "new" Somalia after all!

As for us distinguished visitors, we felt we had validated another timely precept:

Somalia Lesson No. 2: You can't do peacemaking unless you swallow the risk, go where the fighting is and dirty your shoes.

As promised, Aided made himself quite accessible, so we took advantage to question him more closely about his Baidoa offensive. He bridled when we used the word "capture," however. He had only come to mediate a local clan dispute, he insisted, not to impose his rule or grab territory. There was no need to "capture" a town whose people had long ago joined his camp.

He pointed out, and we had to agree, that we had seen no signs of recent fighting in Baidoa and that its streets and shops were full of people peacefully going about their business.

He reminded us that he had spent most of the previous day and night in marathon meetings with local clan elders, working to untangle the strands of their dispute (the very one in which our relief workers were alleged to have meddled).

He also reminded us that we'd watched thousands cheer his promises of political peace, regional autonomy, a free market economy and multiparty elections at a rally staged to welcome him at the Baidoa soccer field. Did they look to us like "captured people?" he asked.

(We granted him these points, although I still suspect what we saw was more akin to Powell's doctrine of overwhelming military superiority: Deploy enough firepower, and even your bitterest enemies will turn out to cheer for you.)

With the "hostage" crisis resolved, our group was finally able to take the closer look we'd come for. In and around Baidoa, much of what we saw looked like the same old Somalia to me—battered buildings, broken-down trucks, burned-out warehouses.

But if you squinted just right, you could see some encouraging signs too: City streets were crowded, tea shops thriving, markets bustling. Goods seemed plentiful for those who could pay, and people seemed relaxed and friendly to outsiders.

Later, on the highway down to the coast, we found buses and trucks piled high with passengers coming from somewhere, merchandise going elsewhere. But we also saw more signs of serious fighting between two subclans whose dispute Aided claimed he was attempting to resolve, and sensed more nervousness on the part of our escorts.

But in the agricultural heartland at Afgoi and along the Shebelle River, we passed sorghum fields carefully banked and plated, sesame and cotton growing tall, citrus for sale in heaps on the highway, barrels of ripe tomatoes on donkey carts bananas ripening, camels copulating and cattle fattening for shipment to Red Sea butcher shops.

And in Mogadishu at last (where some areas were still "off limits"), we pushed through incredible traffic jams and ate at crowded restaurants. Ships were loading bananas in the port. The central market was

teeming, protected by its own private police force. The Somali shilling was trading at stable rates—with no protection at all. And a half-dozen crude newspapers were circulating freely.

Most hopeful of all, we saw practically no guns on the street and heard almost none at night. Disarmament, the elusive goal of American and U.N. peacekeepers, finally seemed to be occurring in their absence, perhaps spontaneously.

To be sure, the only schools operating were Koranic schools. The only regularly scheduled air service carried bales of khat, the Somalis' narcotic of choice. The only telephones were satellite links. The only electricity came from noisy private generators, though it was often shared among neighbors. The only water came from private wells, and there wasn't much of it.

Hospitals were dismal and might as well have been closed. Drugs cost a fortune. Rubble and wreckage still choked the streets. Some buildings had been cleaned up windows replaced and shell holes patched, but we saw little major renovation. And the big problem on everyone's mind was how to create jobs for the youngsters who'd gone to war instead of to school. In a word, there was more poverty than progress in Aided's "new" Somalia—but at least no one seemed to be starving.

Was this just a "show" for foreign guests, as several Aided critics whispered to us? Or were Somalis themselves finally putting their nation and their political system back together again, absent our help?

As Powell observed of the people here: "They had been solving their political problems for a thousand years before Jeffersonian democracy came upon the scene."

Somalia Lesson No. 3: Even overwhelming force can't solve another people's political problems. They must do that for themselves.

When we lunched with Aided one afternoon before leaving Baidoa, I read him some excerpts from The Post's interview with his old adversary. He was fascinated. It was no surprise that he agreed with Powell's central point: We should have stopped while we were ahead.

But what bothered Aided wasn't so much our arrogance as our ignorance. "I think if Americans had tried to understand our system, our traditions, our history, our way of life before sending troops and experts into Somalia to change everything," he reflected, "we would still be close friends."

Perhaps. But it was fortunate for Somalia that Americans hurried to lend a helping hand, even as we were slow to understand how a nation can collapse in turmoil and misery. Had we delayed our intervention until we "understood" the conflict's root causes, many thousands more would have died and clan warfare might yet be raging.

Gen. Powell would probably agree.●

HEAD-IN-THE-SAND FOREIGN POLICY

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, the Washington Post on Monday, October 16, 1995, ran a column by Jessica Mathews that is absolutely on target.

My colleagues have heard me speak before about the need for a more responsible foreign policy.

I thought it was particularly fascinating to note the quotation in the Jessica Mathews column that it costs \$600 million less to run the United Nations than it does the New York City police department.

How foolish we are to fail to do what we should in support of a more enlight-

ened and responsible international policy.

I ask that the Jessica Mathews column be printed in the RECORD at this point, and I urge my colleagues to read it.

The column follows:

HEAD-IN-THE-SAND FOREIGN POLICY

(By Jessica Mathews)

A dispassionate foreign observer of Congress's budget choices would have to conclude that Americans' only international aspiration is to be global policemen. Or, to be scrupulously fair, policeman with a handout for refugees and the most wretched victims of disaster.

That isn't what Americans want, but its' what—unless drastic adjustments are made in the next few weeks of bargaining—they're going to get. In both the House and Senate versions of next year's budget every means of keeping the peace short of military action and every other cost of international leadership or national self-interest—political, economic, environmental, humanitarian—is stripped to near or below the minimum while more money than the Pentagon thinks it can usefully spend is crammed down its throat.

In round numbers, Congress has added \$7 billion to a \$220 billion military total that already dwarfs what all of the rest of the world outside NATO spends on defense. Meanwhile, in the name of deficit reduction, it is planning to cut \$3 billion to \$4 billion from all other international spending. That may not sound like much but it amounts to 15 percent to 20 percent of the \$20 billion total in international affairs spending and includes reductions for most international agencies of 25 percent to 60 percent.

The cuts mean that U.S. embassies and consulates will close when a globalizing economy and more independent countries mean that more should be opening. They translate into fewer foreign service officers, hamstringed diplomacy and less of the most cost-efficient means of intelligence gathering. They mean long lines and poor services for Americans at home and abroad. All of that is tolerable, if neither sensible nor necessary, given defense increases.

What will really hurt American interests—indeed already has—are the cuts to the United Nations, the World Bank's fund for the poorest countries and the host of small international agencies that provide hundreds of services Americans need and value and underpin agreements that both parties have spent years of tough negotiating to achieve.

Where the cuts are in dues for which the United States is legally committed, as are its U.N. dues, the cost will be measured in an unraveling of international law not limited to finances. If the United States can renege on its funding obligations why can't X on Y (fill in the country and topic of your choice)?

Even where the cuts are in voluntary contributions, the result of a U.S. pull back from the international community along a front that reaches from peacekeeping to environmental protection will be a declining interest on the part of other countries in supporting U.S. initiatives. That will fuel further disenchantment in the United States etc., with results that no one wants.

The cycle has already begun. The United States owes the U.N. \$1.5 billion, a debt that threatens to tip that institution into insolvency. The U.N. is limping along by not paying what it owes to contractors and to countries that supply its peacekeeping troops. In effect, the likes of Pakistan and Bangladesh are covering our bad check.

Congress wants to see organizational reforms at the U.N. before it will consider even a partial payment. But for the rest of the

world, the No. 1 item on the agenda is that a country that can afford to do so does not pay its dues year after year. As Britain's foreign secretary remarked to an appreciative audience, the United States seems to want "representation without taxation."

Part of what has brought us to this sorry pass is too many years of cheap shot—and now almost obligatory—political rhetoric that has inflated the self-evident need for U.N. reform into a problem of unrecognizable dimensions in the minds of most Americans. Even while defending the U.N., U.S. Ambassador Madeline Albright called it "elephantine." It took Australia's Gareth Evans to provide some perspective by pointing out that the U.N.'s secretariat and core functions (in New York, Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi and the Hague) cost \$600 million less than the New York City Police Department. Adding the development, environment and population agencies, the huge refugee operation, UNICEF and others, the total is still less than Congress's defense add-on.

Having launched a last-minute effort to reduce U.N. funds and the rest of the international affairs budget, the administration is battling a sentiment it helped create by blaming the United Nations for its own mistakes in Somalia and Bosnia, and an attitude on the part of congressional freshmen for which the politest description is a profound and willful ignorance of America's role in the world, its obligations, its interests and what it takes to meet them.

However long it takes, this struggle deserves attention and public support. No American doubts the need for a superlative military. But it should be obvious by now that the best-armed force in the world cannot meet more than a fraction of the threats of the post-Cold War world nor help seize most of its opportunities. An America served by a rich military budget and impoverished funding for every other international function will be a country both poorer and less secure than it should be.●

ALL BETTER NOW

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, a longtime friend who headed my Illinois operation for many years and still is associated with me, Jerry Sinclair, once again showed why he is a valuable friend by sending a column that appeared in World Business in their September-October 1995 issue.

It deals with the Canadian health care system written by Diane Francis, the editor of Canada's foremost business newspaper, the Financial Post. It views things from a business perspective. She is the author of five books on business.

Ms. Francis spells out very clearly why the Canadian health care system is far superior to the United States system.

The propaganda spread against the Canadian system here in the United States by those who profit from the present system terribly distorts what the Canadians have. This column helps to balance that.

I would add, in the last poll I saw of Canadian citizens, exactly 3 percent of them said they would prefer the United States system of health care to theirs. That does not, as this column points out, suggest there are no problems with the Canadian system. But they deliver superior health care to their