

Mr. Barela began his IRS career as a grade 3 mail clerk in the Phoenix District Office on 1961. He then became an office call interviewer in Phoenix until 1966.

After that he transferred to Las Vegas as a revenue officer until 1969 whereupon he became revenue officer group manager in San Bernardino, CA. In 1971, he moved to San Diego as chief of office branch and was selected as one of the first grade 13 group managers in collection in the Los Angeles District.

Mr. Barela moved to the field branch chief position in 1972 in San Diego and in 1973 marked his first return to Albuquerque as a collection and taxpayer service division chief. 1973 also marked another promotion for Mr. Barela as the collection division chief in New Orleans District. Mr. Barela served as executive assistant, to assistant regional commissioner, central region office in Cincinnati from 1975 to 1981.

In 1981, Mr. Barela entered the executive ranks of IRS, where he has served in several positions of increasing responsibility. Mr. Barela's first executive assignment was an assistant director, returns and processing in Washington, DC, during 1981. In 1985 Mr. Barela became the assistant director, service center in Atlanta. In 1989, Mr. Barela became assistant District Director in Fort Lauderdale where he assisted during the recovery after Hurricane Andrew. In 1993, Mr. Barela returned home to Albuquerque as the District Director, the highest State office with the IRS. ●

#### PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1995

● Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise to address H.R. 4, the Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, a bill to reform the Nation's welfare system.

H.R. 4 is a radical departure in Federal welfare policy. This bill would end a 60-year-old Federal entitlement to poor families with children under the Aid to Families With Dependent Children Program [AFDC]. In the place of AFDC, the Senate bill would create a Federal welfare block grant that will give almost \$17 billion annually to State governments over the next 7 years to provide cash assistance, child care, job training, and other services to our Nation's poor. The States will have nearly complete flexibility to design and carry out these programs. The Federal Government requires only that the States impose a 5-year lifetime limit on welfare benefits and begin moving welfare recipients to work as rapidly as possible between now and the year 2000.

Opponents of H.R. 4 have talked extensively about this bill's flaws. It is said that the Federal money contained in the H.R. 4 is insufficient to meet the work requirements. We are told that funds for child care will make it impossible to care for the children of welfare recipients who go to work. Others have argued that States will cut welfare dramatically and set off a reverse bidding

war as States reduce and eliminate benefits to avoid becoming welfare magnates.

Mr. President, I supported amendments to this legislation that address many of these concerns. I voted for Senator DODD's amendment that would have provided an additional \$6 billion in Federal child care subsidies. We reached a compromise to increase Federal child care spending by some \$3 billion. The Senate also agreed to require the States to continue spending at least 80 percent of their 1994 welfare dollars. I believe these amendments have significantly improved H.R. 4 and increased the likelihood that it will succeed in reducing welfare dependence.

The Senate also took up an amendment offered by Senator DOMENICI on the issue of limiting welfare benefit increases for women who have additional children while on welfare. When H.R. 4 emerged from the Finance Committee it allowed States to impose the so-called family cap but did not require it. The Dole substitute amendment made this policy mandatory. The Domenici amendment reinstated the state option on the family cap.

New Jersey, Georgia, and several other states have imposed family caps based on the premise that increases in benefits for new births encourage illegitimacy. My instincts tell me this is probably true and, at the State level, I would have voted for this experiment. At this point, however, there is simply no firm analytical evidence to support it. A Rutgers University study published earlier this year found that the New Jersey family cap had no effect on illegitimacy rates and may have increased the State's abortion rate. Until the States have accumulated enough experience with the family cap to show it is effective in reducing illegitimacy, I believe it should remain a State option but should not be mandated by the Federal Government.

Mr. President, I voted for the Dole substitute amendment to H.R. 4. I understand the concerns expressed by those who fear this legislation will not do enough to protect children whose parents have reached the end of their welfare time limits. If this bill becomes law, I believe its effects on the well-being of children should be monitored carefully. Further steps will likely be needed by Congress and the States to assure that children are adequately cared for.

Mr. President, H.R. 4 is unlikely to be the last word in welfare reform. The problems we are trying to address in this legislation—welfare dependency and the illegitimacy, violence, and drug abuse that it engenders—are probably the most complex, troubling, and intractable problems facing American society. Anyone who believes that they have the single set of reforms to solve these problems is wrong. As UCLA sociologist James Q. Wilson argued late last year in an essay entitled, "A New Approach to Welfare Reform: Humil-

ity," what is really needed is the kind of State-based experimentation that might yield innovations that could be replicated by other States. I voted for H.R. 4 because I believe it offers the best opportunity to encourage this kind of experimentation. It is my hope that the conference between the Senate and the House will produce a compromise that I can also support.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the essay by James Q. Wilson be printed in the RECORD.

The essay follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, Thursday, December 29, 1994]

FIRM FOUNDATIONS: A NEW APPROACH TO  
WELFARE REFORM: HUMILITY  
(By James Q. Wilson)

We are entering the last years of the 20th century with every reason to rejoice and little inclination to do so, despite widespread prosperity, a generally healthy economy, the absence of any immediate foreign threat, and extraordinary progress in civil rights, personal health and school enrollment. Despite all this and more, we feel that there is something profoundly wrong with our society.

That communal life is thought to be deficient in many respects, plagued by crime, drug abuse, teenage pregnancy, WELFARE dependency and the countless instabilities of daily life. What these problems have in common in the eyes of most Americans is that they result from the weakening of the family.

Having arrived at something approaching a consensus, we must now face the fact that we don't know what to do about the problem. The American people are well ahead of their leaders in this regard. They doubt very much that government can do much of anything at all. They are not optimistic that any other institution can do much better, and they are skeptical that there will be a spontaneous regeneration of decency, commitment and personal responsibility.

I do not know what to do either. But I think we can find out, at least to the degree that feeble human reason is capable of understanding some of the most profound features of our condition.

The great debate is whether, how and at what cost we can change lives. If not the lives of this generation, then of the next. There are three ways of framing the problem.

First, the structural perspective: Owing to natural social forces, the good manufacturing jobs that once existed in inner-city areas have moved to the periphery, leaving behind decent men and women who are struggling to get by without work that once conferred both respect and money. Their place is now taken by street-wise young men who find no meaningful work, have abandoned the search for work, and scorn indeed the ethic of work.

Second is the rationalist perspective: Welfare benefits, including not only aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), but also Medicaid, subsidized housing and Food Stamps, have become sufficiently generous as to make the formation of stable two-parent families either irrational or unnecessary. These benefits have induced young women wanting babies and a home of their own to acquire both at public expense, and have convinced young men, who need very little convincing on this score, that sexual conquest need not entail any personal responsibilities.

Third is the cultural perspective: Child rearing and family life as traditionally understood can no longer compete with or

bring under prudent control a culture of radical self-indulgence and oppositional defiance, fostered by drugs, television, video games, street gangs and predatory sexuality.

Now, a visitor from another planet hearing this discourse might say that obviously all three perspectives have much to commend themselves and, therefore, all three ought to be acted upon. But the public debate we hear tends to emphasize one or another theory and thus one or another set of solutions. It does this because people, or at least people who are members of the political class, define problems so as to make them amenable to those solutions that they favor for ideological or moral reasons. Here roughly is what each analysis pursued separately and alone implies:

(1) Structural solutions. We must create jobs and job-training programs in inner-city areas, by means either of tax-advantaged enterprise zones or government-subsidized employment programs. As an alternative, we may facilitate the relocation of the inner-city poor to places on the periphery where jobs can be found and, if necessary, supplement their incomes by means of the earned-income tax credit.

(2) Rationalist solutions. Cut or abolish AFDC or, at a minimum, require work in exchange for welfare. Make the formation of two-parent households more attractive than single parenthood and restore work to prominence as the only way for the physically able to acquire money.

(3) Cultural solutions. Alter the inner-city ethos by means of private redemptive movements, supported by a system of shelters or group homes in which at-risk children and their young mothers can be given familial care and adult supervision in safe and drug-free settings.

Now, I have my own preferences in this menu of alternatives, but it is less important that you know what these preferences are than that you realize that I do not know which strategy would work, because so many people embrace a single strategy as a way of denying legitimacy to alternative ones and to their underlying philosophies.

Each of those perspectives, when taken alone, is full of uncertainties and inadequacies. These problems go back, first of all, to the structural solution. The evidence that links family dissolution with the distribution of jobs is, in fact, weak. Some people—such as many recent Latino immigrants in Los Angeles—notice that jobs have moved to the periphery from the city and board buses to follow the jobs. Other people notice the very same thing and stay home to sell drugs.

Now, even if a serious job mismatch does exist, it will not easily be overcome by enterprise zones. If the costs of crime in inner-city neighborhoods are high, they cannot be compensated for by very low labor costs or very high customer demand. Moreover, employers in scanning potential workers will rely, as they have always relied, on the most visible cues of reliability and skill—dress, manner, speech and even place of residence. No legal system, no matter how much we try to enforce it, can completely or even largely suppress these cues, because they have substantial economic value.

Second, let's consider some of the inadequacies of the rational strategy. After years of denying that the level of welfare payments had any effect on child-bearing, many scholars now find that states with higher payments tend to be ones in which more babies are born to welfare recipients; and when one expands the definition of welfare to include not only AFDC but Medicaid, Food Stamps and subsidized housing, increases in welfare were strongly correlated with increases in illegitimate births from the early 1960s to about 1980. At the point, the value of

the welfare package in real dollars flattened out, but the illegitimacy rate continued to rise.

Moreover, there remain several important puzzles in the connection between welfare and child-bearing. One is the existence of great differences in illegitimacy rates across ethnic groups facing similar circumstances. Since the Civil War at least, blacks have had higher illegitimacy rates than whites, even though federal welfare programs were not invented until 1935.

These days, it has been shown that the illegitimacy rate among black women is more than twice as high as among white women, after controlling for age, education and economic status. David Hayes Bautista, a researcher at UCLA, compared poor blacks and poor Mexican-Americans living in California. He found that Mexican-American children are much more likely than black children to grow up in a two-parent family, and that poor Mexican-American families were only one-fifth as likely as black ones to be on welfare.

Even among blacks, the illegitimacy rate is rather low in states such as Idaho, Montana, Maine and New Hampshire, despite the fact that these states have rather generous welfare payments. And the illegitimacy rate is quite high in many parts of the Deep South, even though these states have rather low welfare payments.

Clearly, there is some important cultural or at least noneconomic factor at work, one that has deep historical roots and that may vary with the size of the community and the character of the surrounding culture.

Finally, the cultural strategy. Though I have a certain affinity for it, it has its problems, too. There are many efforts in many cities by public and private agencies, individuals and churches to persuade young men to be fathers and not just impregnators, to help drug addicts and alcoholics, to teach parenting skills to teenage mothers. Some have been evaluated, and a few show signs of positive effects. Among the more successful programs are the Perry Pre-School Project in Ypsilanti, Mich.; the Parent Child Development Center in Houston; the Family Development Research Project in Syracuse, N.Y.; and the Yale Child Welfare Project in New Haven, Conn. All of these programs produce better behavior, lessened delinquency, more success in school.

The Manhattan Institute's Myron Magnet (author of "The Dream and the Nightmare: The Sixties' Legacy to the Underclass") and I have both endorsed the idea of requiring young unmarried mothers to live in group homes with their children under adult supervision as a condition of receiving public assistance. I also have suggested that we might revive an institution that was common earlier in this century but has lapsed into disuse of late—the boarding school, sometimes mistakenly called an orphanage, for the children of mothers who cannot cope. At one time such schools provided homes and education for more than 100,000 young people in large cities.

Though I confess I am attracted to the idea of creating wholly new environments in which to raise the next generation of at-risk children, I must also confess that I do not know whether it will work. The programs that we know to be successful, like the ones mentioned above, are experimental efforts led by dedicated men and women. Can large versions of the same thing work when run by the average counselor, the average teacher? We don't know. And even these successes predated the arrival of crack on the streets of our big cities. Can even the best program salvage people from that viciously destructive drug? We don't know.

There is evidence that such therapeutic communities as those run by Phoenix House,

headquartered in New York, and other organizations can salvage people who remain in them long enough. How do we get people to stay in them long enough? We don't know.

Now, if these three alternatives or something like them are what is available, how do we decide what to do? Before trying to answer that question, let me assert three precepts that ought to shape how we formulate that answer.

The first precept is that our overriding goal ought to be to save the children. Other goals—such as reducing the costs of welfare, discouraging illegitimacy, preventing long-term welfare dependency, getting even with Welfare cheats—may all be worthy goals, but they are secondary to the goal of improving the life prospects of the next generation.

The second precept is that nobody knows how to do this on a large scale. The debate has begun about welfare reform, but it is a debate, in large measure, based on untested assumptions, ideological posturing and perverse principles. We are told by some that worker training and job placement will reduce the welfare rolls, but we now know that worker training and job placement have so far had only a very modest effect. And few advocates of worker training tell us what happens to children whose mothers are induced or compelled to work, other than to assure us that somebody will supply day care.

The third precept that should guide us is that the federal government cannot have a meaningful family policy for the nation, and it ought not to try. Not only does it not know and cannot learn from experts what to do, whatever it thinks it ought to do, it will try to do in the worse possible way. Which is to say, uniformly, systematically, politically and ignorantly.

Now, the clear implication of these three precepts, when applied to the problem we face now, is that we ought to turn the task and the money for rebuilding lives, welfare payments, housing subsidies, the whole lot, over to cities and states and private agencies, subject to only two conditions. First, they must observe minimum for fundamental precepts of equal protection, and second, every major new initiative must be evaluated by independent observers operating in accordance with accepted scientific canons.

Some states or counties in this regime may end AFDC as we know it. Others may impose a mandatory work requirement. A few may require welfare recipients to turn their checks over to the group homes in which the recipients must reside or the boarding schools that their children must attend. Some may give the money to private agencies that agree to supply parent training, job skills and preschool education. Some may move welfare recipients out of the inner city and to the periphery.

Any given state government may do no better than Washington, but the great variety of the former will make up for the deadening uniformity of the latter. And within the states, the operating agencies will be at the city and county level, where the task of improving lives and developing character will be informed by the proximity of government to the voices of ordinary people.

Mr. Wilson is professor of management and public policy at UCLA. A longer version of this essay will appear in the Manhattan Institute's City Journal. •

#### INVESTIGATION OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT TRAFFICKING—CORRECTION OF THE RECORD

• Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, this Senator would always wish to correct the record of any proceedings of the