

support of my colleagues in opposing this amendment.

Now, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOLE. I ask further proceedings under the quorum call be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment No. 2781 offered by the Senator from Maryland [Ms. MIKULSKI].

The yeas and nays have been ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Texas [Mr. GRAMM] is necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 47, nays 52, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 464 Leg.]

#### YEAS—47

Akaka	Feinstein	Mikulski
Baucus	Ford	Moseley-Braun
Biden	Glenn	Moynihan
Bingaman	Graham	Murray
Boxer	Harkin	Nunn
Bradley	Hefflin	Pell
Breaux	Inouye	Pryor
Bryan	Jeffords	Reid
Bumpers	Johnston	Robb
Campbell	Kennedy	Rockefeller
Chafee	Kerrey	Sarbanes
Cohen	Kerry	Simon
Conrad	Lautenberg	Snowe
Daschle	Leahy	Specter
Dodd	Levin	Wellstone
Dorgan	Lieberman	

#### NAYS—52

Abraham	Frist	McCain
Ashcroft	Gorton	McConnell
Bennett	Grams	Murkowski
Bond	Grassley	Nickles
Brown	Gregg	Packwood
Burns	Hatch	Pressler
Byrd	Hatfield	Roth
Coats	Helms	Santorum
Cochran	Hollings	Shelby
Coverdell	Hutchison	Simpson
Craig	Inhofe	Smith
D'Amato	Kassebaum	Stevens
DeWine	Kempthorne	Thomas
Dole	Kohl	Thompson
Domenici	Kyl	Thurmond
Exon	Lott	Warner
Faircloth	Lugar	
Feingold	Mack	

#### NOT VOTING—1

Gramm

So the amendment (No. 2781) was rejected.

Mr. BOND. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. DOLE. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, was leader's time reserved?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It has been.

Mr. DOLE. I ask unanimous consent to use leader's time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### CONSULTING CONGRESS

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, yesterday, together with some of my colleagues, I sent a letter to President Clinton urging him to consult with the Congress on the nature of the commitments his administration has made to our NATO allies and the Bosnians with respect to United States involvement in a potential peace enforcement operation in Bosnia. The letter included a number of specific questions about such an operation and the wisdom of the administration's present approach.

Much to my surprise, administration spokesmen protested this letter claiming that there have been numerous consultations on this matter.

Despite White House claims, the fact is that the Clinton administration has not consulted the Congress on sending United States ground forces to Bosnia since 1993—when consultations were held on possible enforcement of the Vance-Owen plan.

What was Congress' reaction then? As part of the fiscal year 1994 Defense Appropriations bill we passed an amendment, 99 to 1. The Mitchell-Dole amendment—which reads as follows, and I quote:

It is the sense of the Congress that none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this act should be available for the purposes of deploying United States Armed Forces to participate in the implementation of a peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, unless previously authorized by the Congress.

A subsequent provision addressed consultation on U.S. participation in any peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations and opposed it unless, and I quote:

The President initiates consultations with the bipartisan leadership of Congress...

This was followed by directions for such consultation, including discussion of the goals of the operation, U.S. interests, the costs, funding strategy, extent of U.S. involvement, and the expected duration and scope of the operation.

Well, it is more than 2 years later—more than 2 years later—and a great deal has changed. The situation on the ground is not what it was and the peace settlement being negotiated is also not what it was. While we are aware that the administration continues to repeat its commitment to send U.S. troops to participate in a settlement force, we in the Congress do not know what that means in concrete terms. And we believe we have a right to know.

About 2½ weeks ago, the administration sent a high level team, led by Deputy Secretary of Defense White, to brief Senators on the NATO air campaign. At that time, questions were

raised about administration plans to participate in a peace enforcement operation. Unfortunately, these officials did not answer any of these questions, claiming that the planning process was not finished.

Mr. President, the point of consultations is to have input before there is a finished plan, before the Congress is handed a fait accompli. We do not want to be told after the fact that is a briefing, not a consultation. And we have had plenty of those where we are informed. We are not consulted; we are told. Lists of administration briefings and returned phone calls don't add up to consultation.

Today administration officials and members of the contact group concluded a second round of negotiations with the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian Foreign Ministers on principles for a peace settlement. There is little doubt in my mind that whether the Bosnian Government continues participating in these talks and finally agrees to sign a settlement will depend significantly on whether or not the United States sends troops to enforce it.

Let us face it, the so-called agreed principles are vague, except in that they partition Bosnia into two entities. As such, the Bosnians are bound to rely on United States guarantees where there are differences with the Serbs, which are inevitable on matters of Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Because the administration and allied approach has left the Bosnians without the means to secure their own peace, they will depend on those troops sent to enforce a settlement to defend their sovereignty.

Mr. President, we are still waiting to hear the administration's plan on lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia, a question that remains relevant now, as well as central to any exit strategy for American forces. I cannot conceive of supporting a plan that sends United States troops into Bosnia, while leaving the Bosnians unable to defend against future aggression.

We must know what the administration is telling the Bosnians, the Serbs, and our NATO allies, what promises and what threats, are being made. We also need to know what commitments are being made to the Russians with respect to their participation. In particular what is the administration response to Russian demands to share command with NATO in an enforcement operation? Will U.S. forces be under unified NATO command at all times?

The bottom line is that U.S. credibility depends on the United States keeping its word, meaning what it says. NATO credibility is also on the line. Why has there been no response to Bosnian Serb violations of the NATO no-fly zone reported today and last week?

No doubt about it, there is a lot at stake here—United States and NATO credibility, as well as the future of Bosnia.

It cannot escape the administration that the Congress has repudiated its approach toward Bosnia for the past 2 years. An overwhelming bipartisan majority has opposed the arms embargo, and Congress has voiced concerns with respect to peace plans that would destroy the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. So, to operate under the assumption that Congress will approve administration plans to send thousands of Americans in harm's way to enforce a settlement is a major error. The fact is that the Clinton administration may be making promises it cannot or should not keep.

Therefore, I am writing today to the chairmen of the Appropriations, Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees to request that they hold extensive hearings on this critical issue. I will request that the questions asked in the letter to President Clinton form the basis of their examination of this matter.

I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the letter we sent to the President today be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,  
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER,  
Washington, DC, September 25, 1995.

The PRESIDENT,  
The White House,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is our understanding that your administration, together with our NATO allies, is completing plans to enforce a potential settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina—a settlement not yet finalized. Much to our dismay, what we have learned about possible U.S. troop obligations has been largely from press reports. To date, your administration has failed to consult with the Congress on the nature and extent of commitments made to our NATO allies and the Bosnian government regarding U.S. participation in a force to implement a settlement. We are especially concerned since those forces must consist primarily of ground troops. There should be no doubts that without the concurrence of the Congress these commitments will not be fulfilled.

In our view, your administration must answer the following questions as soon as possible in order that the Senate may begin to fulfill its responsibility to carefully evaluate this matter:

(1) What specific commitments regarding U.S. troop participation have been made by your administration to our NATO allies?

(2) What specific commitments regarding U.S. troop participation have been made by your administration to the Bosnian government?

(3) What is the range of total NATO ground force levels, related to enforcement of a Bosnian peace settlement, being considered in the administration and at NATO headquarters? What would the U.S. contribution of forces be? What is the estimate of the number of reservists that would need to be called up? What is the estimated impact of such a deployment on readiness?

(4) Would this be a NATO-only operation or would Russian troops and/or other troops, from Islamic countries for example, also be a part of that total force enforcing a settlement?

(5) Would NATO be in complete command of all forces involved in an enforcement operation? Or would Russian forces and non-NATO forces be under different command arrangements? If so, how would these varied command arrangements be ultimately integrated in order to achieve unity of command? Is there to be another dual-key command?

(6) When would NATO forces be deployed—immediately after an agreement is signed or after Bosnian government and Bosnian Serb forces withdraw to lines of demarcation? What if the fighting does not stop after an agreement is signed?

(7) Is there a time table for UNPROFOR withdrawal? Would some of these U.N. units, from NATO contributing countries, remain as part of the new force?

(8) When would the “dual key” be eliminated? Would there be any other U.N. input into the command arrangements?

(9) What would the rules of engagement for NATO forces be?

(10) Where would NATO troops be deployed? In Bosnian Serb controlled territory?

(11) Would Bosnian government forces be supplied with additional arms during this enforcement period so that Bosnia can better defend itself against aggression after NATO forces leave? If so, what types of weapons would be provided and by whom? Has a commitment to provide military assistance—to include arms and/or training—to the Bosnian government in a post-settlement period been made by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, or any other administration officials to Bosnian government officials?

(12) How long would NATO troops be deployed? What is the exit strategy?

(13) What are the estimated costs of such a NATO deployment? What would the U.S. share be and how does the administration plan to pay for it?

Mr. President, these are not the only questions that will need to be answered, but they are essential to any Congressional debate and consideration of commitments made by you and your administration with respect to U.S. troops participating in an enforcement operation.

There are also matters of principle that will have to be carefully considered. First and foremost is a very fundamental question—whether United States forces should be deployed to partition a sovereign and independent country into two entities. Our men and women in the military have protected our freedom and our interests and defended our principles. Do we want to place our soldiers in harms' way to defend the compromise of our principles? We must also ask whether or not any settlement reached has been agreed to freely by the Bosnian government and without coercion. We are concerned about news reports that senior administration officials gained Bosnian government agreement on the first set of “Agreed Principles” by threatening a halt in NATO bombing. Finally, we must ask whether it would not be more just and more wise to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and allow the Bosnians to fight until there is a stable military balance—the precondition for any settlement which would not require the deployment of thousands of American and NATO troops to police it.

Mr. President, we have serious concerns about the commitments you and your administration reportedly have made with respect to U.S. participation—to include thousands of ground forces—in enforcing a possible Bosnian peace settlement. We hope that you will begin to consult earnestly and forthrightly with the Congress in the very near future.

Sincerely,

ROBERT DOLE,

JOHN W. WARNER,  
THAD COCHRAN,  
BOB SMITH,  
JESSE HELMS,  
ARLEN SPECTER,  
JAMES M. INHOFE,  
DIRK KEMPTHORNE,  
JON KYL,  
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON.

Mr. DOLE. I reserve the balance of my leader's time.

#### DEPARTMENTS OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1966

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The previous order is the Senator from Maryland is to be recognized to offer an amendment.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me indicate to my colleagues what we hope to achieve here this evening.

The Senator from Maryland will be recognized. I understand there is a 1-hour time agreement. We are willing to accept a 1-hour time agreement on the amendment.

Mr. SARBANES. It has already been agreed to.

Mr. DOLE. We will do that amendment and then the amendment of the Senator from Vermont, Senator JEFFORDS. I understand there is a 30-minute time agreement agreed to or willing to be agreed to. We will have those two votes.

By that time, we hope to be in a position to announce what will happen to the remainder of the evening. I am hopeful that Members who still have amendments will be willing to debate those amendments tonight and we will start voting on the amendments tomorrow.

We are talking about the additional amendments. There are two Rockefeller amendments, a Baucus amendment, Moseley-Braun.

Ms. MIKULSKI. As you know, we have been moving along very well on this bill, and what we will endeavor to do, and I thought we had, is to see if Senators ROCKEFELLER and BAUCUS will offer their amendments tonight because they are on the Finance Committee. That would, I think, take us through a substantial part of the evening.

Mr. DOLE. I suggest after these two votes we will announce what agreement we have been able to reach. We may not be able to reach any agreement. I do not want to keep raising this, but whether or not we are in session next week depends on whether or not we finish this bill, Labor-HHS, and State, Justice, and Commerce.

Yesterday we did not do anything. We had debate on one amendment. The amendment was voted on at 2:15 today.

My view is it is our hope we can finish this bill tonight and finish Labor-HHS by Thursday and dispose of the other bills by Saturday. If we cannot