

time to be sure, and Senator PELL has more than earned his comfortable retirement. But the sentiments held by his colleagues that this place will be impoverished by his departure are genuine. For Senator PELL's career was marked by more than extraordinary achievement. It was marked by extraordinary graciousness, and generosity, and an indefatigable decency toward others. I think we would all agree that when it comes to these virtues, CLAIBORNE PELL is a gentleman without peer.

In his announcement of his retirement, Senator PELL expressed some very gracious sentiments about this institution and the men and women who work here. Coming from him, they were most appreciated. For if the Senate is indeed a finer place than it is popularly perceived to be that quality is due in part to CLAIBORNE PELL's presence here. He will be greatly missed.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST ASIA

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, while we were out of session over the last three weeks there were a number of important developments in Asia—specifically Vietnam, Cambodia and China—to which I, as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, would like to draw my colleagues' attention.

First, the human rights situation in Vietnam continues to be of great concern. The weekend of August 12, barely a week after Secretary of State Christopher opened the newly-established U.S. embassy in Hanoi, a Vietnamese court convicted two Vietnamese-born U.S. citizens and seven Vietnamese nationals accused of being counter-revolutionaries and acting to "overthrow the people's administration." The group, allied with the banned political party Tan Dai Viet, was apparently trying to organize a conference in Ho Chi Minh City (the former Saigon) to discuss human rights and democracy in Vietnam. After their first attempt failed, they tried to set up another meeting but were arrested 10 days before it was held. Radio Hanoi Voice of Vietnam, in somewhat characteristic rhetoric, described their "crimes" as follows:

Taking advantage of our party's renovation policy, they used the pretext of democracy and human rights to distort the truth of history, smear the Vietnamese communist party and state, instigate bad elements at home, and contact hostile forces abroad to feverishly oppose our state in an attempt to set up a people-betraying and nation-harming regime. A check of their personal backgrounds indicated that they spent almost all their lives serving the enemy of our people and giving a helping hand to the aggressors' attempts to oppose our country.

The administration warned them and used educational measures on them after it discovered their sabotage scheme. Nonetheless, they stubbornly contacted reactionary forces abroad and carried on their scheme aimed at opposing and overthrowing the people's ad-

ministration. Their activities posed a particular danger to society and was detrimental to national security.

Americans Nguyen Tan Tri and Tran Quang Liem received a 7-year and 4-year prison sentence respectively.

In addition, the Vietnamese government's persecution of Buddhist leaders continues unabated. On August 15, a Vietnamese court sentenced a leader of a banned Buddhist church to five years in prison for criticizing Communist rule and maintaining an independent (i.e., outside direct Communist control) Buddhist church. The court convicted Thich Quang Do, secretary general of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), and five other activists in a 1-day trial. Thich Quang was accused of publishing a criticism of the Communist Party and sending two faxes to overseas Buddhists accusing the Vietnamese Government of obstructing a church-sponsored flood-relief mission in 1994. The other five were arrested for participating in that mission.

Vietnamese authorities also recently announced that the government would soon try the acting head of the UBCV Thich Huyen Quang, who is under house arrest at the Quang Phuoc Shrine in Quang Ngai; and Thich Long Tri, UBCV's third highest official, who is under house arrest at the Vien Giac Pagoda in Hoi An, Quang Nam. The announcement is especially ironic given that since last year the government has systematically denied that Thich Huyen had ever been placed under arrest. On December 29, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry announced that reports of Thich Huyen's arrest were fabrications and that he had simply been "moved to another pagoda at the requests of other monks."

Mr. President, these are not isolated incidents, but part of a systematic denial of even the most basic human rights on the part of the Vietnamese government. Let me list just a few others:

Thich Tri Tuu, the senior monk of the Linh Mu pagoda in Hue and a close disciple of the late Supreme Patriarch of the UBCV, is serving a four-year sentence on charges of "public disorder" at the Ba Sao prison camp, Nam Ha, Phu Ly province, in conjunction with the May 1993 protest in Hue. At the time of the demonstration, Thich Tri was being held in police custody, and police refused to let Buddhist monks who began the protests see him or talk to him. The crowd later saw him slumped in the back of a police vehicle, stopped the vehicle and extracted him from it—he had apparently fainted. He was placed, unconscious, into a cyclo-pousse which carried him back to his temple as the protest continued and certain persons in the crowd set the police vehicle on fire. Also still imprisoned at the Ba Sao camp on public disorder charges stemming from this protest are Thich Hai Tang and Thich Hai Thinh. Thich Hai Chanh was released, but not allowed to return to his residence at the Linh Mu pagoda in Hue and has been obliged to move to a pagoda in Quang Tri province.

Thich Hanh Duc, appointed by the state-sponsored church to be abbot of the Son Linh Pagoda of Ba Ria-Vung Tau in 1982, was arrested in July 1993 when police attempted to

enter the pagoda and a violent confrontation ensued. The Fatherland Front and the provincial people's committee issued an eviction order against Thich Hanh and other monks after the senior monk publicly read an oration of Thich Huyen Quang and expressed support for the restoration of the Unified Buddhist Church. In February 1993, the provincial committee of the state-sponsored church expelled him from the church for "violating the principles of Vietnamese Buddhism." Thich Hanh Duc was ultimately sentenced to three years of imprisonment for "crimes against on-duty officials" and "handing out documents hostile to the socialist government of Vietnam;" he was last known to be detained at the Phuoc Co prison in Ba Ria-Vung Tau.

Do Trung Hieu, formerly a Communist Party cadre in charge of religious affairs in Ho Chi Minh City and now a private businessman, was detained by police in Ho Chi Minh City on June 14, 1995. Hieu had written and circulated an autobiographical essay describing the Party's efforts to dismantle the Unified Buddhist Church after the war out of fear that its influence and following would spread throughout Vietnam. Hieu has reportedly been transferred to Hanoi for questioning, but his whereabouts have not been confirmed.

Hoang Minh Chinh, a well-known communist intellectual, was also detained in Hanoi on June 14 this year. This was his third detention for criticizing Party policy; he had previously been arrested for advocating "revisionist" lines in 1967 and 1981. The cause of the latest detention appears to be petitions he sent to the highest levels of the Party demanding that his name be cleared for his previous jailings, and his questioning the propriety of the constitutional provision that enshrines the leading role of the Vietnam Communist Party.

Doan Thanh Liem, a law professor who was educated in the United States, is serving a twelve-year sentence for "counter revolutionary propaganda"—that is, notes he had prepared on constitutional reform. He was arrested in April 1990 for his association with Michael Morrow, Dick Hughes and Don Luce. He knew all three Americans from his participation in a well-known Saigon charity, the Shoeshine Boys. Liem, held in the Ham Tan camp, has developed a serious pulmonary condition in prison that is often associated with tuberculosis. Senator HARKIN's request to meet with Liem was denied during his July 1995 visit.

Nguyen Tri, also known as Truong Hung Thai, was sentenced to eight years at the trial of Doan Thanh Liem for having helped Liem purchase a typewriter and having received from Liem two documents the official press described as "anti-communist."

Doan Viet Hoat, one of Vietnam's most prominent political prisoners, was transferred abruptly among three different prisons last year, ending up in the Thanh Cam camp, a facility for common criminals in a remote and malarial part of Thanh Hoa province. Arrested in November 1990, Dr. Hoat was given a fifteen-year sentence on charges of "attempting to overthrow the government" for producing the reformist newsletter Freedom Forum. His transfers seem to have come in reaction to public statements which he has periodically been able to release since his initial detention. The move to Thanh Cam has isolated him from the outside world, and he is allowed only limited communication with his family.

Pham Duc Kham, also tried for the Freedom Forum affair, was sentenced to sixteen years of imprisonment (later reduced to just under twelve years) for his participation. He was transferred in November 1994 from the Xuan Phuoc labor camp in Phu Yen province

to the Cam Thuy camp Number 5, not far from the Thanh Cam camp in a remote part of Thanh Hoa province.

Le Duc Vuong, tried for the Freedom Forum affair, was sentenced to a five-year term. He was last known to be performing hard labor at the A-20 camp in Xuan Phuoc.

Dr. Nguyen Dan Que, an endocrinologist who was sentenced in 1991 to twenty years of imprisonment on charges of "attempting to overthrow the government" for publicly signing a declaration calling for political reform and respect for human rights, is reported to be in fair health, having received some medication for a kidney stone. He has been held in isolation at Xuan Loc prison camp for nearly two years, following the Vietnamese government's unwillingness to allow our colleague Senator ROBB to meet him.

Do Van Thac was arrested with five other members of the opposition Dai Viet Duy Dan (People's Party) on July 9, 1991. In January 1992, a court in Hanoi sentenced Do Van Thac to fourteen years' imprisonment—later commuted to twelve years—on charges of "attempting to overthrow the government," apparently for circulating writings describing the People's Party and calling for political and economic reform.

Vu Thanh, Dat Hai, Paul Nguyen Chau Dat, and five other members of the Congregation of the Mother Co-Redemptrix remain in prison. On May 15, 1987, these persons, along with Father Dominic Tran Dinh Thu and approximately sixty other Catholic clergy and laypersons were arrested when authorities raided the compound of the order founded by Father Dominic. During the raid, authorities seized rice stocks from the community and religious literature, causing people from the surrounding area to defend the congregation (and their rice stocks) with improvised arms. Vu Thanh, Dat Hai, Paul Nguyen Chau Dat and twenty others were tried on October 30, 1987 and convicted of "sowing disunity between the people and the government." Vu Thanh Dat Hai was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment and three years of suppression of civil rights, and is now in the Long Khanh prison camp. Paul Nguyen Chau Dat was given a twenty-year term, which he is also serving in Long Khanh. Nguyen Van Thin Quan is serving a sixteen-year sentence in the Ham tan camp; Mai Duc Chuong Nghi is serving an eighteen-year term in a Thanh Hoa province labor camp; Dinh Viet Hieu Thuc is serving a fourteen-year sentence in the Long Khanh prison camp; Pham Ngoc Lien Tri is serving a twenty-year term at the Long Khanh camp, and Nguyen Thien Phung Huan is also serving a twenty-year term at Long Khanh.

Pastor Nguyen Duc Loi and Pastor Nguyen Van Vui are reported to have been arrested on November 20, 1994 when proselytizing among the ethnic Hre minority in Quang Ngai province. According to unconfirmed local sources, the two have been accused of pursuing political activities under the guise of religion, and after their arrest officials ordered local Christians to cease all religious activities, including prayer meetings.

Mr. President, in all the controversy surrounding the Clinton administration's recent questionable decision to normalize relations with Vietnam, the emotional and unresolved POW-MIA issue, and the blind headlong rush of United States business to enter the expanding Vietnamese market regardless, I believe that some Americans have lost sight of an important fact: the Vietnamese Government is a textbook Communist dictatorship to which the idea of basic human rights is sim-

ply a nuisance. No amount of talk about their modernizing their economy or welcoming American investment will change that fact. I am already seriously disinclined to support the establishment of a United States ambassador in Hanoi, or the granting of most favored nation status or OPIC funding for Vietnam because, unlike the administration, I do not believe that the Vietnamese have been as forthcoming as they could be on the POW-MIA issue; their human rights record makes me even less so.

Moving on to Cambodia, Mr. President, following closely on the unfortunate expulsion of Sam Rainsy from the Cambodian legislature the government of that country has once again taken steps which call into serious question its commitment to its nascent democracy. Over the past year and a half, the frequency of the government's mistreatment of the domestic media and its suppression of the freedoms we have embodied in our First Amendment has become alarming; journalists critical of the government have been arrested and prosecuted and newspapers have been shut down.

Just recently, the government charged the Phnom Penh Post and Michael Hayes, its American publisher, with violations of Article LXII of the Cambodian Criminal Code and is seeking to fine the publisher and close down the paper. Article LXII provides for a fine and up to 3 years imprisonment for publishing false or falsely attributed information in bad faith and with malicious intent when the publication has disturbed or is likely to disturb the public peace. In order to convict, the government must prove all three elements—falsity, malicious intent, and public disturbance. The story in question is an article by Nate Thayer in the March 24/April 6 edition entitled "Security Jitters While PM's Away." The article detailed alleged security threats and measures taken by the government while the two Prime Ministers attended the April 1995 meeting of the country's principal aid donors. In reporting about the threats, Mr. Thayer clearly notes that many of the reported assertions were "rumor" or opinions or statements attributed to unnamed third parties. The article went on to cite "human rights officials" as saying that recent government actions against the press, the U.N. Center for Human Rights, and M.P. Sam Rainsy are the beginning of an official effort to put an end to criticism of the government that leaders say undermines its image at home and abroad as a democratic country.

Despite the fact that from the particulars of the case I doubt very much that the government could actually prove a violation of Art. LXII, they have decided to proceed with the case. The purpose of that decision is clearly is two-fold. First and foremost, there is the chilling effect bringing a criminal prosecution has on other like-minded journalists; the threat of jail or a

fine—even simply the threat of criminal litigation—can make even the most serious and accurate journalist skittish. The reason for picking on a foreign-owned paper is also clear; as a U.N. worker recently noted:

The cases against the Khmer press are in a slightly different category because they have been persecuted for articles that are mostly opinion. The Phnom Penh Post and other Western-style newspapers are more troubling to the government because they deal with facts that can be proved true. They bring to light the inner workings of government and that bother [the government] far more than opinions that are sometimes insulting.

Second, the government seeks to use the law to discover the identities of Mr. Thayer's sources. To prevent the government from proving the first element of an Art. LXII offense in court—false attribution—Thayer would be forced to disclose his sources. Any forced compromise of journalistic sources severely curtails the ability of a free press to report on, and the people's right to be informed about, matters of public interest. This is especially true in instances involving such issues as government corruption, where the power of the wrongdoers makes those knowledgeable about the wrongdoing hesitant to come forward.

This is far from being the only time that the Cambodian Government has initiated an Art. LXII prosecution on flimsy grounds. Two Cambodian journalists have already been convicted under that provision for articles that, in my view, plainly reported opinions—which are by definition subjective rather than objective—rather than facts. On May 19, the editor of Oddom K'tek Khmer, Thun Bunly, was sentenced to a fine of R5,000,000 (\$2,000) or one year in jail for printing a letter to the editor entitled "Stop Barking Samdech Prime Ministers." The following day, Hen Vipheak was sentenced to a fine of R5,000,000 or two years in jail for a cartoon and satire of the three branches of government. Most recently, Thun Bunly was tried again, this time for expressing opinions highly critical of the government; he described certain government officials as greedy dictators. His paper was shut down and he was sentenced to a fine of R10,000,000 or two years in jail.

Unfortunately, this blatant intimidation shows no signs of abating. Last week the Ministry of Information announced that the government is seeking prosecution on unspecified charges of between two and five newspapers. One of them, Samlung Yu Vachuan Khmer, has already received a court summons. In addition, the government has adopted a new press law that would allow criminal prosecutions where the published material affects national security and political stability—as nebulous a standard as I have seen—and permits the Ministries of the Interior and Information to confiscate publications they find objectionable or temporarily suspend publications without the

approval or oversight of an independent court. Although the measure has yet to be signed into law by King Sihanouk and therefore is not legally in effect, it is being used to bring charges against the media.

The repeated pattern of these prosecutions, as well as the fact that all of the alleged offenders have all stepped on the government's toes, leads me and groups like Human Rights Watch/Asia to conclude that the government has embarked on a program of intimidation aimed at quelling its detractors. That perception is not helped by statements such as those by Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh last month that foreign newspapers are distorting the current situation in Cambodia and that the Western brand of democracy and freedom of the press is not applicable to Cambodia. The Prince needs to be reminded, however, that the freedoms embodied in the Paris Accords are not Western, but universal, and as such were supported by each of Cambodia's political parties. In addition, they are embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which Cambodia is a signatory.

The Cambodian Government may believe that no one is watching, or that no one outside Cambodia cares, or that their actions are somehow excused by the nascent nature of their democracy; they could not be more wrong. Mr. President, we and the other donor countries are watching and we care. It is precisely because Cambodia's democracy is in its infancy that it is important to avoid the tendency towards this type of abuse; otherwise, Cambodia risks institutionalizing the behavior. If the Cambodian Government is unwilling to protect these universally recognized rights, and to protect journalists and others who peacefully advocate dissenting political views, then we and the other donor nations will ensure that there is literally a price to be paid.

Last, but certainly not least, there were a number of developments in China which are noteworthy. First, on the brighter side, there appears to have been a slight warming in our bilateral relationship. On August 24, the Wuhan People's Court sentenced Harry Wu to a 15-year jail term and expelled him from the country, thus removing a serious obstacle to the resumption of friendly relations between us. A number of encouraging signs have followed. The Chinese have indicated that they will be sending back to Washington their ambassador, Li Daoyu, who was recalled after our decision to admit Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui for a private visit. Having previously broken off all high-level governmental contacts, the Chinese agreed to a 3-day visit by United States Undersecretary of State Tarnoff to discuss a variety of bilateral issues. In addition, on September 1, Li Xilin, the Guangzhou Military Area Commander of the People's Liberation Army, attended a ceremony in Honolulu marking the 50th anniversary

of the end of World War II as the representative of Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian. There is also talk of an October summit meeting between President Clinton and his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin. These contacts are important because they provide a venue for dialog and dialog keeps parties from misunderstanding each other.

I am very pleased that it appears that the dip in our bilateral relationship has reached its nadir and is on the upswing. That is not to say, of course, that everything has returned to normal. Reports in the Chinese media, and statements from the Foreign Ministry, indicate that that government is still adhering to the unacceptable position that the United States is solely responsible for the current problems in Sino-U.S. relations; Washington should take all the blame for the problems. Mr. President, the PRC should be mindful of the adage that when you point the finger of blame at someone, three fingers are pointing back at you. If the Chinese were to indulge in one of their favorite political pastimes—self-criticism—then perhaps they would realize that it is they that may be at fault: their overreaction to President Lee's visit, technology transfers to Pakistan and Iran, failure to enforce its obligations in regards to intellectual property and arbitral conventions—the list goes on. The Chinese need to get over the blame game and get down to constructive dialog and constructive actions.

Despite my generally optimistic feeling about the general trend in our relationship, however, there have been a number of developments there which are troubling to me. First, on August 17 China conducted its second underground nuclear test this year at its facility at Lop Nor—its fourth in the past 14 months. This test concerns me, and others, for the same reason as the proposed French tests in Mururoa; I believe that conducting these tests is damaging to international efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In May of this year, the world's five acknowledged nuclear powers persuaded the rest of the world to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. To win that consensus, the five countries promised to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] by the end of the year. The continuation of Chinese testing though, only 4 months after China signed the agreement, calls into question that country's commitment to the CTBT and consequently undermines these international efforts to curb nuclear proliferation. What possible incentive do other nuclear countries have to refrain from testing if others continue to test?

I am not alone in my disappointment at this decision. Many countries in the region, including Australia and Japan, have been very vocal in their opposition. In fact, on August 30 Japan announced it will freeze most of its grant aid—about \$81.2 million in fiscal year

1995—because of China's testing. Foreign Minister Kono Yohei told a news conference: "We have decided to freeze aid to China with the exception of a portion that is provided for emergency relief measures and humanitarian aid—until China says it will stop nuclear tests."

I would hope that Beijing would reconsider this course, not because we disapprove, or other countries disapprove, but because of the benefits that will accrue to the world as a whole as a result.

Another issue, Mr. President, is the unfortunate Chinese decision to deny a visa to Hong Kong political leader Martin Lee Chu-ming. Lee is the Chairman of the Democratic Party in Hong Kong, a principal voice of support for democracy in the colony; in that role, he has been a frequent critic of the communist government in Beijing. Lee needed the visa to attend the LawAsia conference in Beijing, to which he had been officially invited. But before he could apply, Zou Yu, the head of the local coordinating body the China Law Society, said there was no place [here] for people like him because he was one of the founding members of the subversive Hong Kong Alliance in Support of a Patriotic Democratic Movement. Ironically, Lee has a letter of invitation to the conference, which delegates had been told would be enough to have a visa issued on presentation, signed by Mr. Zou.

Before I hear it from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, I will state at the outset that I fully recognize that who the PRC does or does not admit within its borders is purely an internal matter in which third countries have no right to interfere. Certainly, Lee's statements in support of democracy are not music to the senior cadres' ears and if they choose to exclude him on that basis so be it. However, I believe that it would have been in China's best interests to admit him. Such a move would have been greatly reassuring to Hong Kong—to both its citizenry and business interests—and would have gone a long way to bolster China's stature worldwide. As it stands though the Chinese move seems petty and vindictive, and calls into question both its post-1997 commitment to the continuation of democracy in Hong Kong and its ability to impartially host international conferences.

The PRC has a disturbing habit of seeking to host these conferences in an effort to boost its international image, only to then heap a host of conditions on the attendees to ensure that nothing comes up at the conference which might embarrass China by, say, openly discussing its abysmal human rights record. The LawAsia Conference and Martin Lee are one example; another is the present U.N. women's conference in Beijing. When it became clear to the Chinese authorities that the participants in the conference's NGO forum are prone to spontaneous demonstrations and statements in support of a

variety of causes the regime finds threatening—democracy, opposition to coerced abortion, the role of women in society—the forum suddenly found itself moved a substantial distance outside Beijing to the small village of Huairou. The official reason was that the Beijing stadium originally planned to hold the forum was structurally unsound—despite the fact that only 2 weeks ago the Chinese held a major event there. The unofficial reason is clear to everyone; Chinese authorities are doing their best to make sure that the flood of delegates does not contaminate China or its citizenry with foreign ideas and open dialog.

Official statements to the contrary aside, the Chinese are fooling no one. As the Chinese themselves are fond of saying: "Actions speak louder than words." Once Beijing began to prepare for the conference, the patterns of isolating delegates and imposing censorship became clear. Delegates with views with which China disagrees were denied visas. Groups representing Tibetan and Taiwanese women were unfairly denied accreditation, lest they embarrass the host country. Thirty delegates from Niger were denied visas; ostensibly because their paperwork was not entirely in order, but more likely—as almost everyone believes—because Niger diplomatically recognizes Taiwan. Delegates who were allowed in were warned that Chinese customs officials would confiscate any printed material China deemed objectionable, including Bibles. Buses that were promised to run every 20 minutes from Huairou to Beijing have dwindled to one per day, effectively isolating the delegates at Huairou even more. The U.N. designated "newspaper of record" for the forum—chronicling the meetings and seminars and reporting on the day's events—has been unable to publish because the Chinese firm with which they contracted is suddenly and inexplicably "too busy with other printing work."

I think one of the especially telling examples of this trend is the creation of an "official protest site" for the conference. Predictably sited outside of Beijing in Huairou, the official spot is located on a middle-school athletic field within the confines of the forum, where an extra 5,000 police officers will be on duty. There, separated from the Chinese people by an artificially imposed chasm, the delegates are free to protest to their hearts content—with one exception. Vice Minister of Public Security Tian Qiyu has announced that "Inside the site, NGO's are permitted to have demonstrations and processions, but these should not infringe on the sovereignty of the host country and should not slander or attack [its] leaders." In other words, say what you want just don't criticize China. So much for an open forum.

The actions of the Chinese Government became so oppressive that they threatened to scuttle the entire forum. Complaints from a large number of del-

egates about the omnipresence of Chinese security police hovering over them grew with each passing day of the forum, and for good reason. Both uniformed and plainclothes police monitored meetings and discussions, and videotaped participants. Security officers have searched hotel rooms, followed delegates, rifled through personal papers and tried to restrict the movement of people who have come to take part in the conferences. On August 31, following a screening of a video about Tibet entitled "Voices in Exile," police snatched the video cassette and attempted to confiscate it, only to have it snatched back by the attendees. Another group of delegates protesting China's treatment of Tibetan women were surrounded by Chinese plainclothes police and shouted down; one Canadian woman, the adoptive mother of a Tibetan child, was even physically assaulted. Although the Chinese denied such an assault took place, it was captured on video and broadcast here by CNN. A session held by Australian NGO's was disrupted when security officials seized microphones and video equipment and ordered the groups to disband; the Australian Government lodged a formal protest in response. In another incident, police tried to seize a Chinese woman who chatted with delegates on the street. When the woman was surrounded by delegates, though, the police retreated. The Chinese moves are especially galling because under the agreement signed by the Chinese the forum site is considered to be under U.N., rather than Chinese, jurisdiction for the duration of the conference, much like embassies are considered to be.

Things got so bad that on September 3, the leaders of the forum issued an ultimatum to the Chinese demanding that China stop its heavy-handed security measures by noon on that day. In response, the Chinese grudgingly replaced some uniformed officers with plainclothesmen and scaled back some of the surveillance. Despite the changes, though, clashes between police and delegates continue. Just this last weekend Islamic women demonstrators were physically prevented by police from marching out of the forum site into Huairou.

Given this somewhat ironic Chinese penchant for actively seeking to host international conferences dealing with human rights and the free exchange of ideas only to trample those very rights, I would not be at all surprised if the next time the PRC seeks to host such a meeting the participants think twice; and the Chinese—although they will certainly try—will have no one to blame but themselves. As I have pointed out previously, if China wants to assume a place at the international table, then it must respect international rules and norms of behavior—in trade, in diplomacy and military affairs, in nonproliferation, and not least in domestic practice.

THE AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH: A BEACON FOR POLICYMAKERS

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, as the Congress considers its appropriations bills and strives to reduce the rate of growth of Federal programs, I would like to call attention to one very small, but important agency that policymakers and industry representatives alike have praised as responsible and cost-effective—the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research [AHCPR].

AHCPR, which is part of the Department of Health and Human Services, was established in 1989 with strong bipartisan support. Broadly stated, the agency's mission is to conduct impartial health services research and disseminate information that will complement public and private sector efforts to improve health care quality and contain costs.

AHCPR's charge is to find out what works and what does not work in the health care system, and the results of its research are being used voluntarily by the private sector to contain health care costs. The agency funds outcomes research projects that examine the efficacy of medical interventions in terms of how they affect patients. It also funds studies on the medical effectiveness of particular procedures and conducts assessments of health technologies utilized by HCFA and CHAMPUS to make coverage decisions. These projects have identified millions of dollars in potential savings to Medicare. Finally, the agency convenes multidisciplinary panels of experts to develop clinical practice guidelines on such topics as low back pain, cataracts, sickle cell anemia, mammography, unstable angina, and cancer pain. These guidelines are disseminated to consumers, private and public sector health care policymakers, providers, and administrators for use as they see fit.

AHCPR is a true public/private partnership designed to improve the quality of health services and contain their cost. And it is working. Supporters of the agency include conservatives and liberals in both political parties and span the health care spectrum, from the insurance industry to providers to academia and other highly regarded public policy institutions. AHCPR has been called an "honest broker" because of the way it compiles and distributes health care cost and quality information among competing public and private sector interests.

It is very important to the health care system that AHCPR continue producing the kind of significant research it has developed in the past 5 years. To slash AHCPR's funding now would truly be penny-wise and pound-foolish: The current funding level for the agency amounts to a little more than a dollar per American. Yet potential savings from the use of its guidelines and research could save hundreds of millions, and by some estimate billions, of dollars.