

roads and sewers, and so much more—is AID.

Second, AID is the instrument through which we get on with the task of building functional democracies around the world. What we sought to preserve throughout the cold war, we can now expand. Country after country, on continent after continent, want to establish representative governments, democratically elected and based on the rule of law and a respect for human rights and liberties. The development assistance and expertise developed by AID is the way to get them the resources they need to achieve a result we all want. While there is an element of altruism in such programs, there is also a cold calculation that it serves our national interest. Wherever we are successful in ensuring that democratic principles take root, we are less likely to face the prospect of intervention in a political crisis, with its high costs of peacekeeping and emergency relief operations.

Third, AID's overseas assistance efforts provide for both immediate and long-term economic benefits to the United States.

In the short run, nearly 80 percent of AID's grants and contracts go directly to American firms and private organizations. This creates American jobs, encourages American exports, and expands domestic prosperity. Over the longer run, our current and prospective foreign assistance efforts help to create future overseas markets for American goods and services in developing countries. A built-in, long-term preference for American exports bodes well for continued employment and prosperity here as well.

So, Mr. President, the functions that AID performs are important. And the question now is whether we can continue that work in a new organizational structure.

I do not think we can or need to for three reasons.

First, AID is already reorganizing. The Agency is reinventing itself in order to become both more efficient and effective. Under the leadership of its Administrator, Brian Atwood, AID has already cut its costs. Overseas, AID will have closed 21 missions between 1994 and 1996. In its domestic operations, AID has eliminated 90 offices in Washington. Overall, AID has cut 70 senior positions and reduced total staff by over 1,200. Moreover, AID is adopting a new development strategy. Recognizing that its limited resources make it impossible to be all things to all people, it is targeting fewer countries for more intensive assistance. While some may criticize this almost triage-like approach, it certainly reflects a willingness to adopt a leaner focus to the problems it confronts.

Second, the suggestion that the savings will come out of "administrative reforms" is simply not credible. As I have indicated, AID has already scaled back. I do not believe there will be significant additional administrative sav-

ings from this consolidation. The reality is that AID's overseas operations, like all U.S. Government agencies and departments operations in our embassies and consulates, already are fully integrated into State Department administrative services on a reimbursable basis. So, the proposed consolidation would not save any money abroad. And domestically, there is no room in the State Department to house AID's employees and functions, so we will not save on building costs here in Washington, either.

The net result, I fear, is a further reduction in our developmental programs. Some may say "well its about time." But that kind of response is usually based on a profound misunderstanding of just how much we spend on foreign aid. While many believe that such programs account for 8 to 10 percent of all Federal spending, in reality they now constitute only 1/2 of 1 percent of all spending by the U.S. Government. This level of spending already places us in the lowest ranks of the developed world in terms of per capita spending on foreign aid and assistance programs. Indeed, from 1956 to 1993, our share of official development assistance worldwide has dropped from 63 to 17 percent. Our current effort, then, is inadequate. This bill makes it even worse. And, as a result, it threatens our ability to protect the national interests I identified at the beginning of these remarks.

Finally, Mr. President, I have to note the major irony involved in this proposal. This proposal to augment and centralize the State Department is made by precisely the same people who profess to believe that "big government" should be decentralized and made more flexible.

Let me conclude, Mr. President, with this simple observation. Destroying AID is not the way to accomplish our foreign policy objectives. It would not be efficient or effective, and we should not do it.

OPPOSING CONSOLIDATION OF USIA

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I oppose consolidating the U.S. Information Agency.

We need to ask two questions about this proposal to abolish USIA and merge its functions and personnel into an expanded State Department. First, will it result in a less costly set of information, cultural and exchange, and broadcasting programs in support of American foreign policy objectives? Second, will it enhance the effectiveness of these programs as we continue to readjust and redirect our foreign policy interests?

Mr. President, the answer to both questions is "no."

Let us look initially at the purported cost-savings of merging USIA into the State Department.

There is a seductive logic to the argument that merging USIA into the

State Department would result in substantial administrative cost-savings. But the facts reveal otherwise.

Managerially, USIA's overseas operations currently are well-integrated with State's. USIA—like all departments and agencies operating from our Embassies and consulates—already reimburses the State Department for administrative support services, such as housing, computers, motor pools, and the like. Consolidation will not save any money overseas.

Would there be savings in U.S. operations by merging USIA into the State Department? I do not believe so. Aside from its foreign press centers, the Agency by law has no domestic charter, no domestic presence. And we would not be able to eliminate the need for some sort of separate office space to house USIA's personnel and functions, since the State Department has none to spare.

In fact, USIA on its own and in response to the President's and Vice president's reinventing Government initiatives has already achieved major and substantial cost-savings. In this regard, I believe that it is important to remember that the Agency constitutes only 6 percent of the total function 150 budget but accounts for 58 percent of the total savings wrung from the 150 account in the past 2 years.

USIA has accomplished these savings by consolidating and restructuring its own activities. USIA now has RIF authority and is in fact closing overseas posts and bringing officers home, as well as cutting overseas and domestic positions and staff.

By bringing together all of the U.S. Government's international broadcasting activities, USIA will save more than \$400 million by fiscal year 1997 and eliminate 1,250 staff positions. By creating a new Information Bureau, USIA has reduced its policy and program staff by 30 percent for an annual savings of \$10 million. And by streamlining and downsizing its educational, cultural, and management functions, USIA has wrought savings of almost \$15 million and eliminated 186 positions this year alone.

The fact is, Mr. President, significant, real cuts are being made by USIA right now without consolidation. We cannot extract more savings by merging USIA into the State Department without sacrificing the very programs that support our foreign policy worldwide in the new information age.

Will consolidation enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. Government's information, broadcasting, and cultural and exchange programs? I do not think so for at least two reasons.

First, the budget cuts raised by this bill for USIA—\$118.6 million in fiscal year 1996 and an additional \$81 million in fiscal year 1997—are general reductions. In fact, they have nothing to do with consolidation and cannot be achieved by merging USIA into the State Department. To meet these spending levels, the Agency will have

to make deep cuts in its overseas presence and its core programs.

Second, USIA was carved out of the State Department in 1953 to fulfill a function—that of public diplomacy—that the State Department is inherently unable to perform. USIA was expanded in 1978—when State's Bureau of Cultural Affairs was abolished and its functions given to the Agency—when the State Department could not give high priority to programs that promote unofficial contacts between U.S. public opinion leaders and their foreign counterparts overseas.

In other words, Mr. President, merging USIA back into the State Department flies in the face of our historical experience. It is being proposed at precisely the time when the benefits of our cold war labors—democracy-building world wide—are just beginning to be realized in such far-flung places as Haiti, Angola, and Cambodia and require active, effective public diplomacy from USIA.

Finally, I note that—at a time when businesses across America are creating more flexible, less centralized organizational structures, and we are seeking to emulate this move in the Federal Government—it is hard to understand why any of my distinguished colleagues on the other side of the aisle would advocate creating a mega-bureaucracy in the State Department.

I urge my colleagues to oppose consolidating USIA.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I would now like to ask for the yeas and nays on amendment 2042, the amendment that is pending before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is not a sufficient second.

Ms. SNOWE. I yield the floor.

Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I intend at the appropriate time to offer amendment No. 1964 on behalf of Senators HATFIELD, GLENN, SIMON, and BIDEN, and myself that would amend S. 908 in order to retain the independence of ACDA from the Department of State.

The State Department authorization bill, S. 908, would, as reported, make meaningless serious and comprehensive efforts in recent years to strengthen and revitalize ACDA. Moreover, it would have this unfortunate effect without any significant savings with respect to ACDA. As a result, its true price would be high.

As an aside, commenting on the words of the Senator from Maine, I appreciated her kind words about the Foreign Service, being the only Foreign Service officer in the Senate. I think all of us recognize what the Foreign Service does, and I appreciate the comments of Senator SNOWE.

S. 908 as reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, would abolish ACDA and place the retained functions and personnel in a single bureau of the Department of State. That bu-

reau would be one of five under the control of an undersecretary also responsible for international narcotics, law enforcement, political-military affairs, humanitarian assistance, refugees, and migration affairs. We believe that what can only be described as a jumbled reorganization would be in error that could prove very costly to our Nation, and to our arms control efforts, for several reasons. First, this major downgrading of the arms control apparatus at a time in which major threats to our security are becoming both more diverse and more challenging is a dangerously shortsighted action. Second, it would muffle, if not silence, the arms control voice at several major levels. Third, it would deny the Secretary of State and the President the benefit of an independent perspective and judgment on arms control and nonproliferation issues. For these and other reasons, it would be inevitable that our ability to identify and implement effective arms control and nonproliferation activities would be diminished to the detriment of our national security interests.

The amendment would require a serious and comprehensive effort to eliminate duplication and overlap within and between the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, while preserving the agency's independence and authorizing the appropriation of necessary operating funds.

In the course of committee markup of the legislation, I offered an alternative proposal—that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency be retained and strengthened. At that time, my proposal was supported only by my Democratic colleagues. The amendment I intend to offer is more modest in that it does not shift important nonproliferation responsibilities to ACDA. Rather, it preserves the present relationship, leaving the issue of the further strengthening of ACDA to be resolved later. It also authorizes appropriations of \$45 million in fiscal year 1996 and in fiscal year 1997, which allows for spending at current levels.

I hope that a number of Senators of both parties—not just one, but both parties—who understand arms control and nonproliferation issues and appreciate the value of ACDA as a specialized agency at the center of these issues will join in supporting the amendment.

Arms control activities were handled within the Department of State until 1961, when it was decided that a separate agency would be a better approach. As the final decisions were being considered, I remember going to the White House with the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. Humphrey, and the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Clark, to make the case that arms control was a matter of such central importance to the United States that it should be the responsibility of an agency created by and operating under statute.

As I think we all can recall, when Senator Kennedy was running for President, he talked about it being a separate statutory agency. But when the time came and he was President, then the question came up whether he had the votes for it to be made a statutory agency or whether it should be set up by Executive order.

The decision made, on the recommendation of Arthur Schlesinger, at that time to the President was that he stick to his guns and that we have it as a separate statutory agency. This was a decision that President Kennedy made at that time. I believe that decision really came out of the conversations Senators Clark, Humphrey, and I had with him then.

McGeorge Bundy, who served both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as National Security Adviser, recalled the decisions on ACDA earlier this year in testimony on this bill. He spoke of "the requirements for first-class executive branch performance in the field of arms control. These requirements are well met in the present executive arrangements; they could be met only by most improbable good luck if the proposal before you (S. 908) should be adopted."

Mr. President, no American has left a greater mark on arms control in the modern era than Ambassador Paul H. Nitze. In a long and illustrious career, he has served Democratic and Republican administrations alike. He understands fully the value of ACDA within any executive branch. He wrote me on July 6 to say: "This reorganization I believe to be ill-advised; folding the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department seems to me to be unnecessary and unwise."

I think when a man of wisdom and experience and the depth of knowledge of arms control, as in the case of Paul Nitze, takes a view like this, we all should take his view seriously.

Ambassador Nitze continues,

In my experience as an arms control negotiator, I always found ACDA's input into the negotiating process to be expert, insightful, and uniquely helpful. That input could well be lost if the Agency does not remain independent. As recent events in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea show, nonproliferation and arms control are more important than ever. Eliminating ACDA from the diplomatic effort to protect our security would be like eliminating the Marine Corps from the military effort. While it will never replace its larger brethren on the foreign policy team, ACDA plays an essential role as a lean and flexible vanguard, always ready to aggressively counter the threat weapons of mass destruction pose to our national security.

Paul Nitze concluded,

The game has changed, but the stakes are at least as great; our national survival still hangs in the balance. We should be strengthening our nonproliferation team, not abolishing it. ACDA is a key part of the best team possible to face the real and growing threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism. In this new era of opaque and unpredictable threats to our security, the vigilance that saw us through the Cold War should not be relaxed.

(Ms. SNOWE assumed the chair.)

Mr. PELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Ambassador Nitze's letter be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. PELL. Madam President, the need for first-class arms control performance has not always been recognized. Accordingly, in the past 34 years, the agency has had its ups and downs, but it has been central to some successes, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT I Interim Agreement, Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, Senate agreement to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty, Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention now pending before the Senate. While ACDA was not in charge of START I or START II, it did the bulk of the backstopping work.

It is worthy of note that ACDA has fought alone in some key matters. The State Department opposed negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to please NATO allies. ACDA persevered and won. When the State Department wanted to eviscerate the ABM Treaty in the early 1980's, ACDA fought for the traditional interpretation. Recently ACDA and the Energy Department have been supportive of the current nuclear testing moratorium and of a comprehensive test ban. The State and Defense Departments have been the foot draggers. Recent press reports allege that the administration sided with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff against ACDA and the Energy Secretary in its decision not to agree with the Russians to negotiate further strategic arms cuts beyond START II.

In 1991, the Bush administration did not seem to hold ACDA in particular regard, and there was a general sense on the Hill that ACDA was both insignificant and ineffectual. Senator SIMON proposed, and the committee and Senate agreed to, an amendment requiring that the State/ACDA inspector general, Sherman Funk, investigate ACDA and report back with recommendations in December 1992. Mr. Funk ordered a very thorough study and analysis by an outside panel headed by Ambassador James Goodby. That panel explored all the options, including merger into State and concluded that ACDA should be kept independent and strengthened.

The importance of the independence of ACDA can not be overemphasized. This was the same logic that President Kennedy used when he said it should be a statutory agency and it should be separate, and why he made the decision to have it set up by statute.

Subsequently, I introduced legislation to strengthen and revitalize ACDA. At the same time, the new administration was considering a plan to

merge ACDA into State. That subsequently rejected plan is the progenitor of the current majority plan to merge ACDA into State.

After their review, the President, on the recommendation of Secretary Christopher, decided to retain ACDA and support the bill I had introduced as soon as some compromises were reached. That was done and the bill, with bipartisan support in both Houses was enacted last spring. These are the highlights of the revitalization legislation, which is now law.

The bill enhanced the role of the ACDA in the areas of arms control and nonproliferation policy and negotiations in several ways: First, ACDA was given primary responsibility for all arms control negotiations and implementation fora, including negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban; second, positions for Presidential Special Representatives for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament were created and placed under the ACDA Director; and third, ACDA's role in nonproliferation was underscored by giving the Agency primary responsibility for managing U.S. participation in the 1995 review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and primary responsibility for other nonproliferation activities when so directed by the President.

The bill improved ACDA's role regarding arms transfers and nonproliferation. ACDA was given mandatory prior consultation and review rights with respect to export licenses and other matters under both the Arms Export Control Act and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.

The bill strengthened the functioning of the Agency by eliminating a number of outdated or redundant reporting requirements and by disbanding the General Advisory Committee, thereby permitting the Agency to reassign personnel to other substantive areas.

The results of the strengthening and revitalization are beginning to be seen. Officials of ACDA are effectively involved in bringing an arms control perspective to executive branch decision-making at various levels. The Agency was in charge of the critically important and successful effort this spring to secure the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Agency is currently running the efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban in negotiations in Geneva. The Agency recently submitted a remarkably detailed and informative annual report to Congress that included a section dealing with the adherence of the United States to its arms control commitments and the compliance of other nations with their obligations under arms control agreements. Any Senator reading this compliance report, in either classified or unclassified form, would have to agree that ACDA is on top of various arms control problems and that it is willing to be open and forthright with the Congress regarding

these matters and what can be done to deal with them.

I am convinced that ACDA is on the right track now. Having decided to strengthen ACDA, it makes no sense now to abolish the agency and give its unique and specialized responsibilities to the Department of State. Within very real budgetary constraints, we need to stay the course and continue to strengthen ACDA. Our amendment would do just that.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy also told the committee:

Arms control—especially the limitation of nuclear danger—is not easy. It requires agreement among sovereign states who often fear and mistrust each other. It can require limits on weapons that a military service may initially prefer not to limit. It requires technical understanding, political sagacity, and coordination from the White House. What I would emphasize in particular, from my own service with two Presidents who were deeply and directly engaged in the effort to limit nuclear danger, is that there must be a close and continuous relation between the President and his staff and the main center of arms control analysis and effort. The government's senior people on arms control should have easy access, as a matter of right and expectation, to the White House.

The value of independent access to the President as cited by Mr. Bundy cannot be overestimated. Many arms control and nonproliferation matters should be considered at the inter-agency level and decided by the President. To put arms control at a lower level within the Department of State would mean that the arms control voice would be muffled and key questions could be dealt with inside the Department. Under the present and preferred arrangement, the Director is the principal adviser on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation matter to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State. Thus, the Agency can be actively engaged and effective at whatever level is appropriate.

Much is made of the notion that abolishing agencies such as ACDA will save large funds. The ACDA budget is currently about \$55 million. ACDA's core spending would remain at about \$45 million under my amendment. The Vice President has set about the task of making all feasible reductions throughout Government, and indications are now that significant cuts can be made. With regard to ACDA and the State Department overlap, it is clearly largely within the Department, and there can be reasonable savings in areas in which the Department duplicates ACDA pointlessly. Beyond that, it is hard to imagine cuts that would not simply mean the termination of important programs.

I conclude that there could be some relatively insignificant savings realized from the merger of ACDA into State, but the results would not be an improvement. It would amount to dollars saved very foolishly—at an unfortunately high price. Too much is at stake. We should not take steps that

could lead to risks to our national security. In a challenging and threatening international environment, reasonable amounts spent on ACDA can only be seen as a sound investment.

EXHIBIT 1

THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL
OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
Washington, DC, July 6, 1995.

Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.

DEAR CLAIBORNE: As a long term observer of U.S. foreign and security policy, I write to you in opposition to the foreign affairs reorganization bill soon to be considered by the Senate. This reorganization I believe to be ill-advised; folding the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department seems to me to be unnecessary and unwise.

In my experience as an arms control negotiator, I always found ACDA's input into the negotiating process to be expert, insightful, and uniquely helpful. That input could well be lost if the Agency does not remain independent. As recent events in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea show, nonproliferation and arms control are more important than ever. Eliminating ACDA from the diplomatic effort to protect our security would be like eliminating the Marine Corps from the military effort. While it will never replace its larger brethren on the foreign policy team, ACDA plays an essential role as a lean and flexible vanguard, always ready to aggressively counter the threat weapons of mass destruction pose to our national security.

The global security environment has changed radically in recent years. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the increasing flow of materials and know-how from the former arsenals of communism are now the chief threats to our nation. ACDA has been the champion of nonproliferation within the U.S. Government for more than thirty years. Without the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the number of aspiring nuclear powers confronting us today would be an order of magnitude greater. The NPT would never have been achieved without an independent ACDA balancing the bilateral interests promoted by the State Department. Just two months ago, ACDA led the inter-agency effort which made the NPT unconditionally permanent. Organizing consensus for indefinite extension among the nearly 180 parties to the NPT was a great diplomatic victory for the United States. An independent ACDA proved it could succeed in a post-cold war leadership role that would have been impossible for it to play as part of the State Department.

The Soviet Union has collapsed under the weight of its own bankrupt ideology and the global threat of communist aggression has shattered. But the technology (and even the very weapons and materials) used by the communists to threaten our way of life continue to endanger our nation, only now the danger comes from many sources instead of one. The game has changed, but the stakes are at least as great; our national survival still hangs in the balance.

We should be strengthening our non-proliferation team, not abolishing it. ACDA is a key part of the best team possible to face the real and growing threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism. In this new era of opaque and unpredictable threats to our security, the vigilance that saw us through the Cold War should not be relaxed.

Sincerely,

PAUL H. NITZE.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Madam President, I strongly support Senator HELMS ini-

tiative to reorganize our foreign affairs agencies—the time has come to restructure the Department of State, USIA, and ACDA to better serve American interests abroad in the new post-cold-war world.

The combination of diminishing resources and increased international trade and economic competition require us to revise our priorities and approach and restructure our institutions.

During my tenure on the Foreign Relations Committee and now on the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, I reached the same conclusion that many of my colleagues did—foreign aid is almost as unpopular as it is misunderstood.

Time and time again I have addressed audiences that really believe that foreign aid represents at least 50 percent of our budget—if we just scaled it back to 5 percent we could balance the budget.

Well, as most of us know, foreign aid hovers around 1 percent of the Federal budget, and is shrinking by the day.

So why do so many people have the wrong impression?

I think the problem stems from the fact that no one really knows what we do abroad or why? Sure they understand emergency food and medical support to a country that is experiencing an earthquake or similar natural disaster.

But what does sustainable development mean and why is it important?

Why are we the largest contributor to global family planning programs?

Do we really need to fund the International Office of the Vine and Wine?

I share the view of many Americans that think our aid does not support clear cut U.S. interests. And, central to this problem is the disconnect between the agencies administering foreign aid and foreign affairs.

I commend Senator HELMS for his ambitious effort to reorganize our bureaucracy to better serve our interests. His proposal to integrate our aid and interests in one agency closely tracks legislation I introduced earlier this year. I also support his emphasis on our trade and economic interests—assuring each regional bureau actually has a deputy responsible for trade and development will enhance our global standing and performance.

The reforms outlined in S. 908 are essential to rebuilding American confidence in our foreign aid programs. The bill reduces waste and expensive duplication of agency efforts. And, in scaling back and focusing our resources and effort, we will strengthen the coherence and effectiveness of our programs and policies.

Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. KERRY. Madam President, prior to the Senator proceeding, I ask unani-

mous consent to have printed a letter to the President of the United States from a series of groups with respect to this legislation.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PLANNED PARENTHOOD,

July 26, 1995.

President WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,
The White House, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We urge you to oppose all efforts to prevent the United States from sending an official delegation to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, to be held in Beijing, China in September. The UN Conference on Women is predicted to be the largest UN conference ever held; 184 government delegations and over 6,000 NGO representatives are expected to attend the UN meeting. The Conference will adopt a Platform of Action which outlines critical actions governments must take to advance women's rights and access to resources in many areas including health, education, economics, human rights and the environment. Our organizations—representing millions of Americans—are deeply concerned about attempts to stifle US participation in this important global conference.

In response to recent reports of increases in the number of human rights abuses in China, there are efforts currently underway in the Senate and House of Representatives to block participation of a U.S. delegation to the UN Conference on Women. We strongly believe that human rights abuses in China and in all nations must be confronted directly. Our organizations abhor infringements upon the basic human rights of all people. At the same time, we find the abuse, suffering and inequities faced by millions of women worldwide equally distressing. The purpose of the Fourth World Conference on Women is to assess progress made in improving women's status and seek real solutions to bringing women out of the cycle of poverty, inequality and discrimination that continues to entangle so many women and their families.

American women should not be denied the voice of their government at this high level international meeting. There are appropriate vehicles for dealing with this matter including multilateral and bilateral policy discussions with the Chinese—not in the context of a world conference about women's issues. The matters of women's health, human rights, education, employment and political status are much too important for the U.S.—or any nation—to ignore by sitting on the sidelines of this prominent forum. The U.S. would be doing an injustice not only to American women but to all the world's women, if its voice is silent in Beijing.

The decision to hold a women's conference in Beijing was made years ago by many nations and agreed to by former U.S. President George Bush and then Secretary of State James Baker. While many would prefer that this conference be held elsewhere, especially now that the Nongovernmental (NGO) Forum has been forced to a less than adequate site some distance outside of Beijing, we believe that U.S. attendance is critical. In fact, it would be a victory for China, which does not want to be criticized, for the U.S. to be absent from this international event. What better forum to highlight women's abuses in China and all other nations, than this global conference of government delegates, NGOs and media? The U.S. has been a leading advocate on human rights and democracy. Further, it has been one of the strongest voices at the UN for NGO access and accreditation. Restricting U.S. participation in the Conference would undermine

our ability to use this conference as an opportunity to pressure China on democracy and human rights issues.

We, the undersigned, represent a wide array of citizen-based groups working to improve the lives of all people. We focus on issues concerning human rights, economic and social development, health, environment and women's rights.

We urge you to oppose all efforts to prevent or restrict in any way the United States' full participation in this conference.

Sincerely,

American Friends Service Committee, American Association of University Women, The African-American Institute, Bay Area Friends of Tibet (San Francisco), Center for Women's Global Leadership, Rutgers University, Douglass College, Centre for Education, Development, Population, and Population Activities, Chesrown Metzger International Group, Childhope, Church Women United, Coalition for Women in Development.

Delegation of Original Women of Philadelphia (DOWOP), The Development Gap, Family Care International, Feminist Majority Foundation, Friends of the Earth, Heifer Project International, The Hunger Project, InterAction, Institute for Policy Studies, International Center for Research on Women (ICRW).

International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet (San Francisco), Laubach Literacy International, MAP International, Ms. Foundation for Women, National Audubon Society, The National Black Women's Health Project, Oxfam America, People for the American Way, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Population Action International.

Population Communication, Save the Children, Tibetan Association of Boston, Tibetan Association of Northern California, Tibetan Rights Campaign (Seattle), Tibetan Women's Association/East Coast (New York), United Church of Christ, Board for World Ministries, United Church of Christ, Coordinating Center for Women, U.S.-Tibet Committee (New York), Utah Tibet Support Group (Salt Lake City), World Women in Development and Environment.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that such time be provided for me to speak in regard to this matter, Senate bill 908.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Madam President, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995 represents an important step in establishing a coordinated and coherent foreign policy and a refocusing of our national priorities in this time of limited resources.

We need our foreign relations to be conducted at the highest level of integration and coordination, and the highest level of representation of the interests of this country and of the American people. And a top priority must be to ensure that our influence is used to benefit our interests and to ensure respect for American leadership.

Senate bill 908, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995, is a bill which will do that.

I want to commend the Presiding Officer, and the chairman of the committee, Senator HELMS, for his guidance and direction in crafting this important legislation that eliminates program duplication and establishes a sense of clarity in the conduct of for-

ign relations. This bill also streamlines the delivery of services by eliminating three agencies and consolidating their remaining functions within the Department of State. I believe this will strengthen the role of the Secretary of State and will enhance his ability to organize a foreign policy structure that will best serve our Nation.

We will not be well served by a foreign policy that continues to flow from the mouths of many. This is a very important issue, and one that the full Foreign Relations Committee addressed on several occasions with witnesses appearing from the Agency for International Development [AID], U.S. Information Agency [USIA], and Arms Control Disarmament Agency [ACDA]. I found it interesting that some witnesses indicated that it was important that separate sub-interests of the United States be represented vocally and that there be a competition of sorts—a "good-cop, bad-cop" approach to foreign policy, whereby the folks who handed out the foreign aid for the United States would maintain good relations with a particular client nation, while the Department of State would essentially hold the line in protecting United States interests.

I find that to be somewhat troublesome. I think we need to speak with a single voice. I do not think someone should be handing out foreign aid to a country at a time when that very country is clearly acting against our interests.

If we continue with a foreign aid proposal, it should be with an understanding that the person asking for coordination and cooperation in one arena is the same person that will be delivering foreign aid and the kind of assistance that this country gives to other nations that are developing.

The network of competing fiefdoms can only undercut the authority of the Secretary of State in conducting foreign policy. This bill will change that. It would be difficult to believe that those individuals who have tried to represent our interests with a singular, clear voice, would not favor this reorganization. Thus, it is no accident that virtually every previous Secretary of State who has had experience in this arena supports this bill.

I believe that it is no accident that all the former Secretaries of State that came to speak with us supported this concept, and supported it very clearly, as did the current Secretary before his voice was muffled by the Vice President and others who suggested that perhaps he should not have that opinion.

Sadly, rather than grab the opportunity to play a constructive role in helping to shape this proposal, the administration sought instead to adopt a fighting posture, a fixed-bayonet, take-no-prisoner strategy.

I was particularly troubled by the secret minutes of an internal AID staff meeting that were provided to mem-

bers of our committee. In that internal staff meeting, the staff was advised that "Our strategy is delay, postpone, obfuscate, derail. If we derail [the bill], we can kill the merger."

This has nothing to do with the merits of this particular proposal. It has to do with the preservation of the bureaucracy. The American people deserve better from public servants than to sit around the conference rooms of these agencies figuring out how to derail, obfuscate and delay the will of the American people.

The American people not only deserve a sound foreign policy, they deserve to have individuals operating in our agencies so as to comply with the will of the Congress and the people, as expressed through the Congress.

An entrenched group of Government bureaucrats has been diligent in their efforts to hold the line at any cost, by stonewalling and delaying the process. This represents precisely the attitude of Government that this last election was designed to change.

People have signaled very clearly a distaste for this. They not only want our Government to reflect their wishes, they want the Government, when it reflects the America interests abroad, to do so coherently, concisely, and clearly.

They think if we have a single voice in foreign policy representing the administration, be it Republican or Democrat, that single voice is most likely to get the job done, rather than if we have competing agencies, an agency handing out foreign aid resources, another agency asking for cooperation in some other area of the international arena.

There is another point that ought to be made here, and that is while there has been wild speculation that this consolidation plan and the corresponding reductions in some foreign assistance accounts is undertaken, somehow our national prestige will be threatened. I think it is important to understand that national prestige is reinforced and enhanced when we operate with a clear, coherent, concise, understandable foreign policy. Speaking out of both sides of our mouths may be a habit that is understood politically in the United States. It is really not appreciated by the American people. It is certainly not appreciated in the international community, when various organizations from this country misrepresent our stated policy.

On the related topic of our national prestige, it is my sense that our stock will rise on the exchange of the world's international community, when we let them know that we intend to seriously address our responsibilities.

This reorganization plan correctly recognizes the fact that there is a direct correlation between our international prestige and our ability to express ourselves with clarity. Second, it recognizes a direct correlation between our international prestige and the fiscal health of this country.

If we do not have the ability to put our financial house in order, we will not be respected by countries around the world. If we continue to race down the road to bankruptcy, our influence will not be substantial.

This is the first authorization measure to come before the U.S. Senate that makes good on the promise we extended to the American people when we passed the budget resolution; that is, to have a balanced budget, to put our financial house in order. I submit to you that living within those rules and setting our priorities, financially as well as refining and clarifying our message in the international community—all of these things have no promise whatever other than to raise the prestige of the United States and to set an example in the world community that we should be responsible.

Unfortunately, there are those in this country who think that there cannot be any cuts at all in the foreign relations area. And the lobbyists came around with their buttons saying "Just 1 percent." They said that since our foreign aid budget represents only 1 percent of the total Federal budget, it cannot be touched. I just want to point out that the "Just 1 percent" is actually \$14.3 billion. And I believe it can be touched.

Should it be abolished? I am not in favor of abolishing foreign assistance. But I am in favor of sending a signal around the globe that when American citizens are tightening their belts, and exercising fiscal responsibility, there will be some ripple effects in terms of our aid. Not that we are going to shut anything down, not that we are going to change our policy dramatically, but we need to send a clear signal that the shared sacrifice here at home should be matched by a certain degree of sacrifice around the world. If we did not have the courage to ask them to participate in that respect, they would lose some of their admiration for the way we do business and they would lose some of their respect for us, and we would lose some of our ability to influence events around the world.

This administration seems to be following the same path as the foreign aid lobbyists leveling charges that this commonsense reform bill represents a dangerous shift toward isolationism. It is not a shift toward isolationism but rather a shift toward the development of respectable foreign policy. We have dealt with foreign situations but we have not had foreign policy. Policy is something that is coherent, that sticks together, that you can forecast, that you can predict. It has a philosophy about it. We have too many lawyers in the process and too few philosophers. We solved this problem, and we solved that problem, and we solved this other problem. But we never do it in accordance with a philosophy. And the philosophy should be a philosophy which keeps us from having additional problems.

I remember when the leaders of the so-called foreign policy establishment of this administration came to talk to the committee about the North Korean situation and the problems which we had negotiating with the North Koreans over nuclear issues. I asked the leadership of this administration's foreign policy what it was about the way we solved that problem that would suggest to the rest of the world that we should not do the same things that the North Koreans had done. They said, "Well, nothing. We think this is a unique situation, and it will not never happen anyplace else." So we could afford to make this a very sweet deal for the people who went against the U.S. interest because it could never happen again.

I submit to you that is not foreign policy. It may have temporarily solved that problem. But that is not policy. That is just pragmatism at the moment, and does not look down the road.

We need a foreign policy, and we need a Secretary of State with the capacity to articulate that foreign policy with clarity, with singularity, and coherently around the world.

The administration has pursued a "Chicken Little" approach to denouncing the reorganization plan by issuing a series of gloom and doom forecasts about how passage of this bill will result in damaged American prestige abroad and the possible emergence of more Rwanda-type situations.

Well, it is just not so. The sky will not fall if the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is abolished. At the present time, the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the CIA all have departments that are dedicated to pursuing arms-control-related functions. We have the ability to handle these issues in a coherent, rational, integrated, coordinated way if we make the changes that are in this important legislation which is before us.

It is time that we prioritize. Some said we cannot afford to reduce our foreign aid at all in 1993. AID helped fund a visit to the United States by a group of Romanian architects so they could study U.S. architecture. Was this a priority for a country whose economic infrastructure was devastated by 40 years of Communist rule? I doubt it.

Last week, the Washington Times reported that AID recently spent \$175,000 to produce 3,000 of these gender analysis tool kits.

I think the American people might wonder if the purchase of gender analysis tool kits is the right kind of priority setting.

AID even floated a plan to help supply Moscow with street lamps. I know that crime has gotten to be a problem in Moscow. But it is a tough sell to say to the people of the United States of America, some of whom live in inner-city neighborhoods in the United States that make Moscow after dark look like a trip to Disney World, that we should spend millions of dollars put-

ting street lights in Moscow, particularly at a time when Moscow was spending billions of dollars grinding up the people of Chechnya. I wonder.

Again, it is a question of establishing priorities.

In closing, and with great enthusiasm, I want to draw attention to the key features of this reform legislation. It says we do not have unlimited resources, we need to set priorities, and we need policy, and policy should not be articulated by contradictory messages issued by a variety of organizations. It says we must maximize our influence, and in order to maximize our influence, let us not speak with many voices in contradictory messages; let us speak with one voice so those who deliver the benefit can also be those who ask for the cooperation.

It says that we in the United States of America will not sacrifice without expecting others to sacrifice along with us, because ultimately when we have the kind of fiscal integrity that we ought to have, the entire world will benefit. When our house is in order, we will be the leader that provides the kind of message and the kind of opportunity around the world which will lift the performance of many nations with us.

We cannot spend as we have in the past in ways that are counterproductive. As the world desperately needs a leader—and there is only one—the United States must revamp its capacity to deliver that leadership with clarity and coherence, and the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act does that.

I urge my colleagues to vote for this measure, because it is a major step forward in our world leadership responsibilities.

Thank you, Madam President.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. Madam President, before the distinguished Senator from Missouri leaves for the policy luncheon, I want to say that he has made an extraordinarily brilliant speech. He has said it all, and he said it well. If I may reminisce just one moment, one of the first people I met in another State after I came to the Senate was a young man in Missouri named JOHN ASHCROFT. I went to Missouri to work with him on a little matter. I have admired him ever since. He has had a distinguished career, and he has already begun a distinguished career in the U.S. Senate. I thank the Senator.

I yield the floor.

RECESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now stand in recess until 2:15 p.m.

Thereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the Senate recessed until 2:14 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. COATS).